A POLITICAL HISTORY OF BAROTSELAND
1878 - 1965

by

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Abstract

This thesis attempts to demonstrate the consequences for a relatively powerful African kingdom whose ruler attempted to accommodate rather than to resist European power in the hopes of harnessing it to his own ends. In 1890, King Lewanika, deceived into believing the British South Africa Company was a branch of the British government, signed the Lochner Concession against the wishes of an important faction of the Lozi ruling class.

The entire ruling class was united in opposing the encroachments on Lozi sovereignty which were initiated by the Company's administrators and maintained by the successor Crown government of Northern Rhodesia. Nevertheless, throughout the reigns of the four Lozi kings between 1885 and about 1959, tension existed within the ruling class, since the interests of its inner elite suffered relatively less under colonial overrule than did those of its outer circle. Partly because opposition was seen to be largely futile, in part because those belonging to the inner core were allowed to retain the facade, if not the substance, of power, they rarely attempted actively to resist government interference in Lozi affairs.

Only when Paramount Chief Mwanawina refused to come to terms with African nationalism did the traditional ruling class substantially unite to defend the petty privileges which it continued to hold in the stagnant rump of a labour reserve which the kingdom of Barotseland had become. But the very existence of such a tribal elite was a contradiction of nationalist principles, and its intransigence in dealing with the new black government of Northern Rhodesia/Zambia assured that the final destruction of the Lozi ruling class, begun by the Company, came swiftly and decisively under African rule.

Preface

This thesis has not attempted to go beyond the confines suggested in its title. Its primary concern is to reveal where real power lay in Barotseland between 1878 and 1965, and its focus is therefore upon kings and chiefs, governors and district officers, politicians and councillors. In a sense, therefore, it is history of the old-fashioned variety, restricted to reconstructing and analyzing political power struggles among elites, and largely eschewing many interesting and significant issues and problems in Lozi history which must one day be treated but which remain irrelevant or tangential to the central theme. There has, in consequence, been little attempt to deal with such questions as the relationship between the Lozi and their alleged subject tribes, or to describe Lozi life and society, or to examine the role of Lozi communities outside Barotseland, except insofar as they have impinged upon the main struggle for power within the Lozi ruling class and between it and its several external "enemies".

For the same reason, little attention has been devoted, except by implication, to the problem which increasingly seems to be jeopardizing the stability of independent Zambia: the tribal conflict within the ruling UNIP party between Lozi and Bemba.

As this is written - September 1967 - the Bemba members of the party appear to have inflicted a decisive defeat on their erstwhile Lozi colleagues. If, as a result, some of the latter decide to align themselves with Paramount Chief Mwanawina and his traditionalist clique in Barotseland in a renewed demand for secession, the consequences for the future of Zambia may well prove to be far-reaching. As the last chapter of this thesis suggests, such a situation is by no means inconceivable, and may become a serious challenge to the central government sooner than many observers expect.

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Abbreviations

African National Congress	ANC
Barotse Anti-Secession Movement	BASMO
Barotse Native Government	BNG
Barotse National School	BNS
Barotse Province Files, Mongu Boma	Boma Files
Colonial Office	CO
National Archives of Rhodesia	NAR
National Archives of Zambia	NAZ
News from Basutoland and Barotsiland	News from B. and B.
Northern Rhodesia Native Affairs Annual Report	NRNAAR
North-Western Rhodesia	NWR
Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (now Institute for Social Research)	RLI
Societe des Missions Evangeliques (Paris Missionary Society)	PMS
———————————, Paris Archives	PMSP
———————————, Sefula Archives	PMSS
United National Independence Party	UNIP
Witswatersrand Native Labour Recruiting Association	WNLA

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Barotseland is that province of the Zambian republic centred on and extending outwards from the flood plain of the upper Zambesi River. Its name derives from the dominant people of the area, the Lozi (Rozi), who probably originated in the Congo basin. The most persuasive, but not definitive, evidence suggests that they split off from the Lunda-Luba empire, reaching the plain during the latter half of the seventeenth century.[1]

There they were labelled the Luyi (foreigners) by the existing inhabitants whom they conquered, a name they retained until they were conquered from the south in the nineteenth century. According to Gluckman, some twenty-five smaller tribes comprise, with the Lozi themselves, what he calls the "Barotse nation" as against the ruling Lozi. It is, however, by no means easy to distinguish between Lozi and members of the smaller groupings, who in some senses maintain their original identities yet are to a great extent assimilated. As Gluckman notes, "These tribes have intermarried considerably, and nowhere has this been more marked than among the Lozi themselves .... Today the Lozi themselves say that there is practically no Lozi who is a pure Luyi. Almost all of them point

without shame to Nkoya, Kwangwa, Subiya, Totela, Mbunda, Kololo and other blood in their ancestry."[2] One of my informants, with a Subiya father and a Lozi-Toka mother, speaks Subiya as well as Silozi and told me he was a Subiya, yet adding: "but this is part of being a Lozi. No one is a real Lozi; this is just a name for all the people of Barotseland."[3] Yet this too is an over-simplification, for one of the themes of Barotseland history has been the demand by members of the smaller tribes for increased representation in the councils of the nation. Some people, clearly were excluded from positions of power, perhaps those who had never intermarried with "pure Lozi". This study, therefore, will use the name Lozi when referring to the people who, in the last analysis, remained dominant; Barotseland will be taken as the area over which the Lozi ruled, which included many peoples partly distinguishable from them.

Virtually nothing is known of Lozi history until the end of the eighteenth century. The traditions of the Lozi ruling class, as reproduced by an Italian missionary, consist almost entirely of myths, legends, miraculous events and fanciful stories.[4] The function of most of these stories is obscure, but the purpose of one of them at least is apparent. Members of the royal family expounded

an autochthonous interpretation for the origin of the Lozi: if Nyambe (God) and his wife-daughter begat the first Lozi king from whom all successive Kings are descended, the legitimacy of the royal family's right to reign is not open to challenge.

It is only with the reign of King Mulambwa (1780? - 1830?[5]) that some flesh is added to the bare bones of Lozi history. Variously considered to have been the ninth, tenth, or fourteenth Lozi ruler,[6] Mulambwa is universally considered by Lozi to have been their greatest king, and indeed the founder of modern Barotseland. We may presume that during his very long reign, the Lozi political, economic and judicial systems had reached that degree of sophistication which later impressed so many European observers.

Mulambwa's Barotseland - like a number of other nations on both sides of the Zambesi - Ndebele, Ngoni, Bemba and Lunda - obviously falls into the traditional anthropological category of a so-called "primitive" state, that is, a society with an organized government as opposed to stateless societies such as the neighboring Ila and Plateau Tonga.[7] Like that of the Ndebele, the Lozi state was essentially a unitary one, in which struggles for power were largely concentrated at the capital. Moreover, for the Lozi ruling class, fissionary tendencies were of little consequence, for

they were offset by the centripetal forces, centring on the capital, inherent in the political and economic structure of the Kingdom.

On the one hand, the extremely complex structure of this highly centralized state produced considerable cohesion and stability; on the other, it created the conditions whereby, as the Lozi themselves say, the state is always on the verge of revolt.[8] The Kingship, for example, was the mystical symbol of national unity, but the choice of king was not rigidly fixed: any male descendant in the patrilineal line of the first legendary king was eligible to succeed, thus giving rise to intense competition for the succession. Similarly, any commoner could aspire to become not only an induna, but the chief councillor or Ngambela. The king could appoint any commoner to any place in the established hierarchy of council titles, or to the Ngambelaship. This both augmented and diminished the power of the king, for while his subjects depended on him for promotion, he was perpetually open to the threat that they, if antagonized, would rally behind a prince whom they would attempt to substitute for the incumbent. But the induna's freedom of action was also circumscribed. The rewards and perquisites attached to the various titles were considerable in terms of status, land, cattle, followers and further opportunity for promotion; moreover, the more senior the title, the greater were the perquisites. It was therefore

in their interests to prove themselves loyal followers of the King, who alone could promote or demote them. Yet by the same token, the rewards of office were a sufficient incentive to support a rival for the throne in the hopes of a higher position should he succeed. Since the Ngambelaship was the highest post in the nation to which a commoner could aspire, it was the obvious objective of every ambitious induna; the Ngambela was thus greatly dependent on the King's favour. Yet because constitutionally he was not only the mouthpiece of the King to the nation, but also represented the nation to, and if necessary against, the King, it was his function to oppose a King who ruled unjustly. In this way, then, permanent intrigue at every level of government inhered in the system, no man from King to the most subordinate councillor enjoying secure tenure of office.

Nor was the supreme council of the nation a monolithic body easily able to unite for or against the King. It was, to begin with, divided into three "mats": on the right of the King in the council sat all the commoner indunas (an induna being a councillor as well as a judge); on his left sat, first, his stewards, who were responsible for his property and who represented his interests (and were also indunas), and, secondly, princes of the royal family

who represented the interests of the royal family, if necessary against those of the King. Moreover, the National Council was divided into three sub-councils: the Katengo, comprising minor indunas of the right and the stewards; the Saa, which included all other members of the Council save the Ngambela and the Natamoyo (the "Minister of Justice" or sanctuary, the only indunaship to which a royal alone could be appointed); and the Sikalo, which consisted of the Ngambela, the Natamoyo, and the senior indunas of the Saa. Each of these sub-councils was considered to represent a different interest: the Sikalo, the King and Ngambela; the Saa, the indunas; and the Katengo, which ceased functioning probably from Lewanika's time to 1947, the mass of the nation.

The sub-councils assembled separately to discuss issues of import, then re-integrated into the full Council for further discussions before the King was called upon to give the final decision. Because of the different interests into which all these members of the ruling class were divided, it was difficult for them to unite against the King. But if they did reach a concensus of opinion, it was hazardous for the King to adopt an opposing policy. Unlike the Zulu and Sotho, the Lozi do not seem to have had regular meetings of the full National Council, except to decide matters of the gravest importance, such as the granting of the concession to

the British South Africa Company or the selection of a new King. Ordinary business and court cases at the capital were handled by the Kuta, a smaller body on which representatives of all three mats sat.

In Mulambwa's time (as we are presuming), Lozi political organization was distinguished by a system which largely fell into disuse after the Kololo invasion. This was its division into both silalo and makolo, a system unknown to other tribes in southern Africa. The silalo were simple territorial divisions, but without the usual administrative functions of such divisions. Far more important for such purposes - jurisdiction, organization for war, labour conscription - were the makolo, which Gluckman defines as non-territorial political sectors. Each sector centred in an important title at the capital, and every Lozi was attached to a sector. But the people in one area, even in one village of kinsmen, would be members of different political sectors, and members of any given sector were widely dispersed over the country. As a result, no councillor or prince had accruing to his title a solid localized block of men, with whom he could either break away from or battle against the King.

Several consequences followed from the makolo system. It was another element in the extreme centralization of the political

system in the capital, and consequently a further reason why the important power struggles were confined to it. It largely precluded segmentation from the larger unit of a dissident bloc under a councillor or prince, thereby preserving the territorial integrity of the Lozi state. Yet it was a typically Lozi institution in that it simultaneously safeguarded and jeopardized the personal position of the King. For if it prevented a rival prince, or an ambitious councillor spurring a prince to mass an army of his dependents against the king, it clearly maximized the possibility of a swift coup d'etat or assassination.[9]

The Barotse Valley - the flood plain of the Upper Zambesi - floods each year between February and July, compelling in earlier times the people to move during this period each year from the plain to the higher ground surrounding it. This transhumant existence may have prevented the establishment of territorial segments whose leaders with their armies could dominate national politics. The phenomenon of the annual flood was the single most important objective fact of life to the Lozi, and on it was probably based not only part of their political structure, such as the makolo, but the greater part of their internal economy as well as the trading system of the larger "empire" of Barotseland. This profound dependence on the flood and the flood plain continue to be reflected

in the annual Kuomboka and Kuluhela ceremonies, the ritual voyages of the King from the plain capital to the higher capital in March, and the return in July.[10] These are the most important in Lozi life, and are for them the equivalent of national planting or first-fruits ceremonies such as among the Luvale and the Tonga, which the Lozi do not have.

It is the flood plain which Lozi themselves consider Bulozi - Barotseland proper - and within this area there was, besides the "northern" capital of the King, a "southern" capital at Nalolo. Although the "chief-of-the-south" never possessed the power which attached to the King, he was the latter's equal in terms of ritual honour and prestige, and was the second most powerful individual in the Kingdom. The Lozi believe that it was a civil war started by Mulambwa's son who was prince at Nalolo which enabled the Kololo to defeat them, and when the Kololo were finally overthrown, the new Lozi King began the practice, followed every since, that a woman should be appointed head of the southern capital. Because a woman could not become King, this Mulena Mukwae (princess chief) could not be a direct rival for the throne. She had the right to be consulted on all major decisions taken in the King's capital, and the duty to reprove a King she believed was ruling unjustly, but ultimately it was the word of the King which always prevailed.

Moreover, in the colonial period, the main link was between the King and the white administration, and the influence of Nalolo steadily declined. Nevertheless, there was a long tradition of competition in the relationship between north and south, which strikingly manifested itself, as shall be seen, in the rebellion of 1884 - 85.[11]

Local and national politics were also directly affected by the complex and relatively developed economic system which was organized on the substructure of the flood plain. Fishing, cattle and agriculture were the chief elements in the local economy which, if hardly a prosperous one in absolute terms, yet produced a higher standard of living in the Barotse Valley than in most other areas of Central Africa. These elements in turn depended upon the control of the numerous though limited mounds which dotted the plain. Although the king was "owner of the land", his rights of ownership were strictly circumscribed since certain mounds were attached to councillors' names and members of the royal family. When a man was appointed to a title, he acquired temporary control of the highly productive mounds attached to that title. But it was the king who selected his own indunas, and since the more senior an indunaship the greater the amount of land, and thus wealth, status and dependants, which attached to it, the King's power was therefore significantly augmented at the same time that disappointed councillors

received even greater reason to rebel.

Moreover, once the Lozi completed their conquest of the Barotse Valley, and established their state centred on the flood plain, they were able to extend their domination from that plain in a wide-ranging trading system with its centre at the Lozi capital. For the plain produced goods which were different from the products of the surrounding areas. The Valley and the outlying regions were consequently mutually dependent, giving rise to a certain stability in the kingdom and enhancing the power and influence of the Lozi ruling class which controlled the heart of the network of exchanges. In consequence, the key position of the capital in the overall Lozi polity was yet further consolidated. Moreover, much of the trade and all of the tribute (not always easily distinguishable from trading goods) from the outlying tribes went to the king, who was obligated to distribute it among his councillors, each man's share being contingent upon the seniority of his title. Political status thus led to greater economic status which in turn created increased opportunity for yet greater political status.[12]

Obviously the control over political and economic resources was reflected in social status, a fact of great significance among a people as conscious of class as the Lozi were and remain. All Lozi felt superior to all their vassal tribes, while ruling class Lozi

regarded their less privileged kin with much contempt. Since those in the upper social strata were also the political elite, and since it was in theory and sometimes in practice possible for any commoner to aspire to an induna's title, the rewards of power were very great indeed. In a state characterized by extreme inequality in every sphere, the stakes for which one played were very high.

The extent of the area which may legitimately be considered the kingdom of Barotseland is not easily ascertained. The question was of critical importance on two subsequent occasions in Lozi history: the first, between 1890 and 1905, when Portugal and Britain clashed over the proper boundary between Angola and Northern Rhodesia, a question which formally rested on what the two powers agreed was the western frontier of Barotseland, since its King, Lewanika, had granted a concession to the British South Africa Company; the second, in the early 1960's immediately prior to Zambian independence, when the Zambian government and the Company clashed over the eastern limitations of Lewanika's dominions, since the Company claimed rights to the minerals of the Copperbelt, by virtue of its concessions with Lewanika which it asserted covered certain areas of the Copperbelt. On both occasions, a great mass of writing poured forth from the various parties involved, each

hoping to validate its own position; for that reason, much of it was tendentious and unreliable.[13]

The problem is unusually difficult because the Lozi did not send princes or senior councillors to govern outlying provinces. Because the Lozi were not threatened by powerful tribes until about the middle of the nineteenth century, and because trade with the Valley was advantageous to many smaller tribes outside it, such direct rule was not considered necessary. Moreover, no King wished to give a potential rival such an obvious opportunity either to establish a secessionist state or to band his subjects together against himself. Outside the Valley, therefore, as for example among the Subiya of Sesheke and the Nkoya of Mankoya, Lozi influence was excited through mandumeleti, Lozi indunas representing the King of Barotseland. So far as we can tell, these representative indunas attempted to exert only so much influence over the area to which they were assigned as to ensure a regular supply of tribute and, perhaps, slaves, to the Valley. Behind them, as their presence constantly attested, lay the sanction of a punitive Lozi military expedition should the expected tribute not be forthcoming.[14]

Like Company officials in the 1890's, Lozi informants make extravagant claims as to the extent of the area to which representative indunas were despatched.[15] Yet none of these sources, nor indeed even the royal family itself, have ever suggested that the Lamba people, the aboriginal tribe of the Copperbelt, fell under the Lozi sphere of influence.[16] Nor does it seem, as Lozi say, that permanent residents were attached to the Lunda and Luvale peoples to the north, to all the communities of the Ila and Tonga to the south-east, or to the Mbunda west of the Mashi (Kwando) River, though it is likely that the stronger Lozi did undertake sporadic raids, usually successful, for cattle, tribute and slaves among these tribes.[17] If they did not quite fall within the system of indirect rule, then, they were nevertheless regarded by the Lozi as being within their sphere of influence. Moreover, the evidence is persuasive that representative indunas were stationed in several areas which, under colonial rule, were excised from Lozi jurisdiction: the Hook of the Kafue River, the area between the Mashi River and the 22nd parallel, the Caprivi Strip, and the Zambesi River between Kazangula and Livingstone. The Zambesi between these two latter points was the main entrance to Barotseland from the south, and as all white travellers who attempted to cross the river between 1865 and 1885 discovered, it

was effectively controlled by representatives of the Lozi king.[18]

This, then, we presume, was the Kingdom of Barotseland over which the great Mulambwa reigned - and ruled - for, so far as we can determine, almost half a century. That he ruled until his death from natural causes at a very old age is eloquent testimony to the potential for stability inherent in the structure of the state, if its institutions were controlled by a king with great wisdom, shrewdness and justice; that is to say, if he satisfied the royal family and important indunas by timely grants of land and suitable promotions and by seeking their advice before taking important decisions (such as, for example, undertaking a raiding party or making an appointment), if he properly preserved the traditions and prestige of the nation, and if he were able to check the ambitions of those not thus satisfied.

On the other hand, that potential instability was equally intrinsic in the institutional set-up was reflected in the struggle for the succession between his two sons which followed Mulambwa's death. Silumelume was in fact chosen by the council of the nation, but he was soon assassinated, perhaps on the instructions of his brother Mubukwanu, who thereupon succeeded him.[19] But the fraticidal rivalry had so shattered national unity that only the followers of Mubukwanu rallied behind him against the invading

Kololo,[20] and, according to the royal family, when the invasion appeared imminent, "Mubukwanu sent messengers to those of the Barotse people who refused to recognize him, to tell them to stop fighting and killing each other, because the nation's enemies had arrived."[21]

The implication that a unified nation might have withstood the Kololo attack is obviously a more palatable explanation to the Lozi for their crushing defeat than the logical alternative, that the size and strength of their empire has been exaggerated. Yet even had the Lozi kingdom been as great as they enjoy believing, which is not likely, it is doubtful that it would have been a match for the Kololo.

The Kololo were a powerful Sotho group which, under the leadership of the "remarkable military leader and statesman",[22] Sebituane, migrated from the Transorangia area of South Africa to the Zambesi River to escape the turbulence and conflict which resulted from the military revolution of Shaka Zulu.[23] Like many of the other groups who broke away from Shaka's empire, not least the Ndebele, the Kololo had adopted from him the essentials of their highly centralized political and military organization, and were equipped "with weapons and tactics which made them virtually invincible against all but opponents heavily armed with guns."[24]

The Kololo were therefore able to inflict heavy defeats on most, though not all, of the many smaller tribes they encountered in the course of their monumental march, as Sebituane continued to lead them on in search of white men from whom they could secure guns; for his experiences had already taught him "that only the possession of firearms could give him peace and security."[25]

Reaching the Zambesi near the Victoria Falls probably in 1840,[26] the Kololo overpowered a Tonga force and settled across the river in the highlands near the Kafue River. But their pacific existence here was soon shattered by two inconclusive clashes with Mzilikazi's Ndebele, as a result of which Sebituane decided to move up the Zambesi into Barotseland.[27] The Lozi, internally divided and militarily weak as compared with the Kololo, were soon in retreat. Moreover because their economic system was able to absorb all the manpower carried home from raids or sent as tribute, the Lozi had rejected overtures from the Mambari, half-caste traders from Angola, to exchange slaves for guns,[28] the only weapons which might have given the Lozi a chance. Over the next three to four years, Sebituane organized a systematic campaign of conquest, during which, despite sporadic but ineffectual Lozi opposition organized by King Mubukwanu, he extended the Kololo hegemony over Barotseland as far as the northern edge of

the Barotse Valley.

During this period of consolidation, Sebituane had to face attacks from three different groups coming from the east, among which the Ndebele posed the most serious threat. The Kololo succeeded in checking two separate Ndebele invasions, Sebituane learning in the process that the stability of his new empire depended upon attaching the loyalty of the defeated Lozi to himself. He therefore discouraged his people from adopting the attitude of a dominant aristocracy, and consciously strove to integrate important Lozi into his administration. His policy was embodied in the decree that "all are children of the chief,"[29] and although Kololo families, responsible to himself were "spread over the country, one or two only in each village, as the lords of the land,"[30] some of his appointments also went to Lozi, thus giving them a vested interest in the stability of the occupation.[31] Moreover, because Sebituane spared the lives of several royals, including Sibeso and Sipopa, sons of Mulambwa and half-brothers of King Mubukwanu, these men, together with their dependents, reconciled themselves to a ruler who, though alien, appeared to be liberal and just.

But by no means did all Lozi become collaborators. Imbua, another son of Mulambwa, fled with his followers to Nyengo

country along the present Angola-Zambian border. Mubukwanu himself escaped with his son Imasiku to Lukulu, where the King was poisoned in mysterious circumstances. Imasiku, now ruler-in-exile, was soon attacked by Sebituane's forces. Although they were unable to defeat the Lozi battalion, neither could Imasiku force them back, and he was compelled to choose between the only two alternatives which presented themselves: capitulation or migration. With his followers, he decided to flee; moving north-east, they crossed the Kabompo River to hide east of the Manyinga River in what came to be known as the Lukwakwa. The Lozi royal family was thussplit into three groups, each of which, when and if the Kololo were expelled from their nation, would inevitably try to assert the right of its own leader to claim the kingship.[32]

The occupation, however, meant far more than an eventual conflict over the succession, for the Kololo made significant changes in the structure of Lozi society. Above all, they disregarded the makolo as the key mechanism of the administration and political organization, substituting for it the simpler device of territorial divisions. Moreover, Sebituane distributed large tracts of land to his own followers, much of which was apparently reclaimed by Lozi who had no legitimate right to it after the Kololo were defeated, thus creating considerable hostility between them and the self-

professed rightful owners.[33] Finally, the Kololo language, a variant of Sesuto, became the lingua franca of the kingdom; language can of course have important social consequences, and it may have acted as a unifying factor in Barotseland, and may have introduced new concepts into Lozi life, but these questions cannot yet be answered.

The Kololo also extended the frontier of the Lozi economic system. Trade between the Valley and the surrounding tribes may have been adequate in most senses, but not in the one Sebituane considered most vital. He therefore allowed the Mambari slave traders to enter his kingdom, explaining that he desperately needed guns to ward off Ndebele attacks, and though he offered to purchase them with cattle and ivory, nothing but slaves would satisfy the Mambari.[34] For the same reason, he was reduced to selling his captives to Arab traders from the east in return for English muskets.[35] At the same time, his leading followers were able to exchange slaves for the Mambari's cheap, coloured cloths, which soon became the conspicuous badge of the Kololo ruling class.[36]

The first white man to enter Barotseland was the famous Portuguese slave trader, Silva Porto, who made three journeys into the area between 1847 and 1858. Sebituane apparently welcomed him in order to obtain the guns which Silva Porto was pleased to

exchange for slaves.[37] Similarly, Sebituane warmly greeted Livingstone when the missionary arrived in 1851 at the Kololo capital, recently shifted from the flood plain to the healthier area around Linyanti on the Chobe River, for the chief visualized for Livingstone a key role in Kololo foreign policy. "He had the idea," Livingstone observed, "that our teaching was chiefly the art of shooting and other European arts, and that by our giving him guns he would thereby procure peace" because Mzilikazi's Ndebele would be "deterred from continuing their unwelcome visits".[38] On a later visit in 1860, Sekeletu, Sebituane's successor, made the point more explicitly: still fearful of an Ndebele attack, he begged Livingstone and his family to remain and live with the Kololo, "as Mosilikatse would not attack a place where the daughter of his friend Moffat (Livingstone's father-in-law and a favourite missionary of Mzilikazi) was living". So anxious was he to achieve this end that he promised "to cut off a section of his country for the special use of the English."[39]

Not even the death of Sebituane shortly after Livingstone's arrival, probably from an old battle wound[40] but apparently blamed by the Kololo on Livingstone,[41] was sufficient to undermine the Kololo's conviction of his utility in consolidating the stability of their state. Sekeletu, son and successor of Sebituane, was anxious

to obtain a modus vivendi with the exiled Lozi in the north, so that his forces could be concentrated in the south-east against the Ndebele. In the attempt to forestall a potential second front, one of his chosen instruments was Livingstone. The missionary was entreated, as he travelled up the Zambesi on a second journey in 1853, to make peace treaties with the chiefs to the north and west of Barotseland, including the Lozi who had fled. "Thus the Makololo chief financed Livingstone as a peace-making ambassador, somewhat outside the ordinary political system, to obtain peace on certain frontiers."[42]

Initially, the plan appeared to be successful. Livingstone reached the Kabompo River, where he met an emissary of Imasiku, the Lozi King-in-exile at the Lukwakwa. Realistically assessing his weak position, Imasiku "expressed delight, by his principal men ... at the proposal of peace and alliance with the Makololo."[43] But the detente originally desired by both sides was never consummated. Though Livin gstone himself never suggested the reasons for his mission's failure, we may conjecture that it was a result of the serious internal conflict which, between 1855 and 1860, had broken out in both the Kololo and the Lozi camps.

Returning to the Barotse Valley from Angola in 1855, Livingstone discovered that Imbua, half-brother of Imasiku and

and leader of the Lozi who had fled to Nyengo country, had attacked his kin at the Lukwakwa.[44] Presumably the motive was the generally agreed right among the refugees of the Lukwakwa king to resume the throne once the Kololo were expelled from Barotseland. But Imesiku's warriors repulsed the invaders, and Imbua, his ambitions crushed, returned in defeat to his Nyengo quarters.[45] Upon his unexpected return, Meebelo, who had been chosen to replace him as leader of the Nyengo faction, fled to the Kololo together with Litia, another son of Mulambwa, and Litia's son Lubosi (later Lewanika). In 1859, Meebelo was murdered by the Kololo, as were several other Lozi royals, including Litia, in the next few years. By 1863, of the royal family, only Lubosi and Malitela, also a grandson of Mulambwa, remained alive in Barotseland. During the same period, Lozi royals in the Lukwakwa were also being exterminated, but this time at the hands of their own kin. Imasiku was killed around 1859, and Sipopa, yet another son of Mulambwa, was installed in his place as Lozi King-in-exile.[46]

While the Lozi royal family was thus being decimated, perceptible strains were also becoming manifest among the Kololo. Partly these were a result of the climate to which the Kololo were not accustomed, and malarial fever seems to have killed a large

number of them, while debilitating many others.[47] But to a large extent, the Kololo hegemony was undermined by the new ruler himself, whom all sources tend to deprecate as compared with his father.

It is true, as has been seen, that Sekeletu adopted a large part of Sebituane's foreign policy by attempting to use Livingstone to prevent wars with both the Ndebele and the exiled Lozi. The missionary left Linyanti for the east coast in 1855, taking with him a large number of Kololo porters, and when, by 1860, neither he nor his porters had returned, Sekeletu was convinced that he had been betrayed. This fact largely accounts for the treatment meted out in that year to the ill-fated Helmore-Price expedition. The two missionaries, and their families had counted on Livingstone's presence to assure them an hospitable reception. But he failed to return until after they left, and the Kololo, seeing no particular value in the mission party, soon forced them to flee to South Africa.[48] Yet at the same moment that Sekeletu's people were "pillaging and plundering" the expedition's goods, he was keeping guarded and intact a wagon which had been left by Livingstone five years earlier, hopefully awaiting its owner's return. Nor were these political facts of life unknown at the time. For as John Moffat later told Livingstone,

"no mission unattended by one or the other of them should ever have been sent."[49]

Not all of Sekeletu's actions, however, were as rationally conceived. He failed to follow Sebituane's imaginative and statesmanlike methods of governance which made his rule tolerable to the conquered peoples. He contracted a horrible illness, probably leprosy, and became morbidly possessed by the belief that he had been bewitched by one of his subject tribes.[50] Perhaps for this reason, he reversed his father's prudent policies: he married only Kololo wives, created only Kololo chiefs, and surrounded himself with Kololo advisers alone. Following their chief's example, his people naturally began arrogating to themselves the position of an exploiting aristocracy subsisting on the forced labour and tribute which they wrung from the subject tribes.[51]

Nor were Sekeletu's suspicions confined to those he had subjugated. He was, if anything, more fearful of leading men among his own people who might have wished to succeed him. Many of his important councillors were put to death, and Sekeletu eventually withdrew almost entirely from public life, refusing to see anyone but his father's brother, Mamili. Moreover, his malady was strangely reflected in the condition of his kingdom: "there was (in 1860) widespread dispersion (of his subjects); crops had failed;

sickness was prevalent, they were now an easy prey to invasion."[52] The ailing chief indeed acknowledged to Livingstone, whom he consented to see, that the Ndebele remained his great fear, and again implored the missionary to settle among his people.[53]

In fact, however, the greater threat to Kololo domination lay within the kingdom. Those Lozi who had remained in Barotseland under Sekeletu and Sebituane had become irreconcilably alienated from Kololo rule, as a result of Sekeletu's discriminatory practice, and his elimination of members of the Lozi royal family; their murders were seen, no doubt correctly, as a means of precluding a Lozi rebellion.[54]

It is possible that, had the Kololo ruling class remained united, it might have been able to check a Lozi uprising. But the bloody power struggle consequent upon Sekeletu's death in 1863 irrevocably undermined Kololo might. Grasping the opportunity, the Lukwakwa exiles organized an armed attack against the occupiers of their country, timed to coincide exactly with an uprising of their kin still in Barotseland. The plan worked perfectly; the Kololo were utterly defeated, and in the following weeks virtually all Kololo males were slaughtered.[55] Women and children were, however, spared, some of the former being enslaved, although many were taken in marriage by Lozi men, one result of which

being that the Kololo language remained the lingua franca of the liberated kingdom.[56]

Liberation, however, as other Africans discovered a century later, by no means meant salvation. The unity of purpose which the Lozi were able to show in the face of a common enemy was soon shattered in a host of new problems which now presented themselves: the return of the emigrés, rights to land, reconstruction of the political system, struggles for the throne and for the senior indunaships, the continuing threat of the Ndebele, and, not least, the question of how to deal with the white traders, hunters and missionaries who were beginning to seek access to the kingdom. In their attempts to come to grips with these problems, inevitable disagreements and disputes among the Lozi leaders over the succeeding three decades certainly endangered the stability of the state.

Yet the turbulence of this period must not be exaggerated. The hysterical accounts by the first white missionaries of a savage state saved from its own destruction by the intervention of the gospel and "European civilization", hardly squares with the known data. Sipopa, after all, ruled for twelve years; Mwanawina, it is true, was deposed after fewer than three years; Lewanika was in power for seven years before rebels forced him to flee, and once he regained the throne a year later, he retained it (albeit with some

difficulty) for another dozen years before the first officer of the British South Africa Company permanently settled in Barotseland.

To be sure, however, the process of stabilization proved arduous. Trouble began almost immediately, when Sipopa, chief at the Lukwakwa, asserted his right to become king of Barotseland. Although he was apparently favoured by most Lozi, there was a certain amount of opposition to his succession. A number of Lozi in the Valley who had retained positions of some privilege during the occupation feared the consequences should Sipopa become King. These fears proved justified, for when Sipopa at last returned to Barotseland, those who had opposed him or refused to recognize him were quickly killed.[57]

The first constructive act of Sipopa's twelve-year reign was to appoint as Ngambela Njekwa, the man who had organized the rebellion against the Kololo. Both Sipopa and Njekwa had lived at the capital of the Kololo chiefs for many years before fleeing to the Lukwakwa, and instead of re-establishing the Makolo system of administration, chose to follow the Kololo system of governance: "his (Sipopa's) great men attended his court supported by their armed followers."[58] Perhaps because they wished to restore the traditional Lozi system,[59] perhaps in order to secure a king over whom they would have greater control,[60] a small number of indunas

tried around 1870 to depose Sipopa. To this end they summoned Imbua, half-brother of Imasiku, who had moved from Nyengo country to the Lukwakwa when Sipopa returned to Barotseland. Imbua's meagre army and his few supporters in the Valley were, however, decisively defeated. Both Imbua and Namiluko, his chief councillor, were killed, but the latter's son Sikufele and two of Imbua's sons escaped and returned to the Lukwakwa. The following year, Sipopa sent an army to the Lukwakwa which destroyed Sikufele's capital but in the end was unable to force him to surrender, and it returned to Barotseland in 1872.[61]

Sipopa's victory suggests that, initially at least, his reign was popular with his subjects, and/or that he and Njekwa shrewdly manipulated the resources they controlled to earn the support of their leading councillors. The King has always been described as being generous in his distribution of tribute and goods among his indunas,[62] while Njekwa is considered one of the great Ngambelas in Lozi history; doubtless the latter's reputation rests partly on his role as hero of the uprising against the Kololo.[63]

Assuming this internal stability in the first half of his reign, it follows that, like the Kololo leaders, Sipopa saw the Ndebele as the greatest threat to the nation's security under his rule. Like them too, he chose as one of the chief instruments of his foreign

policy a white man. The principal tenet of that policy was isolationism. Most Europeans were refused permission to cross the Zambesi River, and only a few Mambari traders were allowed to penetrate the kingdom from the north. The Mambari, however, did not suit the needs of the Lozi: like Mulambwa, but unlike the Kololo, Sipopa wished to use captured slaves as workers in the Barotse Valley, and was therefore unwilling to trade them for the Mambari's guns. Yet guns were imperative if the Ndebele were to be withstood.

In almost every sense, then, George Westbeech was the man best suited to fulfil Sipopa's needs. Westbeech was an English trader who, during the 1860's, worked among the Ndebele, soon gaining the confidence of both Mzilikazi and his successor, Lobengula. In 1871, with elephants rapidly disappearing from the country south of the Zambesi,[64] but perhaps also because Lobengula saw him as a useful link with the Lozi, Westbeech and his partner, George Blockley, appeared on the Zambesi. Sipopa welcomed them as friends, and Westbeech became the most significant single exception to the King's isolationist policy during the latter's reign.[65]

Several explanations may be posited for Westbeech's extraordinary position. His good relations with Lobengula may have made him, like Livingstone, seem capable of preventing Ndebele raids on Barotseland. He was also a source of firearms

for the Lozi, necessary in the event his peacekeeping role should fail. Moreover, unlike the Mambari, he preferred in exchange for his guns ivory, a commodity in abundance in Barotseland. As a result of these factors, Sipopa and his successors allowed Westbeech a virtual official monopoly of trade in the kingdom for almost two decades. The trader consequently benefitted enormously from his friendship with the Ndebele,[66] and, as it happened, no Ndebele raid was undertaken during Sipopa's kinship, although there is no evidence that Westbeech was responsible for this.

Moreover, in the event, Sipopa's fatal enemies proved to be internal. His position was first weakened in the middle of his reign when, in 1872, Njekwa was forced to surrender the Ngambelaship. The year previous, the chief of Nalolo had died.[67] As the new Mulena Mukwae (princess chief), Sipopa appointed his daughter who was also Njekwa's wife. Since the Lozi rule forbade any Ishee Kwandu (consort) of a princess to fill a position reserved for a commoner, Njekwa reluctantly forsook his position as the leading commoner in the nation.[68]

Njekwa's loss was a considerable blow to the King, for the two men are said to have worked closely together, agreeing on the major questions of the day. Why Sipopa's relationship with the new Ngambela, Mowa Mamili, was so much less satisfactory is

not clear. About Mowa Mamili himself we know virtually nothing.[69] It is possible that, around this time, the King's mental condition deteriorated, and the cruelty for which he is generally remembered - the other side of the coin from his generosity - possibly increased from this period.[70]

However, resentment at the King's peripatetic activities now seems to have become widespread. Although he followed the tradition of moving his capital each year as a result of the floods, he apparently never chose the same site twice. Whether this was a deliberate device to keep in contact with his subjects as a means of keeping the nation united, or a means of maintaining a check on his councillors, or part of his search for game, or a result of his fear of remaining too long in any one place lest he be bewitched, is not known. His final move in 1879, from Libonda in the north of the Valley to Sesheke, is said to have

> distressed the country greatly. Those who followed him there complained about their wives and children remaining behind in Barotseland, not to mention their cattle (and land and dependents). Those who remained behind were discontented because their chief was not with them, and they declared that Sipopa had no ideas above hunting, selling ivory and amusing himself, the care of the country being a secondary consideration with him.[71]

It is not likely that Sipopa could have been unaware of these grumblings. He may have sensed too the resentment created by his philandering; he seems to have been, even for a king of Barotseland, unusually notorious for the number of wives he stole, and unusually tactless in the number of indunas he cuckolded.[72] It is also possible that Sipopa knew that some petty indunas had been turned against him by Mwanawina, a paternal grandson of Mulambwa, who promised them important promotions were he to become King.[73]

By 1876, Westbeech was able to report from Sesheke that "the disposition to revolt and the determination to dethrone the king was fast gaining ground among the chiefs ...."[74] The danger to the King had increased since the estranged indunas now found a leader in the Ngambela. Seemingly in an advanced paranoid state, Sipopa had apparently been outraged by "the reverence and affection" which had been shown to Mowa Mamili as he travelled down the river to meet his King. The latter accused his Ngambela of high treason,[75] but Mowa Mamili was able to escape to the Valley where he assembled his supporters and started south again. The King, being warned, prepared to do battle, but before the two armies met he was assassinated by one of his bodyguards, Mwanamacaha, who was in the service of the dissident councillors.[76]

Sipopa dead, Mowa Mamili supported Mwanawina's candidature as successor to the throne. Mwanawina apparently enjoyed considerable popularity and his appointment was approved by the leading councillors. Little is recorded of his brief reign, and not much more is recalled in oral tradition. He seems to have made two key errors which led to his downfall. Mowa Mamili, considering himself a king-maker, is said to have tried to usurp excessive powers to himself; as a result, Mwanawina had him, his children, and his elder brother put to death. The murder of the Ngambela apparently made other indunas fear for their own lives, and these early seeds of tension soon bloomed into outright hostility as nepotism became rife in the administration. Mwanawina came from the Senanga district (that is, he was a "southerner" considering the flood plain as "Barotseland proper" or Bulozi), and began distributing important titles as well as land to his southern kin. The latter soon demanded that the people of the north be excluded from all positions of power, and finally ordered the King that all "northern" indunas be killed.[77]

With this, the indunas of the north, led by Mataa, a minor but ambitious councillor, and Numwa, a famous Lozi warrior,[78] assembled and armed their supporters, and succeeded in driving the King from the country. When Mwanawina and his soldiers returned

the following year (1879), they discovered that the army of the new King, Lubosi, was prepared for them. Mwanawina's warriors suffered great casualties and soon retreated. The former king managed to escape and died in exile.[79]

In the same year that Lubosi became king, François Coillard of the Paris Missionary Society first arrived in Barotseland. Lubosi (later Lewanika) died in office in 1916; Coillard became the one of the two most important white men in Barotseland, a position he maintained until his death in 1904. The year 1878 is thus a climacteric in Lozi history, and may be said to have ushered in the modern historical period.

REFERENCES

Chapter 1

1. This is the broad conclusion reached on the basis of Lozi oral tradition by myself as well as Mutumba Mainga, "The Origin of the Loxi: Some Oral Traditions", and L. S. Muuka, "The Colonization of Barotseland in the 17th Century", in E. Stokes and R. Brown (ed.), The Zambesian Past : Studies in Central African History (Manchester, 1966); Max Gluckman, "The Lozi of Barotseland in North-Western Rhodesia", in E. Colson and M. Gluckman, Seven Tribes of British Central Africa (Oxford, 1951), pp.2-4; C. G. Trapnell and J. Clothier, The Soils, Vegetation and Agricultural Systems of North-Western Rhodesia (Lusaka, 1937), p.48. For other interpretations, see J. D. Clark, Pre-History of Southern Africa (London, 1959), p.291 and I. G. Cunnison, (ed. and trans.) Historical Traditions of the Eastern Lunda (Rhodes-Livingstone Institute Communications No. 23, 1962).

2. Gluckman, op. cit., pp.7-8.

3. Mr. Mbanga Mutemwa. He was a friend before he became an informant, and until he offered this information as part of his autobiography I had never had reason to consider him anything but a Lozi.

4. Adolph Jalla, Litaba za Sicaba sa Malozi, first printed 1909 and translated as The History of the Barotse Nation Lusaka, 1921).

5. Gluckman, op. cit., pp.2-3.

6. Respectively, ibid; List of Lozi Rulers in their order of succession, from "A Brief General Description of the Barotse Government", compiled by "Lozi men" and "passed on as correct by Yeta III, 1 July 1932", typescript mss. in R.L.I. Collection, Barotseland Historical Manuscripts; and Genealogical History of the Barotse Nation, Statement by Lewanika, 29 June 1903, C.O. African South 717.

7. Editor's Introduction to M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems (London, 1940), pp.5-6. Barotseland also possessed many of the attributes of a more recently evolved model by which to classify African political systems, "government by political association"; see Peter C. Lloyd, "The Political Structure of African Kingdoms : An Exploratory Model" in Association of Social Anthropologists, Political Systems and the Distribution of Power (London, 1965), pp.102-4.

8. Max Gluckman, The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence (New Haven, 1965), p.57.

9. This very brief summary of the essentials of the Lozi political system is largely based on the extensive writings of Gluckman, especially his chapter on "The Lozi" in Seven Tribes; Jurisprudence, ch. 2; Economy of the Central Barotse Plain, Rhodes-Livingstone Papers No. 7 (Livingstone 1941), pp. 94-101; Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society (Oxford, 1965), pp.144-7; Essays on Lozi Land and Royal Property (Livingstone, 1943), pp.13-14.

Since the makolo system was disregarded during the Kololo occupation of Barotseland (1840? - 1864), and never wholly re-established by subsequent Lozi kings, few white officials took it into account, and it is not discussed in any of their analyses of Lozi government of which I am aware, some of which, however, are valuable in other respects. See for e.g. A. F. B. Glenrie, "The Barotse System of Government", Journal of African Administration, Vol. IV, No. 1, Jan. 1952; Report on the Barotse by Colin Harding to C.O., 30 Apr 1901, C.O. African South 659.

Moreover, even my older and highly knowledgeable Lozi informants, such as Messrs. Mupatu, Simalumba and N. Zaza, tended to play down the role of the makolo in their explanations of Lozi government. In a very real sense, therefore, Gluckman's material is virtually the only extant source of information on the subject. See also Sources, Pt. 1.

10. These ceremonies continue to this day. Lewanika established Lealui as the permanent flood plain capital between 1878 and 1884, and his son, Yeta III, built Limalunga, the present capital during the flood, in the 1930's.

11. Gluckman, Seven Tribes, pp.26-9.

12. Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual, pp.142-4; Economy, pp.29, 33, 90, 93, 104; Seven Tribes, p.14; Report from Coillard, 25 July 1902, in News from Barotseland, No. 17, Dec. 1902, F. S. Arnot, Garenganze, or Seven Years Pioneer Mission Work in Central Africa (London, 1889), p.73. For an illuminating account of the means by which a king was able to enhance (and, by implication, to undermine) the status of a commoner, see Francois Coillard, On the Threshold of Central Africa, trans. by C. W. Mackintosh (2nd edition, London, 1902), p.444.

13. Of the voluminous amount of material on the dispute between Britain and Portugal, the most important is A. St. H. Gibbons Africa from South to North through Marotseland (London, 1904); Colin Harding, In Remotest Barotseland (London, 1905); Report by Harding to C.O., 30 April 1901, C.O., African South 659, pp.213-37, 267-70; Report by Major Goold-Adams, 27 Aug 1897, C.O., African South 552, pp.146-64; Goold-Adams to F.O., 7 Feb 1897, F.O. 403, Vol. 245, No. 108. For a devastating critical attack on what he considers the serious distortions of Harding and Gibbons, see C. M. N. White, "The Ethno-History of the Upper Zambesi", African Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1962, pp.23-4.

    For the Zambian government's case against the Company, see the study it commissioned, Maxwell Stamp Associates, A History of the Mineral Rights of Northern Rhodesia (2 vol., London 1967); this history has not yet been published.

14. Gluckman, Essays on Lozi Land, pp.13-14; Memorandum on Barotse Representative Indunas by Frank Worthington, 5 June 1908, C.O., African South 899.

15. Messrs. Mupatu, Simalumba and M. Mufemwa.

16. See The Frontiers of the Barotse Kingdom as defined in a Council by King Lewamka and recorded by Francois Coillard, 25 June 1890, reproduced in Maxwell Stamp Associates, op.cit., Vol. 2, pp.24-26.

17. Report of the Commission Appointed to Examine ... the Past and Present Relations of the Paramount Chief of the Barotse Nation and the Chiefs Resident in the Balovale District .... (Lusaka, 1939), pp.1-53; White, op.cit.; E. W. Smith and A. M. Dale, The Ila-Speaking Peoples of Northern Rhodesia (2 Vols., London, 1920), Vol. 1; also from an analysis of the evidence cited in fn. 13.

18. See Chapter 2.

19. Jalla, op.cit., pp.17-18.

20. Mr. Zaza.

21. Jalla,op.cit., p.19.

22. J. D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath : A Nineteenth Century Revolution in Bantu Africa (London, 1966), p.115.

23. See A. T. Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal (London, 1929) and E. Ritter, Shaka Zulu (London, 1955).

24. Editors' introduction, Stokes and Brown, op.cit., p.xviii.

25. Omer-Cooper, op.cit., p.119.

26. White, op.cit., p.25; E. W. Smith, "Sebituane and the Makololo", African Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1956, p.67.

27. David Livingstone, Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa (London, 1857), pp.86-7; Smith, op.cit., pp.68-9; Jalla, op.cit., p.24.

28. Livingstone, op.cit., p.86; also L. H. Gann, "The End of the Slave Trade in British Central Africa, 1889-1912", Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, No. 16, 1954, pp.29-31.

29. Livingstone, op.cit., p.197.

30. Ibid., p.186.

31. Messrs. Simalumba and Zaza; William Waddell's Diary, 27 Dec 1885, NAR Hist. mss. WA 1/1/2.

32. Jalla, op.cit., pp.19-20; White, op.cit., p.18; Smith, op.cit., pp.69-70; Messrs. Zaza, Mupatu and Simalumba.

33. Gluckman, Jurisprudence, pp.69-70; This point was not made by Livingstone, Jalla or any of my Lozi informants.

34. Jalla, op.cit., pp.28-9; George Seaver, David Livingstone, His Life and Letters (London, 1957), p.141.

35. Livingstone, op.cit., p.92.

36. Isaac Shapera (ed.), Livingstone's Private Journals, 1851-53 (London, 1960), p.16; W. E. Oswell, William Cotton Oswell (2 Vols., London, 1900), Vol. 1, p.245.

37. James MacQueen, "Journey of Silva Porto with the Arabs from Benguela to Ibo and Mocambique through Africa", Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, Vol. 30, 1860, H.M. Hole, The Passing of the Black Kings (London, 1932) p.292; V. W. Brelsford, Generation of Men : The European Pioneers of Northern Rhodesia (Lusaka, 1965), p.6. No Lozi informant remembered Silva Porto.

38. Schapera, op.cit., pp.16-17, 25.

39. Cited in Seaver, op.cit., p.372. For an elaboration of this point, see article by Gluckman in The Listener, 22 Sept 1955.

40. Omer-Cooper, op.cit., p.124.

41. So Coillard was later told. Cited in C. W. Mackintosh, Coillard of the Zambesi (London, 1907), pp.272-4.

42. Gluckman in The Listener, 22 Sept 1955.

43. Livingstone, op.cit., p.277.

44. Ibid., p.497.

45. Ibid., p.277; Jalla, op.cit., p.35.

46. Jalla, op. cit. It is possible that not all those Lozi who claimed to be descendants of Mulambwa could justify their claims. But no Lozi informant challenged them.

47. Michael Gelfand, Livingstone the Doctor : His Life and Travels (Oxford, 1957), p.103.

48. E. W. Smith, Great Lion of Bechuanaland : The Life and Times of Roger Price, Missionary (London, 1957), pp.87-91.

49. Seaver, op. cit., p.375. Of the party of ten, no fewer than seven persons, men, women and children, died. Price, one of the survivors, believed they were poisoned, and Jalla, op. cit. p.32, accepted this judgment. But Livingstone himself believed they succumbed to malarial fever, an interpretation recently upheld by Rev. E. W. Smith, in Seaver, op. cit., App. B, pp.411-25.

50. James I. MacNair (ed.), Livingstone's Travels (London, 1956), p.227.

51. Ibid., Jalla, op. cit., p.33.

52. Seaver, op. cit., p.372; David and Charles Livingstone, Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambesi and its Tributaries (London, 1865), p.272.

53. Seaver, op. cit.

54. Messrs. Mupatu, Simalumba and Njekwa. Mr. Njekwa is the grandson of the Njekwa who led the successful uprising against the Kololo.

55. Jalla, op. cit., pp.33-4.

56. Messrs. Njekwa, Zaza and Simalumba.

57. Jalla, op. cit., p.35, and Mr. Simalumba. The latter, an early Lozi supporter of African nationalism, compared these opponents to the Africans in Northern Rhodesia who, during the independence struggle, preferred to remain under white rule.

58. Gluckman, Jurisprudence, p.69.

59. Ibid.

60. Jalla, op.cit., pp.36-7.

61. Ibid., and White, op.cit., p.19.

62. By Jalla's elitist informants at the turn of the century; see Jalla, op.cit., and more recently by Messrs. Zaza and Mupatu.

63. Messrs. Mupatu and Njekwa; Jalla, op.cit. p.37. One of the most serious problems in the reconstruction of Lozi history is that literally every living literate Lozi has read Jalla's history, which was largely based on the evidence of Lewanika and his closest advisers. It follows that an interpretation by an informant which agrees with that of Jalla cannot necessarily be taken as independent confirmation of Jalla. Nevertheless, I shall in such instances record the existence of both sources, if only to indicate that a source outside the royal family shares (but does not necessarily corroborate) its version of a given situation. When an informant disagrees with Jalla, the conflicting testimonies must be assessed functionally in an attempt to determine whether the former or Jalla's informants among the royal family had more to gain from a particular interpretation; as will emerge, however, the conflicting interests are not always apparent. For a more detailed exposition of the general problem of the credibility of sources, see Sources Pt. 1.

64. L. H. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, Early Days to 1953 (London, 1964), p.41.

65. Editor's Introduction to E. C. Tabler (ed.), Trade and Travel in Early Barotseland: The Diaries of George Westbeech and Captain Norman MacLeod (London, 1863), pp.4-7; S. de le Roux, Pioneers and Sportsmen of South Africa, 1760-1890 (Salisbury, 1939), pp.143-5; Emil Holub, Seven Years in South Africa (2 Vols. London, 1881), Vol. 2, pp.103-4.

66. de le Roux, op.cit.,; Brelsford, op.cit., pp.10-12.

67. Gluckman, Seven Tribes, pp.27-9.

68. Messrs. Simalumba, Mupetu, Njekwa and Zaza all largely confirmed the version given by Jalla, op. cit., p.37.

69. Lozi informants were able to shed no light either on his background or his personality.

70. Mr. Zaza and Coillard, op. cit., pp.56-7.

71. Jalla, op. cit., p.38.

72. Mr. Simalumba. Gluckman's informants also told him of the King's adulterous behaviour; see his Jurisprudence, p.69.

73. Mr. Mupatu.

74. Cited in Holub, op. cit., p.134. Holub was a Czech missionary doctor who Sipopa, on Westbeech's recommendation, allowed to remain in Sesheke for several months in 1875.

75. Ibid., pp.284-5.

76. Jalla, op. cit., pp.37-9, and Messrs. Njekwa and Zaza.

77. Messrs. Zaza and Simalumba. Gluckman was also told that the conflict between northerners and southerners led to Mwanawina's downfall; see his Jurisprudence, p.69.

78. See Chapter 2.

79. Jalla, op. cit., pp.39-40, and Messrs. Mupatu and Simalumba.

Chapter 2

LUBOSI

Lubosi, later called Lewanika, was born on the western fringes of Barotseland in the 1840's. According to Gluckman, his father was a certain Mando who gave his pregnant wife to Litia, a son of the great king Mulambwa[1]; Lozi informants believe him to have been Litia's physical son, although they acknowledge the custom whereby commoners have given their sons to members of the royal family.[2] Whatever the truth of the matter, there is no evidence to my knowledge that Lubosi's right to the throne was ever challenged on this ground.

At the moment of his birth, Litia was taking refuge from the Kololo invaders; the name Lubosi means "the escaped one". Around 1856, Litia decided to ally himself with the Kololo, and returned with his family to the Valley to join Sekeletu. Litia was among the Lozi royals later killed by Sekeletu, but Lubosi was spared.[3] On Sipopa's accession to the throne, he accepted the young man as a member of the royal family, and adopted him as part of his personal entourage,[4] perhaps because he was one of the few remaining descendants of Mulambwa.[5] He is said to have been a model Lozi youth: an efficient and willing servant of the King,

yet sufficiently humble to mix freely among less privileged commoners.[6]

Lubosi appears to have been implicated neither in Sipopa's assassination nor Mwanawina's deposition. After the former's death, he returned from Sesheke to his own village north of Libonda, where he was when the latter was forced to flee the country. Years later, the mature Lewanika reminisced "with pleasure" about these good years, when he could carve and hunt and generally act as he pleased.[7]

After Mwanawina's escape, the National Council assembled to select his successor. Some of its members may have supported Sikufele of the Lukwakwa, nephew of the late Imbua,[8] but the two major candidates were Lubosi and Musiwa, younger brother of Mwanawina. Lubosi believed that his rival was sponsored by induna Mataa[9], but Lubosi's chief supporter, the older and more respected induna Nalabutu, persuaded the Council that Musiwa, if chosen, would wreak vengeance on all those who had helped drive out his brother.[10] For his part, Lubosi perhaps was considered a generous and popular young man, and, no less importantly, had the advantage of "belonging" to both the southern and northern sections of the nation, since his mother had been born in Senanga and his father near Lealui.[11] In short, as one informant put it, Lubosi was "really the only man of royal birth who had nothing against him",[12]

and in August 1878, the young prince - then about thirty years old - was formally installed as King.

If, as Lozi tradition suggests, the new King was an innocent at the moment of his succession, he acquired the proper posture of a monarch with remarkable rapidity. Serpa Pinto, a Portuguese army officer who reached Lealui, the capital which Lubosi was in the process of constructing, very shortly after his installation, was struck by his regal bearing and his regalia: Lubosi was wearing, he noted,

> a cashmere mantle over a coloured shirt ... drawers of coloured cashmere, displaying Scotch thread stockings, perfectly white, and he had on a pair of low well polished shoes ... and a soft gray hat adorned with two large and beautiful ostrich-feathers.[13]

Moreover, Lubosi was fully aware that he was the third King of Barotseland within a period of three years, and quickly took steps which he believed would preserve him from the fate of his two predecessors. The most immediate threat to his position came from Mwanawina, from whom an attack could be expected at any time; the King refused permission to Francois Coillard, a French missionary, to enter the country on the grounds of "the civil war which was threatening it".[14] To secure his position, Lubosi appointed his known supporters to the important offices in the kingdom. He had the Kuta agree to replace

Mwanawina's Ngambela, Ngenda, with his own preference, Silumbu.[15] His sister Matauka was appointed Mulena Mukwae at Nalolo, several indunas were promoted to higher titles, and a number of commoners were made minor indunas.[16]

The King's next step, according to Gluckman, was to initiate the restoration of the makolo system. The Kololo had ignored the makolo system during their rule, and neither Sipopa nor Mwanawina had tried to revive the system. Lubosi presumably believed that his predecessors were the victims of ambitious indunas who, because the makolo system was not functioning, were able to raise an army of supporters in opposition to his predecessors. By reverting to the traditional Lozi system, Lubosi is said to have hoped to deprive potentially subversive councillors of a corporate group of followers. Gluckman also states that the King proposed to allow "people" to reclaim land which had been controlled by their ancestors but which had been improperly claimed by some "great councillors" after the Kololo had been overthrown;[17] "people" presumably refers to minor indunas who were unable to resist the claims of the "great councillors" but, if Gluckman is correct, it is not clear why Lubosi wished to ingratiate the former at the expense of the latter.

Lozi themselves speak of a different reform which the King

attempted to institute. Lubosi is said to have been under the influence of Nalabutu, a very old and very conservative induna who supported him for the Kingship in the hope of gaining influence over the young man. Apparently he was successful, for Lubosi is said to have had much respect for Nalabutu's great age and experience,[18] but this may be because the old man offered the kind of advice the young king was anxious to have. Lubosi certainly may have learnt from Nalabutu the value to the reigning king of the makolo system, and Lozi informants agree that it was Nalabutu who inspired the King's plan to have indunas undertake physical labour. Nalabutu's argument was that indunas should not raid other tribes for slaves to till their fields; they should rather cultivate their own gardens in order to increase their self-respect while maintaining physical fitness. Lubosi apparently went so far as to demand that members of his personal bodyguard which included a number of famed warriors, till some of the King's land.[19] We may assume, however, that the self-respect and physical condition of his indunas were not the King's primary motive for adopting Nalabutu's suggestion; more realistically, it may simply be considered a tactic for minimizing the number of legitimate occasions they had to collect as an armed band.

These, then, were the means by which the new King hoped

to achieve his overriding objective, his own self-preservation. But inextricably connected to this goal was the preservation of his kingdom from another external invasion. To this end, a series of alliances, or at least agreements, withoutside powers seemed necessary, even if they meant an end to the traditional Lozi policy of isolationism. For in these early years of Lubosi's reign, no fewer than four alien sources - two European and two African - offered themselves as allies of the Lozi ruler. It soon became evident to him that although all of them could not be accepted, neither could all of them be rejected. Lubosis decision would rest on his assessment of which power would provide the maximum protection from outside interference with the minimum infringement of the King's own sovereignty. Indeed, it was realistic to assume that his allies might support the King against internal as well as external attacks, and the question therefore became one of potential conflict between the faction of the ruling class supporting the King and the one which soon arose wishing to see his deposition.

It is probable that Lozi foreign policy at the time of Lubosi's accession was, in general, based on the assumption that the greatest external danger to the Lozi state emanated from Lobengula's Ndebele, and that the Ngwato of Khama (in modern Botswana) were potential allies. As we have seen, throughout the years of Kololo rule the

Ndebele remained a serious threat to Barotseland.[20] Serpa Pinto reported in 1878 that King Lubosi was "not on the best of terms with the Matabele"[21], and if this was not because a direct Ndebele attack on the Barotse Valley was feared, it must at least have been based on Ndebele raids on the Ila, Tonga and Toka peoples whom the Lozi considered to be within their own sphere of influence. The Lozi found, therefore, that they shared with the Ngwato a common interest in containing Ndebele power. Although it is not clear which side initiated them, contacts between the Lozi and the Ngwato rulers apparently began shortly after Sipopa became King, and are said to have continued under Lubosi.[22] The Lozi were therefore in a position to know that Khama had applied in 1876 for British protection against the Boers,[23] and that he wished as much as they to end the threat of Ndebele raids.[24]

Khama and Lobengula thus represented two diametrically opposed policies for dealing with the ever-increasing number of white men who were appearing in south-central Africa: the first was to find an accommodation with these men, and hopefully, manipulate them and harness the power they embodied in the interests of oneself and one's state; the second was to resist them on the grounds that their superior power could result only in the undermining of one's own power and of one's state. In fact, as the

subsequent history of the Ndebele, the Ngwato and the Lozi all testify, neither resistance nor accommodation prevented the effective usurpation by white power of the sovereignty of their respective nations. But since this fact could hardly be foreseen at the time, the choice between the two conflicting policies appeared critical.

Given the traditional fear in Barotseland of the Ndebele, it was perhaps predictable that the Lozi would reject Lobengula and the policy he represented. Yet there is evidence that Lubosi briefly considered an alliance with the Ndebele. According to Frederick Arnot, a missionary who lived in Lealui between 1882 and 1884, during this period

> the chief of the Matabele sent a powerful emissary to Lubosi with presents of shields and spears, inviting him to become his blood brother and to join with the Matabele in resisting the invading white man. Lubosi was greatly delighted with the shields and inclined to accept Lobengula's advances. I was able to persuade Lubosi that ... Khama was a better man to make friends with than Lobengula .... Lubosi immediately decided to write to Khama asking for his friendship .... I wrote the letter for him ....
>
> Khama replied to Lubosi ... that he must join with him, not against the white man, but against the white man's drink if he wished to be Khama's friend.[25]

It was, of course, typical of the Europeans in Africa at this period to magnify their own influence on the peoples they

encountered, and it is difficult to credit Arnot's assertion that he talked Lubosi out of one alliance into another. It is surely more reasonable that, in the first place, Lozi distrust of the Ndebele was too deep-rooted to allow them seriously to consider an alliance between the two nations, and, in the second, that Lubosi had already understood the futility of a direct conflict with white power. Indeed, there is evidence that, on the contrary, he was fully aware of the utility both to his own position and to the security of his nation could he gain access to white guns, white trading goods and white technology. To do so, however, was no simple task, for it seems that if his councillors shared his distrust of the Ndebele, some of them were equally suspicious of the white man, in part because they feared for the sovereighty of their nation, partly because they feared white power would buttress the King's own position. Moreover, there existed the problem of determining which white men to deal with. Both these reasons help explain the ambivalent attitude towards Europeans of which so many of them during these years complained.

Serpa Pinto was the first European so to complain after Lubosi's accession. A Portuguese army officer, he is recalled in Lozi tradition as a trader who was initially welcomed because he brought flint muskets and powder as well as cloths and blankets.

But informants disagreed as to whether he exchanged his goods for slaves or for cattle and ivory; he himself denied dealing in slaves.[26] Nor is it clear why George Westbeech was not supplying the Lozi with sufficient quantities of weapons,[27] for Lubosi complained to Serpa Pinto that, "among other things, he was absolutely without powder."[28]

Serpa Pinto explained to Lubosi and Ngambela Silumbu that he was no mere merchant but a representative of the Museneputo, the King of Portugal.[29] As such, he was endeavouring to link the two Portuguese territories of Angola and Mocambique, and promised the King that if he provided troops and guides to facilitate his journey eastwards, he "would procure for him ... all the powder and other things he required". Lubosi assembled his Kuta which, "after a lengthened and heated discussion", resolved "with enthusiasm" to provide Pinto with his guides and to send a Lozi trade delegation back to Benguella in Angola.[30]

This harmonious relationship was short-lived. Soon after the Kuta meeting, rumours apparently began circulating that Pinto was in reality an ally of the exiled Mwanawina and intended to murder Lubosi. The King sent the Ngambela to order Pinto out of Barotseland, but the Portuguese threatened that the King of Portugal himself would punish Lubosi if Pinto's voyage failed. Later the

same day, the King himself came surreptitiously to Pinto's hut to say that he now agreed to furnish the traveller with guides "but that in consequence of the events that were occurring in his States, he could furnish me with no forces" nor guarantee Pinto's safety. Whether this was an allusion to a split in the Kuta over co-operation with the Portuguese or to a continuing fear of a counter-attack by Mwanawina, is in no way clear. Nor is there evidence to explain why the Ngambela, as Pinto alleged, should have been pressing the King "to order me to be put out of the way."[31]

After several false starts by land for the east, Pinto was informed that a missionary was waiting at Panda matenga, near the Victoria Falls, for permission to enter Barotseland. He resolved to find the man, but his request for canoes to travel down the river met with initial procrastination from the King. Finally a number of boats were provided, but without paddlers. Lubosi explained to him that "the elders of his council" strongly opposed the idea of providing Pinto with men, since those who had years before accompanied Livingstone to the east never returned. "He assured me," Pinto wrote, "that if it were in his power he would give me some men, but the opposition on the part of his people was great, and it was not advisable for him to run counter to it ...." Yet immediately prior to his departure, Lubosi paid the traveller a final

visit, during which he presented him with a number of his own slaves to man the canoes and an ox as provision for the voyage. Pinto "thanked him warmly and we parted the best of friends".[32]

The episode reveals that Lubosi, still in the first months of his reign, was not prepared openly to flaunt the opinions of his Kuta, yet was willing, within discreet limits, secretly to ignore those opinions. It is not clear, however, why the Kuta's original approval of Pinto's venture changed so abruptly, and why the indunas and the King differed on this matter. Pinto had been cordially greeted, as Livingstone had by the Kololo, presumably because it was thought he could prove valuable to the Lozi ruling class. Yet he was later ejected from the Kingdom, much as Sekeletu had ejected the Price expedition, on discovering that he could derive no benefit from it. But there is no evidence to indicate why Pinto was suddenly considered to be useless, not to say dangerous, to the Lozi. Perhaps the Kuta feared that Lubosi intended to monopolize the weapons which Pinto promised. Alternately, Lubosi's attempts to ingratiate himself personally with his visitor may be seen as an early indication of his determination to gain the friendship of, rather than force a confrontation with, a European power.

The split within the Lozi ruling class was again revealed when its members attempted to decide whether to permit the

missionary of whom Pinto heard to enter Barotseland. This was François Coillard, a zealous and earnest French Protestant. Born in 1834, Coillard as a young man decided to become a missionary, and joined the Paris Missionary Society.[33] As a non-Catholic organization, the Bourbon government refused to allow the PMS to work in French colonies, it therefore turned to Southern Africa, and established its first station in Basutoland in 1835. Coillard and his new wife, Christina Mackintosh, arrived in Basutoland twenty-three years later, where they remained until 1877.

In that year, the Coillards led a party of four Sotho evangelists to seek a new station, to be manned by the Sotho Christians themselves, in territory controlled by the Ndebele. Lobengula, however, refused to allow them to remain in his sphere of influence, in part no doubt because he identified the PMS with his Sotho enemies. The tiny band then made its way to the [illegible]Ngwato, where Chief Khama strongly encouraged Coillard to go to Barotseland where Sesuto was understood. Khama himself sent an envoy to Lubosi to inform him of the party's arrival. Although Coillard believed that Khama, as a Christian, was eager to further the spread of the Gospel, we may surely assume that the shrewd ruler saw this as an opportunity to establish a new link with the Lozi as against the Ndebele.[34]

Coillard's party arrived at Leshoma, on the southern bank of the Zambesi, in July 1878. They decided to cross the river, but found that the principal ford of the Zambesi at its confluence with the Chobe - the entrance to Lozi country - was guarded by three Lozi "chiefs" who refused to allow them to pass. One of the "chiefs" first "had to forward a special message, and obtain formal permission, as all entrance to their country ... is absolutely forbidden to strangers".

The Lozi, then, controlled the Zambesi at this point, but apparently Lealui did not have full control over that part of Barotseland south of the flood plain. For permission to cross soon arrived not from the capital but from Sesheke, and the party was provided with canoes and escorted up the river. At Sesheke they were warmly welcomed by the local indunas, led by the senior induna who bore the title Mulanziani (Morantsiane, Mulusiane). Here Coillard learned with dismay that Lubosi had not been forewarned of his arrival; it is not clear what happened to Khama's envoy. A new message had, therefore, to be sent to the King, and a reply awaited, for although the Sesheke indunas consistently treated the mission party with cordiality, they refused to allow Coillard to continue to Lealui without the King's permission.[35]

Serpa Pinto was still in the capital when the Kuta met to discuss Coillard's request. According to his account, a "hot

discussion" ensued, in which there was a considerable difference of opinion. He did not, however, suggest the composition of the opposing sides, though he specifically mentioned that induna Matan was most vocal in opposing Coillard's admittance. The Kuta finally agreed not to grant Coillard's request, at least for the moment.[36] The missionary received two replies from Lubosi. In the first, the King "politely refused to let me enter the country", Coillard reported, "under pretext of the civil war (with Mwanawina) which was threatening it. He sent me a tusk of ivory at the same time, evidently mistaking me for a trader". In the second, Coillard claimed, Lubosi "expressed a great desire to receive us". He suggested that if Coillard wished to leave the country before the rains began in December

> it must only be on the condition that he returned before the beginning of winter in June .... He himself was building his town (Lealui) just now, but by that time he would be in a position to receive me. He was already giving orders that, on our return, we should be brought before him without delay.[37]

Highly encouraged, Coillard returned to South Africa and left for Europe, where he attempted to raise funds to support his proposed Barotseland mission. He did not return to the Upper Zambesi until 1884.

Since Lubosi in fact warmly welcomed Coillard on his return six years later, it is probable that he was not exaggerating the enthusiasm contained in the King's letters. He was almost certainly wrong, however, in believing that the King was interested in him in his capacity as a missionary. Oral tradition is clear that the Lozi at this time were highly suspicious of any European whose motives in coming among them was not absolutely clear. In practice, this encompassed traders such as Westbeech, and a few other whites who could directly serve the interests of the ruling class, as the Kololo believed Livingstone could do. Lubosi, as Coillard recognized, mistook the missionary for a trader, and an informant told me that "All they wanted then from a white man was goods and gifts".[38]

Yet the problem was in fact far more complex than this suggests. For ultimately, the white man represented a powerful unknown factor to the Lozi. Contacts with a few whites, and above all with Khama, must have given the Lozi both respect and fear for white power. On the one hand, therefore, Coillard and Serpa Pinto alike represented a potential political threat; on the other, if the might they represented could be harnessed, it would obviously have great attraction. Moreover, Coillard in the first place had been sponsored by the famed Khama, and secondly, had among his party

several Sotho evangelists who, he observed, were unfailingly treated with "respect and esteem".[39] And the Sotho, after all, were the people from whom the Kololo had sprung.

In short, both Coillard and Serpa Pinto embodied for the Lozi a whole new world of potential allies and potential enemies. It seems likely that Lubosi decided it was worth gambling that he could manipulate them, and their power, for his own ends. For this reason, indunas like Mataa - who soon emerged as the King's greatest enemy - wished to keep them out of the Kingdom, although there apparently existed a group of traditionalist councillors, under old Nalabutu, who feared white power not because it might undermine its members' own political ambitions, but because it might destroy the Lozi nation. They were convinced, it is said, that the white man came "only to steal their country" and to take their land.[40]

During this period, as in the reigns of Sipopa and Mwanawina, George Westbeech stood unique among the white men who were allowed into Barotseland. Extravagant claims have been made of Westbeech's great political influence on the Lozi, largely on the basis of his own assertions.[41] Oral tradition, however, recalls him only as a trader who may have advised Lubosi on how to treat other Europeans,[42] and this seems more consistent with the events in which there is evidence he participated. It was his

scrupulous inpartiality in internal Lozi affairs which, we may assume, convinced the King that Westbeech's assessment of other white men could be trusted.

Before Coillard left for South Africa, he received from Westbeech a promise that he, Westbeech, would support the missionary when he returned to Barotseland from Europe. In 1881, however, a party of three Jesuits, having been forced to abandon a mission among the Plateau Tonga because of disease, attempted to found another in Barotseland itself. They apparently befriended Westbeech, with those assistance they reached Lealui where, they claimed, Lubosi welcomed them and asked them to remain in the Valley; on this basis, they left to bring up further missionaries from the south.[43]

At some point between the Jesuits' return to Pandamatenga from Lealui in October 1881, and May 1882, they had a difference of opinion with Westbeech.[44] When Frederick Arnot, a Plymouth Brethren missionary, arrived at Pandamatenga in August 1882, Westbeech agreed to help him enter Barotseland. Arnot was anxious to have the Jesuits kept out of Barotseland, and, with Westbeech's aid, was temporarily successful. The Jesuits, also in August, were unable to rent boats or porters, presumably because of Westbeech, while the trader's partner, Blockley, arranged

an easy journey to Sesheke for Arnot.[45] Westbeech preceded Arnot to Sesheke, where he acted as the missionary's interpreter, then proceeded to Lealui to seek permission from the King for Arnot to visit the capital. The trader soon wrote that the King had given his permission, "and this without much trouble".[46]

Thanks presumably to Westbeech's introduction, Arnot received a warm welcome in Lealui from the King, who provided him with a specially built hut, food in abundance, and one of his own servants.[47] The missionary remained at the Lozi capital for some eighteen months, and his account of the period makes relatively clear the reason why the King was prepared to allow him to remain. (It does not, however, reveal the attitudes to him of the Kuta members). As Lubosi explicitly explained to Arnot, the missionary's function was to teach the children of the ruling class, "to read and write, and to know numbers". For this purpose, he permitted Arnot to open a small school, which was attended by a small number of boys and young men, including the King's eldest son Litia (later King Yeta), one of his "nephews" and Litia's close friend Mokamba, son of the late Ngambela Njekwa and later himself Lubosi's Ngambela. But only practical subjects could be taught at Arnot's school; Lubosi specifically forbade him to preach the Gospel, which he clearly considered irrelevant.[48]

Nor was Arnot allowed to interfere in the social life of the community. When he confined himself to instructing the King's proteges in practical and obviously utilitarian aspects of western education, his relations with Lubosi remained warm. When he intruded in other matters, they quickly deteriorated. Thus Arnot recounts how on one occasion two men "failed" the ordeal of the boiling water test and were burnt to death. Arnot, shocked, then

> asked the King and his people to come to my yard to hear the Gospel, but he seemed annoyed at the public invitation and said I must content myself with the children ... (and) that the big people did not want to learn these things.[49]

Arnot, to be sure, believed that he had far more influence on the King than this suggests. As we have seen, he claimed for himself the considerable achievement of preventing an alliance against Europeans between the Lozi and the Ndebele, but it has already been suggested that this claim was vastly exaggerated. It is more credible, however, that Arnot was partly responsible for the failure of the Jesuit mission when it again arrived in Barotseland early in 1883. It is not clear how they succeeded in reaching the Valley, since Westbeech, so far as we can tell, was at this stage hostile to their venture. Arnot did not intend to remain in Barotseland, and repeatedly advised the King to wait for Coillard

rather than allow the Jesuits to replace him;[50] presumably Westbeech proferred similar advice. Arnot and Lozi sources both relate stories of the Jesuits' parsimoniousness and tactlessness in their distribution of gifts and other goods.[51] Years later, Arnot claimed that the accusations of greed against the Jesuits convinced the King to assemble the Kuta to discuss the matter,[52] and we must assume the Kuta decided to reject the Jesuits, since they departed shortly thereafter. In December 1883, Blockley reported to the King that the Jesuits intended to return the following year. Blockley later informed Arnot that Lubosi was determined to have nothing to do with them, saying that "Arnot is my man and he is quite enough".[53]

We can not, then, be certain why Arnot was allowed to remain in the Valley while the Jesuits were expelled. Perhaps Westbeech's influence was important, perhaps too, as Gann has suggested, the Lozi were offended that the Jesuits had first settled among the Tonga - whom the Lozi considered to be within their sphere of influence - without seeking Lealui's consent.[54] Equally, Lubosi's statement that Arnot was "quite enough" may have had several implications. He was capable alone of doing that limited practical teaching which the King deemed necessary. The King probably discovered that the Jesuits were no more likely than

Arnot to supply the arms for which, as we shall see, he had become so anxious, and could therefore be of little use to him. And, finally, it is possible that the presence of white men was adding to the tensions between the King and some of his indunas, and he was reluctant to aggravate these tensions by inviting an entire party of Jesuits to the capital.

For in October 1883, two mon ths before Blockley spoke to the King, Arnot had begun to make brief allusions to the conflict within the ruling class. He implied that the capital was virtually split between those who supported and those who opposed the King; the former virtually controlled the King, with the latter he quarrelled "almost daily": "they taunt each other, and I fear the end will be another king-killing".[55] Arnot believed that it was Lubosi's fear of being overthrown which had briefly tempted him to accept Lobengula's offer of an alliance.

> Lubosi seemed at this time (Arnot had noted) to be in a very unsettled state of mind; he had many enemies ... and some powerful rivals. My coming did not satisfy him, for I could not teach his people to make guns and powder, and it seemed (to him) a mockery to bring "mere words" to a man who needed "strong friends".

The King had gone on to remind the missionary of the fates of his two unfortunate predecessors.[56]

Arnot was not exaggerating the amount of opposition which the King faced, and Lubosi was not overstating the precariousness of his position. Each step which he had taken to secure his own position between 1878 and 1884 had resulted in the creation of a new set of enemies. He had been responsible, in the first three years of his reign, for the murders of Musiwa, his rival for the throne; a number of persons who had hidden Musiwa when he fled the King's wrath; three sons of Sipopa, as such potential rivals for the Kingship; and his own brother, whom the King believed was plotting against him.[57] Inevitably, the kin of those murdered desired vengeance, while at the same time were anxious to take steps to preclude their own deaths. Moreover, even those whose lives were not endangered are said to have resented the "unconstitutional" way in which Lubosi took these measures, that is to say, without first seeking and following the advice of his indunas on the matter.[58]

Those indunas whom Lubosi had dismissed, but not killed upon taking power, were naturally eager to recover their positions, which meant, as we have seen, not merely political influence but status, land, dependents and cattle as well. Some indunas, like Mataa, desired promotions in the hierarchy of councillors' titles. Others, who had taken possession after the Kololo overthrow of land

not formerly attached to them, naturally resented the proposal to allow such property to be reclaimed by its original owners. A number of the King's bodyguard, led by the renowned warrior Numwa, felt humiliated by Lubosi's demands that they do "women's work" in the fields.[59] And many indunas must have feared the loss of their corporate group of dependents should the King succeed in re-establishing the ancient "sector" or makolo system of administration.

Finally,[60] the ruling class was divided on the question of its policy towards Europeans. As we have seen, in the cases of Serpa Pinto, Coillard and the Jesuits, the Kuta seems to have forced the King to expel white men whom he was prepared to have in the Valley. Some indunas, like Nalabutu, are said to have opposed any and all whites remaining in Barotseland. But since, as we shall see, Lubosi's usurpers were anxious to have Coillard settle among them, there must have been another basis for the split, and this, as has already been suggested, was probably the fear among the King's enemies that, with the support of white power, they would be unable to depose him.

For, as Serpa Pinto noted, it was induna Mataa who objected most forcibly to allowing Coillard to visit Lealui in 1878,[61] the same Mataa who in 1884 organized and led the coup against the King. Mataa seems to have been riddled by insecurity, fear and ambition.

His resentment of Lubosi began early, although he apparently concealed this fact for some time. Although only a minor induna, he had probably supported Musiwa against Lubosi for the Kingship with the expectation of being appointed Musiwa's Ngambela.[62] Thwarted in this ambition, he was not assuaged by the promotion which Lubosi gave him. At the same time, Mataa must have feared that Lubosi might some day take revenge on him, not only because he supported Musiwa, but because the King seems to have believed that it was Mataa's father who had encouraged the Kololo to murder his own father.[63]

Except for his opposition to Coillard, and perhaps other whites, entering the country, Mataa's hostility towards the King was not openly manifested until, according to one informant, Lubosi "wanted to take Mataa's wife". The same informant considered that a number of indunas who backed Mataa had also been cuckolded by the King, and that "this was the main reason for the rebellion, though it is not usually told to outsiders".[64] An eye-witness also told me that Mataa sent a message to induna Mulanziani of Sesheke complaining that relations with the King had deteriorated because of Lubosi's untoward interest in his wife.[65] Lubosi's philandering, then, seems undeniable, but it can hardly be regarded as sufficient cause for overthrowing a King. It is

more plausible that Mataa used the affair as an excuse to bring his opposition to Lubosi into the open, and as a symbol of the latter's unworthiness to continue as King.

George Westbeech believed that Mataa's strength was due to his membership in what the trader called a "clan of great importance among the Barotse" called the Banosha (Bano Gha), and that it was this "clan" which "fomented" the unrest against the King.[66] According to Gluckman, however, the Lozi in fact have no clans, they have, rather "descent-names": "people sharing a single descent-name are not considered to be a group, nor do they have any specific obligations to each other ...."[67] Not being a corporate entity, these people, as groups, could consequently play only a limited part in the political or social life of the nation.[68] An informant indeed agreed that the Banosha was one of a number of families then prestigious in Barotseland, but implied - what Gluckman after all does not contradict - that though they had no specific obligations to each other, they nevertheless felt certain general ties of kinship.[69] Mulanziani of Sesheke, for example, was also a member of the Banosha; he supported Mataa against Lubosi, but not, according to his brother, because he had a familial obligation to do so; more simply, it is said, he believed he was more likely to receive the promotion he desired from his

kinsman Mataa than from Lubosi.[70] This is the most plausible way to account for the vow made by Lubosi upon recapturing the throne "to exterminate the last scion of the house of one Kuanosha".[71] It is quite likely that Westbeech, who was familiar with the Ndebele and their corporate clans, imposed the structural significance of clans upon the Lozi social system. We may reasonably think that Mataa used his family network, as in the case of Mulanziani, against the King, but the Banosha were not likely to have been the decisive factor in the rebellion's success.

Mataa's chief ally in organizing the coup was Numwa. He was one of the King's leading bodyguards, an induna of some seniority, and a warrior of renown. He apparently turned against Lubosi in protest against the new decree compelling indunas to till their own lands, and possibly feared losing some of the land he had controlled since the Kololo were overthrown. It is said too that he was alienated when the King had one of his close relatives at Nalolo murdered.[72]

Apart from these two men, it is difficult to identify other rebel leaders in Lealui. The evidence offered for the roles of a few other names is often contradictory. Jalla, for example, tells us that Mukubesa, presumably a senior induna for he is said to have had "a large following", was, apparently at the same time, an

important ally both of Lubosi and of Mataa.[73] One informant told me that Mukubesa was murdered at the beginning of the rebellion for refusing to pay proper homage to Mataa, but Coillard met Mukubesa in Lealui several months later.[74]

Whoever the leaders were, they were certainly felt by the King to be a serious threat. Arnot referred ominously to the possibility of "another king-killing" in October 1883,[75] and in May of the following year, because of increasing rumours of an impending civil war, decided to quit Barotseland.

> When I went to say good-bye (to the King, he wrote), he shook hands long and warmly, saying, "You are my friend; come back very soon. But," he added, in a tone of sadness, "you may not find me here".[76]

Lubosi acknowledged that he desperately needed "strong friends" to protect him from his enemies within the Valley,[77] and he must have been gratified when, in July 1884, a messenger from Khama arrived in the capital to announce that Coillard was about to reach the Zambesi. Coillard was now considered to represent not only the distant white power structure; since the messenger came from Khama, who was supporting the missionary, Lubosi probably believed that Coillard's presence might act as a deterrent to precipitate action by Mataa and his followers. For the King sent instructions that Coillard be brought to the capital "at once" and canoes were sent to Sesheke to expedite his passage. According to

the missionary, however, on the very date the canoes arrived,

> the rumour spread that the Matabele had crossed the Zambesi, and there was universal panic .... All prepared to flee .... The canoes which were to have brought us to the King were laden with ivory to buy powder and guns from Mr. Blockley (Westbeech's partner) ....[78]

Although no invasion in fact took place, the King and much of the Kingdom were diverted from their other concerns, and Mataa and Numwa might have chosen that propitious moment to put their plot into effect. Alternately, the King about this time is said to have "rebuked Mataa for his pride and independence, and even went so far as to say to him: 'You are the man who will kill me in the end'."[79] These words, if they were in fact ever spoken, may have acted as a self-fulfilling prophecy, convincing Mataa that he must act lest the King try first to eliminate him.

Whatever the immediate cause, late in August 1884, Mataa's men surrounded the palace in Lealui, and, though they failed to kill the King, forced him to flee. With a small entourage which included his son Litia, Lubosi made his way south-west to the Mashi people along the Kwando (Mashi) River. Here he was joined by Ngambela Silumbu and Litia's friend Mokamba, who had similarly managed to elude their persuers. The exiles remained in a small camp near the river for two or three months, before moving west to the Okavangu (Kwito River) where the local chief,

Libebe, agreed to give them refuge.

While they were at their new camp, Lubosi's sister Matauka, the Mulena Mukwae of Nalolo, succeeded in escaping from Mataa's village where she had been held captive. She too reached the Mashi with a group which included a number of loyal indunas and headmen, some of whom she sent ahead to her brother with the message that "Barotseland is divided, many of the people, especially those of the south (i.e. the southern half of the flood plain), long for you. Let the chief but return and we will fight for him and slay Mataa".[80]

This assessment of the division of the country was, so far as the evidence reveals, substantially accurate. There is no indication that people divided along the lines of political organization, for one aspect of the genius of that organization was that ordinary Lozi had conflicting ties of allegiance - to the induna who headed their sector (makolo), to the silalo induna who controlled the land upon which they lived and worked, to a large number of kin. Gluckman explicitly states that "People in the same sector and land-district, even in the same family, supported different parties, and each party had supporters in all sectors of the Lozi people".[81]

There is some evidence, however, to support Gluckman's suggestion that one possible division was based on a person's

attachment either to the King's capital at Lealui or to the capital of the Mulena Mukwae at Nalolo.[82] The very fact that Lubosi was physically forced to flee his own capital is a telling indication of the strength and organization of Mataa's supporters. All my informants agreed that the latter included a large majority, perhaps three-quarters, of the indunas in Lealui, though they offered contradictory opinions as regards the attitudes of ordinary Lozi in the capital.[83]

Mataa's men also quickly took control of Nalolo, the capital of the south of the Valley, from Nalolo to Senanga. Lubosi's sister was deposed as Mulena Mukwae by a group apparently led by her Sambi, the Nalolo counterpart of the King's Ngambela. The only reason offered to explain why the Sambi, Kalaluka, turned against his princess chief is that he was a friend of Mataa's.[84] There are also contradictory versions of the role played in this drama by her Ishee Kwandu (Prince Consort): Jalla was told that he helped plan her overthrow because he was jealous of her,[85] but an informant told me that the Sambi killed the Prince Consort.[86] I was unable to discover evidence to clarify this contradiction.

Though Mataa controlled the institutions of Nalolo, he seems to have been unable to subdue the considerable number of opponents of his regime who remained in the area. That there was more general hostility to the rebels in the south than in the Lealui area,

the north of the Valley, is not surprising given the traditional competitive relationship between the two capitals.[87] As one informant put it, "The Nalolo people led the opposition to Mataa because he had not consulted them before overthrowing the King".[88] Lubosi's father had been from the north and his mother from the south, and another informant said that, unlike his predecessor, he had been "kind" to the people in both areas.[89] Jalla's informants told him that, before the rebellion, Mataa had urged the King to "make war on the people of the south because they had stood by Mwanawina, but the chief had demurred, saying: 'They are just as much my people as any others'. This speech won the hearts of the people of the south".[90]

Whatever their motive, southerners were the first overtly to challenge the legitimacy of the rebellion. A group from the Nalolo-Senanga area marched to Lealui to protest against Lubosi's deposition; threatened by Mataa, they returned to their homes, confirmed enemies of the new regime.[91]

It is perhaps worth emphasizing that the "south" did not at this time include the present southernmost district of Barotse Province, Sesheke. The "south" referred only to the southern half of the flood plain - "Barotse-land proper" or Bulozi. Not until 1886, when Lewanika sent his sister's son to be senior induna of

the area, did Sesheke come to be considered an integral part of Bulozi. The home of the Subiya and, to a lesser extent, the Totela and Toka peoples, the Sesheke region was merely one of many in which Lozi influence was maintained through a representative induna appointed by the King to assure the regular contribution of tribute and to prevent outside interference. During the Kololo hegemony, in order to prevent Ndebele penetration of Barotseland through Sesheke, the Kololo appointed over the area a chief entitled Mulanziani; his powers were rather greater than those which the Lozi representative had wielded, and, under him, the Kololo consolidated their authority over the smaller Sesheke tribes. This tightened control was retained by Sipopa, save that the Kololo chief was replaced by a group of indunas under a senior induna, all appointed by him.[92] These indunas, then, were dependent upon the King, who had appointed them but could equally dismiss them. Nevertheless, they had a certain independent authority for, as we have seen, they allowed Coillard to come to Sesheke in 1878 without first seeking the King's permission, though they refused to allow him to travel to Lealui without Lubosi's approval. They were independent, in short, in those affairs which did not directly affect Barotseland proper. And if in theory it appeared that Sesheke thus had inherent fissionary potential, in fact the greater power of the

forces controlling the Valley was sufficient to prevent such a development except, as we shall see, for a somewhat obscure incident in 1888.

As senior induna of Sesheke, Sipopa selected Kalimukwa, who retained the title Mulanziani. When Kalimukwa died, his son Sitwala was chosen by Lubosi to succeed as Mulanziani. By a coincidence which was to have far-reaching consequences, Kalimukwa was the brother of Mataa's father; Mataa and Sitwala were therefore first cousins.[93] When the news of Lubosi's flight reached Sesheke in September 1884, Coillard was present. According to his account, "The lords of Sesheke could not contain their delight" at the fall of the King.[94] Nor did he sense any discord among the local indunas when he returned to Sesheke in December after a brief visit to the south.[95] Yet all my own informants independently agreed that the majority of the Sesheke indunas, with the exception of Sitwala Mulanziani himself, were allies of Lubosi.[96]

According to his brother, Sitwala was "only interested in power"; his real grievance was Lubosi's refusal to recognize him as a member of the royal family descended from King Ngalama. He and Mataa, his first cousin, were on "good terms" and had been in "constant communication" for some time prior to the rebellion. One of Mataa's messages informed Sitwala that Lubosi wished to

steal his (Mataa's) wife, and asked Sitwala to "spread the word that Lubosi is a bad King". At the news of the rebellion, Sitwala Mulanziani immediately pledged his allegiance to the new rulers, apparently expecting to be recognized as a royal and, perhaps, believing he had some chance himself to become King.[97]

Those indunas who remained loyal during the rebellion to Lubosi are said to have done so in gratitude for his confirmation of their appointments when he initially came to the throne.[98] The reason Coillard was unable to detect this cleavage within the Sesheke council seems to be, simply, that the loyalists gave de facto support, however reluctantly, to the new regime. As the Mulanziani's brother told me, "They all feared Sitwala because he was so powerful", and he compared the situation to "the way a few white colonial servants were never attacked when they ruled Northern Rhodesia".[99] In short, because he was supported by the new controllers of the Lozi power apparatus, open opposition by indunas to Sitwala and Mataa would have led to the withdrawal of their titles and, perhaps, to their deaths. And, since Sesheke in any event exercised a kind of self-government in local matters, the change in leadership at the capital would not have had a direct impact on the Sesheke indunas.

For as always in the history of Barotseland, the significant political activity was concentrated in the capital and in the Valley surrounding it. Mataa had quickly begun to consolidate his position. A rebel, not arevolutionary (following Gluckman's distinction[100]) he dared not antagonize his followers by making himself, a commoner, the King. Only a royal could aspire to the sancrosanct institution of the Kingship, and Mataa therefore summoned Tatila Akafuna, grandson of Mulambwa and son of Imbua, from the Lukwakwa where Akafuna was ruler (unrecognized by Lealui) of a small community of Lozi refugees. Mataa, however, intended personally to rule; his King would merely reign. Akafuna, having lived outside the Kingdom, lacked the land and the dependents which normally attached to princes, and had therefore no independent power base in Barotseland. He was totally dependent on, and in effect the puppet of, Mataa, who became his Ngambela. Mataa further protected his position by having Akafuna appoint Mataa's followers to the senior indunaships, while he hoped to control the south - the Nalolo-Senanga area - by having Lubosi's sister replaced as Mulena Mukwae of Nalolo by Afakuna's sister, Maibiba. At the same time, he is said to have murdered a large number of the deposed King's kinsmen and supporters,[101] though as we have seen, he did not liquidate all of Lubosi's followers in the south.

Once the machinery of government was in the control of his own people, Mataa sent for Coillard, who was camped with his party at Leshoma south of the Zambesi. Coillard received Mataa's message early in December 1884, only some three months after the coup.

> He wishes to see us (the missionary reported) even before (he sees) the lesser chiefs of the country, hoping, he says, that we may be able to give him good advice, to guide him in the exercise of the power confided to him. Two bands of messengers have arrived at Sesheke, each with more pressing messages (for us) than the last. The chiefs of Sesheke have sent them on to us, without losing any time, and ... they have sent twenty young men to carry out baggage.[102]

With the help of canoes and food provided by the Sesheke indunas,[103] Coillard proceeded up the river without incident or interference. He reached Nalolo early in 1885, where the new Mukwae received him "with the greatest affability".[104] Three days later, the missionary saw Lealui for the first time. "What desolation !" Only Paris under the Commune seemed an adequately horrific comparison with this town which had been "reduced to cinders".[105] The desolation, however, did not preclude him from receiving "a grand official reception" attended by "the young king", the Ngambela, and "the great number of the most important chiefs". Mataa welcomed Coillard warmly :

> ... it is with joy that we see your faces (the Ngambela declared), and hear you say that you have now come, not merely to visit us, but to live among us with your families .... The nation is weary; it sighs for peace, it languishes. Here it is; we place it before you; save it. You see, the king is only a child; be his father; uphold him with your counsels.[106]

Mataa then accompanied Coillard to Sefula village, about twenty miles south of Lealui, where he offered a site for a mission station which Coillard accepted. The latter than returned to fetch the rest of his party from Leshoma.[107]

Coillard's meeting with Mataa and Akafuna had been undertaken against the advice of Westbeech, who had warned him that the situation in the Valley was extremely unstable, and that if Lubosi succeeded in retrieving the throne he would obviously resent the fact that the missionary had negotiated with his usurpers.[108] As shall be seen, Coillard later paid for ignoring this prudent advice. Nor was he more sensitive to the real factors which surely led to him warm welcome by Mataa. He was convinced that "the country is decidedly open to us" because the Lozi needed the word of the Gospel.[109] "They know we speak of peace," he wrote, "and it is that which ... opens their hearts to us".[110]

It is true that Coillard consistently emphasized that the bringing of peace - the Lord's peace - was among the major purposes of his mission. Perhaps the Lozi indeed believed that this white man -

with his cameras and magic lantern - possessed certain mystical powers by which peace and stability could be achieved. But it is more plausible that Mataa was merely adopting for his own ends Lubosi's tactic of using the missionary to secure his own position. Sponsored by Khama, again accompanied by Sotho evangelists who were once more treated with deference,[111] the representative, so it must have appeared, of the entire white power structure, Coillard must have seemed to Mataa, as he had to Lubosi, the man who was capable of helping him remain in power.

Certainly the stability of the new regime seemed uncertain. After only a short time in Lealui, and with the rebellion barely six months past, Coillard noted that

> I cannot rid myself of the impression that a new revolution is being prepared; it is impossible for Afakuna to remain on the throne for very long .... Discontent is already making itself felt. Some regret the expelled King; others think of a new chief.[112]

The missionary believed he understood the basis for the discontent. He described Mataa as being "blinded by ambition", blatantly manipulating Akafuna, while

> The King is a beardless boy, born and brought up in exile. He is a perfect stranger among the tribes who have called him to govern them, and does not yet speak the (local) language .... To him power means pleasure, and he occupies himself very little with business.[113]

The opposition in the capital, however, remained latent. But that of the south - the Nalolo-Senanga area - now became manifest. Mataa's representatives in Nalolo were unable either to eliminate or to pacify Lubosi's supporters. In March 1885, with the aim of restoring Lubosi to the throne, but not at Lubosi's command, they first mobilized as a fighting unit under Simasiku Mutemwa, brother of the deposed Mokwae of Nalolo. They advanced to within a few miles of Lealui, where they confronted and were defeated by a larger force under Numwa.[114] Two months later they struck again, but were once more driven off.

Neither of these unsuccessful forays on behalf of Lubosi had been made with his direct encouragement. During the first, he and his band were at their refuge on the Okavangu (Kwito) River. Shortly thereafter, his sister, the deposed Mukwae of Nalolo, reached the Mashi River, and sent a message to Lubosi that, if "the chief but return ... we will fight for him and slay Mataa". Lubosi was "greatly comforted" by this loyalty, and returned to rejoin his sister at the Mashi around May 1885, probably about the time of the second unsuccessful attack on the capital.[115] No source indicates the numerical strength of this coterie of exiles.

It can be inferred from Jalla that Lubosi was not yet willing personally to fight for his throne. He agreed only under pressure,

apparently, that an expedition should return to the Valley. According to an informant, he would not lead this force because he was "still frightened",[116] and Lubosi's Ngambela, Silumbu, was instead placed in command. A messenger was sent ahead to prepare the "southern people", who were assembled when Silumbu's contingent reached the Zambesi below Senanga in July 1885. The combined forces moved up the plain, meeting no opposition until it had very nearly reached the capital. For reasons nowhere stated, Mataa's men are said to have been taken entirely by surprise and were forced to flee, and Silumbu was able to regain control of Lealui without a struggle.[117]

While the Ngambela sent word to Lubosi and his sister Matauka to return, Mataa, Akafuna, and a number of indunas retreated north to the Lukwakwa. This area was now controlled by Sikufele, son of the brother of Imbua, and hence Akafuna's first cousin. Mataa said to have appealed to Sikufele for assistance, but the Lukwakwa chief apparently refused to ally himself with Akafuna. Mataa thereupon discarded his puppet king, and he and Numwa prevailed upon a very reluctant Sikufele to claim the throne. Leaving his son Sikufele Fumiko in his own place as ruler of the Lukwakwa, Sikufele moved south with his own troops under the command of Mataa and Numwa.[118]

They arrived outside Lealui in November 1885, only to learn that Lubosi and his sister had also just reached the capital. So far as the very scanty evidence allows a judgment, it appears that the two sides were more or less evenly matched, although Lubosi's army at first seemed to be on the verge of defeat. Lubosi himself later admitted that he was saved only by the intervention of a band of armed Mambari traders, whom he wooed with the promise of special trading privileges in the future. By the end of the day, after seven hours of fierce fighting in which Silumbu, Sikufele, Mataa and Numwa all fell, the issue was resolved, and Lubosi reclaimed his throne.[119]

He now received the sobriquet "Lewanika" - meaning "to join, to add together" - but he seems to have been far from convinced that his Kingdom was yet adequately "joined together". It is said that the bitterness of fifteen months in exile - and perhaps the guilt of having played such an equivocal personal role in the counter-rebellion - left Lewanika "thirsty for vengeance".[120] Even my informants who admire him as their greatest king believe that he now acted mercilessly in relentless pursuit of all the members of Mataa's family. They were hunted down, according to one informant, "like animals", and even Mataa's mother was drowned.[121]

Nor was Mataa's first cousin in Sesheke ignored. As we have seen, the indunas at Sesheke had remained, on the surface at least, united in their loyalty to Mataa while he remained Ngambela. About mid-August, they received the news that Lubosi's Ngambela had forced Mataa to flee to the Lukwakwa, but that the latter was mobilizing his supporters for a final confrontation.[122] According to rumours reaching Westbeech at Leshoma, a number of Sesheke indunas, perhaps a minority and presumably under Mulanziani, wished to join with Mataa against Lubosi's men, but the remainder refused "as they had not been called to assist when he was driven out last year".[123] The latent division within the Sesheke council now finally manifested itself, and in the most extreme manner possible: an actual physical split occurred. Both sides evacuated the village, Lubosi's adherents moving out onto islands in the Zambesi, Mataa's setting up temporary huts a little to the east.[124]

This was the situation Coillard found when he returned from Kazangula to Sesheke towards the end of September 1885. As he acknowledged, "Our arrival here did not alter the state of things in any way. The chiefs (of both camps) showed us much deference ... but all our efforts towards a reconciliation proved abortive".[125] According to Westbeech, however, Mulanziani was sending him

messages to Leshoma "begging me to go and try and settle their differences".[126] The trader agreed to intervene, and arrived at Sesheke probably late in November. He remained there for a week, "but," he admitted, "could effect nothing satisfactory" since both sides "refuse to return (to the village) before they learn that things are satisfactorily settled in the Barotse valley"; he therefore returned to Leshoma.[127]

Coillard, however, remained in Sesheke. It was soon learned that Lewanika had regained his throne, and during December, several messengers arrived, each summoning Coillard and Mulanziani to the capital and at the same time assuring the latter that "a general amnesty" had been proclaimed. Near the end of the month, a new induna arrived in Sesheke, claiming to have instructions from the King to escort Coillard to the capital. "Would you believe that all this was only to hide a plot?" For, several days later, Lewanika's men suddenly "fell upon the Morantsiane's village, and there gave themselves up to rob and murder to their heart's content".[128] Mulanziani himself, though pursued, managed to escape east to Toka country in what is now Zambia's Southern Province.[129]

Presumably, this attack resulted in the two parties again separating into their different camps. For Westbeech, in response

to further pleas (from unspecified persons), returned to Sesheke, probably in January 1886; his diary entries are not dated. He claims that he then " saw all the Chiefs at a big Palaver which I held", and told them they must all return to the village as a sign that they accepted Lewanika; those who refused would be considered disloyal and would face "my hunters armed with Breech loaders .... This had the desired effect and the next day they commenced bringing their cattle in and making the town habitable."[130]

This was the second time in these months that Westbeech and Coillard were, on their own evidence, at Sesheke at the same time. Yet at no time during this period do the writings of either man ever allude to the presence of the other. Moreover, my Sesheke informants explicitly denied having any knowledge of Westbeech's self-proclaimed role in this crisis.[131] It is hardly plausible that either the missionary or the trader merely invented all the events they recorded, but it is quite possible that the latter grossly exaggerated, as he tended to do, his own role in them - the role of the lone civilized white man bringing order and stability to the savage natives.

In any event, the important fact now was that the King had succeeded in dislodging from their positions of power and influence all those who had supported his usurpers during the rebellion.

As we shall see, Lewanika was profoundly impressed by the traumatic events of the previous year and a half. They seemed to suggest that new circumstances had arisen in which a reign of fifty years, such as Mulambwa had enjoyed, was no longer possible for a Lozi king functioning independently within his personal empire. For isolationism itself was no longer feasible. The external threat from the Ndebele, the increased accessibility of arms, the penetration by white Portuguese from the north-west and white Englishmen and Frenchmen from the south - all tended to weaken those elements in the Lozi political structure which had once allowed Mulambwa to satisfy most of his subjects and to eliminate as a threat those whose ambitions were not fulfilled. The successful re-establishment of the makolo system was a long-run project; in the short run, it merely alienated, as the King learned to his cost, those indunas who would lose by it their corporate body of followers. He could, therefore, not again attempt to re-introduce the system, even if failing to do so left potential rivals with a potentially dangerous number of dependents. Moreover, what was to prevent such rivals from, say, coming to terms with some white men and together attempting a new coup? Like all men of power, Lewanika's first priority was

to safeguard his own position, and his experiences had suggested to him a means by which he hoped to achieve this goal.

REFERENCES

Chapter 2

1. Gluckman, Seven Tribes, p.42.

2. Chief Liatitima and Mr. Simalumba

3. See Chapter 1

4. Adolph Jalla, Lewanika - Roi des Ba-Rotsi (Geneva, 1902), p.3; Jalla, History of the Barotse Nation, pp.40-1.

5. Ishee Kwandu, The Origin of the Lozi Chieftainship, ch.15.

6. Jalla, History, op.cit., and Mr. Mupatu. This portrait of the young Lubosi, before he was corrupted by power is, of course, suspiciously ideal. Jalla's sources were the King himself and his advisers. Mr. Mupatu is a conservative and upholder of Lozi tradition as against the Zambian government. Yet there is no evidence to challenge their verdict. One has, therefore, little alternative but to record it while emphasising the biassed nature of the sources.

7. Unsigned note in News from Barotseland, No. 15, May 1902, p.3.

8. Mr. Mupatu

9. Jalla, History, p.41.

10. Ishee Kwandu, op.cit., and Mr. N. Zaza.

11. Mr. Simalumba

12. Mr. N. Zaza

13. Serpa Pinto, How I Crossed Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean through Unknown Countries (2 Vols., London, 1881), Vol. II, p.7.

14. Coillard; Journal, 14 Oct. 1878.

15. None of my informants was able to provide data about the backgrounds of these men.

16. Jalla, op.cit., p.41.

17.1 Gluckman, Jurisprudence, pp.69-70. This critical point is not suggested in any other source, written or oral, and Gluckman unfortunately never elaborated upon it in his other works.

18. Mr. N. Zaza, who married into Nalabutu's family.

19. Messrs. Zaza, Simalumba and Mupatu; Ishee Kwandu, op.cit. Gluckman also heard the story, see his "Barotse Civil Wars and the World War, 1939-43", in Mutende, undated typewritten mss. at Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI), Lusaka.

20. See Chapter 1.

21. Serpa Pinto, op.cit., Vol. II, p.28.

22. Mr. Zaza.

23. I. Schapera, The Tswana (London, 1953), p.16, and Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories, P.5. The High Commission Territories (London, 1953), p.189.

24. Richard Brown, "Aspects of the Scramble for Matabeleland", in Stokes and Brown (ed.), The Zambesian Past, p.70.

25. Cited in E. Baker, The Life and Explorations of F. S. Arnot (London, 1921), p.97.

26. Serpa Pinto, op. cit., Vol. II, p.10. Mr. Simalumba insists that the truth is that Lewanika and his indunas exchanged their slaves for guns, "even if many people do not like to admit it". The more conservative Mr. Mupatu believed only a few Lozi ever sold slaves.

27. Unfortunately Westbeech's diary covers only a brief period in the mid-1880's.

28. Serpa Pinto, op. cit., p.10.

29. Ibid., p.6.

30. Ibid., pp.9-11.

31. Ibid., pp.22-49. My informants were unable to clarify this problem.

32. Ibid., pp.52-71.

33. The French name is the Societé des Missions Evangeliques. This paper will follow the universal Lozi custom of referring to it by its English name or initials, PMS.

34. Francois Coillard, On the Threshold of Central Africa (2nd edition, London, 1902), pp.31-57; C. W. Mackintosh, Coillard of the Zambesi (London, 1907), pp.3-31, 41-5, 140-3, 237-50, 254-65; Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, pp.42-4.

35. Coillard, op. cit., pp.53-61.

36. Serpa Pinto, op. cit., p.59 and 100.

37. Coillard, op. cit., pp.61-5.

38. Mr. Mupatu.

39. Coillard, op. cit., p.177.

40. Mr. Simalumba.

41. See, for e.g. Tabler's introduction to his Trade and Travel in Early Barotseland, pp.7-8.

42. Messrs. Zaza and Simalumba independently made this suggestion.

43. H. Depelchin and C. Croonenberghs, Trois Ans dans l'Afrique Australe (2 Vols., Brussels, 1882-3), Vol. II, pp.431-3. But Westbeech claimed that, because of his promise to Coillard, he refused to assist the Jesuits, even though they offered him £500 to do so. Westbeech Diary, Folio 75, NAR. Historical Mss. WE 1/2/1.

44. Letter by Fr. P. Prestage, 30 May 1882, cited in The Zambesi Mission Record, Vol. II, p.342.

45. Depelchin and Croonenberghs, op.cit., p.342; Robert I. Rotberg, Christian Missionaries and the Creation of Northern Rhodesia, 1880-1924. (Princeton, 1965), p.14; F. S. Arnot, Garenganze, or Seven Years Pioneer Mission Work in Central Africa (London, 1889), pp.50-1.

46. Arnot, op.cit., p.62. Arnot provided a classical missionary comment on his time in Sesheke. "I have spent a pleasant week here," he wrote, "and get on well among the people .... The people like to come and hear me read (a Tswana translation of the Bible) .... Their ignorance, to a man, is absolute, and their depravity complete". Ibid., pp.53-4.

47. Ibid., p.66, and Baker, Life of Arnot, p.67.

48. Arnot, op.cit., pp.70, 72-4, 81 and Baker, op.cit., p.70.

49. Arnot, op.cit., p.92.

50. Ibid., p.72.

51. Jalla, Lewanika, pp.4-5; Arnot, op.cit., pp.79-80; Messrs. Mupatu and Zaza, who are not likely to have read Jalla's Lewanika. Both had read Jalla's History, however, and Mr. Zaza had read Mackintosh's Coillard, but the story of the Jesuits' greed are recorded in neither.

52. V. Ellenberger to Director, 28 Feb. 1914, PMS Paris Archives, Lettres Recues (hereafter PMSP), 1914.

53. Cited in Baker, op. cit., p.83.

54. Gann, op. cit., p.46.

55. Arnot, op. cit., p.91.

56. Ibid., p.97.

57. Ishee Kwandu, op. cit., ch.15; Jalla, History, p.41; Jalla, Lewanika, p.4; Machintosh, Lewanika, p.19; Messrs. Mupatu, Simalumba and Zaza.

58. Messrs. Zaza and Mupatu and former Ngambela Wina.

59. Mr. Zaza.

60. Lubosi himself later claimed that excessive beer-drinking among indunas was the decisive cause of the rebellion (Lewanika to Wallace, 3 Aug, 1909. NAZ. B1/2/292 and Jalla, History, p.42) and several of my informants repeated this belief (Messrs. Simalumba, Mupatu and Zaza). This argument is entirely unconvincing, but it well suits Lozi purposes. First, there is the implication that excessive drinking was symptomatic of a society in general decay, and consequently the overthrow of the great Lewanika (as all my informants considered him) need not be seen as evidence of the incompetence or wickedness of his rule. Secondly, Lozi generally agree that the Kololo introduced strong beer into Barotseland; prior to their time, it is said, the Lozi only drank a mild, non-intoxicating beer. This again implies that external factors were responsible for the deposition of the King, who was personally undeserving of such treatment.

61. Serpa Pinto, op. cit., p.59.

62. Mr. Mupatu and Jalla, History, p.41.

63. Jalla, op. cit., p.41 and Mr. Simalumba.

64. Mr. Simalumba. Mr. Zaza also said that Lubosi's "interest in Mataa's beautiful wife set off the spark of the rebellion".

65. Mr. L. B. Kalimukwe, who was the brother of Sitwala Mulanziani. Mr. Kalimukwe was born in the early years of Sipopa's reign. Although he is about 100 years old, blind and virtually incapacitated, he satisfactorily responded to several control questions which established his credibility as a witness.

66. Westbeech Diary, NAR, and "Part of a Diary" (RLI mss.), pp. 14-6; there are slight variations in these two copies of Westbeech's diary. Gann accepts Westbeech's judgment uncritically; op. cit., p. 47.

67. Gluckman, "Kinship and Marriage among the Lozi of Northern Rhodesia and the Zulu of Natal", in A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and D. Forde (ed.), African Systems of Kinship and Marriage (London, 1965), p. 166 and 172; and Gluckman, Seven Tribes, p. 73.

68. Radcliffe-Brown "Introduction" to African Systems of Kinship and Marriage, p. 41. The Lozi meet none of the criteria he suggests for judging whether a group may be considered corporate.

69. Much as, say, a businessman in Britain might hire a nephew or in-law to whom he has no specific obligation. The informant was Mr. Mupatu, who considered himself a member of the Banosha. This fact emerged, however, only when I questioned him about this "clan" when we discussed Mataa and the rebellion. He did not himself mention it when he originally gave me his autobiography.

70. Mr. Kalimukwe.

71. Coillard, Journal, 4 May 1886.

72. Mr. Zaza.

73. Jalla, History, p. 41 and 43.

74. Mr. Zaza; Coillard, Journal, 11 Jan. 1885.

75. Arnot, op. cit., p. 91.

76. Ibid., p. 95.

77. Ibid., p. 97.

78. Coillard, Journal, 9 Aug. 1884; also Coillard, Threshold, pp. 146-7.

79. Jalla, History, p. 42.

80. Ibid., pp. 45-9; Westbeech, "Part of a Diary", p. 14.

81. Gluckman, Economy, p. 96.

82. Gluckman, Seven Tribes, p. 17.

83. Messrs. Mupatu, Zaza and Simalumba.

84. Jalla, History, p. 43, and Mr. Zaza.

85. Jalla, History, p. 43.

86. Mr. Zaza.

87. Gluckman, Seven Tribes, p. 27.

88. Mr. Simalumba.

89. Mr. Zaza.

90. Jalla, History, p. 42.

91. Ibid., p. 43, says the marchers were led by "southern indunas", but Messrs. Simalumba, Mupatu and Zaza all independently claimed that the delegation consisted of ordinary Lozi under Muimui who is not mentioned by Jalla. It is difficult to believe that indunas supporting the exiled King were allowed to retain their positions.

92. Mr. Kalimukwa, whose father and brother successively held the position of Mulanziani; Mr. M. Libati, who succeeded both his grandfather and father as a Sesheke induna; Mr. M. Kawana, the son of the induna Kawana whom Coillard found in Sesheke in 1878; Mr. Mupatu, son of the brother of induna Munyinda whom Coillard met in Sesheke at that time.

93. Mr. Kalimukwa.

94. Coillard, Journal, 4 Sept 1884.

95. Ibid., 7 Dec 1884, and Coillard, Threshold, p.157.

96. All the informants named in fn. 91, including Mr. Kalimukwa, who was in Sesheke with his brother at the time.

97. Mr. Kalimukwa. It is fair to record that Mr. Kalimukwa revealed during our interview an intense resentment of his late brother, and may therefore have exaggerated Sitwala's lust for power. Three other informants, however - Messrs. Kawana, Mukali Mutemwa and Zaza - offered similar explanations of Sitwala's position.

98. Mr. Kawana (see fn. 91).

99. Mr. Kalimukwa. Another obvious parallel is with white civil servants in Rhodesia who opposed UDI but did not resign their positions when independence was declared.

100. Gluckman, Seven Tribes, p.23.

101. Jalla, op. cit., p.43.

102. Coillard, Journal, 9 Dec 1884.

103. Ibid., 10 Dec 1884

104. Ibid., 5 Jan 1885

105. Ibid., 1 Jan 1885

106. Ibid., 11 Jan. 1885; also Edouard Favre, François Coillard, Missionaire au Zambèze, 1882-1904 (3 Vols. Paris, 1913), Vol. 3, p.108.

107. Coillard, Threshold, pp.176-7; Favre, op.cit., p.111.

108. Westbeech, "Part of a Diary", p.8.

109. Favre, op.cit., p.108.

110. Ibid., p.112.

111. Coillard, Threshold, p.177.

112. Coillard, Journal, 19 Jan. 1885.

113. Coillard, Threshold, p.179. Messrs. Mupatu, Simalumba and Zaza all agreed that Mataa was a "treacherous" (Mr. Zaza) and "autocratic" (Mr. Mupatu) ruler. But it is questionable that their testimonies can be regarded as independent, since not only is this assessment of Mataa enshrined in Jalla (History, p.44), but all these informants were basically prejudiced in favour of Lubosi. There is no apparent reason, on the other hand, why Coillard should have been interested in exaggerating the hostility towards Mataa and Akafuna.

114. Westbeech, "Part of a Diary", pp.14-15; Jalla, History, p.44; Messrs. Mupatu and Simalumba.

115. Jalla, op.cit., pp.45-9; Coillard, Threshold, p.188; Favre, op.cit., p.123; Westbeech, op.cit., p.14; Messrs. Mupatu and Simalumba.

116. Mr. Simalumba.

117. Jalla, op.cit., pp.49-50; Westbeech, op.cit., p.15; Messrs. Mupatu, Zaza and Simalumba.

118. Jalla, op.cit., p.51.

119. Ibid., pp.51-2; Westbeech, op.cit., p.16; Westbeech to J. Fairbairn, 9 May 1886, NAR Hist. Mss. HM Hole Papers. HO 1/3/1, folios 5-6; Coillard, Threshold, p.199; Mackintosh, Coillard, p.324; Messrs. Mupatu, Simalumba and Zaza.

120. Jalla, Lewanika, p.12; also Jalla, History, p.52.

121. Mr. Simalumba; also Mr. Mupatu. It is true that both these men had read Jalla's History. But they are both amateur historians who have heard the tales of many older Lozi who could not have read Jalla, and as admirers of the King, they might have been expected to report accounts which conflicted with Jalla's. Westbeech informed J. Fairbairn, 9 May 1886, op. cit., that Mataa's supporters were being slaughtered, but he had not personally witnessed the events.

122. Coillard received the news at Kazangula on 21 August. Coillard, Journal, 21 Aug. 1885.

123. Westbeech Diary, NAR, folio 8.

124. Ibid., folio 10, and Coillard, Journal, 24 Sept. 1885. Coillard's information derived from his young assistant Jeanmairet, who preceded him to Sesheke.

125. Coillard, Threshold, pp.200-1; Coillard, Diary, 4 Nov. 1885.

126. Westbeech to Willie?, 16 Nov. 1885, NAR Hist. Mss. Westbeech Papers. WE 1/1/1, folio 3.

127. Westbeech, "Part of a Diary", RLI, p.9.

128. Coillard, Threshold, pp.204-6, and Coillard, Journal, 27 and 28 Dec. 1885.

129. Mr. Kalimukwa, his brother, who fled with him.

130. Westbeech, "Part of a Diary", p.9.

131. Mr. Kalimukwa; Mr. Kawana, whose father was an induna at Sesheke from the end of Sipopa's reign to the beginning of the twentieth century; Mr. Libati, whose grandfather became a Sesheke induna early in the 1890's.

Chapter 3

THE SCRAMBLE FOR PROTECTION

I

Many African peoples during the imperialist scramble for Africa had white domination thrust upon them. Some asked for, and quickly received, European protection. A few, however, had to plead and importune before a white nation paid them heed. Lobengula was killed because he acceded to the demands of his warriors that he expel the unwanted white man from Matabeleland. Khama invited British protection, and exploited it to secure his own position. Lewanika too requested British protection; this request very nearly led to his overthrow again, and because his "protectors" took a decade to materialize, his position during that period remained extremely insecure.

During the first half of the 1880's, the two policies which would characterize Lewanika's Kingship had begun to crystallize. The "politics of survival"[1] which he adopted followed the pattern of the Ngwato and Ganda, rather than that of the Ndebele and Yao. Lewanika's chosen weapon by which to resist the military superiority of encroaching white power was accommodation rather than confrontation.

He would seek the protection of a European nation to safeguard himself against internal opposition and his Kingdom against an Ndebele invasion. And by attaining for his sons and the sons of his trusted councillors a European education, he hoped to create a loyal elite capable of preventing his white protectors from usurping his sovereighty and competent to build in Barotseland a modern, developed nation.

It was perhaps in the nature of things that Lewanika's dynamic policy encountered a certain amount of internal opposition. In his capacity as King, he tended to be more concerned with the wider national interests of Barotseland than were some of his councillors, as, for example, Lobengula was vis-a-vis his indunas.[2] Neither written sources nor oral traditions supply sufficient data to allow a precise analysis of this opposition. But it is clear that the conservative faction of the ruling class feared the consequences of inviting powerful white men to "protect" the nation, while opponents of the King believed that his white protectors would effectively eliminate the possibility of a new coup. Both these factions were, therefore, hostile to the missionaries whom Lewanika used to educate his young people, and who were also regarded as the advance guard of white power. Despite this opposition, Lewanika

eventually succeeded in attaining his first objective. But he soon thereafter discovered that the white protecting power had no intention of allowing him to realize his second great objective of developing on the upper Zambesi a modern nation.

Lewanika's first steps after recovering his throne were the traditional ones for a new monarch; he uprooted his enemies from positions of influence and replaced them with his own supporters. The large majority of men who had been indunas under the rebels were dismissed, some of them murdered. The new National Council was filled entirely with those who had refused to recognize Akafuna as King. In place of his late Ngambela Silumbu, he appointed Mwauluka, who had led one of his regiments in the decisive battle near Lealui in November 1885.[3] Little is known of Mwauluka, and he does not emerge as a prominent figure during these years. His sister Matauka regained her title as Mokwae of Nalolo. Both Westbeech and Coillard observed that by 1886, the Lealui Kuta was virtually unrecognizable as compared with a year earlier.[4] At the same time, Kabuku, the young son of Matauka, was appointed senior induna of the Sesheke area. This appointment seems to have served as public recognition of the prominent role played in the counter-rebellion by Matauka, for Sesheke thus fell under the responsibility of her capital at Nalolo.[5] With Sesheke integrated into Barotseland

proper for the first time, the formal pacification of the Kingdom was completed.

The King understood, however, that these traditional means to consolidate his position were no longer adequate. He knew an alliance with an external force was required, and was immediately given the opportunity to reach an agreement with the Ndebele. For Westbeech now informed him of an offer from Lobengula through the trader, while Lewanika was in exile, of assistance in helping the King recapture his throne. The offer seemed to imply an alliance between the two kings once Lewanika was restored to power, and he refused it. Westbeech wrote Lobengula that the King

> desires me to state that he is again in power and having done it without assistance will make him now more powerful than if he had received help from any other power.[6]

Indeed, Lozi mistrust of the Ndebele never wavered, and during the remainder of the decade their canoes were stationed on the Zambesi to defend against a possible Ndebele invasion.

Yet Lewanika's reply to Lobengula was not entirely honest. For he was anxious to receive help now from another power, but not from the Ndebele. He probably learned of the concept of a protectorate while he was in exile. A British Protectorate was declared over Khama's country in 1885. While in exile, Lewanika had despatched aides to visit the chief of the Lake Ngami region,

who was in close contact with Khama, and they might well have learned the news there. Coillard was told of Khama's Protectorate by Westbeech,[7] and the latter is likely to have informed Lewanika of it when he regained the throne.

As we shall see, by 1886, Lewanika was already determined to seek similar Protectorate status for himself, but for a moment he was unable to decide who was best suited to forward such a request on his behalf. He appears never to have considered using Westbeech as his intermediary, perhaps because the trader refused to involve himself in negotiations of this kind.[8] The obvious alternative was Coillard. But the missionary, in the high-minded belief that political disputes were not his concern, had been prepared to accept the rule of Mataa and Akafuna. There can be little doubt that this made the King both resentful and suspicious of him. Writing shortly after Lewanika defeated his enemies, Westbeech noted that Coillard

> is at Sesheke but he has received orders from Lebochi (Lubosi) to remain at that place until I have been to the valley, as all his overtures have been made to the King who has fled ... and I must first make things agreeable for C. before he will be permitted to go on .... So much for being strong-headed ... and not taking my advice.[9]

It is true that in his own account, Coillard claimed that the King "has sent us message after message earnestly entreating us to

visit him!'. But as Westbeech, as we have seen, was probably guilty of exaggerating his own role in Sesheke at the end of 1885, so Coillard now seems to have distorted the truth. For as he himself acknowledged, he was unable, from November to February, to obtain canoes to make the journey to Lealui,[10] the Sesheke indunas almost certainly acting on Lewanika's instructions.

Westbeech went to Lealui in February 1886, and it is likely that his success in re-assuring Lewanika that Coillard was not a supporter of Mataa was responsible for the King's decision to send canoes to Sesheke to fetch the missionary to the capital. Westbeech was still in Lealui when Coillard arrived in March, and remained while the latter was formally received; Coillard never acknowledged the trader's critical importance on this occasion.[11]

The King welcomed Coillard warmly. "Whatever his motives may be", the missionary wrote, "Lewanika has a great desire to see us in his Kingdom".[12] These motives soon emerged in the frequent conversations which the two men held, though Coillard preferred not to see them. In the first place, the King took advantage of these sessions to learn as much as he could of the policies of Lobengula and Khama, Coillard observing that "He seems to have a great wish to resemble Khama". Secondly, Lewanika clearly did not yet grasp the distinction between a

missionary and trader, and was palpably chagrined when Coillard told him that trading goods, not excluding guns, could only be bought from men such as Westbeech.[13] The King did seem to understand, however, that Coillard, like Arnot but unlike Westbeech, was willing to undertake teaching duties, and his third use for the missionary soon became manifest. "Lewanika," Coillard observed, "would gladly overwhelm us with apprentices, grown-up men, whom he would like to see learning in a couple of months or so to accomplish every possible handicraft of the whites."[14]

Finally, and above all, Lewanika had decided that Coillard was the obvious agent through whom to make contact with the British government. The mission party had immediately settled at their new station at Sefula, about twenty miles south of Lealui on the edge of the plain. According to William Waddell, the party's artisan, Lewanika shortly thereafter travelled to Sefula where he talked with Coillard

> about the future of Africa and the government of his country, and said he wished to place his country under Queen Victoria's protection as Khama had done .... He did not trust his people and was also afraid of other nations such as the Portuguese and the Boers, the latter Khama was once afraid off(sic) but now he had nothing to fear being under the protection of the Queen.[15]

The King wanted Coillard "to sit down and write a letter to the Queen then and there",[16] but though Coillard wrote the letter, "he said he

would not send it untill (sic) the matter had been discussed and sanctioned by his (Lewanika's) people".[17]

For the next two years the King continued to importune Coillard to write requesting "the Queen's protection", which the latter consistently refused to do.[18] Yet he and his colleagues had, in private, become convinced by 1885 of the advantages - both to Barotseland and to themselves - which British protection would mean.[19] His reluctance now to assist in securing this goal was not due to his self-proclaimed reluctance to meddle in political affairs,[20] for as Richard Hall has commented, "In fact the missionary was tireless when politics could advance his evangelical aims ...."[21] Coillard now adopted a policy of political neutrality because he did not wish to identify the mission too closely with the King, whose position, as we shall see, he considered to be highly insecure.

The King, then, needed Coillard for several reasons, the most important being his desire to follow Khama's example in receiving British protection. Moreover, according to the missionary, Lewanika declared his personal affection for him: "when I once saw you that was enough, I gave myself to you, to the end; it is my nature."[22] Westbeech confirmed that "the King has taken to him", but warned that Lewanika's confidence was not yet adequate protection

for the mission. For the King himself, Westbeech believed, was far from secure, while

> the people want to know what he (Coillard) wants there, as he wont (sic) trade with them and they want to know nothing about the white man's book, as by learning it they can have only one wife, and where are they then going to get beer?

"I expect", Westbeech concluded, "it will go hard with him yet ...."[23] The King himself was obviously not prepared to allow the mission party to remain in the country without the consent of the Kuta, which assembled early in 1887 to debate the issue. Its members proved to be deeply divided between those who saw no use in having missionaries in the country, and those who considered that they were likely to bring future benefits. No one considered the value of the mission in spreading the word of its God. According to Coillard's artisan assistant Waddell, the mission's opponents argued that,

> No we do not need these teachers unless they know and teach us to make powder (for guns) and such like things .... They did not want to know how to pray they knew that already ...

The main arguments in favour of the mission were that, if they stayed, "we shall have a mine of stuffs and of waggons", and that in Khama's country, the missions had provided everyone with European clothing, breech-loading guns, and "rifled cannon".

In the end, it was agreed the missionaries might remain, but only so long as they did not interfere in the affairs of state. They were to restrict themselves to teaching the women and children, and not to intervene in "the business of men and of the kuta".[24]

Both Westbeech and Coillard believed that this compromise muffled a much deeper conflict. The trader claimed that Lewanika's position remained so insecure that he "can be deposed and murdered at any time ...."[25] Coillard realized that the Kuta meeting had revealed the existence of opposition both to himself and to the King. "Poor man !" he wrote of the king; "he is not free from cares .... He is suspicious of everybody, even of those who have brought him to power." He concluded, almost certainly accurately, that the faction in the Kuta which was "hostile to strangers, which sees our presence in the country with an evil eye", was highly suspicious of the King's desire to keep the mission in Barotseland.[26]

Nevertheless, because he thought that British protection was only obtainable through Coillard's intercession, and because he believed such protection to be indispensable to the maintenance of his position, Lewanika continued to look to Coillard for assistance. Without the knowledge of the Kuta, he was still imploring Coillard to write to the Queen on his behalf. Moreover, he remained anxious

for Coillard to begin a school. Through learning the white man's superior skills, his people would, he hoped, be better equipped to deal with the increased numbers of Europeans who were bound to appear. In March 1887, therefore, with the King's approval, the first PMS school at the Sefula mission site was inaugurated. Like that of Arnot several years earlier, the new school was essentially the private domain of the elite. Among its students were two of the King's sons, including Litia, five of Lewanika's "nephews", and the sons of several indunas.[27] By the end of the year, Coillard was complaining that, "with one or two exceptions ... we have found it impossible to make voluntary recruits among the surrounding villages. The school is still considered exclusively that of the young princes ...."[28]

It was, of course, precisely "the young princes" - or anyone else he could use for his own ends - for whom the King intended the school. He appropriated for his own service, for example, two young Lozi whom Coillard had originally hired in 1878, and who had remained with and been educated by the missionary. Coillard facetiously now dubbed them the King's "secretaries of state", and considered it "quite an amusement" for Lewanika to send him "little notes" through these men. In fact, however, the King clearly used them in an utterly practical way :

> He has them about him to teach him to read ... to scribble messages, to keep him informed of the price of merchandise in the countries they have visited in their journeys, to tell him of the value of coins ... and to assist him in his commercial transactions.

Moreover, when he led his army on a raid against the Ila in 1884, he effectively used his "secretaries of state" to have a constant flow of information about his movements sent back to Coillard in the Valley, thus effectively overcoming the critical problem of maintaining communications between himself and his people.[29]

Lewanika's successful adoption of these European techniques did not, however, in any way lessen the opposition to him and his policies. Indeed, the considerable interest he took in the PMS school may well have increased it. Coillard referred several times during 1887 to evidence of discontent against the King. On one occasion, the latter returned from a brief hunting trip to find "the floor of his house all sprinkled with blood."[30] Later in the year, Coillard reported that "sinister rumours of a new revolution (were) flying about the country. In certain places they were talking to each other about a plot, which they asserted ... was to break out immediately".[31]

In fact trouble did break out, but not from within the Valley where it was apparently expected. In February 1888, Mulanziani,

the former senior induna at Sesheke who had fled to Toka country in Southern Province when Lewanika regained the throne, re-appeared in Sesheke with a small band of men. They wished to take vengeance on those who helped the King against them and, they hoped, to encounter and slay Lewanika himself. They succeeded in killing Tahalima, a leading induna, and several others, but hearing that Lewanika was sending a large regiment against him, Mulanziani was forced to flee once more. He returned east, but on this occasion the Toka refused to shelter him. Perhaps to indicate their independence of Lealui, the Toka called for and received not Lozi, but Ndebele intervention, and Mulanziani was killed.[32]

This abortive raid seems to have had a remarkably disruptive effect on the political life of the Kingdom. According to the PMS missionaries in Sesheke, the district remained "bound by a mere thread to the Kingdom of the Barotse!". The people of the area - presumably meaning the Subiya and Totela - were said to be dis-satisfied with their status in the Kingdom and with the "despotism" and "ineptitude" of the young Prince Kabuku, and were apparently prepared "to bring about an irremediable rupture".[33] Lozi informants, including those from Sesheke, told me they knew nothing of this alleged crisis. If Kabuku was in fact ruling despotically,

and interfering in local matters more than Lozi representative indunas had formerly done, it is possible that secessionist sentiments arose among the people of the area. If so, a rumour recorded without comment by Westbeech makes some sense: " ... News arrived here," he wrote from Kazangula, "that Lewanika's intention (is) to kill all the Sesheke people ... in fact to clear the country from Sesheke to the Victoria Falls, and that it was only by intercession of his Barotse Chief men who are related to many down here that that affair has been stopped."[34]

It is not easy to believe that Lewanika was capable of genocide. But it is possible that his enemies were spreading such rumours. Many Lozi did not understand, and resented and feared, the King's close relationship with the mission. They may have accused the King of adopting, because of the missionary's influence, policies which were causing the break-up of the empire. Yet they were no less resentful when he took steps to keep it united. Returning from a successful cattle raid on the Ila people in July 1888, Lewanika unilaterally decided to return a great deal of the booty to its original Ila owners. This gesture of generosity was clearly designed to placate Ila sensibilities, perhaps even to preclude them looking to the Ndebele as the Toka had done. It was, consequently, in the national interest of Barotseland. Yet to the indunas, who perhaps in

the nature of their positions were more concerned with their own immediate self-interest, the King's action simply meant less cattle to be shared among themselves.[35]

Similarly, a large number of Lozi seem not to have grasped Lewanika's far-sighted support for the mission and its school. Many indunas believed during the mission's early years that its members were intent on establishing white domination over Barotseland. Three independent sources relate that great suspicion immediately greeted Coillard's instructions that worshippers must shut their eyes during prayers. One old Lozi recalled years later that "I did not close my eyes. I peeped through my spread-out fingers in case the white man tried to murder me or bewitch me. One could not be too sure in those days."[36] The school was likewise seen by a certain faction among the Lozi as part of the strategy of a white take-over, and commoners even wrote songs accusing Lewanika of selling his children to the missionaries when he sent them to live at the school.[37]

This natural divergence of interests between the King and a faction among the Kuta had, by mid-1888, created a climate of considerable hostility between them, and Coillard reported that rumours of a new plot were once again rife.[38] Lewanika continued to believe that only by following the example of Khama could his own

position be secured and the future which he envisioned for his nation be realized. Coillard, however, still insisted that he would not contact the British government until the agreement of the Kuta had been won. Clearly fearing a new coup, Lewanika was increasingly desperate for British protection which only Coillard could request for him. He therefore decided that the issue must be brought into the open. In this tense atmosphere, he summoned both his indunas and Coillard to a special assembly at Lealui. The Ngambela, Mwauluka, acted as the King's mouthpiece.

> Barotsi (he is reported to have said), we are threatened with enemies from without and from within. I have sought missionaries for you, so that you should not be behind other nations .... The chief Khama has missionaries, but he also has masole (soldiers). They go together. So if you like to have the missionaries, ask Satory (Victoria) to send us her soldiers.

The indunas were shocked, partly because they had not been consulted in the matter earlier, but above all at the extraordinary prospect of having foreign soldiers among them. Coillard informed the assembly that the mission was entirely neutral on this question, and tried to explain the little he understood about "what a protectorate is, the liabilities it involves", and - we may surely guess - the benefits it would bring.

In response, according to the missionary's version, the Kuta expressed its general confidence in the mission, but nothing else.

> If you will have the masole (they declared), let them come, but not while we are here. We serve you because you are king and sovereign; but if you become the motlanka (the servant of rulers), the subject of a master and foreigner, that is a humiliation the Barotsi will never accept.

Later the same evening, the King met with his senior indunas in his private office. "But discussion," Coillard reported, "was no longer possible. The chiefs had laid their heads together and taken their stand ...: 'The missionaries - yes, them we understand ... but we will not have foreigners to rule over us.'". Their meaning was clear: the mission could remain so long as it did not stray from its proper duties, but they were determined to preserve the sacrosanct nature of the Lozi kingship, if necessary against the King himself. Lewanika understood the implied threat. "Why not ask me what I want them (soldiers) for myself?" he demanded. Then addressing Coillard and pointing to the indunas, he added: "It is to protect myself against those Barotsi. You do not know them; they are plotting against my life."[39]

At this point, it appears that the King decided upon a show of strength against the dissident faction of the Kuta. His stewards, according to Coillard, organized on the following day a public trial to "unmask the schemes" of those said to be plotting against him. One induna seems to have been selected to be the scapegoat and publicly humiliated.[40] Coillard claimed that the remainder of the

"compromised" indunas now no longer "dared oppose" the King's wishes, and seemed satisfied that Lewanika finally had "the full assent of his principal chiefs" to open negotiations with the British government.[41] In fact, it seems more plausible that the opposition was merely momentarily intimidated by the King's power and that a large faction of the Kuta, by Coillard's own evidence, opposed British intervention. The change surely, was in the position not of the Kuta but of the missionary. It is likely that Coillard had perceived, between 1886 and 1888, that it was the King alone who wished the mission to remain in Barotseland, and that only foreign protection could secure the position of the King and, by implication, of the mission.

He thereupon discarded the pretence of his political passivity, and wrote two letters on Lewanika's behalf. The first was to Khama:

> I understand (the King dictated) you are now under the protection of the great English queen. I do not know what it means. But they say there are soldiers living at your place, and some headmen sent by the Queen to take care of you and protect you against the Matabele .... Are you happy and quite satisfied .... I am anxious that you should tell me very plainly, your friend, because I have a great desire to be received like you under the protection of so great a ruler as the Queen of England.[42]

Shortly thereafter, on 18 January 1889, Coillard finally wrote to Sir Sydney Shippard, the Administrator of British

Bechuanaland, informing him that the Lozi wished to be placed under British protection. At the same time, he added, a "second request", allegedly on behalf of the King, "concerning a threatened invasion of the Matabele". Lobengula's troops had raided Toka and Ila territory in 1888, "and they have boastfully declared that their next war path would be this year, 1889, to invade Barotseland". Since Lewanika had heard that Lobengula had come under British protection - a badly distorted interpretation of the Rudd Concession - he hoped the Queen's representative would "do your utmost to prevent the Matabele invading his country and spreading terror and desolation among the tribes north of the Zambesi ...."[43]

For several months the Valley remained calm while replies from Khama and Shippard were awaited. In April, however, the latent tension became manifest once again. A calculated attempt was apparently being made in Lealui to convince the King that the missionaries and their newfangled ideas were responsible for the prevailing discontent. On several occasions Lewanika complained to Coillard that his people were saying he had gone mad. "Since I began to learn to read. I am all alone, no one supports me, courage begins to fail me."[44] Three months later the missionary recorded that "the pagan conservative party has raised its head once again, and we were very nearly chased from the country."[45]

The "pagan conservative party" was that faction within the Kuta which Coillard believed to be most hostile to the King's policies. Indeed, it is possible that their "paganism" was a reaction to Lewanika's support for the mission. With old induna Nalabutu as their chief spokesman, they voiced their alarm that the King's policies meant the surrender of Lozi autonomy to white men in order to secure his own position, and they resented the influence which they believed Coillard had won over Lewanika. It was, in short, a classic instance of a King attempting to increase his own power at the expense of his traditional advisors, and the latter were inevitably fearful that he would be successful.

Lewanika indeed seized the first opportunity that presented itself to consummate his plan. In June 1889, Harry Ware arrived in Lealui, seeking on behalf of a South African mining syndicate a concession from Lewanika to prospect for gold in certain outlying districts of the Lozi kingdom. Coillard advised the King that there was only a dimprospect of receiving British protection in the near future, but suggested - with little pretext of impartiality - that an agreement with Ware would be "the first step" in that direction. The Kuta was assembled, and Ware explained through Coillard that he wished to dig for tsepa (iron or metal) in Barotseland, but that he had not come to buy land which belonged to the Lozi;

this assurancewas warmly received. Moreover, he produced a number of rifles and pieces of cloth, which pleased a number of indunas who had declared that since Westbeech's death in 1888, "what they wanted was a man like him to buy their ivory that they may get powder guns and blankets ...."[46]

The King and Kuta then agreed to concede to Ware the right to prospect for twenty years in that part of the Lozi Kingdom extending east from the Machili River, south from "the cattle path" leading to Ila country, and north from the Zambesi; no eastern boundary was delineated. In short, as Coillard pointed out, the concession covered "the whole of the Batoka country (a tribe tributary to the Barotsi) .... It is immense, and Mr. Ware has reason to congratulate himself on so great a success."[47] In return, Ware agreed to pay Lewanika the sum of £200 annually plus "a royalty of four per cent on the total output of any minerals or precious stones won by me in the said granted territory".[48]

A year later, in 1890, Lewanika bitterly protested that the final concession was a distortion of what he and the Kuta had actually agreed to: they had, he claimed, merely granted to Ware permission to <u>search</u> for minerals; further negotiations would continue if and when valuable finds were made.[49] It is true that the Ware Concession was a detailed and intricate document, and that

Coillard must have met great difficulty in attempting to translate some of the words and concepts in it. Nevertheless, it is likely that the Lozi did in fact understand and agree to Ware's request. Lewanika's protest of 1890 was written after he signed a second concession about which he soon came to believe, as we shall see, that he had been deceived. It is in the context of the bitterness engendered by this apparent betrayal that his strictures against the Ware Concession must be viewed.

For in reality, the Lozi had little to lose and much to gain by allowing Ware access to Toka territory. This, almost certainly, was the reason that not only the King but even Nalabutu's "pagan conservative party" was prepared to accept the concession. For the Toka, once considered part of the Lozi sphere of influence, had in the previous few years seemed to fall increasingly under the sway of the Ndebele. As we have seen, the Toka had called for Ndebele assistance against Mulanziani in 1888, while in the same year, Coillard had informed Shippard, the Ndebele had raided Batokaland. (It is possible that this "raid" was in fact the Ndebele response to Toka appeals for aid). It was, therefore, far from clear that Lealui any longer possessed the authority to allow prospectors in Batokaland. Consequently, they would be surrendering nothing for something - Ware's £200 plus royalties. Moreover, the

Lozi may even have considered that the presence of Ware and his colleagues in the area would deter any further Ndebele encroachment on it, and that Lozi influence over the Toka could be re-asserted. In short, as one informant put it, the King and his indunas alike must have believed that they were getting the best of both worlds.[50]

Lewanika indeed must have considered the Ware Concession a great personal victory. He had managed to take, as Coillard assured him, "the first step" towards receiving British protection without a clash with those who refused to agree to such protection. This victory, moreover, was closely followed by two further ones. Only weeks after Ware's departure, the King received Khama's reply to the letter which Coillard had earlier written to the Ngwato chief. Unknown to the Lozi, Khama was now cooperating closely with Cecil Rhodes against the Ndebele.[51] It was hardly surprising, therefore, that Khama expressed great satisfaction to have "the People of the Great Queen" with him. "I live," he wrote, "in peace with them, and I have no fear of the Matabele or the Boers any longer attacking me", and he offered to have a British representative sent to meet with Lewanika in Lealui.[52]

Although doubtlessly encouraged by this reply, the King soon learned to his satisfaction that Khama's offer was superfluous. For in September 1889, Shippard, the Administrator of British Bechuanaland,

also replied to the letter which Coillard had written him on Lewanika's behalf. The King's request for British protection, Shippard wrote, was being considered by the Queen's government. In the meantime, Rhodes' new Chartered Company would

> be able to afford to Lewanika and his people the fullest protection .... Mr. Rhodes has written to his board to support Lewanika's petition, and has offered to take the pecuniary responsibility .... He is sending a Mission to you.[53]

This was, so far as we know, the first occasion on which either the Lozi or Coillard learned about Rhodes and his new Company. Shippard did not, in his letter, attempt to explain the nature of the Company, except for the obvious implication that it was closely tied to the British government. It soon became clear that Coillard understood no more about a chartered company than did Lewanika, and the introduction of this new factor seems to have heightened the suspicions of those who in any event objected to a British protectorate.

These suspicions were shrewdly played on by George Middleton, an Englishman who had joined Coillard's expedition to Barotseland as a lay member in 1883. Four years later, however, he quit the mission and returned to South Africa, apparently having decided that there were more profitable ventures on the upper Zambesi than spreading the gospel. For at the beginning of 1890, he re-appeared in Sesheke as a representative of a business firm in Mafeking.[54]

Middleton was sufficiently familiar with the political situation to know the kind of arguments which would impress the King's enemies in Sesheke and the Valley; these he was prepared to use in order to have the King abrogate the agreement with Ware, refuse to sign one with Rhodes' representative, and instead give a new concession to Middleton's company.

By signing the Ware Concession, Middleton claimed, Lewanika had "sold the country" to white men, and it was the missionaries who had duped him into doing so.[55] Nor could Frank Lochner, Rhodes' agent who reached the Valley in April 1890,[56] be trusted. Lochner reported that Middleton told the Lozi that if they signed an agreement with him, Lochner, "Your country will be sold, you will not have enough ground to sit upon, that white man (meaning myself (Lochner)) does not come from the Government, he is only for himself like Ware, and will buy your country etc."[57] Since these accusations merely confirmed the existing preconceptions of many Lozi, they naturally made a considerable impact. Soon "messenger after messenger" was hurrying from Sesheke to Lealui "to upset the minds of Lewanika and his ministers".[58]

The King was certainly upset, partly fearing that perhaps he had in fact been deceived over the Ware Concession, partly because the messengers' stories must have strengthened the position of his

opponents. For three months after Lochner's arrival Lewanika refused to summon the Kuta to discuss the issue; Coillard thought the King "did not seem anxious to face the question of the so-called Protectorate", and the missionary, as ever noting the gloomiest aspects of a situation, did not rule out the possibility of another rebellion.[59] Nor did Lochner's open contempt for Africans help ingratiate him with those from whom he sought a concession.[60]

Yet several factors were operating to Lochner's advantage. He had been accompanied to the Valley by Makoatsa, Khama's regular messenger to Lewanika and the man who had earlier escorted Coillard from Ngwato country to Barotseland;[61] curiously, however, Makoatsa seems to have disappeared for some time after reaching Lealui, re-appearing again dramatically only towards the end of the Council meeting which was considering the new concession. Lochner, moreover, received the full support and cooperation of Coillard and Adolph Jalla, the two missionaries closest to Lewanika. There were several reasons for this. Lochner possessed a letter of introduction from their friend J. D. Hepburn, one of Khama's missionaries, in which Hepburn stated that Rhodes' agent "has full power to offer Lewanika protection against the Matabele" so that "Lewanika would be safe and your wars done with ...."[62] Indeed, despite his personal unpleasantness, the missionaries were delighted to welcome anew white man with whom

they could converse, and when Lochner initially reached SeFula quite ill from his voyage, Coillard and his wife offered him the hospitality of their home as a "manifest duty",[63] thus seriously compromising in Lozi eyes Coillard's reputation for neutrality. That "neutrality" as has been seen, had always been spurious, and the missionary himself now acknowledged that he had become "more and more firmly convinced that ... if the concession can give the country some sense of security, it will be a blessing hitherto unknown".[64]

Above all, both Coillard and Jalla seriously misunderstood the relationship between the British Government and the Chartered Company, with critical consequences for the future of Barotseland. Jalla referred to Lochner as "the representative of the English government",[65] and Coillard believed that "a treaty with the Company was the equivalent of a treaty with the Government itself".[66] Indeed, for all of Coillard's "neutrality", when Rhodes wrote inviting him to become Company Resident in Barotseland, the missionary replied:

> Well, I cannot serve two masters (the Church and the Company). But if without any official title I can be to your Company of any service as a medium of communication until you get the proper man, I willingly place myself at your disposal.[67]

Lochner himself deliberately declined to clarify these misconceptions. He consistently misrepresented his own position and that of the Company. He claimed to be the special envoy of the Queen

and implied that the Company was a department of the British government. He intimated that it was the Company which was protecting Khama,[68] although it of course had no status in Bechuanaland. The Colonial Office was moved to acknowledge that "Mr. Lochner may have made too free a use of Her Majesty's name in communicating with Lewanika ...."[69] Even later writers sympathetic to Rhodes and the Company have agreed that Lochner consciously deceived the Lozi, but, one explained,

> Had he not adopted this course, Lewanika would have refused to deal with him, and Barotseland might never have been added to the Empire - might even have become the prey of a foreign syndicate with no nice scruples as to how it acquired territory.[70]

Lochner used his "nice scruples" first to convince the missionaries, then to have them con vince the King, that Company protection was tantamount to the Queen's protectorate. Early in June, Lochner invited the King, the Mokwae of Nalolo, and several senior indunas and princes to Sefula, where they spent many hours discussing the Sesuto translation made by Coillard of the concession which Lochner brought with him.[71] The obvious technical difficulty was that certain words and concepts in the concession were virtually untranslatable. "Chartered Company", for example, Coillard translated dubiously as lekhotla (Kuta), the King's council.[72] Further, according to a Lozi informant, for the word "grant",

implying perpetual right, which is Kufa, Coillard used Kukalima, meaning "borrow".[73] By thus obscuring the real nature of both the Company and the concession, Coillard significantly mitigated its unacceptability to many Lozi :

At the same time, the missionary insisted that the King's annual subsidy be not £800, as Lochner offered, but £2000 per annum. Lochner cleverly observed that Coillard was by this means attempting to ingratiate himself with both King and Kuta.[74] For even the dissident indunas shared Lewanika's desire to obtain sufficient weapons to balance those which they knew Lobengula was receiving. But Barotseland, unlike Matabeleland, was among those regions of Africa from which guns in substantial quantities were excluded by the Treaty of Berlin of 1885. The King therefore demanded enough money to buy his own weapons, and Lochner had little alternative but to agree.[75]

This financial arrangement seems to have given the King adequate confidence to believe he could now overcome the opposition of the dissident indunas. We may also assume that he shrewdly used to his own advantage the months during which the protection issue was being thrashed out, by wielding the powers that were uniquely attached to the kingship; we can imagine him threatening opponents with loss of their titles, while promising promotions,

land, cattle and dependents in return for pledges of support. Thus prepared, he at last summoned not merely the Kuta, but the full National Council. To decide this crucial question, all the members of the three mats, many headmen from throughout the Valley, and representative indunas stationed among the subject tribes, all crowded into Lealui.[76]

The assembly opened on the 22nd of June, Coillard and Adolph Jalla acting as official interpreters. Through them, Lochner explained that many other tribes had accepted "British protection for their own welfare", and that by accepting the concession they would "grow rich, make progress, graze your flocks and cultivate your land with full security". In return, Lochner received a volley of "all sorts of questions about their slaves, wives, lands ...."[77] What the indunas were demanding to know, in short, was whether their own powers would be circumscribed while the position of the King was strengthened, and though the terms of the concession offered assurances on this point, a number of them remained unsatisfied.

Then, "at the critical moment of the negotiations, when the ... success of Mr. Lochner's mission was trembling in the balance, Khama's ambassador, Makoatsa, entered the lekhotla (Kuta) with his suite ...."[78] "Barotsi", he declared, ostensibly in

Khama's name,

> ... Today I hear sinister rumours, you speak again of revolution. Take care ! Lewanika is my friend, and if you dare to make attempts against his life or power, I am Khama ! You will see me with your eyes and hear me.[79]

He apparently went on to support Lochner's mission, stating that the Company was comprised of the "Queen's men" to whom she had assigned the task of spreading "civilization" in the heart of Africa.[80]

Since the threat obviously implied in "Khama's message" was believed by the missionaries to have been decisive in silencing the dissident indunas,[81] it is worth noting that Lochner had earlier promised Makoatsa that if the concession were signed, "I would ask the Company to make him a good present; he stated that if the Company would give him a waggon, nothing would please him more."[82] His vested interest helps explain both the vehement nature of his speech and why he had disappeared until "the critical moment of the negotiations".

The Lozi could not, however, have been aware that Makoatsa was compromised, and with his speech the opposition to Lochner collapsed. On the 27th of June 1890, Lewanika, his son Litia, Ngambela Mwauluka, and thirty-eight indunas signed the concession, which "shall be considered in the light of a treaty between my said Barotse nation and the Government of Her Brittanic

Majesty Queen Victoria". Though the Company was granted no administrative rights, it received "the sole, absolute, exclusive and perpetual right and power" to "search for, dig, win and keep" any and all minerals in Barotseland.[83] Coillard later recorded what the King and Council considered to be the extent of their Kingdom; they made the very dubious claim that Lozi authority was recognized by the Lunda and Luvale in the north, the Kaonde to the north-east, the Ila to the east, and the Tonga and Toka to the south-east.[84] In effect, then, through the Lochner Concession, the Company assumed the whole of what was to become North-Western Rhodesia; its authority over all the peoples named by Lewanika rested solely on its agreement with the Lozi; no independent agreements were ever signed by chiefs of the Lunda, Luvale, Ila, Tonga or Toka who nevertheless had to submit to Company overrule.

In return for this vast accretion to Rhodes' empire - estimated by Coillard at some 200,000 square miles[85] - the Company undertook "to protect the said King and nation from all outside interference and attack", but pledged not to "interfere in any matter concerning the King's power and authority over any of his own subjects." To King and councillors alike, the annual payment of £2000 with which they could buy weapons against the Ndebele must have seemed fair

compensation for mineral rights. For the King himself, two further clauses were of critical importance. By the first,

> The Company further agrees that it will aid in the education and civilization of the native subjects of the King, by the establishment, maintenance and endowment of schools and industrial establishments.

Here at last seemed to be the means by which his dynamic policy for the modernization of his nation could be implemented; he could not know that the same clause was written into the pro forma contracts which Company agents were having signed by the chiefs of other tribes in North-Eastern Rhodesia.[86] Secondly, Lewanika's conviction that he could manipulate white power to buttress his own position seemed to be implied in the promise that the Company would "appoint and maintain a British resident, with a suitable suite and escort, to reside permanently with the King."[87]

In the years that followed, the Company managed to renege, temporarily or permanently, on nearly every commitment it made: the powers of both the King and the Kuta were severely circumscribed, no payment was made for the first seven years, no school or industrial establishment was ever maintained with Company money, and its resident arrived only in 1897, with a tiny and unimpressive suite and escort, and he soon moved his headquarters far from the Barotse Valley. In short, the worst fears of those who opposed the Concession were vindicated, while the brightest hopes of the King

failed to materialize. One Lozi informant compared Barotseland's fate under Company "protection" to the parable of the camel and the Arab:

> The camel first asked to put just his head in the Arab's tent, then his legs, and finally his entire body. The camel then saw there was not room enough for both of them in the tent, and threw the Arab out.[88]

None of this, however, altered the historical significance of the signing of the Lochner Concession. For better or worse, but in any event irrevocably, the Lozi had taken, in Stokes' words, an "independent initiative ... to open a window on to the modern world",[89] with results, in the opinion of Gann, which "profoundly affected the subsequent course of history in Central Africa".[90] There is no doubt that the responsibility for taking the initiative belonged entirely to the King himself, who understood before any other Lozi that white power must one day be confronted, and that by making the overture himself, he might be able to harness that power both to secure his own position and to help develop his nation along European lines.

It was precisely when they grasped these motives that a faction among his indunas decided to oppose his policies. Yet their defeat was inevitable. They themselves had no alternative policy for preventing an Ndebele invasion, a threat which united all Lozi.

Khama's great satisfaction with British protection was clearly of considerable influence, as was Coillard's role in convincing the Lozi that Lochner in fact represented "the great Queen".[91] But what Khama, Coillard, and Lochner all represented in the final analysis was a distant white power structure for which all Lozi had come to have a fearful respect. It is possible that Khama's envoy informed the Lozi of Rhodes' plan of 1889, in which Khama was deeply implicated, for a private force of European mercenaries to crush the Ndebele.[92] It is true that the Company was determined to build a settlement in Matabeleland, and was prepared to go to any lengths to achieve this end. But the Lozi could hardly have known that Rhodes was not interested in Barotseland for the same reason. Lewanika therefore decided that an accommodation with, rather than resistance to, white power could best preserve the integrity of the nation. Some of his indunas, less concerned with the long-run stability of Barotseland than with their own immediate self-interest, saw only that white power would strengthen the King's authority at the expense of their own. But in the end, their fear of the white power which stood behind Lewanika was great enough to silence their opposition, and the Lochner Concession was signed. Almost alone among the powerful kingdoms of Central Africa - the Bemba, the Ndebele, Mpezeni's Ngoni - colonial rule came to the

Lozi peacefully and - for their King at least - with great relief. Whether this amicable settlement provided the Lozi with a more satisfactory future than was the case with, say, the Ndebele or Bemba, had still to be seen.

II

Lochner left Barotseland believing that the Lozi were fully reconciled to accepting the concession. In fact, the dissident indunas had merely been silenced, and, as shall emerge, their opposition re-materialized quickly enough. Moreover, the King himself profoundly feared any unforeseen development which might give his opponents their opportunity. This new development soon arose. Lewanika discovered that he had not been placed under the direct protection of Her Majesty's Government, and one of the major themes of Lozi history during the succeeding thirty-four years[93] is the continuous attempt by both him and his successor to throw off Company rule. Nevertheless, his first priority was to receive the "British Resident" promised in the Lochner Concession. A resident, even if he in fact was sent by the Company, would be seen as the physical manifestation of the King's unassailable position, and Lewanika was intent upon having him. His major political objective in the seven frustrating years which followed was,

therefore, to secure his resident before his opponents were able to depose him.

It was only a matter of weeks after Lochner's departure that Lewanika was prepared to tear up the entire concession. In September 1890, George Middleton arrived in Lealui, where he informed the King that the missionaries had deceived him into surrendering his country to a mere commercial concern. Lewanika presumably believed this was precisely the information which would give his opponents confidence to rebel, for he became, Coillard reported, "crazy with anger".[94] Apparently at the King's request, Middleton wrote a long, bitter letter direct to Lord Salisbury, stating that Lewanika "repudiated" the Lochner Concession which he had signed only because he believed Lochner represented the Queen. Lewanika still remained "glad to enter into a treaty of amity and political preference with HM's Govt.", however, since he remained "extremely friendly to White people and to Englishmen in particular ...."[95]

Several days later, Coillard forwarded to Sir Henry Loch, High Commissioner at Cape Town, a second letter written by Middleton for the King. Lewanika stated that he had been deceived into thinking that the Company was identical with the British government, and now feared that if this fact became known, it

"will not fail to cause much excitement and trouble in the country among my people"; he therefore again requested direct British protection.[96] Coillard, already fearing for the safety of the mission, added a covering letter strongly urging that "an Embassy" be sent immediately from England to "conciliate him (Lewanika) and save much trouble".[97]

Middleton seems to have convinced the King that Barotseland was rich in mineral wealth. Lewanika's best interests would consequently be served by having, on the one hand, the Queen's protection, and, on the other, an arrangement with a trusted individual to exploit those riches in cooperation with the King; that individual would, of course, be George Middleton. Lewanika accordingly decided that no agent of the Company should be allowed to cross the Zambesi into Barotseland.[98] When two such agents arrived at Pandamatenga early in 1891, Lewanika duly refused to permit them to cross into his country: "You say you come from the queen but you are only a company .... I do not like the Company. Yes go, lieve (sic) my country".[99]

By May 1891, Lewanika wad denouncing not merely the Company but the missionaries as well. Middleton had apparently been recalled to Mafeking by his employers, but was able to persuade Lewanika that in fact it was the Company which was forcing him to leave.

Outraged, the King summoned Coillard to the capital, where he was confronted by Lewanika and Middleton together. In the face of their denunciations of the concession, the missionary felt bound to defend it, although, as he admitted privately, he now recognized that the Company "is not the Government itself". His stand, however, merely confirmed Middleton's accusations that the missionaries were "implicated" in Lewanika's betrayal. Coillard's arguments were therefore ignored, and he reluctantly acceded to the King's demand that the missionary return to the Company the £200 which Lochner had paid in accordance with the terms of the Ware Concession.[100]

Both the King and the missionary were becoming increasingly alarmed about the insecurity of their respective positions. "The King is accusing everybody of having made a plot against him and wishing to kill him to put Sepopa (a son of the late King Sipopa) in his place".[101] At the same time, believing the mission would be victimized by the "tempest" that was raging, Coillard wrote angrily to the Company complaining that Lochner's duplicity had "unconsciously made (him) a dupe and accomplice in these transactions" and announcing that "he would no longer have anything to do with those affairs (between the King and Company)". Coillard showed this letter to Lewanika, who was only briefly mollified.[102] The "wildest excitement" continued

in the capital, and the missionaries continued to fear for their future.[103]

Moreover, the general state of agitation was severely exacerbated by a flood of rumours around the middle of 1891 that an Ndebele force had crossed the Zambesi near Kazangula.[104] In fact the rumours proved to be false, but we may assume that they had a devastating effect on the morale of the country. Not only had the treaty with the British government proved to be a mere business agreement with a commercial company, that company was compounding its deceit by refusing to provide protection against the Ndebele.

The position of the King appeared to be precarious until, in October 1891, his son Litia returned from a trip to Khama's country. If it had not been known before, Litia must surely have discovered that Khama was working in collusion with the Company. On his arrival at the capital, Litia delivered a message from Khama strongly rebuking the Lozi for attempting to renege on their commitment to Lochner;[105] this remonstrance must have reminded the King and his indunas alike of the forces they were trying to repudiate.

A fortnight later, Lewanika received a letter from Loch, High Commissioner at Cape Town, assuring the King that

> you are under the protection of Her Majesty the Queen and that you will not be molested by any Foreign Power. You have been wrongly informed by those who say that Her Majesty's Government ignore the British South Africa Company. On the contrary, the Company is recognized by Her Majesty as acting under a Royal Charter which she has given them ...

Loch promised that Harry Johnston, the Queen's Commissioner for Central Africa, would visit Lewanika as soon as he possibly could to "explain Her Majesty's wishes and feelings in regard to your country".[106] Coillard reported that Lewanika was "very pleased, but had nothing to say"; he would await Johnston's arrival and present his complaints then. Middleton still held the King's ear, Coillard pointed out, and Johnston would have to work smartly to "win back his confidence".[107]

But it was not Harry Johnston who now - or ever - appeared in the Valley; it was Dr. James Johnston, an eccentric Scots doctor who had come to Africa from Jamaica with two Jamaican Negroes, "inspired", as he wrote, "by a belief that black men from Jamaica ... could be advantageously employed for Christianization and civilization of the African savage tribes ...."[108] Though Johnston was no more successful in converting the King to Christianity than Coillard was, the visitor became a personal admirer of Lewanika as well as his staunch ally against the Company.

The King's own cordiality to Johnston may well have been because the two black men with the doctor were seen to be his companions rather than his attendants.

Johnston revealed a penetrating insight into the King's vision of the future of his nation. Lewanika, he wrote,

> says he longs for light and knowledge and wonders why more missionaries do not come to teach him and his people. It must not be imagined by this, however, that he yearns for a knowledge of the gospel. By no means; he wants teachers to instruct his people how to read and write, but especially to train them as carpenters, cabinet-makers, blacksmiths and for other trades that they may make furniture and build houses for him .... He has a great idea of the ability of the Marotsi to learn the various arts and become wise like Europeans.[109]

In turn, the King, having come to trust Johnston, poured out to him his bitterness against the Company, stressing repeatedly how he had been deceived into signing the Lochner Concession.[110] When Johnston finally departed, Lewanika handed him a letter, probably written by Middleton, entreating him to see that the Lozi grievances received maximum publicity in Britain.[111] Johnston published this letter, along with his own biting indictment of the Company's rule, in a book which spurred the Aborigines Protection Society to write the Colonial Secretary demanding whether Lewanika's grievances had been met.[112] The Colonial Office issued a long reply stating, in essence, that Lewanika had never really had any grievances but

had merely been deceived into believing he did.[113]

Middleton meanwhile continued to make effective debating points agains the Company. "At present", wrote Waddell, the mission artisan,

> there is no further news of the Queen's representative, so the enemy (Middleton) has taken full advantage of the situation by telling the Barotse that there is no Queen of England, that she is only a mith (sic) like the missionarys (sic) God, and unfortunately the Barotse cannot understand why a subject of Setori (Victoria) like me never saw Her Majesty.[114]

Coillard believed that Middleton had convinced the King's "headmen" of this argument,[115] and in Sesheke anti-white sentiment resulted in a growing indifference to the mission.[116]

Despite his conviction that the position of the mission remained tenuous, Coillard decided in February 1892 to seek permission to establish a station for the first time at Lealui itself. The King, Coillard wrote, "assured me that my transfer to the capital was in no way questioned by him, but that the chiefs were animated by quite other feelings".[117] The truth probably was that Lewaniks himself feared to be too closely identified with the mission at this stage, and hoped that a Kuta veto of the proposal would save him the embarrassment of personally refusing Coillard's request. In the event, however, the indunas, according to Coillard, "without exception" agreed that he should open a station at the capital. "We have seen great things", he reported a "great chief" as saying :

> foreigners closeted with our king, overrunning our malapa (courts) .... We heard them speaking of mines, of trades, and of presents without our being told what it was all about. And we asked ourselves, "Wither are we drifting? Are we at the mercy of foreigners?" Today our father comes amongst us; all these plots will end.[118]

It is indeed plausible that the Kuta would feel reassured by Coillard's closer propinquity, but hardly for the reasons the indunas openly presented. For in their eyes, he was no longer simply a preacher and teacher; he had become a diplomat, a representative of the Company, and therefore a centre of power in his own right. Surely their motive now was to have him in Lealui in order to keep him under surveillance, and above all to maintain a close scrutiny over the relationship between the missionary and the King.

This fact was recognized neither by Coillard nor by Middleton. So far as the latter was concerned, Coillard's move to Lealui could only decrease the likelihood that the King would grant a concession to Middleton's company. Presumably believing that the breach between Lewanika and the mission owing to Coillard's role in the negotiations with Lochner was irreparable, Middleton, according to PMS sources, demanded that the King expel the missionaries or else he himself would leave the country. Lewanika is said to have replied that he could not "chase away my missionaries", and in April 1892, Middleton returned to South Africa.[119] Coillard and his

colleagues believed the King's choice was based on his personal affection for the missionaries and his respect for their integrity.[120] More realistically, as one of my informants emphasized, Lewanika still ardently desired British protection to stabilize his own position, and Coillard, not Middleton, continued to be his only link with the Queen's government.

The missionary was naturally pleased with his move to Lealui and thankful that the dangerous Middleton had departed at last. Nevertheless he understood that the security of the mission would not finally be attained until the King's own security was guaranteed. He therefore again wrote Loch at Cape Town, describing almost hysterically the distress of the country, and pleading for the immediate despatch of the long-awaited resident, whose presence alone could "set at rest Lewanika's mind".[121] Loch forwarded the letter to the Company which, in reply, pointed out that the occupation of Mashonaland had diverted its attention from Barotseland, but adding that Rhodes believed "it will not be long" before a resident would be appointed.[122]

This vague re-assurance can hardly have been of great consolation to either the King or Coillard, and several months later, in September 1892, Coillard again wrote Loch informing him that "the situation here is improving but very slowly if at all".

Remarkably accurate new rumours had begun to circulate of "the Company's strange doings in other lands, and of their resolve of appropriating to themselves boundless rights over the land and people"; and where, the King demanded to know, were his resident and his £2000 a year? Tales were being told as well that both white traders and Ndebele warriors were trying to enter Barotseland, and therefore "a large village has been founded at Kazangula in order to watch the ford and to control the crossing of any stranger".[123] By November, with reports of an imminent Ndebele raid becoming more urgent, Lewanika felt it necessary to send a small band of warriors to the lower Zambesi and to forbid the handful of white traders and hunters at Kazangula and Pandamantenga - whom he feared would aid the Ndebele - from crossing into Barotseland.[124]

The King was outraged that, despite the Concession and all the subsequent assurances of its validity, he should still have to fear Ndebele attacks. In a letter written on his behalf by Coillard in February 1893, he bitterly complained to Loch that the threat from the Ndebele was seriously weakening his personal position. Accusations that he had been deceived by those wanting to "steal" Barotseland were once again increasing. "The people are loud in their expressions of bitterness and distrust .... The Government have taken no notice of him, and they have left him to himself,

exposed to the vexations of his enemies and the suspicions of his people".[125]

As he had done on several previous occasions in similar circumstances, Lewanika attempted to assuage the hostility of his critics by an attack on the mission. Early in 1893, he personally ordered that no provisions be sold or bartered to the mission stations at Lealui and Sefula, and in a "stormy interview", denounced Jalla and Coillard as "cheaters, liars, thieves ... secret agents". Middleton, Jalla mused, "would have been happy to see how well his lessons had been learned".[126]

Yet the breach between the mission and the King was healed as quickly as earlier ones had been. Coillard believed that a number of indunas, both in Lealui and Nalolo, were still conspiring against the missionaries,[127] but felt - not very convincingly - that perhaps his own illness had softened the King's attitude to him.[128] The problem is unilluminated either by written or oral sources, but it is clear that, for some reason, the King no longer felt the need to make a scapegoat of the missionaries. Lewanika felt sufficiently self-confident to allow Coillard to start a new school of Lealui,[129] and indeed the personal relationship between the two men continued to be warm throughout the remainder of the year,[130] notwithstanding a brutal Ndebele incursion into Batokaland in August 1893.

Rumours that the invaders had reached as far as Sesheke were given credence for some time, until in late November news arrived that war had broken out between the Ndebele and the Company south of the river. Lewanika was clearly relieved, and began renewing tentative overtures to the Company, meekly apologizing - perhaps for tactical reasons - for the distrust he had shown.[131] Coillard followed with a personal appeal to Rhodes to "show some interest in the welfare of the people".[132] Early in 1894, Loch wrote to the King from Cape Town announcing proudly that "the Matabele have been conquered", and though Lobengula had escaped north towards the Zambesi with a band of warriors, they would "be followed up" once the rains had stopped.[133] This news seemed to satisfy the King that British power was in fact ranged against the enemies of the Lozi, and that his missionaries had not therefore betrayed him; and several times during 1894 he went out of his way publicly to support the mission and to castigate those indunas who refused to send their children to its schools.[134]

Nevertheless, Ndebele warriors still remained at large, and precautions had to be taken. Accordingly, in August 1894, Litia, the King's eldest son, was despatched to Kazangula as "Paramount Chief in the Province of Sesheke and Batokaland"; his responsibility was to guard the fords against a possible invasion,[135]

and probably to integrate that difficult district even more closely into "Barotseland proper".[136] Yet the war against the Ndebele must have been viewed by the Lozi as a mixed blessing. In the first place, it meant that the Company would continue to be absorbed south of the Zambesi, to the consequent neglect of Barotseland. Secondly, the Company was here demonstrating in no uncertain terms how it would deal with recalcitrant African rulers. Almost certainly, the Lozi were highly intimidated by the power which Rhodes' men had unleashed against Lobengula, and much of their subsequent dealings with the Company in the years that followed can only be understood if considered in this light.[137]

To the opposition faction in the Kuta, then, the position remained that on the one hand, the Ndebele threat had not yet been crushed, and, on the other, if Lewanika's "protectors" ever did materialize, might they not attack the Lozi as they did the Ndebele? The King, however, had staked everything on the gamble that the white men would support, not undermine, his position. He therefore was prompted to write again to Loch, declaring himself "uncared-for and forlorn", and repeating his plea "to be recognized as one of the Queen's children". Increasingly his opponents were claiming that he had been deceived, saying "You have sold your country and your liberty to a trading company". His mind, the King declared,

was "greatly disturbed", and he had begun to doubt whether Harry Johnston was "a real living man".[138]

By the end of 1894, Lewanika's position seemed to be in real jeopardy. Several leading indunas, as has been seen, now believed that his foreign policy could lead only to disaster - whether at the hands of Europeans or the Ndebele - and equally resented his intimate relationship with the missionaries. It was mission influence, they believed, which not only kept him faithful to the Lochner Concession, but which appeared also to be convincing him of certain dangerously heretical Christian notions. Above all, Lewanika actually seemed interested in monogamous marriages. His son Litia had already publicly declared for Christianity and, mutatis mutandis, against polygyny, and the King had allowed one of his wives who became a "believer" to leave the royal establishment. Even Coillard recognized that monogamy struck "at a political and social institution which raised the opposition of all the chiefs ...."[139]

Now a number of conservative councillors, led by old Nalabutu, the Ngambela, and Kalonga, a senior induna, decided to put an end to these disruptive tendencies. They attacked the mission 's African evangelists for showing disrespect for the King by accusing him of preventing his people from being converted. Curiously, the King supported the evangelists, claiming that their

attackers merely feared that " I will become a Christian, send away my wives, and that I will oblige you to do the same". Why the King felt sufficiently confident at this juncture so to challenge the dissident faction in the Kuta is not at all clear, and his speech led, not surprisingly, to what Jalla called "a recrudescence of discontent among the chiefs at Lealui, Sefula and everywhere".[140] Coillard believed that Nalabutu and the Ngambela went so far as to threaten the King that they would not tolerate having a Christian king.[141]

With relations within the ruling class thus seriously strained, a new external threat again provoked panic throughout the Kingdom. This time the "invaders" consisted of two parties of white prospectors which appeared on the southern and eastern frontiers of Barotseland in the first few months of 1895. Both groups, Coillard reported, "produced a most painful impression on the King and his people" by their "boasting and threatening bearing" and by their stories that more whites were to follow them. In Lealui it was believed that the prospectors were "bullying the natives and threatening to fight and burn their villages ...."[142] Not only was the presence of these men a transgression of the clause in the Lochner Concession which agreed that no foreigners would be allowed to enter Barotseland without the King's consent. More important, perhaps remembering Lobengula's unsuccessful attempts to restrain his more aggressive

warriors, Lewanika feared that his own people might give the Company provocation to attack Barotseland. "How", he desperately demanded of Dr. Jameson, "am I to manage with them (the prospectors) so long as there is nobody sent by the Company to reside with myself? ... How could I be held responsible for anything happening to any white people?"[143]

Coillard also wrote to Jameson, elaborating upon the Lozi's very reasonable alarm: if prospectors were to continue to enter Barotseland and provoke the local people, he stated,

> there must certainly be before long serious trouble, in spite of the King's sincere and strenuous efforts to keep peace. Unfortunately, the impression has spread that it is exactly what is wanted, and these pioneering men are looked upon as mere tools to foster disturbances and bring on war, so that the country may be wrested from the hands of the natives.

The entire episode, he concluded, had served to confirm yet again the general Lozi suspicion that the King "has not been fairly and honestly dealt with" by the Company.[144]

Jameson replied offering the usual assurances,[145] but what Lewanika could not know was that the Company in fact now intended to act. The initiative came from London, where the Foreign Office had become concerned that the Lochner Concession did not adequately prove Britain's right to claim Barotseland as against the contrary claims of Portugal.[146] Rhodes responded with alacrity and

announced that Hubert Hervey, a Company official in Mashonaland, would be sent as "Resident Commissioner" to Barotseland as soon in 1896 as the rainy season ended.[147]

Behind the anxiety of the Foreign Office lay two critical issues the existence of which the Lozi naturally never suspected. What was to be the nature of the political and administrative relationship between Barotseland and the Company? What were the actual dimensions of the Lozi kingdom, a crucial problem in delimiting the British and the Portuguese spheres of influence in this part of Africa. As regards the first question, the Colonial Office decided that the Lochner Concession was irrelevant: it did not grant the Company any administrative rights; its monopoly provisions were inconsistent with the Company's charter; and, in any event, its terms had never been implemented by the Company, since Lewanika's annual grant had never been paid. The Colonial Office therefore decided that a new concession was required.[148]

As for the second question, Portugal and Britain had, in a series of agreements, defined the provisional frontier between their respective spheres of influence in west-central Africa as the line following the upper Zambesi to its junction with the Kabompo River and thence up that river. The definitive boundary was to be subject to further negotiations between the two European

powers. Lewanika had never been informed that about half the territory he claimed as part of his Kingdom had tentatively been handed to Portugal by the government to whom he looked for protection, but Rhodes protested strongly against what he believed was an abject surrender of so vast an area by Britain.[149] Lord Salisbury of course had no means of knowing whether the western boundary of Barotseland was the upper Zambesi, as the Portuguese claimed, or the twentieth meridian as Rhodes insisted. It was therefore decided that Major Goold-Adams, a Colonial Office official in Bechuanaland, be sent as "Special Commissioner to inquire into the territorial claims of the Chief of Barotseland in the direction of Angola ...", and Lewanika was duly informed of the Major's impending visit.[150]

This information reached Lealui at a propitious moment, for the Lozi had just discovered to their dismay that two Portuguese forts had been constructed on the western side of the upper Zambesi. The King regarded the forts as the advance guard of an imminent Portuguese invasion of Barotseland, and protested by letter to the Portuguese commandant that

> You have no right at all to invade my country, since I have never made any agreement with you .... The country (you are in) is mine. Besides that, do you not know that (my kingdom) has been since 1890 put by myself under the protection of the great Queen of Britain through the officers of the Chartered Company.[151]

Jalla communicated this protest to Governor Rosmead, together with a supporting note from himself,[152] and Lewanika sent off a separate letter complaining to Robinson, the High Commissioner at Cape Town.[153] Jalla emphasized that not until the Resident - promised categorically for 1896 - actually appeared would the King "know of a certainty that he is under the protection of the Great White Queen".[154]

It was, however, not the desired Resident but Goold-Adams who became the first official English representative to arrive in Barotseland. He reached Lealui in October 1896, preparatory to investigating the western limits of Barotseland, with instructions to "Explain to Lewanika that you have been sent direct from the Queen".[155] Six years of extreme insecurity had, however, left the King deeply suspicious of all white strangers. "For some reason," Goold-Adams reported ingenuously, "he appeared to doubt my coming from the Government". Lewanika explained that "he could now not trust any white man, and that if he allowed me to go over his country, I would probably return to England and say that I had purchased the country as Mr. Lochner had done".[156]

Fortunately for Goold-Adams, relations between Lewanika and the mission were now warmer than they had been atany time since Lochner's time.[157] Adolph Jalla, who was representing the

PMS in Lealui with Coillard on holiday on Europe, successfully interceded on Goold-Adams' behalf, Lewanika finally declaring that "he did believe I came from the Queen and that therefore I was free to go wherever in his country I wished". Goold-Adams was highly impressed with the King, whom he described as "an enlightened man ... intelligent, industrious ... (and with) a great idea of the capabilities of his people to learn the arts and trades ...."[158] Moreover, as an opponent of the slave trade, "thoroughly loyal" and "civil", he considered Lewanika "a man to be made a friend of",[159] which Goold-Adams believed the future Resident could achieve without "the slightest difficulty" so long as he showed more "tact" than the openly racialist Lochner had done.[160]

Lewanika himself confirmed the accuracy of this assessment. After Goold-Adams explained to him the boundary controversy between Portugal and Britain, the King wrote to both the Queen and Robinson, the High Commissioner, that he would be

> very glad if the (British) government separates me from the Portuguese, because if the latter come into my land they will steal it .... I do not wish my country to be divided into two parts between Portugal and Germany; it must be in one part under England .... The government must carry me as a woman carries a child upon her back.[161]

This was the plea of a desperately frightened and insecure ruler of a threatened nation, and Lewanika was properly gratified when,

in May 1897, Milner, the new High Commissioner, wrote him to say that though Hubert Hervey had died, Robert Coryndon had now been appointed Resident and would be arriving in Lealui within a matter of months. Milner explained that Coryndon, though selected by the Company, had been approved by the government and was "responsible for his actions, through the Company, to the Great Queen ... (who) is always anxious for the welfare of yourself, your headmen, and your people".[162]

There is reason to believe that certain of the King's "headmen" were not impressed by the Queen's solicitude for their welfare. Several years later, Frank Worthington, one of Coryndon's officers, claimed to have discovered a "plot", to be carried out "a few months after we entered the Barotse country", to "kill all the white men in the country". Worthington acknowledged that "It would have been very easy to have killed us all", for even including the missionaries the number of Europeans in Barotseland was tiny. But "At the last moment, the King refused to sanction the scheme and remained firm against all arguments ....". The motive of the conspirators, of course, was to prevent the Company from taking over the country. According to Worthington's account, he presented this information to Litia, the King's son, who "seemed surprised to hear that I knew about the little plot", but "did not deny it".[163]

So far as is known, there is no other written evidence concerning this alleged plot. But Lozi oral tradition tends to confirm its existence. One informant told me the plan was not to kill the whites, but simply to "request" that they leave.[164] Three others, however, agreed that all white males were to be murdered and their wives taken as brides by Lozi men, much as happened, it was pointed out, when the Lozi defeated the Kololo three decades earlier.[165] None of these informants was able, or prepared to name the particular indunas involved, but all agreed that it was Lewanika himself who crushed the plot. The King in fact is said to have decreed that any Lozi who killed a European would himself be killed together with seven of his relatives.[166] We may assume that the conspirators were later grateful to Lewanika for his prudence, for Worthington flatly informed Litia that "if they had made an end of us, the people of England would have avenged us to such an extent that today (1902) there would be no Barotse nation".[167]

In October 1897, Robert Coryndon arrived in Lealui, quite unsuspecting the alleged intrigues which might have cost him his life. A "Company man", Coryndon had been one of Rhodes' "twelve apostles" who led the Pioneer Column into Mashonaland. He then became private secretary to Rhodes for a year before the latter selected him - despite his limited administrative experience - to be

Lewanika's resident.[168] Since the Foreign Office had ruled that the Lochner Concession conferred no administrative rights on the Company in Barotseland, Coryndon was appointed a "judicial officer" under the Africa Order in Council of 1889.[169]

The new resident's party consisted of only six other Europeans, including Worthington as his secretary;[170] this, plus the fact that Coryndon was only twenty-seven years old, probably disappointed the King, who must have been anxious for a more ostentatious demonstration of British support. Indeed, Lewanika initially refused to believe - as he had with Goold-Adams - that Coryndon genuinely represented the British government. Once again, however, Jalla successfully interceded,[171] and with the King's doubts thus assuaged, he accorded Coryndon "almost a royal reception, and has ever since shown a strong desire to maintain friendly relations between his nation and Her Majesty's Government". On Milner's instructions, Coryndon presented Lewanika with a portrait of the Queen, for which he was "deeply gratefified"; conspicuous by its absence, however, was the sum of £14,000 which was now owed to the King by the terms of the Lochner Concession, and which he in fact never received.

In a major address to the Kuta, the new resident declared that Barotseland was officially a British protectorate, and implicitly

assured the assembly that Portuguese advances, about which Lewanika had immediately complained to him, would be dealt with. Alth ough Coryndon also discussed with the King "questions connected with the Lochner concession",[172] he contrived in the beginning to keep his relationship with the Company in the background.[173]

Above all, Coryndon endeavoured to obliterate the notion that his presence, and the Concession, meant any diminution of Lozi sovereignty. In London, Coillard had asked for clarification of the Company's right to make land grants in Barotseland. The Colonial Office pointed out that the concession of 1890 gave the Company rights in land solely for mining and trading purposes, and that no land could be granted by the Company to white settlers without a new concession from the King explicitly empowering it to do so.[174] Coryndon hastened to pass on these assurances. He promised the Kuta that he had not come to interfere in Lozi affairs or in relations between the King and his subjects. Indeed, the proof that his mission was a peaceful one was in the small escort he had brought with him.[175] He then wrote formally to the King, stressing the same point :

> You are definitely under British protection. You gave a concession to the British South Africa Compay. Afterwards you were afraid you had sold your country.[176] Do not believe this: you have not sold your country.[176]

The struggle between the King and his opponents, then, appeared to have been resolved in favour of the former. The dynamic elite had defeated the static elite. That faction of the ruling class which believed that the King's policies could only be implemented at the expense of their own powers had been unable to overthrow him before his protectors had arrived. By the same token, to Lewanika his seven frustrating years of waiting seemed not to have been in vain. The promised representative of the "Great Queen" had at long last appeared, expressing all the proper sentiments. Now his own position would be secure. Now he could, with the co-operation of Britain and the new group of aristocratic young men whose education he had commenced, begin building his modern nation. He informed Milner that he was finally satisfied; he declared himself to be "Her Majesty's servant", and expressed the hope that "there shall be nothing to disturb peace and to destroy the friendship" between himself and the Queen.[177] Rhodes' most recent biographers have claimed that, with Coillard's arrival, "a new era of peaceful and progressive administration began" in Barotseland.[178] Such complacency is no doubt justified insofar as the interests of the Company were concerned. For Lewanika, disillusionment was quick to set in, for the worst fears of his opponents were soon realized.

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Chapter 3

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3. Jalla, History of the Barotse Nation, p.44, 50, 52.

4. Coillard, Journal, 8 April 1886; Westbeech to Fairbairn, 9 May 1886, NAR Hist. Mss. Hole Papers, folios 5-6.

5. Messrs. Muhali Mutemwa and M. Kawana; Coillard, Journal, 7 Aug. 1886; Westbeech Diary, folios 34 and 53, NAR.

6. Westbeech to Fairbairn, 9 May 1886, op. cit.

7. Coillard, Journal, 11 July, 1885.

8. Although it is true that Westbeech transmitted messages between Lobengula and Lewanika.

9. Westbeech, "Part of a Diary", p.8, RLI.

10. Coillard, Journal, 5 March 1886. For an assessment of Coillard's reliability as an informant, see Sources, Pt. 1.

11. Coillard, Journal, 23 March 1886.

12. Coillard, Threshold, p.226.

13. Ibid., pp.221-3.

14. Ibid., p.262.

15. Waddell's Diary, 14 Nov. 1886, NAR Hist. Mss. WA 1/1/3.

16. So Waddell later told Miss Mackintosh, cited in her Coillard, p.381.

17. Waddell's Diary, 14 Nov 1886. Also Coillard to Mrs. Coillard, 14 Oct. 1886, NAR Hist. Mss. Coillard Papers, Vol. 2, 1883-91. CO 5/1/1/1.

18. At no time did Lewanika apparently ever ask Westbeech to write on his behalf. The latter's diary in fact never mentions the protection issue.

19. Coillard, Journal, 24 June 1885 and 22 Jan. 1887; L. Jalla to Boegner, 9 Sept. 1889, PMSP; Favre, Coillard, Vol. 3, p.161.

20. Mackintosh, Coillard, pp.372-3.

21. Richard Hall, Zambia (London, 1965), p.63.

22. Journal, 5 April 1886.

23. Westbeech Diary, folio 65, NAR.

24. Waddell's Diary, 6 Feb. 1887, op.cit.

25. Westbeech, "Part of a Diary", p.45, RLI.

26. Coillard, Journal, 20 Jan. 1887, and Coillard, Threshold, p.281.

27. Coillard, Journal, 4 March and 5 March, 1887.

28. Coillard, Threshold, p.291.

29. Coillard, Journal, 23 Aug. 1888; Favre, Coillard, Vol. 3, p.192.

30. Coillard, Journal, 10 May 1887.

31. Coillard to Boegner, ? Nov. 1887, PMSP.

32. Mr. Kalimukwa, Mulanziani's brother, who was at the same time taken as a prisoner back to Matabeleland where he remained for almost a decade. His account is largely substantiated by those of two PMS missionaries, as reported in Waddell's Diary, May 1858, op.cit., and by that in Westbeech's Diary, folios 76-81, NAR. Westbeech's information came from a Lozi induna who fled to Kazangula when Mulanziani returned, and from a letter written to Westbeech by a Sesheke missionary on Mulanziani's behalf.

33. So Waddell reported in his Diary, May 1888, op.cit., as did Coillard in a letter to Boegner in Paris, 14 March 1888, PMSP.

34. Westbeech Diary, folios 76-81, NAR.

35. The story is cited in a memorandum by Charles McKinnon, 17 Sept. 1910, giving Lewanika's own version of "Bashakalumbwe (Ila) History", trans. by Ishee Kambai, in NAZ. KDE 2/43/1. The King's version was contemporaneously confirmed by Coillard, letter to Boegner, 5 Aug. 1888, PMSP, and was told to me by Mr. Simalumba as well.

36. Cited in Peter Fraenkel, Wayaleshi (London, 1959), p.110. Mr. Njekwa reported the same fears to me in almost identical words, and Coillard learned in 1895 that old induna Nalabutu had initially advised people never to shut their eyes during services; Coillard, Threshold, p.599.

37. Mr. Mupatu, and Memorandum by A. Jalla, 26 Oct. 1928, NAZ. KDE 2/30/9.

38. Coillard, Threshold, p.208 and 320, and Coillard to L. Jalla and Goy, ? Dec. 1891, PMSP.

39. Coillard, Threshold, pp.329-32; see also A. Jalla to Colin Harding, undated but after Lewanika's death in 1916, in NAR. Hist. Mss. Catherine Mackintosh Papers. MA 18/1/4, folios 2-3.

40. Coillard, Threshold, pp.332-3.

41. Coillard to L. Jalla and Goy, ? Dec. 1891, PMSP

42. Cited in Hall, Zambia, p.63, and H. M. Hole, The Making of Rhodesia (London, 1926), p.213.

43. Coillard to Shippard, 8 Jan. 1889, cited in T. W. Baxter, "The Concessions of Northern Rhodesia", in National Archives of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Occasional Papers, No. 1, June, 1963, p.4. It is difficult to determine how much of this letter represented the opinions of Coillard rather than those of the King.

44. Coillard, Journal, 15 April 1889.

45. Coillard to Boegner, 20 June 1889, PMSP.

46. Waddell's Diary, July 1889, NAR.

47. Coillard to Boegner, 28 June 1889, PMSP.

48. The Ware Concession, 27 June 1889, cited in Baxter, op. cit., pp.5-7.

49. Middleton to British South Africa Company, 27 Oct 1890, NAR CT 1/4/1.

50. Mr. Zaza, who also pointed out that most of his own Lozi informants were unable to distinguish between the Ware Concession and the more famous Lochner Concession of the following year.

51. Brown, "Aspects of the Scramble for Matabeleland", op. cit., p.70.

52. Khama to Coillard and Lewanika, 17 July 1889, NAR Hist. Mss. Mackintosh Papers. MA 18/4/1, folios 4-7.

53. Shippard to Coillard, 1 Sept 1889, NAR Hist. Mss. Coillard Papers CO 5/5/1, folios 13-15.

54. E. W. Smith, The Journal of Andrew Baldwin, Pioneer Missionary in Northern Rhodesia (typewritten mss, 1953, Methodist Missionary Society Archives, London), p.7.

55. Reported in Coillard to Mrs. Hart, 28 May 1890, NAR Hist. Mss. Coillard Papers. CO 5/1/1/1, folios 984-5, and Waddell's Diary, 7 June 1890, NAR.

56. Rhodes bought the Ware Concession from Ware's principals, but typically sent Lochner to Barotseland some two or three months before the deal was formally concluded. See Hall, Zambia, p.65. For Rhodes' motive in wishing a concession from Lewanika, and for the position of the British government, see F. R. Harris to Lochner, 5 July 1890, NAR Hist. Mss. Mackintosh Papers MA 18/4, folios 2-4; Weatherby to Harris, undated but c. May-June 1890, ibid., folio 24; CO 468, Vol. 1, "British South Africa Company Report on the Company's Proceedings ... 1889-92", London, 1892; Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher and Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians, The Official Mind of Imperialism (London, 1963), pp.246-7; Eric Stokes, "Barotseland; The Survival of an African State", in Stokes and Brown (ed.), The Zambesian Past, pp.262-64.

57. Lochner to ?, undated NAR Hist. Mss. Mackintosh Papers. MA 18/4, folios 32-3.

58. Waddell's Diary, 7 June 1890, NAR.

59. Coillard to Rev. Smith, 20 June 1890, NAR Hist. Mss. Coillard Papers. CO 5/1/1/1, folio 991.

60. See A. Jalla, Pionniers Parmi les Ma-Rotsi (Florence, 1903), p.36, and Coillard to Jameson, undated, cited in Hall, Zambia, p.93.

61. Lochner to Company, 2 July 1890, cited in Maxwell Stamp Associates, History of the Mineral Rights of Northern Rhodesia, Vol. 2, p.21.

62. Hepburn to Coillard, 22 Nov. 1889, NAR Hist. Mss. Mackintosh Papers, MA 18/4, folios 8-9.

63. Coillard, Threshold, p.385.

64. "Of course," he added, "we too shall reap some advantages from these changes, for our postal communications and perhaps also for our supplies". Coillard to Hunter, 12 Aug. 1890, NAR Hist. Mss. Coillard Papers. CO 5/2/1, folios 62-3.

65. A. Jalla to Boegner, 5 May 1890, PMSP.

66. Coillard to L. Jalla and Goy, ? 1891, PMSP. Louis Jalla commented that he had read this statement with "great astonishment" and felt that Coillard "had been deceived", for he himself had "never believed this". L. Jalla to Boegner, 18 Feb. 1891, PMSP.

67. Cited in Mackintosh, Coillard, p.383.

68. James Johnston, Reality vs.Romance in South Central Africa (London, 1893), p.148.

69. C.O. to F.O., in FO 403, Vol. 157, No. 169.

70. Hole, Making of Rhodesia, p.217; also J. G. Lockhart and C. M. Woodhouse, Rhodes (London, 1963), p.239.

71. Coillard to Boegner, 25 June 1890, PMSP.

72. According to Andrew Baldwin, a Methodist missionary who saw the documents; see Smith, Journal of Baldwin, pp.8-9. No copy of the original Sesuto version of the concession seems to exist.

73. Mr. Simalumba.

74. Lochner to Harris, 23 April 1890, NAR Hist. Mss. Mackintosh Papers. MA 18/4, folio 28.

75. Lochner to Company, 2 July 1890, NAR HC 3/3/1, and Coillard to Rhodes, ? 1890, NAR Hist. Mss. Mackintosh Papers, MA 18/4, folio 28.

76. So A. Jalla recalled in a letter written in 1903, cited in Balovale Commission Report, 1939, p.51.

77. Jalla, Pionniers Parmi les Ma-Rotsi, p.39.

78. Mackintosh, Coillard, p.385.

79. Cited in Coillard, Threshold, p.388.

80. Cited in Hall, Zambia, p.69, but no source is recorded.

81. And by Mr. N. Zaza, though it should be pointed out that he had read Miss Mackintosh's biography of Coillard.

82. Lochner to Company, 2 July 1890, cited in Maxwell Stamp Associates, op.cit., p.21.

83. Cited in full in Baxter, "Concessions of Northern Rhodesia", op.cit., pp.8-10.

84. The Frontiers of the Barotse Kingdom as defined in a Council by the King Lewanika, his Councillors and the principal Headmen of the Nation, held at Lealui, 25 June 1890, and recorded by Coillard, cited in M. Stamp Associates, op.cit., pp.24-6.

85. "'See how things grow', said Rhodes gleefully when the news of the treaty was brought to him.'" Lockhart and Woodhouse, Rhodes, pp.239-40.

86. See the Agreements with Kazembe of the Lunda and Nsama of the Itawa branch of the Bemba in Baxter, op.cit., pp.35-7.

87. Ibid., p.9.

88. Mr. Zaza.

89. Stokes, "Barotseland", op.cit., p.261.

90. Gann, op.cit., p.21.

91. Lochner freely admitted that "the Company owes as much, if not more, to M. Coillard than myself in having secured the Barotse Country - he is heart and soul with the Company". Lochner to Company, 30 July 1890, NAR Hist. Mss. Mackintosh Papers. MA 18/4, folio 34. Adolph Jalla agreed that "Without Coillard, the King would never have agreed to the treaty". Jalla to Boegner, 5 July 1890, PMSP.

92. Brown, "Aspects of the Scramble", op.cit., pp.88-90.

93. That is, until 1924, when the Colonial Office assumed the administration of Northern Rhodesia from the Company.

94. Coillard, Journal, 26 Oct 1890 and 16 Nov 1890.

95. Middleton to Salisbury, 27 Oct 1890, F.O. 403, Vol. 157, No.158.

96. Lewanika to Loch, F.O. 403, Vol. 157, No. 119.

97. Coillard to Loch, undated, ibid.

98. L. Jalla to Boegner, 4 Feb 1891, PMSP.

99. Lewanika to Bagley and Fraser, ? Jan 1891, NAR. CT 1/4/1. This letter appears to be in Coillard's handwriting.

100. Coillard, Journal, 4 June 1891. Unfortunately, lacking any of Middleton's own private papers, the historian is compelled to rely almost entirely on mission sources for his role during these years.

101. Ibid., 8 June 1891.

102. Ibid., 10 June 1891. I have not been able to discover the original copy of this letter.

103. Coillard to Smith, 30 June 1891. NAR Hist. Mss. Coillard Papers. CO 5/1/1/1, folios 1015-16.

104. Coillard, Threshold, p.424.

105. Ibid., p.437 and Mackintosh, Coillard, p.394.

106. Loch to Lewanika, 19 Sept 1881, NAR. CT 1/4/4.

107. Coillard to Loch, 13 Nov 1891, FO 403, Vol. 174, No. 50. Cf. Coillard's later published comment: "This (Loch's letter) was all that was needed to dissipate our political clouds. Lewanika says he rejoices in it." Threshold, p.437.

108. Johnston, Reality vs. Romance in South Central Africa, p.7.

109. Ibid., p.142.

110. Ibid., pp.145-7.

111. Ibid., pp.149-51.

112. Society to Ripon, 25 Jan 1884. FO 403, Vol. 197, No. 89.

113. C.O. to F.O., 29 March 1894, ibid.

114. Waddell's Diary, 28 Feb. 1892, NAR.

115. Coillard to Waddell, 22 Feb 1892, cited in ibid.

116. Goy to Boegner, 28 May 1892, PMSP.

117. Coillard, Threshold, pp.447-51.

118. Ibid., pp.451-2. Coillard's account at the time was identical; see Coillard to Waddell, 22 Feb. 1892, cited in Waddell's Diary, op. cit.

119. A. Jalla, Lewanika, p.10, and Waddell's Diary, 24 April 1892, op. cit.

120. Waddell's Diary, op. cit.

121. Coillard to Loch, 12 April 1892, F.O. 403, Vol. 174, No. 205.

122. Company to Coillard, 29 July 1892, NAR Microfilm. Royal-Coillard Papers, folio 2, file 2.

123. Coillard to Loch, 21 Sept 1892, F.O. 403, Vol. 185, No. 26. Captain Bower, Imperial Secretary at Cape Town, replied to Coillard that "It would be well if Lewanika could be informed that he would do well not to believe the stories put in circulation by unscrupulous persons or rival concession seekers, and that when in doubt he should seek advice from Consul (Harry) Johnston". Bower to Coillard, 17 Dec 1892. Johnston was at that time in British Central Africa (Nyasaland).

124. Mr. E. Fry, in an article on his journey to the Victoria Falls in the Cape Times, 12 Nov 1892, cited in F.O. 403, Vol. 185, No. 26.

125. Coillard to Loch, 7 Feb 1893, F.O. 403, Vol. 197, No. 91.

126. Jalla, Lewanika, pp.10-12; Coillard, Journal, 9 May 1893.

127. Coillard, Journal, 19 June 1893; Coillard to Boegner, 27 July 1893, PMSP.

128. Coillard to Boegner, 18 June 1893, PMSP.

129. Coillard, Threshold, pp.512-13.

130. Coillard, Journal, 5 Nov 1893.

131. Lewanika to J. S. Moffat, 24 Nov 1893, F.O. 403, Vol. 197, No. 91.

132. Coillard to Rhodes, 27 Nov 1893, NAR CT 1/4/1.

133. Loch to Lewanika, 18 Jan 1894, F.O. 403, Vol. 197, No. 91.

134. Coillard to Boegner, 21 March 1894, PMSP.

135. Lewanika to Loch, undated, F.O. 403, Vol. 198. No. 210, and Mackintosh, Yeta III, p.34.

136. Three Lozi informants, however - Messrs. A. and N. Zaza and Mr. Muhali Mutemwa - independently told me that Litia was in fact being banished to this distant area because he had committed adultery with, or at least was interested in, one of Lewanika's court mistresses.

137. Mr. N. Zaza placed great emphasis on this argument to explain the countless "surrenders" by Lewanika to the Company.

138. Lewanika to Loch, 30 Oct 1894, F.O. 403, Vol. 212, No. 74.

139. Coillard to Boegner. ?April 1894, PMSP. Lewanika explained to Coillard that his wives were not of his choosing. "They were imposed on me by the nation. They are part of the power they gave me". Coillard, Journal, 5 Nov 1893. For the political and economic functions of polygyny in the Lozi social structure, see Gluckman, Seven Tribes, p.77 and Economy, p.24; Alfred Bertrand, The Kingdom of the Barotse (London, 1899), p.271 and 273; Colin Harding, Far Bugles (London, 1933), p.124.

140. Jalla, Pionniers, pp.122-7.

141. Coillard, Threshold, p.579. Alone of my informants, Mr. Simalumba had a vague recollection of an attempt to depose Lewanika during this period on account of his Christian sympathies. As we shall see, there were several subsequent abortive coups against the King, and informants showed considerable difficulty in distinguishing accurately between them all.

142. Coillard to Jameson, 4 July 1895, NAR Hist. Mss. Coillard Papers. CO 5/5/1, folios 51-4.

143. Lewanika to Jameson, undated, F.O. 413, Vol. 213.

144. Coillard to Jameson, 4 July 1895, op. cit. The missionaries were also concerned that the advent of white immigrants would undermine their own unique status among the Lozi; see A. Jalla to Boegner, 3-12 June 1895, PMSP. Their disillusionment with the Company must have increased, moreover, when J. S. Moffat wrote Coillard that he was "much concerned at what you tell me about the doings of white men in Barotseland. Nowadays, might is right. The Charter Company controls everything, even the High Commission". Moffat to Coillard, 1 Sept 1895, cited in Hall, Zambia, pp.91-2.

145. Jameson to Lewanika, 13 Aug 1895, NAR CT 1/4/4, and Jameson to Coillard, 5 Sept 1895, F.O. 403, Vol. 213, No. 128.

146. F.O. to Company, 1 Nov 1895, F.O. 403, Vol. 213, No. 139, and Harris to Rhodes, 5 Nov 1895, NAR CT 1/4/1.

147. Rhodes to Harris, 6 Nov 1895, NAR CT 1/4/1; Company to F.O., 15 Nov 1895, F.O. 403, Vol. 213, No. 150.

148. Johnston to Roseberry, 19 Aug 1893, F.O. 403, Vol. 185, No. 225; Memorandum by Sir P. Anderson, 20 Nov. 1894, F.O. 403, Vol. 198, No. 213; F.O. to Company, 1 Nov 1895, F.O. 403, Vol. 213, No. 139; C.O. to F.O., 15 Nov 1895, ibid; C.O. to F.O., 4 April 1896, C.O., African South 517; F.O. to C.O., 18 April 1896, ibid; C.O. to F.O., 16 Jan 1897, ibid.

149. Salisbury to Petrie, 22 Jan 1892, F.O. 403, Vol. 174, No. 11; Loch to Ripon, 4 Aug 1893, F.O. 403, Vol. 185, No. 66; Rhodes to Kimberley, 7 Dec 1894, F.O. 403, Vol. 212, No. 1; D'Avila to Machado, 17 April 1895, F.O. 403, Vol. 212, No. 151; Company to F.O., 25 April 1895, F.O. 403, Vol. 212, No. 155 and 156; Milner to Chamberlain, F.O. 403, Vol. 246, No. 45; Report on the Company's Proceedings ... 1895-97, C.O. 468 Vol. 1; Miss K. Nyaywa, "The Definition of the Barotse Boundary", University College of Rhodesia, Dept. of History, Seminar Paper No. 9, 19 May, 1965; Robinson et al, Africa and the Victorians, pp.246-7; Lockhart and Woodhouse, Rhodes, p.389.

150. F.O. to C.O., 18 Feb 1896, F.O. 403, Vol. 229, No. 49, and F.O. to Treasury, 2 March 1896, F.O. 403, Vol. 229, No. 63.

151. Lewanika to Portuguese Commandant, 20 March 1896, C.O., African South 517, enclosure.

152. Jalla to Rosmead, 15 May 1896, ibid.

153. Lewanika to Robinson, 15 May 1896, F.O. 403, Vol. 230, No. 107

154. Jalla to Rosmead, op. cit.

155. F.O. to Goold-Adams, 12 March 1896, F.O. 403, Vol. 229, No. 77.

156. Goold-Adams to High Commissioner, 21 Oct 1896, C.O., African South 517.

157. Jalla, Lewanika, p.9, and Pionniers, p.195.

158. Goold-Adams to F.O., 7 Feb. 1897, F.O. 403, Vol. 245, No. 108.

159. Same to same, 24 Aug 1897, F.O. 403, Vol. 246, No. 35.

160. Same to Rosmead, 21 Oct 1896, F.O. 403, Vol. 245, No. 38.

161. Lewanika to Robinson and Lewanika to Victoria, 23 Oct 1896, F.O. 403, Vol. 245, No. 96. Two years later Lewanika told another British soldier that he wanted "no other" than Englishmen in his country. "To the Portuguese he took special exception ... as they treat people with whom they come in contact as though they were beasts". A. St. H. Gibbons, Africa from South to North through Marotseland (2 Vols., London, 1904), Vol. 1, pp.126-7.

162. Milner to Lewanika, 18 May 1897, C.O., African South 552. The King expressed his pleasure in a letter written on his behalf by Jalla to Milner, 28 July 1897, ibid.

163. Worthington's Journal, 1902, NAR Hist. Mss. Worthington Papers. WO 3/1/2, folios 2-5.

164. Mr. Simalumba.

165. Messrs. Arthur and Newo Zaza and Mr. Njekwa. Arthur Zaza was given his information by "a very old man" in Limulunga village, but I was unable to meet him.

166. Mr. N. Zaza.

167. Worthington's Journal, op.cit.

168. Coryndon remained in North-Western Rhodesia until 1907. He later became, successively, Administrator of Swaziland and of Basutoland, and Governor of Uganda and of Kenya. He died in 1925. See Kenneth Bradley, "Statesmen : Coryndon and Lewanika in North-Western Rhodesia", African Observer, Vol. 5, No. 5, Sept 1936, pp.48-9 and 54, and Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, p.79.

169. F.O. to Coryndon, 8 April 1897, F.O. 403, Vol. 245, No. 101.

170. And, among the Africans who accompanied the party, Mr. L. B. Kalimukwa, brother of Sitwala Mulanziani, who had been enslaved by the Ndebele after he and his brother fled from Sesheke in 1888. He had escaped from the Ndebele during their war with the Company, and remained hidden until he was able unofficially to attach himself to Coryndon's party. Upon arriving in Lealui, he apologized to the King for his activities in the 1880's. Lewanika forgave him, for, he said, "those old wars are finished".

171. Jalla to Boegner, 22 Oct. 1897, PMSP.

172. Coryndon to F.O., 25 Nov. 1897, C.O., African South 559.

173. H. M. Hole, The Passing of the Black Kings (London, 1932), p.297.

174. C.O. to F.O., 29 Sept 1897, F.O. 403, Vol. 246, No. 49.

175. As reported in Jalla, Pionniers, p.236.

176. Coryndon to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 25 Nov 1897, C.O., African South 686.

177. Lewanika to Milner, 1 Nov 1897, F.O. 403, Vol. 264, No. 8.

178. Lockhart and Woodhouse, Rhodes, p.240.

Chapter 4

COMPANY RULE

I

Shortly after the arrival of Coryndon and his party in Lealui, Lewanika made the following pronouncement to the Kuta :

> There are (he declared) three types of white men: (1) those of the government; (2) the traders; (3) the missionaries. Those of the government, fear them, they have the power; the traders, eat them, for they have come to eat you; the missionaries, they are ours, they are of our family.[1]

This astute analysis was quickly substantiated. Three considerations governed the actions of the Company's representatives. In the first place, as Coryndon was specifically instructed, "it is absolutely necessary to reduce expenditures of Company for Administration to a minimum ...."[2] Secondly, being orthodox Company men, they wholly accepted the South African tradition of direct intervention in the affairs of the people they governed.[3] Finally, with only minor exceptions, they regarded Africans as being inherently inferior to Europeans. Frank Worthington, who was typical of most Company officials, began his career believing that "The Barotse had not learned to treat a white man with that respect his colour demands",[4] and was soon "getting to hate niggers more and more .... I would

shoot him (the African) to the last man if I had my way .... Slavery is much too good for the reptile."[5]

These factors had great consequences. The Company had no intention of providing the revenues needed by Lewanika to develop his nation along western lines. The philosophy of direct rule meant that its agents would do their utmost to establish their own control over the activities of the King and his Kuta,[6] while their racialist attitudes left them blind or indifferent to the unquestionable resentment of those whose positions they were undermining.[7]

The "protectors" for whom Lewanika had so impatiently awaited did their work swiftly and thoroughly. In his recent study, Stokes has analysed the process by which, between 1898 and 1911, "Lewanika had lost his powers not only over the outlying districts (of Barotseland) but his superior powers of government within Barotseland proper".[8] This chapter will attempt to supplement his findings and set them in the perspective of a more detailed elaboration of internal Lozi politics in the period, a task which Lozi oral tradition only minimally facilitates.

The Lochner Concession had given the Company none of the administrative powers in Barotseland which it was determined to exert. Because of his ambiguous official position, it was decided that Coryndon could not negotiate the desired new concession, and

he therefore arranged a meeting between the King and Arthur Lawley, Administrator of Matabeleland, for this purpose. In June 1898, Lewanika, Litia and a number of senior indunas were taken to the Victoria Falls,[9] where Lawley presented them with a concession which differed from the Lochner Concession in three decisive ways. It conferred upon the Company the right "to deal with and adjudicate upon all cases between white men and between white men and natives ...." The Company was to receive the right "to make grants of land for farming purposes in any portion of the Batoka and Mashukulumbwe (Ila) country to white men approved by the King". And finally, as compensation for thus extending the authority of the Company, the annual grant to the King of £2000 agreed upon in the concession of 1890, and never paid, was to be reduced to the sum of £850.[10]

Lawley reported that after an intensive study of the document, the Lozi negotiators "expressed themselves perfectly satisfied with the terms".[11] Yet Coillard, who understood what the Company was demanding, refused to participate in the negotiations,[12] nor would the Lozi agree to sign the concession. Lewanika wrote Lawley that they would accept it only if a new clause was added: the Company must agree to exclude from prospecting or settlement an area consisting effectively of the Barotse Valley east of the upper Zambesi and the Sesheke district.[13] We shall attempt below to explain why the Lozi

were so easily persuaded to concede so much in return for so little.

Before the Lawley Concession was formalized, the Barotseland-North-Western Rhodesia Order in Council of 1899 was promulgated superseding, so far as administrative powers were concerned, all previous concessions.[14] With this Order, one of two which divided Northern Rhodesia at the Kafue River into two distinct administrative sections, the Colonial Office deemed a new concession to be necessary to legitimize the Company's administrative rights in Barotseland.[15]

It was to Coryndon that the task of negotiating this new concession now fell. He had already, in 1899, moved his headquarters from the Barotse Valley to Kalomo on the Batoka Plateau where white settlers and prospectors were expected to begin penetrating.[16] Here was the King's first tangible evidence that his position was not the Company's first priority, and a reflection of the Company's belief that Barotseland proper was of little economic value.[17]

Coryndon, who had formally been appointed Administrator of North-Western Rhodesia, travelled to Lealui where he met with Lewanika and twenty-seven of his senior indunas.[18] Unlike the Uganda Agreement of 1900, which "for many years ... (gave) no compelling reason ... for fundamental reconsideration",[19] the Coryndon Concession of the same year, and those which followed it, produced serious conflict between the Administration and the Lozi

ruling class. Coryndon's document contained the three clauses which distinguished the Lawley from the Lochner Concession, but included the proviso demanded by Lewanika excluding the Valley and Sesheke from prospecting. According to Coryndon, this inclusion met the King's most important demand, since, he thought, the reserved area was the richest part of Barotseland in terms of tribute paid, available manpower, and good grazing lands,[20] and the concession was duly signed.[21]

Why had the King and his indunas agreed to grant the Company so much freedom of action outside Barotseland proper? Coillard, after all, refused to witness the new concession, considering it highly unfavourable to the Lozi,[22] although it is true that he was probably resentful that his own influence was declining. Colin Harding, who was one of the witnesses for the Company, later intimated that Coryndon had not revealed to the Lozi the full contents of the document. He believed that the Lozi representatives signed the concession only with "some hesitation and misgiving", and after some subtle threats by Coryndon.[23] This may well have been one of the occasions alluded to by Lewanika when he complained in 1907 that whenever he raised a grievance against the Company, its officials replied: "Do you want to be conquered?"[24]

Moreover, Lewanika, the Mukwae of Nalolo, and at least some indunas had learnt of the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War.[25] They professed to the missionaries their shock at the thought of two groups of white Christians slaughtering each other,[26] but it is quite likely that the war illustrated to them a crucial truth. Englishmen had destroyed Lobengula when he stood in their way; now they were prepared to destroy white antagonists. According to one informant, Lewanika knew of Rhodes' deep involvement in the war. The King therefore reasonably concluded that opposition from Barotseland would hardly be tolerated for very long. This informant claimed indeed that the Lozi had discovered how the Ndebele had been manoeuvred into an aggressive stance, giving the Company an apparently legitimate excuse to attack them. In this knowledge, the King reconciled himself to the need to accept the Company's demands: he would surrender much of his sovereignty over the far reaches of his kingdom, so long as he could safeguard his position at least in Barotseland proper.[27]

It appears that the King's decision not to forcibly resist Company demands brought into the open once again the earlier conflict within the ruling class. This split was reflected in the competition to select a new Ngambela. Mwauluka died in 1898, his difficult role at last at an end. As the King's mouthpiece,

he had helped negotiate the Concessions of 1890 and 1898; as "owner of the nation", he had allegedly threatened Lewanika with deposition should he become a Christian.[28] The Kutas of Lealui, Nalolo and Sesheke submitted to the King the names of Mubita, then induna Kalonga, and Mokamba, from whom to appoint Mwauluka's successor.[29] Kalonga was much the older man, a contemporary and close personal friend of Lewanika, renowned as a great Lozi warrior, powerful by virtue of his holding one of the senior titles in the council hierarchy. He was the choice of those Lozi aristocrats who had grown to manhood before the advent of missionaries and Company officials, and who had opposed the concessions fearing that white power would undermine their own authority as well as the integrity of the nation.[30]

Mokamba represented the modern generation of the ruling class. Although only in his middle thirties, he was already a man of considerable experience. The son of Njekwa, Sipopa's Ngambela, Mokamba remained close to the throne through his intimate friendship with Prince Litia. He fled with Lewanika into exile in 1884, and fought with him in the decisive battle against Mataa's forces in the following year. Mokamba and Litia were among the first students at the PMS school in Sefula, where they shared an enthusiasm for learning and a sympathy for Christian ideas. Like

his father, Mokamba married one of the King's daughters, and soon found himself appointed to an important indunaship.[31]

The King recognized the significance of the choice he now had to make. Kalonga had a powerful and influential position, and even Adolph Jalla, when asked his opinion by the King, supported Kalonga on the grounds that Mokamba was too young to become the senior commoner in the nation. Lewanika replied, however, that Kalonga would do "all in his power to favour paganism, while Mokamba was a Christian with a mind open to every sort of progress".[32] Lozi informants agreed that to Lewanika, Mokamba's Christianity was important not in a religious sense, but because it reflected - as it did, for example, among the Ganda[33] - an attitude of receptivity to modern techniques and development. At the same time he seemed to share with the King and Litia a greater fear of attempting to resist white demands than did some of the older indunas, perhaps in the knowledge that white power would inevitably tend to bolster the position of the King and his immediate entourage as against the Kuta. Because, unlike Kalonga, he was literate and educated, Mokamba would be able to meet with the white man on terms more approaching equality; because he had a proper respect for white power, he would not provoke the Company to crush the Lozi nation. He was the man who could best achieve a balance in the relationship

between the Lozi ruling class and the Company, and it was already clear to the King that that relationship would henceforth be the critical one in the survival of his nation. When, therefore, the traditionalists in the Kuta wished to reject the concessions with Lawley and Coryndon, it was the more realistic Mokamba who supported the compromise measure of making "Barotseland proper" a reserve area in which the King's power would not be circumscribed.[34]

Mokamba's appointment was naturally resented by Kalonga's supporters, their hostility manifesting itself openly, as we shall see, several years later. Nevertheless, Mokamba's twenty years in office earned for him among the Lozi the reputation of being the best Ngambela since his father,[35] while his intelligence, tact, administrative ability and popularity were remarked upon by missionaries and Company officials alike.[36]

Moreover, shortly after the turn of the century, as Lewanika grew perceptibly more tired with advancing age and under the increased strain of Company rule, the actual governing of the country fell increasingly upon the shoulders of his Ngambela.[37] This situation had highly significant consequences, for Mokamba naturally turned for advice and assistance to younger men who, like himself and Litia, had been educated at mission schools. In this way, the supreme status of the Lozi kingship and government was upheld.

For, as Pratt has observed in connection with the Buganda, "many of the abler 'westernized' young men whose equivalents in West Africa were active and open opponents of the tribal authorities either joined the ruling hierarchy or aspired to it".[38] The prestige of the "old order" was, therefore, not merely untarnished but increased. At the same time, Lewanika received, through his payment from the Concession and, as shall be seen, his share of the hut tax, far greater revenues than were allowed to any other Paramount Chief in the Zambesia region. This money served as an adequate substitute for the goods and tribute with which Lozi kings had formerly been able to win the attachment of their subjects. Moreover, it permitted them to live in a manner properly befitting a ruling class, thus saving them from the fate which befell their counterparts among, for example, the Fort Jameson Ngoni, where "The Chief who stayed at home ruling his people found himself outclassed by the newly returned labourers from the south, with their display of clothes, money and urban mannerisms".[39]

But if these developments buttressed Lewanika's position, they simultaneously created new tensions which endangered it. Paradoxically, the absorption into the centres of power of the new mission-educated elite led to a decline in the influence of the

missionaries themselves, as their former students were beginning to be able to undertake tasks such as corresponding with the white officials. Even more important, the influence of the young men was equally resented by the older indunas and the white administrators alike. Coryndon, for example, could not abide the "cheekiness" and "arrogance" of "so-called educated natives",[40] and was determined that he, not they, should have most control over the King. And his ability to achieve this was facilitated by the role of the traditionalist faction within the Kuta. The hostility of its members towards the King's younger advisers was inevitably directed against Lewanika himself. He therefore felt that his position was once again tenuous, and looked to Coryndon and his officials to reinforce it. This they were gladly prepared to do, in return for gaining even greater control over the King and for his abject acceptance of every Company demand which served to circumscribe his own powers and severely limit the extent of his authority.

Many of these cross-currents manifested themselves early in the new century when the King welcomed an "Ethiopian" church to Barotseland. This fascinating episode in Lozi history has been examined by Ranger, who failed to see that the traditionalist indunas did not share the enthusiasm of Lewanika and Ngambela Mokamba for the Ethiopians. For the latter were welcomed, as Ranger

accurately pointed out, " not because they offered an indigenous form of Christianity but because they promised to provide a relevant education and to assist in the 'modernization' of Lozi society".[41] Mission teaching was weighted towards learning Lozi and the Gospel; as the missionaries themselves realized, the new elite wanted far more teaching of English and other "practical" subjects.[42] As a result, Lewanika had already in 1901 sent his son Imwiko and one of his nephews to a private school in England.[43]

When, therefore, Willie Mokalapa, a Sotho-evangelist who had worked with the PMS, turned against the mission and offered to provide the kind of education the King desired, the latter accepted with alacrity.[44] By 1903, the Ethiopians' schools had succeeded in drawing away a majority of former PMS students. By late 1905, however, the Ethiopian movement had virtually collapsed, largely because Mokalapa, entrusted by Lewanika with a large sum of money to purchase wagons, carriages and boats in South Africa, was swindled out of the cash by a firm of South African merchants.[45] In any event, it is unlikely that the Administration would have long tolerated the Ethiopian presence, Coryndon, for example, believing they preached "dangerous doctrines ... not the least pernicious being the practical equality of white and black races ...."[46]

Nevertheless, the mark left by Mokalapa's activities was a very tangible one, "more", as Ranger has said, "through the stimulus which his presence gave to government than through his own direct action".[47] For the local Company officials were fully aware of the King's motivation in welcoming Mokalapa's schools. Worthington and Aitkens shared Coryndon's conviction that only an extension of educational opportunities, particularly in the teaching of English and "useful technical knowledge", could prevent a resurgence of Ethiopianism.[48] In any event, Coryndon acknowledged, no steps had been taken to fulfil that clause in the Concession of 1900 promising to promote African education. Moreover, as shall be seen below, the Company now realized it could meet its obligations by spending only those revenues which Lewanika was receiving as his share of the hut tax. This fact doubtless made more palatable its sanctioning, in 1906, of the Barotse National School, "which was for a very long time the only school in Northern Rhodesia not run and financed by a mission society, and one with significantly superior resources and offering a more advanced standard of education than any other in the territory".[49] The BNS was to play a substantial role in Lozi life, and indeed in the life of Northern Rhodesia, and it owed its existence directly to the initiative of the King, supported by the emerging educated new elite, in welcoming

the Ethiopians to Barotseland.

Essentially, Mokalapa and his assistants were considered by Lewanika to be the instrument by which Lozi independence could be safeguarded: with a properly trained elite loyal to the King, his reliance on both missionaries and Company officials could be significantly reduced. Yet during the same period, troubles at the peripheries of the Kingdom were forcing him into an even closer dependence on white power.

In the north, Kakenge, a Luvale chief, had made an alliance with the Portuguese who were continuing to build forts in his region, and forbade any other Luvale from sending tribute to Lewanika. The latter wished to send an expedition against Kakenge, but Harding vetoed the plan.[50] A number of Lozi indunas, resenting the loss both of tribute and of prestige which was involved, felt that Lewanika's acceptance of Harding's veto was a humiliation to the national pride of the Lozi; "not only is the king getting anxious about it," Coryndon reported, "but his headmen are talking among themselves much more than I care to see".[51]

By 1903, virtually no tribute was being received from the Luvale, and the displeasure of the King and Kuta with Britain's failure to support the Lozi case was growing.[52] The extent of the Company's mineral rights was co-terminous with the extent of

Lewanika's empire. Moreover, Company officials were anxious to have access to as much territory as possible from which labour could be recruited for Southern Rhodesia. For these reasons, Coryndon, Harding, Goold-Adams and Gibbon all supported the Lozi claim to a vast area north and west of the northern extremities of the Barotse Valley.[53] Chamberlain was no less concerned about "the serious danger to British interests" on the upper Zambesi, but preferred an amicable settlement of the question with Portugal.[54] Lewanika wrote Chamberlain expressing his anxiety for a swift and satisfactory settlement.[55] In reply, the latter informed the Lozi king that the kings of England and Portugal "have asked the King of Italy, who is the good friend of both, to hear all that each has to say (on the matter), and then to decide between them".[56]

Lewanika and the Kuta were obviously disappointed at this outcome. The affair had been taken entirely out of their hands; the future extent of their Kingdom rested solely on the efforts made on their behalf by the British government, on which they were thus dependent. The Company regarded this state of affairs ambivalently: they feared the loss of desired territory, but were pleased with any development which further increased the dependence of Lewanika on its officials. For the Company's greatest asset in Barotseland was the King's need for its protection against both his internal opponents

and the Portuguese at his frontiers. And the greater Lewanika's reliance on Company support, the easier it would be to gain his consent to further Company limitations on his sovereignty.

It was for this reason that Lewanika was allowed to visit England in 1902. He had yearned to make the trip for many years, probably since he had learned of Khama's successful visit in 1895. The death of Victoria seemed to offer the ideal opportunity: attending the coronation of Edward VII would be the consummation of his great dream of a special relationship between the monarchsof England and Barotseland. When Coillard asked him what he would say if summoned to meet Edward, Lewanika replied: "When kings are seated together, there is never a lack of things to discuss".[57] What Lewanika specifically wished to discuss was clear. As Jalla reported, and Harding confirmed, Lewanika

> had no peace till he found the way to go and tell him (Edward) that he had no more loyal vassal than himself and entreat him to shift the Government of his country from the BSAC to the Crown.[58]

The Company's motive in sanctioning the trip was no less clear, and quite simple: " ... It would," Coryndon pointed out, "increase his reliance upon us ...."[59] Thus it was that in April 1902, the King, Ngambela Mokamba, a Sotho interpreter, and Colin Harding, acting as their official escort, arrived in England.

The London visit was a great success - at least from the Company's point of view. Lewanika visited his son and nephew who were studying at a private school in Kent, attended the Coronation, and was taken to the House of Lords, the Old Bailey, a naval review, and other typical aspects of English culture. But as he later complained to Jalla, Lewanika "had not got the main thing he had gone for ...." His conversation with the new King was limited to pleasantries, and Lewanika was disappointed that he did not "have the chance to tell His Majesty how much he wanted his country to be governed directly by the Crown".[60] Nor was the interview with Chamberlain more satisfactory. The Colonial Secretary was unable to promise that the Concession of 1900 would be revised or that the Lozi boundary claims would be upheld. Instead, he proferred a vague assurance that the government would safeguard Lozi interests. "Lewanika left", noted Harding, "not entirely satisfied but his anxiety towards the future was abated".[61] The comments of Lozi informants, however, are surely more realistic: having seen British might at first hand, the King and Ngambela understood once and for all that the destiny of their country had effectively been removed from their hands.[62] The obvious futility of resistance begat Lozi submission.

The royal party returned to Barotseland at the end of 1902, receiving a tumultuous welcome as it proceeded up the river to the capital. A new proverb was coined: "There are only two men in the world - Lewanika and his brother Edward". But Lewanika, not yet wholly disillusioned with the policies he had adopted from his original hero, replied to this: "As a matter of fact, there are three Kings in the world, the King of England, myself and Khama".[63]

Apparently, however, not all Lozi accepted this judgment. According to Coryndon, during Lewanika's long absence from the country, and perhaps in the belief that after nine months he would never return, Muimui, the son of the son of one Mulambwa's sons and Lewanika's first cousin, considered seizing the throne. His chief accomplice was said to be induna Kalonga, whom Lewanika had rejected in 1898 as Ngambela in favour of Mokamba, and who presumably would have become Muimui's Ngambela. Coryndon travelled to the capital to assess the rumours he had heard, but was unable to determine whether a plot in fact had ever existed. He claimed that some dissatisfaction with the King could be sensed, but was unable to estimate its extent.[64] My informants had no knowledge of an attempted coup during Lewanika's absence, and there seems to be no way of establishing whether one had been planned. It is true that his trip to England might have seemed to the

conservative faction in the Kuta adequate justification for his deposition. To its members, it must have appeared that Lewanika was, in going to meet the King of England, once again attempting to strengthen his own position as against that of the Kuta. It would not have been unreasonable for them to support a plan for substituting Muimui and the conservative Kalonga for Lewanika and the progressive Mokamba. This, however, must remain speculation. In any event, had such a plot existed, it is likely that Coryndon' s presence in the capital served to remind the opposition faction that deposing a King had, since 1897, become an infinitely more difficult exercise than in earlier days. Moreover, the euphoria that developed when Lewanika finally returned was sufficient to muzzle, at least for the moment, whatever opposition did exist.

It is not at all impossible that Lewanika believed that his enemies wished to depose him, and was quick to agree to an Administration initiative to undermine the authority of the National Council in a critical sphere. Late in 1903, the King became mildly ill; the malady was not grave, but Company officials began considering the question of the succession, for they had already decided that, whoever else might be nominated, Litia would follow his father. Hole, the Acting Administrator, believed that Litia was "not at all persona grata with many of the influential chiefs",

probably the older traditionalist ones. But this weakness made him even more attractive, for, Hole pointed out, "he would be more likely to lean on the British for support if he became King without a unanimous following".[65] Accordingly, Aitkens, DC for Lealui district, broached the subject with the King in 1904, and reported that Lewanika "informed me that he and the Barotsi were all of one mind, and that Letia, his first born, would succeed him", although the King acknowledged that the final choice lay with the Kuta.[66] It was happening, then, the way many of his indunas had feared: the King and the white men colluding to maximize their own authority at the expense of the Kuta, for Coryndon soon "let it be known unobtrusively" that the Administration intended Litia "naturally" to succeed his father.[67] This removed from indunas one of their most powerful sanctions on a King, the right to claim that since they had appointed him, they had the equal right to remove him if they considered that he was ruling unjustly or without seeking their advice.

At about the same time, indunas' freedom of action was curtailed in a physical sense. Under Coryndon, an administrative machine was being built. North-Western Rhodesia was divided into five districts, each under a DC. The Lealui district covered the Barotse Valley and Sesheke, the four others encompassing the

remainder of the land mass west of the Kafue River.[68] Subdistricts within Lealui District were super-imposed generally upon the Lozi silalo districts; the old makolo sectors had never properly functioned since the Kololo period, though indunas theoretically responsible for makolo maintained their titles until 1947.[69]

Under the new administrative system, each DC had considerable authority, his control being gradually extended over most facets of law and order within the district. In 1903, Lewanika was informed that "it will be advisable" if, henceforth, any induna or headmen entering another district should first notify his own DC of his departure, and immediately report himself to the DC of the district he was entering. Although the indunas must surely have considered this a humiliating restriction, the King in fact had little choice but to accept the "advice".[70]

At the same time, the Company officials very shrewdly adopted for their own advantage the Lozi representative induna system. Coillard had claimed in 1890 that all the tribes in what came to be considered North-Western Rhodesia "acknowledge the authority of Lewanika and regularly pay tribute to him", and that the King maintained representative indunas among them all to "exercise a general supervision".[71] This was a vast exaggeration. The Lozi empire had in fact begun to crumble even before colonial overrule.

According to Jalla, Lealui in 1897 demanded the payment of tribute from Sembulamoka, an Ila headman; the latter replied that "You are not our masters; you have not yet conquered us".[72] The Toka, as we have seen,[73] had begun playing off the Lozi against the Ndebele during the 1880's, and Monze, an important Toka headman, asked Harding in 1900 why he should pay tribute to Lewanika, "when I am under the White Queen".[74]

The Administration now decided to prop up this disintegrating system. The advantage in so doing was clear: Lewanika would believe that the Company was helping him to re-extend his former authority, while in fact Company authority over tribes with whom it had no concessions would be seen to be legitimized. As the Secretary for Native Affairs candidly acknowledged in 1905, while adopting the representative induna system would reap Lozi gratitude, it would also "place the entire Administration of natives in the hands of Officials of this Department".[75] A Lozi induna was therefore attached to each of the five DC's in North-Western Rhodesia, but the status of each of them was explicitly subordinate to his respective DC.[76] Yet not even their severely limited authority satisfied the white officials, and in 1907 the Lozi indunas stationed among the Ila and Toka were ordered back to the Valley.[77] Lewanika finally understood that the Company had no intention of allowing him to

exert any influence outside the reserved area, and he wrote angrily to Selborne, the High Commissioner in South Africa :

> Now I also ask Your Excellency what is the meaning of the expulsion of all my representatives from the Mashukulumbwe (Ila) and Matoka districts? Does the Company intend to take those districts quite out of my power? I have always done all in my power to keep the peace in all my country and to have all my people submissive to the Company. I am sorry to see they have so little confidence in me .... I feel it very keenly. Oh ! that we were granted to pass directly under the Government of King Edward !78

Selborne, however, refused to intervene.[79] It was quite clear that His Majesty's representative had little intention of halting the Company's unceasing encroachment on Lozi sovereignty, although the British government did feel that Lewanika's formal consent should be given for each prerogative he was forced to surrender.[80] In 1904, therefore, Coryndon had written Lewanika seeking his agreement for a new proclamation which would give the Administration jurisdiction not only over cases between Europeans and between Europeans and Africans, as the Concession of 1900 granted, but also between Africans in "serious cases" such as murder and witchcraft. Trying to disguise the extent of this infringement of the Kuta's authority, Coryndon promised the King that "It is not intended by this law that the White Government shall interfere in the small matters which concern only native custom and tradition".[81] Lewanika

and the Ngambela agreed that white magistrates should have jurisdiction in cases involving only Africans ,

> with the exception of the Barotse Valley and Sesheke district - the cases in these districts between natives I should like to be tried by Indunas and myself, with the exception of cases of murder and ... witchcraft, which will be tried as you state by yourself.[82]

In the end, the Courts of Justice Proclamation of 1905 left to the King and Kuta in this reserved area "civil and criminal cases between natives of a minor kind in which native custom is not repugnant to English law".[83]

By a steady process of attrition, then, Lozi sovereignty was being forced back into the relatively narrow confines of the Valley and Sesheke, and even there it was being emasculated. The next step in this process has been described by Stokes as constituting Lewanika's "greatest surrender".[84] The Concession of 1900 gave the Company the right to grant land in Toka and Ila country only to white men approved by the King. Coryndon now asked for "the authority to issue land over all your territory (save the usual reserved portion) to whoever I consider to be a good and bona fide farmer or settler".[85] Lewanika replied giving his consent,[86] but at the insistence of the Secretary of State, the agreement was ratified by him in a more formal deed of cession in 1906.[87]

The Colonial Office recognized that the concession amounted to "a land grant of the whole of North-Western Rhodesia, except Lewanika's own reserve".[88] There are two possible explanations for the King's agreeing to sign the agreement. He may not, in the first place, fully have understood its implications. In later years, as we shall see, he and his successor repeatedly insisted that they never intended to allow the Company to sell land, for, as one informant argued, the Lozi naturally saw farming and settlement in their own terms; the King placed blocks of land under the control of others, but all land remained, ultimately, the King's, in his capacity as Litunga, "owner of the land".[89]

In the second place, the King and Ngambela probably accepted Coryndon's demands without seeking the consent of the Kuta. Aitkens, the DC at Lealui, had discussed the Courts of Justice Proclamation only with the King and Ngambela.[90] It was true that the King's powers had been circumscribed no less than those of his indunas. But he nevertheless remained King, and most of the privileges left to Lozi by virtue of the Concession of 1900 accrued to him. It was he who conferred with the representatives of the Company, he who had travelled to England, he to whom the £850 a year was given. And this position was safeguarded, as he fully grasped, so long as he cooperated with the Administration.

He had seen the consequences of resistance in the case of the Ndebele and the Boers. He surely had not forgotten Worthington's threat to Litia in 1902 that, had the alleged plot of 1897 to kill all Europeans succeeded, "today there would be no Barotse nation".[91] No doubt the indunas shared the King's fear of white power. The fact that they seemed more willing to resist it, as we shall see, is likely due to the simple fact that they had less to lose by so doing that Lewanika did. For that reason, he was prepared to capitulate on virtually every issue, so long as the Company allowed him to remain King of Barotseland proper. For, as one informant emphasized, if the Company was not given what it demanded, there was good reason to fear that it would simply take by force everything - including the Kingship itself.[92]

It was also true that in certain cases, the Company initially seemed to be extending the King's powers. Such was the case, for example, with their appointments of Lozi indunas to assist DC's in Toka and Ila areas, and it took some time for the King to realize that he had been out manoeuvred. Such was the case again when the subject of imposing a hut-tax arose.[93] When Coryndon suggested in 1902 that tax collection begin in Toka country,[94] Lewanika agreed with alacrity. Here was a means substantially to increase his own revenues, as well as to re-assert his authority over the Toka.

But the decisions as to his share of the tax, and as to the method of its collection, gave rise to acrimonious disagreements between the King and the Company, the former being forced to accept the latter's terms in each case.

Lewanika, in order, as he said, "to show the people that he is still their king", wished to collect the tax himself through his representative indunas among the Toka, agreeing that all receipts would be handed over to the Administration.[95] Coryndon, however, was intransigently opposed to this scheme, fearing it would augment the King's status outside the Valley. He proposed instead that a Lozi induna should accompany a European collector in each sub-district; the induna would instruct the people to pay the tax in Lewanika's name, but would not himself receive any money.[96] Lewanika reluctantly accepted this proposal.[97]

Controversy now centred upon the percentage of the tax which the King was to receive. He refused to accept that the five per cent upon which Coryndon was insisting was adequate, although he reduced his own demands from fifty to thirty to twenty per cent. Macauley, the Acting DC, Lealui, implied that Lewanika was under the malevolent influence of the educated elite, such as his English-speaking son-in-law Kambai, who was his personal secretary and wrote many of his official letters in English, and his son Imwiko,

who had returned from private school in Kent; Macauley described Imwiko as a "whipper snapper".[98] But the issue was far more complicated that this conspiracy theory implied. Coryndon and Lewanika had already agreed that the latter's share would be distributed among the royal family, all indunas and the senior headmen in the land. The tax question consequently united and divided the ruling class simultaneously. On the one hand, since it would be the King who would decide the amount of each man's share in conjunction with the Administration, his authority over his indunas would be increased. On the other hand, since the greater the total sum received by the King, the greater would be the share of each member of the ruling hierarchy, the entire ruling class supported Lewanika's demand for the largest portion he could obtain.[99]

Milner and Lyttleton acknowledged that a percentage of five per cent, when divided by so many people, would not give a significant amount to any of them. In any event, Lewanika could hardly receive less than ten per cent, the proportion given in Basutoland and Bechuanaland. As a compromise, the Colonial Office decided that Lewanika's formal share of the hut tax be ten per cent, of which, however, no more than £1200 would be given directly to him; this sum was to be on top of the £850 per

annum he was receiving from the Concession of 1900. If his percentage totalled more than £1200, as it was expected to do, the difference would be paid into a fund for public works in Barotseland. This decision was final; it was announced to the King and the Kuta and imposed upon them, and for decades they and their successors complained bitterly about its inadequacy.[100]

For the Company, the hut-tax proved a great success. Set at ten shillings per hut per annum, over £10,000 was collected from the Toka in its first year of collection.[101] By 1907, with collection taking place in all districts, over £33,000 was received, £9000 of which came from the Barotse Valley.[102] Coryndon proudly reported that the number of "defaulters" was minimal, which he attributed to the efficiency of his organization.[103] But the consequences of not paying could hardly have been a negligible factor in its success. Initially, defaulters had their huts and even their crops burned,[104] but the Government, ignoring the destruction of crops, believed such punishment to be excessively lenient in view of the "flimsy and temporary manner in which they (huts) were built".[105] Instead, defaulters were either to be fined or imprisoned.[106] This policy was followed rigidly, defaulters being arrested and "dealt with severely"[107] as many Lozi still remember.

A large number of informants singled out the imposition of the hut tax as the most despicable feature of Company rule. The power struggle between the Lozi ruling class and the Company's officials barely impinged upon the lives of the mass of Lozi. The hut tax hit them directly and powerfully. They had of course never been consulted about the Concessions, probably did not understand their purpose, and certainly derived no perceptible benefits from Company rule. Yet they suddenly found themselves obliged to pay money they often did not have and for reasons they did not comprehend. Informants talked vividly of arrests, handcuffs, miserable prison food, ticks in the blankets, men often enchained, sometimes being forced to carry buckets of excreta on their heads. If the King and even the Kuta had reason to regard the Administration with a certain ambivalence, to the mass of Lozi the Bomas increasingly became symbols of fear and oppression at the hands of the white men.[108]

Informants disagreed, however, whether the majority of Lozi blamed the King or the Company for their new burden. Perhaps they understood that much of the ruling class shared their own antagonism against the white administrators, since the largest group of minor indunas and headmen received no more than a few shillings per head as their share of the tax. Nevertheless, this

share, combined with the greater opportunity of even the most subordinate member of the ruling class to exchangehis cattle for cash with white traders in the Valley, allowed every Lozi aristocrat to find the money to pay his own tax.[109]

But as Lewanika himself acknowledged, "the great majority of natives had nothing whatever", and he understood that, unless work was found for them in Barotseland, most Lozi would be "driven out of the country in order to obtain money for the hut-tax ...."[110] The Company, however, had no intention of finding them work at home. Partly, as we have seen, this was consistent with its absolute determination "to reduce expenditures of (the) Company to a minimum ...."[111] Above all, it was because its officials had already begun to see Barotseland primarily as a source of cheap labour for the south. The imposition of the hut-tax assured the success of this objective. Although a certain amount of labour migration to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia had taken place prior to the introduction of the tax,[112] missionary records testify that such migration "assumed extraordinary proportions" after 1904, for the specific purpose of making enough money to pay the new taxes.[113] The Administration facilitated labour migration by allowing the (Southern) Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau to send its agent into Barotseland to recruit labourers "for the purpose of benefiting the industries of (Southern)

Rhodesia".[114]

By the end of the decade, the extent of labour migration had become one of the chief concerns of the King and Kuta. In 1909, Ngambela Mokamba complained that "The whole country wants work"; those who were unable to leave their families for work in the south "have not enough to pay their taxes and they get imprisoned". Wallace, the Acting Administrator, was unsympathetic. The Company's policy, after all, was that Barotseland should remain undeveloped, in order that it could supply cheap labour to Company enterprises south of the Zambesi, and Wallace openly informed the King and Ngambela that for the foreseeable future, Lozi "boys" must continue to seek work on the line of rail or in Southern Rhodesia.[115] This was the position in 1909, and it remained unaltered during the entire life of Northern Rhodesia.

On every occasion, then, the interests of the Company took precedence over those of the Lozi. This truth was illustrated vividly in 1905 when, at the demands of the Company, the boundary between North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia was shifted from the Kafue River eastwards to the narrow waist of the territory between Katanga and Moçambique. Copper had already been assessed as of great potential importance in what was to become the Copperbelt, and the Company felt that its mines in that area were

more secure under the Concession of 1900 with Lewanika than under those "made with personages (in North-Eastern Rhodesia) whose existence today are somewhat mythical ...."[116] By this simple administrative device, the line of rail and the Copperbelt thus fell under the jurisdiction of the Barotseland-North-Western Rhodesia Order in Council of 1899, but in no sense under the jurisdiction of Lewanika himself.

The King had never asserted any claim to authority over territory so far east of his kingdom, yet formally he received it. He consistently made claims upon a large area west of the upper Zambesi, yet in the same year, much of it was denied to him. In July 1905, the King of Italy handed down his judgment on Lewanika's disputed western boundary. Victor Emmanuel III clearly saw his role as that of a diplomat rather than an ethnologist. He adopted certain arbitrary criteria for determining when one tribe could properly be considered the vassal of another tribe. Had these criteria been universally accepted during the Scramble, the map of Africa would have been substantially different; the Company's rights over the Shona as vassals of the Ndebele, for example, or indeed over the Ila, Tonga and Toka as vassals of the Lozi, would have been declared invalid. Moreover, he did not consistently apply his own criteria to the area in question.

His decision, in fact, was a simple compromise between the claims of Portugal and Britain. The former argued that the upper Zambesi was the legitimate western boundary of Barotseland; the latter, in support of both Lewanika and the Company, claimed the twentieth meridian east of Greenwich. The King of Italy decided, roughly, to divide the disputed area evenly, making the twenty-second parallel Barotseland's western frontier.[117] This settlement reduced Barotseland to about 180,000 square miles, just larger than the size of France.

London had no illusions about Lewanika's reaction to the award. The High Commissioner, Selborne, quickly wrote him admitting the decision was disappointing, but warning that he must nevertheless "respect and loyally abide by the decision arrived at ...."[118] Lewanika was hardly mollified; through his Lozi secretary Kambai, he wrote sharply to Coryndon :

> ... It is not quite a good boundary, is only to make us much disappointed; how a boundary can go like zig-zag, to cut Imilangu tribe in half, Mazengo tribe in half, Ba-Makowa tribe half, Mambunda tribe half ... is not a boundary on ly a joke indeed ....
>
> ... How shall we do, all Barotse indunas, their villages and cattle will be outside, also my sons, nephews and cattle will be outside ....
>
> How shall we do, Sir, to be cutted half and half.[119]

Coryndon realized the magnitude of the loss in terms of prestige, influence, tribute and cattle,[120] and did not minimize the seriousness of the Lozi grievance. Colin Harding agreed that the award had severely undermined Lozi confidence in the Administration, and believed that the decision would "rankle for sometime in Lewanika's mind". Harding had not been in the Valley for several years, and now observed that "I did not receive the same courtesy from his (Lewanika's) people that they were wont to bestow on me".[121]

The boundary decision was merely another in the long series of humiliations and defeats that the Lozi aristocracy, and, in the case of the hut tax, the Lozi peasantry, had suffered at the hands of the Company since 1897. There can be little doubt that a large faction among the indunas blamed the King for this wholly unsatisfactory outcome. It was true that much of his own authority had been circumscribed, but their own powers, as they believed, had been almost entirely emasculated. All the worst fears of the "pagan conservative party" between 1888 and 1897 had been confirmed, and although their King had often complained, never once did he attempt to resist a Company demand.

Not surprisingly, then, even before the King of Italy's award was announced, the DC at Lealui felt that Lewanika had become unpopular among both the people and the indunas in the Valley.

He was convinced that an opposition "party" had once again sprung up, under induna Kalonga and Imoana (Muimui?), with, as its main grievance, the tiny percentage of the King's share of the hut-tax which he distributed to his indunas. The compliancy of the King had convinced the Company that he was their greatest single ally in Barotseland, and Coryndon reacted to this report by ordering to Lealui a patrol of forty police and a Maxim gun, under two European officers, "as a moral support to the constituted authority and to Lewanika himself ...."[122] Lewanika's personal response to the appearance of the patrol was, as Stokes has said, "to throw himself into unreserved dependence on the Administration", agreeing finally to the extension of the hut tax in the entire kingdom, including the Barotse Valley.[123] As for his putative conspirators, they quickly muffled all signs of open protest in the face of white power, and within weeks the patrol was able to leave the capital.[124]

Several months later, however, after the news of the boundary award had been received, Coryndon and Harding again discovered, as has been seen, that the "political atmosphere" was "not as clear as it should be". Both Worthington and Aitken, Coryndon reported, concurred that there was an "atmosphere of constraint" at the Kuta, that few indunas regularly attended its sessions, and that the King was taking unusually infrequent hunting and fishing trips away from Lealui.

"... Perhaps," Coryndon speculated, Lewanika "is largely blamed for many of the irritating restrictions which come with a white administration", such as the hut-tax. "I do not think," the Administrator concluded, "he would be Paramount Chief today had it not been for the establishment of a white government which has consistently supported his authority."[125]

This may well have been true. More important, the Kuta, the King, and the Administration all probably believed that it was true. The armed patrol which Coryndon despatched to Lealui early in 1905 may be seen as the decisive event in determining the respective positions of all the parties involved in Barotseland during the remainder of Lewanika's reign. The Company was determined that he should reign, even if its own officials now ruled. The King realistically decided that this unsatisfactory status was better than no status whatever, and he remained, as the Company clearly grasped, at its mercy. Those indunas to whom the new situation was intolerable were equally aware that, with the King wholly dependent upon the Company and the Company wholly determined to support the King against his opponents, any chance of their deposing him, or of his leading them in resisting further Company encroachments on their authority, had disappeared. Only the "new men" had confidence that they could appeal over the heads of the Company

officials to the British government itself to save their country.

Lewanika's victory, then, in winning "British protection", proved to be a Phyrric one; he succeeded in remaining King only by forfeiting a large proportion of the traditional authority of the kingship. His second major policy, to build a modern nation on the upper Zambesi, was an even more abject failure. This too became undeniably apparent in 1905. Ironically, this second "betrayal" - as he saw it - took the form of an event that did not transpire: the railway line from Victoria Falls completely by-passed the "severely truncated and attenuated"[126] Lozi "kingdom" as it wended its way to the Copperbelt. Lewanika and the Ngambela, together with the missionaries, had cherished a dream that the line would follow the upper Zambesi, and that the Barotse Valley would become the hub of a developing, prosperous Northern Rhodesia.[127] The realization that the railway would run east of the Kafue River was a rude awakening, and with it the dream crumbled. Lealui, as a later writer pointed out

> was no longer the centre on which the successful development of the north depended. Lewanika was no longer the all-important factor in the situation. He was King of only part - a great part - but an increasingly unimportant part, of the much greater territory of North-Western Rhodesia. From now on, Barotseland was bound to sink more and more into the political and economic background.[128]

II

All Lozi were highly dissatisfied with the results of Company rule. But, so far as the limited evidence of both oral and written sources allow us to judge, because they feared the consequences of open rebellion, no Lozi actively resisted the burdens and humiliations which Company domination meant. Lewanika himself was forced into collaborating with the Administration as the price of his remaining King. The traditionalist faction in the Kuta probably wished to depose him in the hope that his successor might provide more militant leadership, but its members were realistically intimidated by white power. Failing this objective, they continued to apply pressure on the King to be less docile in his reactions to Company demands. In this, they had the support of the small but increasing number of educated young aristocrats who, though resented by the traditionalists, shared the desire of the latter to revive their proud heritage of a powerful kingdom. These young elitists, moreover, had considerable influence on the King and Ngambela. Mokamba, who remained receptive to new techniques in their desire to preserve Lozi sovereignty. Eschewing to a large extent the advice and assistance of missionaries - who, after all, were white - they adopted the

tactics of fellow black men, above all those of South Africa, convincing the King that success was achievable if only more sophisticated methods of protest were utilized; this meant, primarily, the use of literate, well-documented and reasoned petitions setting forth Lozi grievances and presenting more desirable and equitable alternatives. Secondly, such petitions were, if possible, to be directed to representatives of Her Majesty's Government rather than to those of the Company.[129] Lewanika accepted these tactics, and during the remaining decade of his life, submitted a number of petitions to the High Commissioner if possible, the Company Administrator when necessary. Without exception, the requests incorporated in these petitions were rejected, while the British government refused in any way to interfere as the Company continued to fulfil its insatiable demands leading to ever greater diminution of the Lozi "empire" and the authority of its traditional rulers.

The commencement of the era of petitions, as it were, began in 1906 with the arrival in Lealui of F. Z. S. Peregrino. Peregrino was a Gold Coaster who had gone to South Africa where he had become editor of the South African Spectator and head of the Coloured Peoples' Vigilance Committee of South Africa, and therefore was familiar with the techniques being used by non-whites in that country of submitting petitions of grievances to the British

Government.[130] Lozi contact with Peregrino may have been made through Prince Imwiko, when he returned to Barotseland from his private school in Kent via South Africa, or possibly by two other sons of Lewanika whom he sent to Lovedale College in South Africa. Peregrino offered himself to the Lozi as "the agent of natives in making complaints to the Government". "The path of the native is difficult", he wrote; "I am a black man and have acted for years between the black man and the Government in Cape Colony with much success". Here, it appeared, was precisely the man the Lozi needed to combat Company domination, and Litia invited Peregrino to Barotseland.[131]

Shortly after his arrival, he prepared for the King a petition to be submitted to Selborne, the High Commissioner for South Africa. These set out the major Lozi grievances. The boundary award of 1905 was, of course, one. The problem of many Lozi in raising money to pay the hut tax was a second, the difficulty being compounded by the insistence of white traders on paying in goods rather than in cash for the produce which was offered to them for sale. Company officials had refused to intervene when informed of this practice. Finally, the Company had not fulfilled its agreement to "establish and maintain" schools, while its payment of Lewanika's share of the hut-tax had been made "but in part".[132]

Two months later, in October 1906, Lewanika and the Ngambela travelled to Bulawayo where they had a brief personal interview with the High Commissioner. The complaints raised in the Peregrino petition were raised, Selborne rejecting all but one of them. He was convinced that most of the issues had been invented by Peregrino, and that the Lozi were unaware of the contents of the petition. In fact, he modestly reported, whatever Lewanika's anxieties might be, they "will perhaps be forgotten for a time in his pleasure at having seen me and at my promise ... to visit his country before long".[133]

Selborne's complacency reflected the failure of white officialdom to recognize the extent to which its intrusions had wounded the sensibilities of a proud people, as well as the cherished colonial myth that Africans protested only at the instigation of a handful of unrepresentative agitators. But it reflected as well the establishment during 1906 of the Barotse National School. The Company's promise to support schools in Barotseland was only implemented now that a school could be financed from that part of Lewanika's percentage of the hut-tax exceeding £1200. The purpose of the school was to produce English-speaking interpreters, skilled artisans and clerks. This, explained Worthington, was the kind of education desired by the King, and he believed that the BNS "would

go a long way towards giving the Barotse occupation and would satisfy the headmen that the Government is at last doing something for them ...."[134]

Within a few years, the new school was functioning successfully, many of its students being the sons of headmen and indunas, and even some of Lewanika's younger sons attended.[135] Moreover, the existence of the BNS prodded the mission into expanding its own school system.[136] Even so the King was not quite satisfied, and sent several of his elder sons and a number of the sons of senior indunas and court favourites to Lovedale College in South Africa and to the more advanced PMS school in Basutoland.[137]

This upsurge of educational zeal had far-reaching political consequences for the Lozi. At home, it meant the creation of a new generation of young men with new ideas and new aspirations who were already influencing the old king and who would become the main advisers of his successor. Moreover, although fewer than a thousand Lozi out of an estimated population in the reserved area of some 125,000 people were at schools,[138] this was a far greater proportion than obtained elsewhere in Northern Rhodesia. The consequences of this were already perceptible in the rest of the territory by the beginning of the war, when educated Africans from Nyasaland and Barotseland had a virtual monopoly on the few semi-

skilled jobs then open to black men.[139] Living outside their homeland had a curiously ambivalent impact upon those Lozi, still relatively few, who thus found suitable employment: on the one hand, it heightened their ethnic consciousness and sense of superiority; on the other, it gave them a sense of identity with other Africans vis-a-vis the expanding European community. These experiences too would, as shall be seen, influence political developments both within and outside Barotseland proper.

These wider ramifications of Lewanika's desire for educational opportunities were not, of course foreseen at the time, and for the moment, the establishment of the BNS by no means assuaged the King's grievances. Peregrino left the country at the end of 1906, and although both Kambai, the King's secretary, and Prince Imwiko had some knowledge of English, Lewanika asked Adolph Jalla to prepare a formal, written petition of Lozi complaints to present to Selborne, the High Commissioner. This was an indication of the significance attached to the meeting at Sesheke in September 1907 with Selborne, the most senior British official yet to visit Barotseland. Here was the first opportunity since 1897 to put to so authoritative an official the accumulated grievances of a decade, and for that purpose internal splits within the ruling class were sealed as the King, Ngambela

Mokamba and a large number of indunas all travelled to Sesheke to demonstrate a united front against the Company.[140]

Their fundamental complaint, as they plainly stated, was that

> We have ever wanted to be under the Imperial Government and are sorry we received the British South Africa Company .... We would not have welcomed it had Mr. Lochner not come with letters from the High Commissioner ... and now we insist upon our wish to pass under the Imperial Government and be no longer under the British South Africa Company.

Selborne replied that the King of England was "perfectly satisfied" with the Company's Administration, and that Lewanika had "every reason to be friendly to the Company and trust the Company which has beena loyal friend to him".

The Lozi delegation sharply repudiated this assertion. Company rule was not only unwanted, it was also harsh. Above all, the financial arrangement was quite iniquitous. Lewanika's annual payment of £1200 was wholly inadequate; that sum had been "imposed upon us against our will, and we vainly protested against it". Why, asked the Ngambela, was the BNS being financed from the ten per cent of the hut-tax promised to the King instead of by the Company as pledged in the various concessions? How was the remaining ninety per cent of the tax total spent?

> We hear that the British South Africa Company is a commercial company (the Ngambela added) .... We think we begin to understand the reason why the ... Company has up to now done no work for the districts of Lealui and Sesheke .... Our people are to go very far out of the country to earn money for the tax .... Are we wrong when we feel that the ... Company wants to draw money from us? This the Imperial Government would not do.

Selborne remained unmoved. He was certain that there was little likelihood that the King's subsidy would be increased since, as he accurately pointed out, Lewanika's revenue was in fact far greater than £1200. In 1905, for example, Worthington had compiled the following estimate of the King's total revenues for the year.[141]

	£
Annual subsidy from Company	850
Share of hut-tax	1200
Sale of King's cattle (7000 sold in 1904)	1500
King's curio shop in Livingstone	200
Half receipts of game licences	150
Hire of canoes, Livingstone to Lealui	200
Toll collected at Gonye Falls	50
Half receipts of ferry licences	10
TOTAL	£4160

"In money matters," Selborne noted, the King "is said to be not easily satisfied".[142] But as has been already stated, Lewanika's revenues were divided among a large number of members of the

Lozi ruling class, a majority of whom received only a few shillings a year, and we may assume that it was partly under pressure from this faction that the King consistently attempted to have his subsidy increased.

Moreover, the harshness of Company rule did not manifest itself only in financial hardship. Lewanika asserted, and Adolph Jalla confirmed, that many Lozi had been beaten up by both Company officials and private traders, often for failing to give "proper respect" to white people.

> We fail to understand (Lewanika declared) why we, headmen and all, are obliged to kneel down and clap hands at anybody employed by the ... Company .... Firstly, my son was chastized by Mr. Coryndon, secondly some were beaten by Mr. Aitkens, and thirdly the Chief's sons were beaten by Sergeant Macarthy ....
>
> We sometimes are caused to feel as if we are a conquered nation, while we have made an agreement which was said to be just like an alliance between our nation and the Imperial Government. When we say so, those of the British South Africa Company ask: "Do you want to be conquered?"

In reply, the High Commissioner did not even deign to refer to these complaints. He simply laid down the rules that, in future, the "royal salute" - kneeling and clapping - must be given to himself and the Administrator exclusively, that "a suitable salute of lower degree, such as the clapping of hands", be accorded to all other

Administration officials, and that "all other whites should be treated with scrupulous courtesy and respect". "It is always polite", added Codrington, the new Administrator, "to take off hats to white men .... It is right that they (Africans) should ... treat all white men with respect."[143]

Selborne later wrote the King a formal letter stating that King Edward had confirmed the judgments which the High Commissioner had handed down at the interview.[144] Lewanika replied that "We are sorry our petition has not been granted, but we submit to the decision of the Great King. Myself and my council and my people we shall abide by the law".[145] Clearly, though, they were sorely disappointed, and the King remained openly antagonistic to the Company which Selborne continued warmly to defend.[146] Lewanika was still bitter that Lozi tax money was not resulting in any benefits to Barotseland: "No public work, nothing felt to promote the progress of the country". Moreover, all the senior Company officials lived far from Lealui. They were seen "hardly a few days" each year, he complained; "their great interest, we feel, is somewhere else."[147]

Codrington and Selborne both agreed that the King and Kuta were not in close enough contact with the Administration. Their concern, however, was that Lewanika's relative isolation prevented

the Company from firmly establishing its authority over the Lozi ruling class. As a result, they incorrectly believed, "Lewanika was more or less in the hands of the missionaries who, since Coillard's death (in 1904), are antagonistic to the Company and took advantage of the High Commissioner's visit (to Sesheke) to submit, in Lewanika's name, several petty, and for the most part unfounded, grievances which they themselves cherished towards the Administration". Their solution was to appoint a special officer, to be called the Resident Magistrate, to represent the Administration in the Barotse Valley.[148]

This assessment of the political situation in Barotseland was almost entirely inaccurate. As far as the Lozi were concerned, their grievances were neither petty nor unfounded. The ruling class needed no missionary to convince them that Company rule was detrimental to their interests. And although it was true that the advent of the Administration meant a diminution in missionary influence on the King, there existed in the Valley manifest social harmony between missionaries, officials and traders.[149]

It was true that the King had Adolph Jalla write his petition to Selborne in 1907, and looked to the missionary for tactical guidance during the interview itself. But in 1906, after all, he had had Peregrino draft the petition. At the brief interview with Selborne in Bulawayo later that year, however, neither Peregrino nor a

missionary was in attendance, and Jalla reported that the King and the Ngambela had felt at a strong disadvantage, being unable to cope with the more experienced government officials.[150] There is no evidence to suggest that either Peregrino or Jalla influenced the contents of the petitions, although it is likely they were responsible for the manner in which each was presented. Indeed, to suggest that alien agitators were provoking the Lozi against the Company was to ignore the major theme of Lozi politics ever since 1890.

In the first place, then, the Lozi did not need missionary promptings to exacerbate their resentment of Company rule. In the second place, although the mission still had a role to play in helping to draft petitions in proper language, even this function was increasingly being usurped by members of the new educated elite. The "new men", moreover, were highly suspicious of the missionaries because of their close relations with the other white men in the Valley. This suspicion served to bind the new elite with the traditionalists in the Kuta, who in many other ways were mutually hostile. The latter had always feared that the King's relationship with the missionaries would limit their own traditional role as his advisers. The young educated men suspected the missionaries of racialist attitudes. Together the two factions

acted to reduce the King's need for missionary advice and assistance, and in tacit recognition of their diminished role, the mission increasingly turned its attention to non-political interests, to such problems as beer-drinking and divorce, the minute number of conversions, and "heathenism" in general.[151]

It seems fairly clear that it was the new elite who were responsible for the mission's new concentration on these non-political matters to which most of the Kuta had always wanted it to be restricted. The older indunas had been unable to achieve this objective because the missionaries alone initially possessed the competence to help the King deal with the Company on an equal basis. Now, however, young educated Lozi were beginning to be able to meet this need. And it is probable that Lewanika hoped that, with their assistance, his dream of building a modern nation might yet be realized. Frederick Arnot, Lewanika's first missionary in the early 1880's, passed through Lealui in 1910, and though he thought the King "old-looking", nevertheless found him "still full of plans for the development of his country".[152] And these plans were fully shared by Ngambela Mokamba, upon whom the great proportion of the nation's business had now fallen.[153] Mokamba, with Prince Litia, were seen by the new educated elite as their chief allies in the ruling class. Together they influenced

Lewanika to become the spokesman for an entire generation of newly-educated young Africans, when they had him write to the High Commissioner asking that "those who understood the notion of progress" should be allowed to advance, and that there should be no discrimination on grounds of colour in the Administration's employment policy.[154]

With their sensitivity to racialism, then, the new elite became suspicious of missionary attitudes. With the self-confidence gained through their education, its members felt missionary intervention in dealing with the Administration to be increasingly unnecessary. In any event, as all Lozi must certainly have perceived, mission assistance had hardly helped to safeguard their position. For by 1907, as Stokes has pointed out,

> the unequal contest (between the Lozi ruling class and the Company) had been decided. Outside the reserved area, Lewanika had given up his rights of tribute and jurisdiction, and his substantial rights over the land. All that he retained was his percentage of the hut tax receipts and the shadowy influence possessed by the representative indunas sitting as assessors in "native cases".[155]

And, as we have seen, the King and Kuta believed their share of the tax to be wholly inadequate, while by 1908 the representative induna system had been effectively dismantled.

Similarly, in the reserved area itself, though the ruling class was allowed considerably greater powers and privileges than any other tribe in Northern Rhodesia, its status as compared with the period prior to 1897 was greatly undermined. Yet this attrition of Lozi power continued, the interests of the Company as always taking precedence over those of the people they were "protecting". Among the major objectives of the Administration were the raising of revenues through the hut-tax and the maintenance of a free flow of labour to the south. Its officials realized that one major obstacle in fully realizing these objectives was what they enjoyed calling the Lozi system of "domestic slavery". Like the missionaries, Company officials failed to distinguish between slaves, serfs, servants, and simply humble peasants, nor did they recognize the King's customary right to demand free labour from his subjects in return for his fulfilling his proper duties as King.[156]

In any event, such distinctions were hardly relevant in terms of the Company's needs. A man who was obligated to provide free labour could not pay his hut-tax; a man who was tied to another man - whatever the nature of the bond - could not become a labour migrant. The system, therefore, must be abolished.[157] Worthington demanded of the King and Kuta that they must officially free all "slaves", but softened the blow by offering

"certain conditions" to limit their freedom:[158] the King would be permitted to call upon anyone in the Valley to perform certain tasks for him and his household without payment for a maximum of twelve days during any year; indunas and headmen could demand free labour only for work "rendered for the exclusive benefit of the community".[159]

Lewanika and the indunas were prepared to agree to this settlement provided it applied to all the people in North-Western Rhodesia, and not, as Worthington suggested, merely those in the reserved area. Worthington angrily rejected this demand; "I tore my copy of the draft Proclamation in pieces and left the Council Chamber with some show of impatience".[160] As always however, the Lozi soon capitulated. According to Jalla, the Ngambela was the first to agree,[161] while Worthington believed that Peregrino's influence was critical. Peregrino and Worthington conferred daily, and the Gold Coaster met with the Kuta after each discussion which Worthington held with them on the question. Worthington believed that Peregrino "argued the cause of abolition on lines agreed between us",[162] but we may surely guess that Peregrino reminded the indunas, on the basis of his South African experiences, of the likely consequences should they refuse to submit. Finally, on 16 July 1906, on Worthington's demand, the "Proclamation of the Abolition of Slavery" was read aloud in Lealui by the Ngambela

to a large crowd of some "several thousand natives".[163]

The Company was very pleased with its work. Not only had a "degrading" institution been abolished, but also, as the High Commissioner did not fail to point out, many more Africans would now be in a position to pay their tax.[164] At the same time, a large pool of potential labour migrants was thus freed to supply the Company's enterprises south of the Zambesi.

The Kuta, on the other hand, considered that they had once again been betrayed. On a political level, it had been another test of strength between the Administration and the Lozi ruling class, and the latter had been decisively defeated. But this was not wholly accurate; the indunas had lost, but the King after all was not asked to make any major sacrifices. He could still demand free labour, if only for a brief period, for any purpose he saw fit. They, however, could demand it only for work "rendered for the exclusive benefit of the community". To have their gardens tilled, for example, they would now have to pay labourers, yet where, from their tiny share of Lewanika's percentage of the hut tax, would they find money for such payments? Some headmen and minor indunas in fact were forced to undertake their own labour, while all members of the ruling class considered their status diminished by the loss of so many traditional dependents.[165]

Few of these repercussions, however, would affect the position of the King, and the resentment aroused by the new Proclamation was directed as much against the Ngambela as against the Company, Mokamba, as Lewanika's mouthpiece and the first man openly to capitulate to Worthington's demands, being accused of sacrificing Lozi rights to the Administration.[166]

To the indunas, then, this episode must have seemed yet another vindication of their original fear of collusion between the King and the white men at the expense of the Kuta. Yet they could hardly argue that the King himself was not being severely humiliated by the actions of the Administration, actions which could serve only to unite the ruling class against the white intruders. In November 1907, Robert Codrington was appointed to replace Coryndon as Administrator of North-Western Rhodesia. Codrington died eighteen months after his appointment, and in any event, like Coryndon after 1900, gave most of his attention to the district surrounding the line of rail, largely ignoring Lozi affairs.[167] His impact on Barotseland was, therefore, negligible, save in one crucial way. Codrington abruptly decided that Lewanika must in the future be designated merely as "Paramount Chief" of the Lozi; "The title of 'King' as applied to Lewanika and that of 'Prince' to Letia," he announced, "are to be discontinued and

discountenanced".[168] This unilateral decree was a powerful blow to the prestige and status of the Lozi ruler, formally reducing his position to a level with those of other tribal heads in Northern Rhodesia, even though all the latter had been either minor figures or had been defeated by Company agents. Lozi themselves never ceased calling him Litunga ("earth"), their nearest equivalent to "King" and the highest symbol of the unity of the nation. But the bitterness engendered by Codrington's decision lasted into the reign of Lewanika's successor, who, as we shall see, with the full support of the educated elite struggled fruitlessly to have his proper title restored.

Clearly Peregrino's faith in petitions praying for the intervention of the British Government was proving illusory, as the Company continued, through the means of both formal concessions and practical encroachments, to eat away at the remaining vestiges of Lozi sovereignty. Company officials considered, for example, that even the severely circumscribed jurisdiction of the Kuta as against their own Magistrates' Courts, as laid down in the Proclamation of 1905, was too extensive. The Proclamation had deprived the Kuta of the right to try any serious criminal case, even one between Africans. Now the Administration refused to allow it to judge even minor civil

cases such as those involving tax evasion, breaches of labour contracts, and the like.[169] Informally and swiftly, all such cases were handed over to the Magistrates' Courts, as persistent demands by the King and Kuta to be allowed wider jurisdiction met with complete failure. By the beginning of World War I, as one senior local official acknowledged, "Lewanika (had) ceded all judicial rights to the BSA Company with the exception of very minor items and of civil cases between natives".[170] In fact, what these amounted to were beer-drinking, and above all, divorce and adultery cases. Indeed, until the end of the colonial era, divorce and adultery constituted some two-thirds to three-quarters of all the cases handled by Lozi courts.[171]

In this same informal way, the Acting Administrator, Wallace, moved in 1909 to increase further the Administration's control over indunas through partial control of their livelihood. He professed to be concerned by the fact that many minor indunas and headmen received "nothing or very little" as their share of Lewanika's £1200 from the hut-tax. Wallace therefore decided that the Administration would pay indunas directly for services rendered, such as guiding district officers through their areas. Although these minor aristocrats were predictably pleased, Lewanika and the Ngambela, as Wallace acknowledged,

> certain ly thought that it might tend to undermine the chief's authority, and they wished the money to be handed to them for distribution .... I could not agree .... He (Lewanika) agreed in the end to all I proposed, but, as to the direct payment to the indunas, with a "somewhat sorrowful heart".[172]

In fact, of course, the King had little alternative but to agree: an Administration decision was, effectively, a fait accompli. Because he retained the power to dismiss dissident indunas, Lewanika was probably not greatly concerned that they would now become more independent and a more serious threat to his position. Nevertheless, he must have felt that his moral authority at least over his people had, by the new arrangement thus thrust upon him, been sorely impaired.

Nor was the Company yet satisfied. Only months later, in November 1909, Lewanika was presented with the last important formal concession of this era which the Administration deemed necessary. The Concession of 1906 had given the Company the right to dispose of land outside the reserved area only for purposes of settlement. Wallace now asked the King to extend that right, in effect to turn over the ownership of that area to the Company. As a quid pro quo, he offered to extend the Barotse Reserve to that territory west of the upper Zambesi which had been returned to the Lozi as a result of the King of

Italy's boundary decision in 1905. Yet that area had in fact automatically reverted to Barotseland at the moment of the boundary award, since, at Lewanika's request, the Colonial Office had made this arrangement the condition of its confirmation of the Concession of 1900. In short, as Stokes has said, the Concession of 1909 was "something of a sleight of hand", the Company giving nothing for something.[173]

According to Wallace, not only did Lewanika agree to this Concession, but did so with a speed which took the Acting Administrator aback.[174] There are two possible explanations for this. The first is that the King in fact did not agree, and Wallace simply ignored his objections. As we shall see, in similar circumstances in 1910, the Ngambela informed the Company negotiator that the Lozi did not accept certain clauses in the Order in Council of 1911; the negotiator simply disregarded these objections, and wrote Lewanika that he was informing the High Commissioner "that you well understand the Order in Council".[175]

The second explanation is that Lewanika agreed to something other than what the Concession actually contained. The records of the meetings between Wallace and the King and Kuta in 1909 do not suggest how the Lozi, particularly some of the English-speaking indunas, could have so completely misconceived its terms. But

this was what Lewanika, the Ngambela and three educated young indunas claimed at an interview with Wallace in 1911. The crux of their argument was simple. The two Concessions of 1906 and 1909 had given the Company the right to "dispose" of land outside the reserved area to Europeans. But "disposing", the Ngambela emphasized, was a totally different matter from "selling". Indeed, the Lozi had no concept of the perpetual alienation of land, all of which belonged in perpetuity to the kingship, each reigning king being entitled to lend some of it if he so desired. What they had agreed, then, was that the Company could allow settlers to plough, but never purchase, land belonging to the King outside of the reserved area. In reply, Wallace and McKinnon, the Resident Magistrate, pointed out with equal simplicity that "when a white man ploughs land he is not like a native": Europeans bought land, they did not borrow it.[176]

The question of "disposing" of land outside Barotseland proper had become of such significance to the Lozi since it also arose out of the Order in Council of 1911 for the amalgamation of North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia, for which the Company had long pressed. Selborne, the High Commissioner, convinced the Colonial Office that Lewanika would accept the Order so long as his rights in the reserved area were safeguarded.[177] Once the decision

to amalgamate had been taken, Lewanika's acquiescence was actively sought, though it is quite clear that the Order was to be promulgated with or without his agreement. His equivocal position was thus clearly illustrated: to no other chief in Northern Rhodesia was an attempt even made to explain the new arrangement, and no other chief or tribe was explicitly referred to in the Order; yet in the last analysis, were Lewanika to refuse to cooperate, amalgamation would take place all the same. This pattern was to be repeated on many occasions over the following decades.

Still, the Colonial Office was sufficiently anxious to win Lewanika's accord that Lord Gladstone, the new High Commissioner for South Africa, invited the King to Cape Town for a personal discussion of the proposed Order in August 1910.[178] Lewanika quickly accepted the invitation, Wallace reporting that "his headmen press him to go"[179]; presumably some Lozi continued to believe that Britain might protect their country from the Company. At the last moment, however, on the basis of very obscure rumours which were passed on to Gladstone, the High Commissioner

> gathered the impression that affairs in the Barotse District were not in an altogether satisfactory state. There was no definite report of unrest or disaffection , but there appeared to be indications of a certain weakening of Lewanika's authority. His recent concessions to the British South Africa Company, which involved practically his abandonment of all land outside the Barotse Reserve, were mentioned as a possible cause of discontent.

Gladstone therefore deemed it "inexpedient" for the King to leave the Valley, and instead sent Colonel Fair, Resident Commissioner of Southern Rhodesia, to Livingstone to discuss the amalgamation order.[180]

The Order in Council of 1911 marked the final encapsulation of Barotseland within the larger colonial entity of Northern Rhodesia. The Lozi ruling class did not understand that, in effect, its separate treaty relationship with Britain was thus shattered, and that to all intents and purposes the Barotse Reserve became merely one of the seven provinces of the Northern Rhodesia, albeit in certain minor ways primus inter pares. For this reason, the amalgamation proposal as such was not opposed. At Livingstone, Fair and Wallace strongly emphasized to Lewanika and Ngambela Mokamba the two clauses - out of forty-eight - in the Order which explicitly safeguarded Lozi rights. The first provided for the non-alienation of land in the reserved area and confirmed Lozi rights and obligations under the Concessions of 1900 and 1909; the second stated that the provisions giving the Company power to remove Africans to make way for white settlement should not be deemed to "limit or affect the exercise by the Chief of the Barotse of his authority in tribal matters".

These provisions, however, did not meet the major source

of Lozi dissatisfaction with the Order.[181] They disagreed, as the Ngambela declared, with the clause allowing the Company to sell land outside the reserved area to Europeans. Fair, however, could "hold out no hope" that the clause would be changed to meet this objection,[182] and after the interview, he wrote an official letter to Lewanika referring to

> the long discussion we had today on the subject of the sale of land by the Company. As I said this morning, I listened carefully to your words and I cannot understand the words you said because I have also read the words which you had written. I cannot believe that you, being a wise man, signed the agreements (of 1906 and 1909) the words of which you did not know; and I feel sure that you will keep to the words of your agreement.
>
> I am now sending all your words to the High Commissioner and am informing him that you have told me that you well understand the Order in Council.[183]

One wonders how many of the earlier "agreements" between the King and the Administration were arrived at in a similar manner.

The Lozi were now certain that the Order in Council would include a clause permitting Europeans to purchase land outside of the reserved area. Three months after the interview with Fair, and two months before Northern Rhodesia was formally amalgamated,[184] Lewanika claimed to have discovered a plot to depose him. On 6 March 1911, he sent an urgent message to Thwaits, Acting Resident Magistrate in Mongu, declaring that a son of the late

King Sipopa, Mboo (Fwabi), "is said to be against me".[185] When Mboo failed to respond to a summons to appear before the Kuta, Lewanika again appealed to Thwaits: "I hope the Government take some steps in this case as the said man what I hear wants to fight".[186] On the following day, Mboo "came in quietly" to Mongu where he was arrested and detained, and Roach, the Native (later District) Commissioner at the Mongu Boma reported that he anticipated no further trouble.[187] Nevertheless, the Administrator decided to send a contingent of two white officers and fifty African members of the Native Police from Livingstone to Sesheke in order to "demonstrate that we are ready to support Lewanika".[188] At the same time, messages were despatched to all indunas and headmen in the reserved area, affirming Administration support for Lewanika, warning against any rioting, but promising an enquiry "with the aid of (the) Council into any grievances they may have against Lewanika or his indunas".[189]

Accordingly, on 16 March, trial commenced against Mboo and several alleged accomplices. With Thwaits and Roach supervising, a number of witnesses were called, with no fewer than six indunas and the Ngambela examining and cross-examining. The case against Mboo, as the evidence revealed, was non-existent. Lewanika had refused to allow him the subsidies, cattle and land

which were due to members of the royal family. A poor man without influence or recognition, Mboo had manifested his resentment by refusing to give the King the royal salute. It was a reflection of Lewanika's own sense of insecurity that he misconstrued an act of disobedience for one of sedition.

It appeared, however, that a headman named Ikasia, who seems to have cherished certain grievances which were not brought out at the trial, might have been attempting to overthrow the King using Mboo as his figurehead. Witnesses claimed Ikasia had spoken to several other headmen and minor indunas against the King, falsely claiming that Mboo "had put these ideas into his head".[190]

The Administration officials were convinced that more intrigue existed than the trial revealed, since many indunas "shun any exposure of the causes which have kept alive a widespread spirit of discontent" in the Valley. This was a reference to their belief that former "slaves" and peasants were suffering due to the harsh exactions of the ruling class, freed slaves being forced to work without payment, poor peasants being obligated to pay their hut-tax while continuing to give tribute to indunas in the form of unpaid labour and crops. At the same time, officials saw this episode as a dispute within the ruling class, Ikasia representing an undetermined number of indunas who considered that Lewanika was betraying the

nation to the Company. Some indunas, Worthington reported, "regret lost freedom, othersthat a larger measure of it has not come to them. Both parties (indunas and peasants) blame Lewanika, both imagine that a new chief would introduce a new order of things more to their liking."[191] The officials were, in short, uncertain whether there had been conscious cooperation between the exploited lower classes and the dissaffected indunas against the King, or whether it was the latter alone for whom Ikasia spoke.

It is hardly likely, and no evidence was introduced, that the first interpretation was valid, although it is likely that the lower classes were discontented with their lot. Moreover, Lewanika's gross over-reaction to Mboo's disobedience strongly suggests that he at least believed that he was seriously threatened by a faction within the Kuta, presumably the same indunas who had from the first been unreconciled to "British protection".[192] Nevertheless, the trial produced no concrete evidence of an actual plot against the King. Instead of asking that Mboo and Ikasia be imprisoned, therefore, Lewanika merely suggested to the Resident Magistrate that "They should be sent out of the country, and I look to the Government to protect me inside and out".[193]

Because he felt his position to be so insecure and his enemies so potentially dangerous, Lewanika had abjectly thrown

himself upon the Company for support. Wallace, the Administrator, could not resist the opportunity thus presented to him further to undermine the powers of the King and Kuta alike. He acted in two areas. Since the Administration was determined to support "the present properly constituted authority of the Chief" - as it had proved during the Mboo episode - it must have "some guarantee" that Lewanika and his indunas did not abuse their power. This could best be effected, he decided, by granting a right of appeal from Kuta decisions to the Resident Magistrate's Court.

> I am aware (he acknowledged) that such a measure would be a serious change and could not be brought about, except for very weighty reasons, without previous agreement with the Chief and Council. It would certainly in time bring about a great diminution in the Chief's authority, but I think it is the only means to check abuse and discontent and it should be the price of our support and protection.[194]

Gladstone quickly agreed that the means to achieve stability in the Barotse Reserve was "the gradual transfer of authority from the Chief and his headmen to the Administration", and the unilateral decision became law.[195]

In the second place, Wallace believed that "the question as to who shall succeed Lewanika lies at the bottom of all these occasional periods of excitement". He therefore decided that the Administration must categorically re-affirm its absolute support of Litia as Lewanika's successor, thereby closing this question

as a potential arena for intrigue.[196] At the insistence of McKinnon, the Resident Magistrate, the Ngambela assembled "all the principal indunas", but, McKinnon reported, "No discussion was necessary as they all assured me they unanimously agreed that Letia be appointed Heir and Successor ...."[197] But a later missionary source claimed that there had initially been considerable opposition to this move within the Kuta, a number of indunas insisting, quite properly, that it was an infringement of their own prerogative to select a successor after the death or deposition of the reigning king.[198] According to a Lozi informant, their consent was now won only because Lewanika agreed, under pressure, that each of their sons should similarly succeed them as indunas.[199] This probably explains the Kuta's acceptance of McKinnon's proposition. He thereupon read a formal proclamation announcing that Litia would succeed his father, adding that "should any other claimant arise attempting to oppose this decision, he will be looked upon as a usurper by the Government and dealt with accordingly". At Lewanika's request, copies of the Proclamation were signed by himself and some forty indunas.[200]

Yet the ruling class had agreed to repudiate the ancient Lozi tradition of selecting a King and indunas in order to leave its successors little more than a tribal labour reserve. This was the

ironic outcome of the initiative Lewanika had taken in having a treaty signed between himself and, as he was deceived into believing, "Her Britannic Majesty". Moreover, even the size of the reserved area had been further reduced. In 1909, the Caprivi Strip, which the Lozi claimed and which had not been dealt with in the boundary award of 1905, had been handed by Britain to Germany.[201] In 1914, a boundary commission concluded that the actual border between Angola and Northern Rhodesia was "much further east" than had previously been thought, and the frontier finally agreed upon placed "a considerable portion" of the Barotse Reserve west of the Zambesi in Portuguese hands.[202]

In 1914 too, serious controversy arose between Lealui and the Administration on the question of the extent of the jurisdiction properly belonging to their respective courts. This dispute, however, was far more serious than the many which had preceded it; indeed, it was the sole occasion on which Lewanika actively attempted to resist an Administration judgment. On this issue, the King, the traditionalist indunas, and the new educated elite were in full accord, for the Administration's demands impinged on the interests of all of them. The young educated aristocrats, "possessing a novel awareness of legal rights and convinced that trickery had been practised on the illiterate Lewanika in the past",[203] now united with

the older indunas to put pressure on the King finally to take an unequivocal stand against any further encroachments on the authority of the ruling class. The incident is no less significant for the light it throws, once again, on the manner in which Administration officials reacted to manifestations of Lozi dissatisfaction with Company rule.

The conflict arose out of a trivial enough incident, a cattle theft in the Sesheke district. The culprits were apprehended, brought before Litia and the Sesheke Kuta, found guilty and fined. However Venning, the local Assistant Magistrate, considered that the Kuta had infringed on the Administration's area of jurisdiction, and protested to Willis, the Acting Resident Magistrate in Mongu.[204] The latter therefore wrote Lewanika requesting that he remind Litia that cattle theft was a criminal offence and therefore must be tried in a Magistrate's Court.[205] Instead of the expected acquiescent reply, however, Lewanika wrote Willis that "I cannot write to Litia before I have seen you. I want to talk about it with you. I have an objection it and my khotla (Kuta)."[206]

Willis agreed to meet with Lewanika, the Ngambela, three traditionalist indunas - Mubonda, Noyoo and Simunja - and Ishee Mwabo, an educated son-in-law of the King; all factions of the ruling class were thus represented. Despite his increasing infirmity,

the King himself was the chief Lozi spokesman, though the others gave him active support. They insisted that only murder and witchcraft cases fell outside the jurisdiction of the Kuta,[207] and presented Willis with a copy of a letter Lewanika had sent Coryndon in 1904, which had been carefully preserved in the Lealui files. That letter affirmed that the King expected the Kuta to try all criminal and civil cases in the reserved area, "with the exception of cases of murder and any offence directly against the law of England, such as witchcraft, which will be tried as you state by yourself".[208] Willis replied, however, that cattle stealing was against the law of England, and therefore Lewanika had agreed that such cases be tried by a Magistrate.[209]

The Ngambela informed Willis that the Kuta was unable to accept his interpretation.[210] This rebuff was followed by another, in a letter written for the King by Kambai, his secretary.

> I have heard your advice (he told Willis) and I understand to what you have said .... It is seeming that the Company is trying as much as it can to take all matters in its hand (despite the agreements we have made) .... I will be objectioned to these matters always .... My son Litia what he did at Sesheke it is alright. I will write to Litia that he has done well about that case.[211]

Willis was infuriated by this reply, and decided that the time had come to employ more formidable weapons. He forwarded to Lewanika a letter written to the King in 1912 by Gladstone, in

which the latter had declared that the spheres of jurisdiction laid down in the Proclamation of 1905 could not be altered; "This is my decision," Gladstone had added, "and I expect it to be loyally accepted by you and the Council."[212] Willis then met again with the King and the Kuta.

> I pointed out (he later reported) that their (last) letter ... was tantamount to saying that they refused to accept the High Commissioner's decision, and ... contained certain insinuations against the Company to which I strongly objected .... Were they tired of the white Government and intercourse with the white people? .... I (gave) them the opportunity of withdrawing their letter.

Properly intimidated by these implied threats, Lewanika apologized for the harsh tone of his letter, but nevertheless repeated that he had never agreed to surrender the Kutas' right to try criminal cases.[213] He then wrote direct to the High Commissioner, protesting that the decision to remove such cases from the jurisdiction of the Lozi courts was "very grievous to us and contrary to what we had expected from the British Government", and requesting a personal interview with Gladstone to discuss the matter.[214]

Gladstone did not see the Lozi. Instead, McKinnon, the Resident Magistrate, Mongu, having returned from his holiday, met the Kuta and laid down the law, once for all. He drew up a list of those cases to be tried by the Magistrates, and had it signed by Lewanika, the Ngambela, and the seven senior indunas.[215]

The Lozi defeat was total. Besides all cases between "natives and Whitemen", murder, witchcraft, and slave-buying or -selling, the Magistrate would also try those involving cattle theft and "serious assault". The jurisdiction of the Kuta was restricted to cases of petty theft, property disputes, divorce and adultery.[216] The ruling class had taken its stand on the right of its courts to try cattle thefts, and it had lost. Clearly, the new elite especially must have recognized that, if the glory that was once Barotseland was to be revived, a new strategy must be devised.

But equally clearly, Lewanika was no longer the man to lead them in their counter-offensive against the Company. The King was now about seventy years old, sick and disillusioned. His dreams of a powerful alliance between the King of England and the King of Barotseland had failed to materialize. Only once, during his visit to the coronation a dozen years earlier, had he actually lived as his romantic imagination had long pictured. He had since moved very far from the glittering world of foreign royalty and politicians and professional soldiers.

World War I gave him his opportunity, as he must have believed, to re-establish that old link. Suppressing the bitterness built up in more than a decade of frustration and humiliation, he grasped the chance to re-create a role of importance for himself

and his nation in the British Empire. He immediately informed McKinnon that

> the Indunas and myself we want to call in all our people and ... tell them to make ready for the war to help the Government ....
>
> We shall stand always to be under the English flag.[217]

The Administration, however, refused to use Africans as soldiers, and were initially able to recruit enough porters from north-eastern Rhodesia. Not even this disappointment was sufficient to dampen Lewanika's enthusiasm, and again he wrote to McKinnon :

> Seeing my men cannot render service in a European warfare, I pray the Government to accept my service in a Two Hundred Pounds Sterling as a material support.[218]

The money was accepted willingly, and Lewanika received the reward he sought: messages of gratitude poured in from the King, the Secretary of State, the High Commissioner, and the Administrator.[219]

Finally, in 1916, with their regular supply of porters dwindling, Administration officials called for 2000 Lozi to fill the need. Lewanika had the required men collected quickly, and his son Mwanawina accompanied them on their march to the east.[220] According to one of my informants, Mwanawina was the only one of the King's sons to respond to his appeal that they volunteer to lead this mission.[221] Indeed, it seems that, aside from Mwanawina

and Litia, the heir-apparent, Lewanika alone among the ruling class felt any genuine sense of duty to assist the war effort. As we have seen, no one but he would have had the psychological need to be actively working for the Empire. Except for Litia, the great majority of Lozi - royals, indunas, headmen, young peasants conscripted as porters - are said to have accepted their obligations as obligations, nothing more.[222]

This was one telling reflection of general Lozi hostility - save for the King and his two sons - towards Company rule. Another emerged during 1915-16, when a pleuro-pneumonia epidemic wiped out a large proportion of Lozi cattle, leaving the remainder unsaleable. Indunas and royals were the largest cattle owners, from which most of their income was derived.[223] Nevertheless, so profound was the Kuta's distrust of any Administration suggestion, that most indunas initially refused to cooperate in an Administration project to inoculate all surviving cattle. Some frank words from McKinnon soon convinced them of the futility of further resistance, and the inoculation campaign was begun.[224] It was, however, already too late to save most of the cattle, a fact which confirmed the original suspicions of many indunas and led to their reluctance to cooperate during another epidemic in the 1930's.

It was somehow fitting that Lewanika should die at this

moment. He had wanted his people to fight for the Empire; the Administration allowed them to be used as porters for white troops. The Administration wished to institute a scheme to save Lozi cattle; the indunas had agreed with the greatest reluctance, and in the end most of the cattle died anyway. Both these situations may be taken as telling symbols of a reign that had lasted for just under four decades. Barotseland had witnessed more changes in those thirty-eight years than in the two centuries since the Lozi first moved into the valley of the upper Zambesi.

No Lozi changed more with the years than did Lewanika himself, but in the end he was faced with a world he had not made and which he could not control. Europeans outdid each other in their eulogies after his death.[225] This was in part, no doubt, a result of the unfailing politeness and respect which he showed all white men, and partly because ultimately he had surrendered to them most of his effective power. But there was more to it than this. So far as it was possible for racialists to have respect for Africans, most white men respected Lewanika. They respected his natural dignity, his astuteness, his admiration for and receptivity to the new and the modern; Goold-Adams, a British officer, spoke for many Europeans when he described Lewanika as "far and away the most intelligent native I have ever met ...."[226]

From the beginning of his long reign, Lewanika followed two overriding policies. The first was to consolidate his own position and preclude for himself the fate of his two immediate predecessors. But the traditional tactics for achieving this end - promoting friends and eliminating enemies - proved inadequate in a new age. Consequently, upon recovering his throne in 1885, he turned for support to an outside power, a white power, and he took the famous initiative which resulted in the Lochner Concession of 1890.

His second major objective was to secure the safety and assure the progress of his nation. Here again the white man was to be utilized. White power would be invoked to protect the nation from outside attack, while white knowledge would, on the one hand, allow a select group of trained young Lozi aristocrats to be able to meet the white man on his own terms, and, on the other, enable them to cooperate with a benevolent white administration in developing a modern, hierarchically-structured state on European lines.

It is reasonable to conclude that those indunas who, from the first, had feared that white power would diminish their own authority as well as undermine the integrity of the nation, had proved more prescient than the King. It is true that he, unlike

either of his predecessors, died in office at an old age, but he was able to do so only by forfeiting to his white "protectors" much of his traditional authority. How much he gained by accepting, rather than resisting, Company overrule is a hypothetical question. While his formal status was considerably superior to that of other chiefs in Northern Rhodesia, his actual power was greater only in degree, not in kind. Presumably he himself believed in the end that it had been on balance worth securing the form, if not the substance, of kingly sovereignty.

In his second aim, his success was similarly equivocal. If the security of the nation was assured, it was at the expense of a drastic diminution of the size of his kingdom. It is arguable that Ndebele warriors could have won hardly more Lozi territory than Company officials were able to do.[227] In the same way, though Lewanika succeeded in creating an educated Lozi aristocracy, he failed to create a modern state for them to take over. The new elite, whose influence over Lewanika's successor was very great, were by no means convinced that the bargain Lewanika had struck with the Company was an adequate one, and the history of the first half of the succeeding reign is the account of the relentless determination with which the new class struggled to win back some of the rights which Lewanika had been forced to surrender in return for remaining in power.

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Chapter 4

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6. As contrasted, for example, with the greater degree of autonomy granted to the rulers of Buganda, see D. A. Low and R. C. Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule (London, 1960).

7. For expressions of official satisfaction concerning the relations between Company agents and the Lozi, see, "Company Report on the Administration of Barotseland, 1898-1900", by Coryndon, CO 468, Vol. 3; Coryndon to High Commissioner, 12 July 1900, NAR HC 3/3/3; Hole to Milton, 23 Nov 1903, NAR A 11/2/14/2; Coryndon to Milner, 8 April 1905, NAR HC 1/2/4; C. J. Hazard, "Recollections of NWR in the early 1900's", Northern Rhodesian Journal, Vol. 3, No. 6, 1958, p.525; R. H. Palmer,

/over

(7) Lewanika's Country : Reminiscences of a Pioneer (private printing, no city, no date), pp. 14-16.

Virtually every Lozi induna who I interviewed voiced his profound resentment of attitudes of white superiority: Messrs. M. Kawana, Ambanwa, Timwendela and Libati of the Mwandi (Sesheke) Kuta; Mr. Mupatu, formerly induna of the Lealui Kuta; Mr. Sibeta of the Luena Kuta.

8. Stokes, "Barotseland; the Survival of an African State", in Stokes and Brown, op. cit.

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18. Coryndon to Milner, 29 Dec 1900, CO 417, Vol. 319.

19. Low and Pratt, op. cit., pp. 158-9.

20. Coryndon to Company, 28 June 1901, CO, African South 659.

21. Coryndon to Milner, 29 Dec 1900, CO 417, Vol. 319; for the actual concession, see Baxter, op. cit., pp. 13-19.

22. Coillard to Mrs. J. Mackintosh, 23 Oct 1900, NAR Hist. Mss. Coillard Papers, CO 5/1/1/1, folio 1823.

23. Harding, Far Bugles, p. 97. Harding's comment suggests that of Low describing Harry Johnston's negotiations with the Ganda in 1900: "... his arguments contained that nice balance of impeccability and threat that were characteristic of the time and the occasion." Low and Pratt, op. cit., p. 28.

24. Lewanika to High Commissioner for South Africa, 1 Oct 1907, CO, African South 872, No. 186.

25. Lewanika to Milner, 6 Aug. 1901, CO 417, Vol. 321.

26. Coillard, Journal, 26 April 1900, and Coillard to Miss Mackintosh, 26 May 1900, NAR Hist. Mss. CO 5/1/1/1, folio 1754.

27. Mr. Newo Zaza. It is now of course well established that the Ndebele were in fact provoked into a war. I cannot see, however, how Mr. Zaza might have become acquainted with the facts of the case given the books I know him to have read. So far as I can gather, he can only have learned them from his own Lozi informants of an earlier generation.

28. See Chapter 3.

29. A. Jalla to Boegner, 21 Feb 1899, PMSP.

30. Messrs. Mupatu and Simalumba.

31. Mr. Simalumba and A. Jalla, Mokamba, Un Premier Ministre Chretien (Paris, 1910), pp. 9-21.

32. Jalla to Boegner, 21 Feb 1899, PMSP.

33. Low and Pratt, op. cit., p.6.

34. Messrs. Mupatu, Simalumba and N. Zaza.

35. Ibid.

36. D. W. Stirke, Barotseland : Eight Years Among the Barotse (London, 1922), p.51; Memorandum by Worthington, 18 July 1929, in Maxwell Stamp Associates, op. cit., Vol. 2, p.374; A. Jalla to Boegner, 11 July 1905, PMSP.

37. Annual Report, Barotse District, 1905, by F. Aitkens, 30 April 1906, NAZ 1//5/2; A. Jalla to Boegner, 11 July 1905.

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39. J. A. Barnes, Politics in a Changing Society (London, 1954), pp.108-9.

40. Cited in Journal of Stevenson-Hamilton, pp.93-4; also Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, pp.82, 152-3.

41. Terence Ranger, "The 'Ethiopian' Episode in Barotseland, 1900-05", Rhodes-Livingstone Journal : Human Problems in Central Africa, No. 37, June 1965, pp.26-41. My own research led me independently to most of the conclusions reached by Professor Ranger.

42. Mann to Boegner, ? May 1899, PMSP; Coillard to Boegner, 10 May 1900, ibid; Coisson to Boegner, 15 Mar 1905, ibid.

43. Kitchener to CO, 28 June 1901, CO 417, Vol. 320; Harding to Resident Commissioner, Southern Rhodesia, 15 Aug 1901, CO 417, Vol. 321; Coryndon to same, 9 Dec 1901, CO, African South 702.

44. Ranger wrongly believed that Mokalapa's breach with the mission began in 1890; op. cit., p.32. In fact it seems to have begun in 1898 or 1899; see Mokalapa to PMS, Geneva, 31 May 1898, in Nouvelles du Zambeze, No. 5, Nov 1898, and Jalla, Pionniers Parmi les Ma-Rotse, pp.293-4.

45. Worthington to Native Commissioner, Matabeleland, 10 April 1906, NAZ IN 1/7. Worthington thought it "fortunate" that Mokalapa had lost the money, since "a revulsion of feeling followed and the movement failed rapidly and completely ...."

46. Coryndon to Milner, 24 Oct 1904, CO, African South 763.

47. Ranger, op. cit., p. 37.

48. Annual Report, Barotse District, 1904, by F. Aitkens, 6 May 1905, NAZ 1/5/2; Worthington to Coryndon, 7 April 1905, CO, African South 763.

49. Ranger, op. cit., p. 38.

50. Harding to FO, 5 Feb 1901, CO 417, Vol. 320.

51. Coryndon to Milner, 10 Oct 1900, ibid.

52. Harding to Coryndon, 25 Feb 1903, CO, African South 717; Coryndon to Milner, 27 Feb 1903, ibid.

53. Harding to Administrator, Southern Rhodesia, 21 Jan 1901, FO 2, Vol. 527; Coryndon to Milner, 10 Oct 1900, CO 417, Vol. 320; Goold-Adams to Milner, ? Sept 1901, CO, African South 694.

54. CO to FO, 1 March 1901, CO, African South 659.

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57. Favre, Coillard, Vol. 3, pp. 501-2.

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68. "Report on the Administration of Rhodesia, 1900-02", by Coryndon, pp. 448-50, CO 468, Vol. 3.

69. Gluckman, Administrative Organization of the Barotse Native Authorities with a Plan for Reforming Them, RLI Communication No. 1 (Livingstone, 1943).

70. Hole to Lewanika, 5 Aug 1903, NAZ A 3/24/4. It was one of Lewanika's special privileges that he was rarely ordered to take any particular step. He was usually "advised" or "requested" to do so, but there was never any doubt that the advice or request must be accepted. When an issue was considered pressing, the white official's tone became firm and demanding: "This must be done quickly", etc. See Letters to Paramount Chief, 1905-15, NAZ KDE 1/4/1-26, and Paramount Chief's Correspondence, 1901-14, NAZ KDE 2/34/1-10.

71. Coillard, Threshold, p. 389.

72. Jalla, La Mission du Zambeze, pp. 71-2.

73. See Chapter 3.

74. Harding, In Remotest Barotseland, p.277.

75. S.N.A. to DC, Hook of the Kafue District, 8 April 1905, NAZ in 1/5/4.

76. Worthington to DC, Mankoya, NAZ IN 1/5/6.

77. For a detailed account, see Stokes, op.cit., pp.284-9.

78. Lewanika to High Commissioner, 11 Dec 1907, CO, African South 899, No. 45.

79. Selborne to Elgin, 17 June 1907, NAR HC1/2/6.

80. Lyttleton to Milner, 1 July 1904, CO, African South 746.

81. Coryndon to Lewanika, 10 Oct 1904, NAZ B 1/2/301.

82. Lewanika to Coryndon, 15 Nov 1904, ibid.

83. Minute by Rodwell, Imperial Secretary, 8 July 1905, NAR HC 1/2/4.

84. Stokes, op.cit., p.283.

85. Coryndon to Lewanika, 19 Aug 1904, NAR A 11/2/14/3.

86. Lewanika to Coryndon, 24 Aug 1904, ibid.

87. Declaration by Lewanika, 23 Jan 1906, NAR HC 1/2/5.

88. Cited in Stokes, op.cit., p.283.

89. Mr. Simalumba.

90. As noted by the King in his letter to Coryndon, 15 Nov 1904, NAZ B 1/2/301.

91. Worthington's Journal, 1902, NAR Hist Mss. Worthington Papers, WO 3/1/2, folio 5.

92. Mr. Zaza.

93. For a more detailed account, see Stokes, op. cit., pp. 275-82.

94. Coryndon to Rhodes, 27 Nov 1901, CO, African South 702, No. 117; Coryndon to Company, 3 Mar 1902, CO, African South 763, No. 717.

95. Lewanika to Company, 10 July 1902, CO, African South 702, No. 337.

96. Coryndon to Company, 9 Jan 1903, CO, African South 717, No. 76.

97. Company to CO, 8 May 1903, CO, African South 717, No. 144.

98. Macauley to Hole, 12 March 1904, CO, African South 746.

99. Coryndon to Selborne, 22 Nov 1905, NAZ, A 3/5.

100. See Stokes, op. cit., p. 281.

101. Worthington to Coryndon, 14 Jan 1905, CO, African South 763.

102. Administrator to Company, 4 Feb 1907, CO, African South 872.

103. Coryndon to Milner, 23 Nov 1904, CO, African South 763; same to same, 30 May 1905, ibid.

104. Milner to Lyttleton, 23 Mar 1905, ibid; Harding to Milner, 14 April 1905, ibid.

105. O'Keefe to Milner, 25 Apr 1905, ibid.

106. Secretary of State to Milner, 15 July 1905, ibid.

107. Report by McKinnon, Resident Magistrate, Lealui, Sept 1908, CO, African South 932.

108. Messrs. Zaza, Njekwa, M. Kawana, and Simalumba, and Mupatu, Bulozi Sapili, ch. 12.

109. Coryndon to Selborne, 6 Dec 1905, CO, African South 802, and Gelfand, Northern Rhodesia in the Days of the Charter, p. 127.

110. Aitkens to Coryndon, 21 Aug 1903, CO, African South 717.

111. Millar to Coryndon, 4 March 1905, NAZ A 1/2/5.

112. Harding to Administrator, Bulawayo, 22 Dec 1899, CO, African South 656; Mann to Boegner, 20 May 1899, PMSP; Report by Harding, 16 Aug 1903, CO, African South 717.

113. Beguin to Boegner, 27 April 1905, PMSP; also News from Barotsiland, May 1905, p.8, and Oct 1905, p.7.

114. Gielgud to Coryndon, 19 Sep 1903, NAZ KDE 2/23/1.

115. Wallace's Address to the Kuta, 11 Aug 1909, and Wallace's Interview with Lewanika, 2 Aug 1909, NAZ B 1/2/292. For a parallel situation in Uganda, see P. Powesland, Economic Policy and Labour, East African Studies No. 10, (Kampala, 1957).

116. H. W. Fox to Codrington, 11 March 1904, cited in Maxwell Stamp Associates, op.cit., p.233.

117. "Award of His Majesty the King of Italy respecting the Western Boundary of the Barotse Kingdom (with attached Map), July 1905", Parliamentary papers, 1905, Vol. 4, Cd. 2584.

118. Selborne to Lewanika, 24 July 1905, CO, African South 763.

119. Lewanika to Coryndon, 19 July 1905, ibid.

120. Coryndon to Selborne, 19 Dec 1905, NAR HC 1/2/5.

121. Harding to Imperial Secretary, 19 Sept 1905, CO, African South 763.

122. Coryndon to Milner, 9 March 1905, NAR HC 1/2/4.

123. Stokes, op.cit., p.281.

124. Coryndon to Milner, 4 April 1905, NAR HC 1/2/4.

125. Same to same, 19 Dec 1905, CO, African South 802.

126. Stokes, op.cit., p.261.

127. Hunter to Coillard, 20 May 1902, NAR Hist. Mss. Coillard Papers, CO 5/1/1/1, folio 2036.

128. Bradley, "Statesmen: Coryndon and Lewanika in North-Western Rhodesia", African Observer, Vol. 5, No. 5, Sept 1936, pp.53-4.

129. This reflected the commonplace belief that the metropolitan government would prove more humane than local officials, particularly if the latter represented a commercial company; see, for e.g., J. Van Velsen, "Some Early Pressure Groups in Malawi", in Stokes and Brown, op.cit., pp.410-11.

130. Mary Benson, South Africa : The Struggle for a Birthright (London, 1966), p.19.

131. For Peregrino, see NAZ IN 1/7; KDE 1/5/2; and KDE 2/15/1-3. My own notes on Peregrino, taken from these sources, have unfortunately been lost. I am indebted to Prof. T. Ranger for the above quotations and references. I am fairly certain, however, that the archival sources did not suggest precisely how contact between Peregrino and Litia was initially established. Not a single one of my Lozi informants had ever heard of Peregrino.

132. Peregrino to Imperial Secretary, 20 Aug 1906, CO, African South 802.

133. Selborne to Elgin, 19 Nov 1906, ibid.

134. "Memorandum on Technical and General Education in the Barotse Valley", by Worthington, 26 Feb 1905, NAZ A 3/5.

135. Reports by the Principal, 16 Oct 1907, 31 Jan 1908, 31 Dec 1909, 30 Sept 1910, NAZ A 3/13/1.

136. A. Jalla to Director, 25 June 1907, PMSP; Report on the Zambesi Mission Schools, by Williams, Principal of BNS, NAZ A 3/13/1.

137. Princes Mwanawina and Akashambatwa went to Lovedale where, in their first examinations, they "stood first, equal, with 88% of the marks possible". Henderson, Principal of Lovedale, to Imperial Secretary, 29 April 1908, NAZ A 3/24/4. Princes Lubinda and Mwanayanda were sent to Morija, the PMS school in Basutoland, thence to Zonnebloem College at the Cape. List of Lewanika's Sons, their educational training and employment, submitted by Yeta to Resident Magistrate, 18 Oct 1916, NAZ KDE 2/34/20. Among my informants, Induna Mataa Imandi, whose father later became Ngambela, accompanied the latter two princes to Morija and Zonnebloem. Mr. Mupatu, whose father was the head of Lewanika's personal bodyguard, was sent by the King to Lovedale with Mwanawina and Akashambatwa.

138. Acting Secretary, NWR, to Imperial Secretary, 19 May 1910, Africa South 948.

139. Hall, Zambia, p.112.

140. L. Jalla to Director, 1 Nov 1907, PMSP; A. Jalla to Director, 8 Oct 1907, ibid. The following summary is taken from Minutes of the Proceedings at a Meeting with Lewanika at Sesheke, 30 Sept 1907, CO, African South 872, Enclosure 6 in No. 186.

141. Cited in O'Keefe to Imperial Secretary, 10 April 1905. CO, African South 763.

142. Selborne to Elgin, 11 Nov 1907, CO, African South 872.

143. Minutes of ... Meeting, 30 Sept 1907, op.cit.

144. Selborne to Lewanika, 3 March 1908, CO, African South 899.

145. Lewanika to Selborne, 5 May 1908, ibid.

146. Selborne to Lewanika, 5 Oct 1907, CO, African South 872.

147. Lewanika to Selborne, 11 Oct 1907, ibid.

148. Selborne to Elgin, 11 Nov 1907, ibid; Codrington to Company, 1 Jan 1908, CO, African South 899.

149. As acknowledged in Ellenberger to Director, undated (c. Jan. 1913), PMSP.

150. A. Jalla to ?, 30 Oct 1910, ibid.

151. See, for e.g., Report from Lealui Mission Station, News from Barotsiland, June 1909, p.9.

152. Arnot to Director, 6 Aug 1910, PMSP.

153. Ellenberger to Director, 17 Jan 1912, and A. Jalla to Director, 28 Feb 1912, ibid.

154. Lewanika to High Commissioner, 17 Sept 1911, NAR A 2/2/1. If the High Commissioner sent a reply to this letter, I have been unable to discover it.

155. Stokes, op.cit., p.287.

156. For the distortions of Europeans, see Coillard, Threshold, p.152, 382, 401; Jalla, History, pp.61, 63-4; Memorandum on Barotse Slavery, by Worthington, 22 Nov 1906, NAR HC 1/2/6. For a more considered assessment of the subject, see Gluckman, Seven Tribes, p.6 and 13; Yeta to Administrator, 10 Aug 1920, personally held; Y. Mupatu, Bulozi Sapili, ch. 7; Messrs. Simalumba and Zaza.

157. Worthington to Coryndon, 23 March 1905, CO, African South 763; Coryndon to High Commissioner, 8 April 1905, ibid. "Certainly" said Mr. N. Zaza, "we cannot think that the Company freed the so-called slaves for philanthropic reasons."

158. Worthington's Memorandum, 22 Nov 1906, NAR HC 1/2/6.

159. "Proclamation of the Abolition of Slavery, 1906" in CO, African South, 802.

160. Worthington to Acting Administrator, 13 July 1906, ibid.

161. A. Jalla to Director, 24 July, 1906, PMSP.

162. Worthington to Acting Administrator, 13 July 1906, CO, African South 802.

163. Worthington to Secretary, Kalomo, 17 July 1906, ibid.

164. Selborne to Elgin, 10 Sept 1906, ibid.

165. Messrs. Simalumba and Zaza; Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, pp.109-10.

166. A. Jalla, Mokamba, Un Premier Ministre Chretien, p.27.

167. Company to CO, 27 March 1907, NAR HC 1/2/6; Henry Rangeley, Memoirs of .... (typescript, 1949), NAR Hist. Mss. RA 1/1; R. Summers and L. H. Gann, "Robert, Edward Codrington, 1869-1908", Northern Rhodesian Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1956, pp.44-8.

168. S.N.A. to DC, Mongu, 3 Oct 1907, NAZ KDE 2/34/17.

169. Gann, op.cit., pp.164-5.

170. Stirke, Barotseland, pp.42-3.

171. See Gluckman, "Kinship and Marriage among the Lozi of Northern Rhodesia and the Zulu of Natal", in A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and D. Forde (ed.), African Systems of Kinship and Marriage (London, 1950), p.181.

172. Wallace to High Commissioner, 10 Sept 1909, CO, African South 932.

173. Stokes, op.cit., pp.291-2. For the Concession, see L. H. Gann, The Birth of a Plural Society : The Development of Northern Rhodesia under the British South Africa Company (Manchester, 1958), pp.223-5.

174. Wallace to High Commissioner, 12 Nov 1909, CO, African South 932, No. 242.

175. Fair to Lewanika, 28 Nov 1910, NAZ A 2/1/4.

176. Minutes of Proceedings at a Meeting ... Between the Administrator and Lewanika, 29 Sept 1911, NAZ B 1/2/292.

177. Selborne to Imperial Secretary, 30 Nov 1909, NAR HC 1/2/9; CO to Company, 14 July 1910, NAR A 3/19/5.

178. CO to Company, 30 Aug 1910, NAR HC 1/2/10.

179. Wallace to Gladstone, 12 Nov 1910, CO, African South 948.

180. Gladstone to Secretary of State, 14 Dec 1910, ibid.

181. Translation of a Memorandum handed to Colonal Fairby the Ngambela, 28 Nov 1910, NAZ A 2/1/4.

182. Proceedings at the Meeting of Colonel Fair with Lewanika at Livingstone, 28 Nov 1910, NAR HC 1/2/10.

183. Fair to Lewanika, 28 Nov 1910, NAZ A 2/1/4.

184. Proclamation, Northern Rhodesia No. 1 of 1911, 4 May 1911, CO 743, Vol. 1.

185. Lewanika to Thwaits, 6 March 1911, NAR HC 1/2/11.

186. Same to same, 6 March 1911, ibid.

187. Roach to Thwaits, 8 March 1911, ibid.

188. Wallace to Watherston, 22 March 1911, ibid.

189. Secretary of Administration to Imperial Secretary, 25 March 1911, ibid.

190. "Review of Evidence", prepared by Worthington, 20 April 1911; ibid; transcript of "Rex vs. Mboo, alias Fwabi, Ikasia and others, 16 March 1911", ibid.

191. Memorandum by Worthington, 20 April 1911, ibid.

192. My Lozi informants professed to know very little about the divisions within the ruling class during this period. For a further discussion of this problem, see Sources, Pt. 1.

193. McKinnon to Wallace, 23 March 1911, ibid.

194. Wallace to Gladstone, 21 April 1911, NAR HC 1/2/11.

195. Gladstone to Wallace, 8 May 1911, NAZ B 1/2/301.

196. Wallace to Gladstone, 31 March 1911, NAR HC 1/2/11.

197. McKinnon to Wallace, 4 May 1911, ibid.

198. Mackintosh, Yeta III, p.43. None of the documents in the Paris archives of the PMS allude to this episode.

199. Mr. N. Zaza.

200. McKinnon to Wallace, 4 May 1911, NAR HC 1/2/11.

201. Jalla, History of the Barotse Nation, p.71.

202. BSA Company Annual Report on Northern Rhodesian Administration, 1914-15. NAR.

203. Stokes, op.cit., p.292.

204. Venning to Willis, 10 Feb 1914, NAR RC 3/9/5/3.

205. Willis to Lewanika, 2 March 1914, ibid.

206. Lewanika to Willis, 2 March 1914, ibid.

207. Report by Willis on his interview with Lewanika, 4 March 1914, ibid.

208. Lewanika to Coryndon, 8 Nov 1904, ibid.

209. Willis to Lewanika, 12 March 1914, ibid.

210. Report by Willis on Meeting with Ngambela, 16 March 1914, ibid.

211. Lewanika to Willis, 19 March 1914, ibid.

212. Gladstone to Lewanika, 18 Dec 1912, ibid.

213. Report by Willis on his interview with Lewanika and the Council, 30 March1914, ibid.

214. Lewanika to Gladstone, 8 May 1914, ibid.

215. Lewanika to Wallace, 29 July 1914, ibid.

216. "List of Cases to be tried by the Magistrate", undated, ibid.

217. Lewanika to McKinnon, 26 Aug 1914, NAZ KDE 2/31/1.

218. Same to same, 9 Oct 1914, ibid.

219. High Commissioner to Wallace, 15 Sept 1914, ibid; Wallace to Lewanika, 12 Sept 1914, ibid; Secretary of State to High Commissioner, 6 Nov 1914, ibid.

220. J. H. Venning, "Mwanawina III and the First World War", Northern Rhodesian Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1959, pp.83-6.

221. Mr. N. Zaza, Mwanawina became King in 1948.

222. Messrs. Zaza, Simalumba and Mupatu, and confirmed in "Report on Effects of War in Barotseland", by Resident Magistrate, 6 March 1919, NAZ KDE 2/21/3.

223. Report from Barotse District, 30 Sept 1915, NAR HC 1/3/9; Report from Lealui Sub-District, 1915, ibid; Report from Lukona Sub-District, 1915, ibid.

224. McKinnon's Speech to Ngambela and Indunas, 12 Feb 1916, NAZ KDE 2/34/13.

225. Hole, The Passing of the Black Kings, p.302; Stirke, Barotseland, pp.vi-vii; Palmer, Lewanika's Country, p.14; Balovale Commission Report, 1939, pp.98-9; James T. Addison, Francois Coillard (Hartford, Conn., 1929), p.49.

226. Goold-Adams to Milner, ? Sept 1901, CO, African South 694.

227. "Truly the pen is mightier than the sword, and in the hands of experts .... achieved more in Barotseland than the most potent lethal weapons in many of our less fortunate dependencies." Harding, Far Bugles, cited in Stokes, op. cit., p.261.

Chapter 5

YETA VERSUS THE COMPANY

King Lewanika died in February 1916. So far as the Administration was concerned, the question of the succession had been definitively settled in 1911, and no written record suggests that the National Council attempted to challenge the accession of his eldest son, Litia. Yet no fewer than five Lozi informants independently testified that many indunas in fact favoured either Sikufele or Imwiko.

Sikufele Fumika was the son of the Sikufele whom Mataa wanted as his King to replace Tatila Akafuna in 1885. When his father was killed in the battle against Lewanika's forces, Sikufele Fumika became chief at the Lukwakwa. In 1892, the latter reached a modus vivendi with Lewanika, whereby Sikufele surrendered any pretensions to the Lozi crown and Lewanika allowed him to run his tiny domain without interference from Lealui.[1] On Lewanika's death, a number of traditionalist indunas supported Sikufele, believing he would turn to them for advice whereas Litia would look to his educated brothers.[2] Summoned by these men, Sikufele began the journey to Lealui, but was struck by lightning en route and died, thus abruptly aborting the challenge from the north.[3]

A second group of indunas are said to have opposed Litia in favour of his younger brother Imwiko, who had been educated in England. As the most highly educated and worldly of Lewanika's sons, Imwiko could be expected most adequately to stand up to the Administration.[4] In the end, however, the opposition to Litia melted away. There was good reason to believe he would resist Company encroachments. The traditionalists, in any event, remembered their arrangement of 1912 with Lewanika: their own sons would automatically succeed them if Litia became King, a bargain which was honoured for the first fifteen years of the latter's reign.[5] Moreover, no induna was prepared to challenge the Administration's threat to crush any man who opposed its choice.[6] When, therefore, the Resident Magistrate met the National Council on 8 March 1916, he found that its members unanimously agreed that "Itis Litia we want, no one else".[7]

Five days later, Litia officially became King (or, as the Administration insisted, Paramount Chief,) Yeta III. Then about forty-two years old, he had been among the first Lozi to attend a mission school, and had taken quickly to western habits and ideas, not excluding Christianity. In 1890 he had accompanied Adolph Jalla to Bechuanaland, where he had been much impressed by Khama and became close friends of a young Bechuana Christian.

On his return to Barotseland, he was publicly baptized - one of the first Lozi to be so. In 1891, his father appointed him chief of Sesheke, a post he retained until he became King. Although his English was inadequate for conversation, his intelligence, breadth of interest and knowledge were widely acknowledged.[8]

The Company on the whole welcomed Yeta's accession. It was true that he had been responsible for the serious jurisdiction dispute of 1914 by insisting that his own court try a case of cattle theft, and that his relations with the new elite were very warm. On the other hand, he stood out among his brothers, save for Mwanawina, for his unswerving loyalty to the British throne. Both as chief of Sesheke and as King, his support in recruiting porters for the war effort was as enthusiastic as his father's had been.[9] On the wall of his palace in Lealui, portraits of Edward VII and George V hung beside that of Lewanika.[10] After an interview in July 1916 with Viscount Buxton, the High Commissioner, the latter felt re-assured that the Lozi "not only acquiesce in their control (by Administration officials) but welcome their advice and assistance. This was markedly the case in regard to Lewanika ... and will be, I think, still more the case in regard to his son Letia ...."[11]

George Lyons, who became Resident Magistrate of Barotseland in 1916, wrote in the same vein in his first annual report. He was

highly gratified by the cooperation which Yeta had demonstrated over the previous year, and considered -ironically, as it emerged - that the only serious problem was that, although the King's "own ideas are all for the advance and improvement of his people, he is tremendously hampered by the conservative ideas held by some of the older and more influential indunas ...."[12]

This analysis probably owed a debt to Lyons' friendship with the local missionaries. They too emphasized that Yeta faced the "superhuman task" of being "a Christian king of a pagan people". How could he "strike out" and innovate in the face of his people's immemorial traditions and superstitions? The missionaries decided that, in their own self-interest, they must be discreet; they must not attempt to pressure him into taking positions - such as on the question of monogamy - which would "expose him to the accusation of being the puppet of white people".[13]

It did not take long to recognize how wholly misconceived all these assessments actually were. Neither the missionaries nor the conservative indunas were in a strong position to influence Yeta. On the contrary, the new educated elite soon achieved the ascendancy among his closest advisers, and they had as their primary objective the total repudiation of Company rule. The success of Lewanika's initiative in creating a group of trained aristocrats to buttress the

traditional ruling class became manifest with Yeta's succession. Lewanika's own sons, and those of senior indunas and his court favourites, had begun to return to Barotseland from their advanced schools abroad. By 1916, no fewer than seven of Lewanika's sons had been to schools in England, South Africa or Basutoland.[14] Yeta selected two private secretaries: his brother Akashambatwa, who had studied at Lovedale and Zonnebloem, the Anglican College at Cape Town, and Mubukwanu Mataa (now Induna Imandi), who had been educated in Basutoland and at Zonnebloem, and whose father became Yeta's Ngambela in 1920.[15] Three other sons of the late King - who were educated in Southern Africa - Mwanawina, Lubinda and Muanayanda - took their proper seats on the royals' mat in the Kuta, as did Yeta's own sons, Daniel Akafuna and Edward Kalue. Both the latter had received their schooling in South Africa, where they had mixed with politically-minded South African Africans, Akafuna finally being expelled for "open rebellion".[16] About the same time, sons of indunas who had been educated either in southern Africa or in Barotseland were beginning to replace their fathers in the Kuta.[17]

George Lyons quickly came to loathe these young men, whom he described as "half-educated schoolboys".[18] No view could have

been more inaccurate. Their grasp of legal complexities, their familiarity with the early concessions, their astute and logical reasoning as well as their political shrewdness, were all soon enough illustrated. The days of picturesque figures of speech, hand-written, were gone forever, to be replaced by typewritten correspondence in "concise, business-like English".[19] Indeed, as Gann has recognized, they were sufficiently competent and sophisticated to "hold their own in a European assembly" and participate in a legislative debate.[20]

Given the close contact of some, and the familiarity of all, of the young men who had been educated in South Africa with African political developments in that country, it was inevitable that they should return with new ideas and new aspirations. Because they were aristocrats by birth, and because they had as a heritage a formerly great empire, these young Lozi's aspirations centred on resurrecting Barotseland's lost glory, on resuscitating a powerful kingdom which they would rule as their ancestors had once done. Moreover, because the new King was himself virtually a member of the new educated elite, he welcomed these younger men into his Council. In their attempts to realize the hopes they shared, the new educated Lozi elite and their natural leader, Yeta himself, joined in an alliance against white rule with the traditional

ruling class, much as their counterparts among the Ndebele and Zulu were doing at the same time.[21] This upsurge of nationalism, or tribalism, among the ruling classes of formerly powerful kingdoms, contrasted with the means by which the "new men" of smaller tribes were attempting to acquire for themselves positions and privileges commensurate with their status as members of an educated elite. In Nyasaland and parts of eastern Northern Rhodesia, for example, where the past allowed no romantic illusions of restoring great empires, the new men turned to Native Welfare Associations based on a wider nationalism, that of Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland as a whole rather than Barotseland or Matabeleland.[22] Lozi nationalism was, therefore, essentially reactionary, an attempt to restore the lost privileges of the past; Nyasa nationalism was progressive, in the sense that the new elite wished to acquire privileges in the larger colonial set-up by winning, for example, jobs hitherto reserved for white men.

There was, then, a fundamental divergence between the objectives of Lozi and the other new elites of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Yet for a short period, their interests happened to coincide. It is true that at no time was the Lozi ruling class, led by Yeta and his "new men", concerned with any interests but its own. But because it believed that its interest could be

satisfied only by a direct frontal attack on the entire institution of Company rule, because it fought for increased powers for Africans as against the white Ad ministration, the Lozi elite briefly represented the aspirations and interests of all black elitists in Northern Rhodesia.[23]

As we have seen, a number of Yeta's young men had already witnessed the futility of protest against Company encroachments on Lozi sovereignty during the last decade of Lewanika's reign.[24] Although petitions to the High Commissioner had proved no more fruitful than those to Company officials, the new elite continued to cherish the belief that only under direct British protection could they hope to see the traditional rights and powers of the Lozi ruling class restored. The first eight years of Yeta's kingship witnessed, therefore, a veritable flood of long and well-argued petitions and supporting memoranda calling for an end to Company rule and the restoration of proper Lozi rights.

The renewed Lozi counter-offensive against the Company became manifest within a month of Yeta's installation. In reply to a letter from the Secretary of State congratulating him on his accession, Yeta wrote: " ... We are proud of receiving good words from him (the Secretary) and ... we now have every hope of being protected and be made a Nation for we are never forgotten as children."[25] It was easy, given the obsequiousness of the tone,

to ignore the real implications of the King's words. In fact, it was a warning that the new King, like his father, would be satisfied with nothing less than direct imperial overrule. The statement, moreover,was significant in two further ways: it was, to my knowledge, the last time a Lozi king humbled himself in such a manner in dealing with the Government, and it was the last time that an official letter from the Lozi capital was written so ungrammatically. In short, it signalled the ascendancy of the new men in what was now called the Barotse Native Government (BNG).

In the following year, 1917, their impact began to be felt. Rumours were spreading that the Company intended to hand over the administration of Northern Rhodesia to the British Government. Yeta reminded the High Commissioner that his father had agreed to give the Company commercial rights in its capacity as the administering agent of Northern Rhodesia. The implication was clear : if it shed its administrative responsibilities, the Company automatically lost its commercial rights.[26]

By the end of the year, the Lozi challenge was moving onto fresh grounds. Yeta informed Lyons, the Resident Magistrate, that since Lewanika had originally been called "King" of Barotseland, he too had the right to that supreme title.[27] The High Commissioner

himself replied, re-affirming the decision of 1907 that the Litunga's English title must remain "Paramount Chief".[28] Yeta was unmoved, however, and a petition, written by his new secretaries, was forwarded to the Administrator repeating the request.[29] Wallace's reply was forthright: the decision against using the title "King" was irrevocable; "If the Paramount Chief persists in claiming this title he will run the risk of ridicule in the eyes of people who understand his position".[30] The humiliating implication that Yeta was merely running his rump of a labour reserve with the Company's consent must have infuriated the entire ruling class, but for the moment it had little alternative but to capitulate.[31]

At the same time, the Administration had become concerned with Lozi "inter-meddling" outside the reserved area. District officers were reporting Lozi attempts to "boss up".Ila and Sala chiefs in the Kafue District and to interfere in the succession to the Mumbwa chieftaincy. Wallace, the Administrator, revealed some understanding of the new mood of the ruling class.

> They feel (he recognized) ... a waning influence over the people and are unwilling to lose their power or diminish the state in which they live. There is a movement, originating I think with the English speaking sons, to renew their influence outside the Barotse District and so incidentally to receive tribute.

In short, as Wallace did not say, the invigorated Lozi patriotism of

the new elite was creating conflict with the Administration. He was not greatly worried that the attempts to revive Lozi imperial pretensions would succeed, but he was not prepared to challenge the Lozi on a question of abstract right. To force Yeta formally to renounce his authority outside the reserved area might undermine the Company's mineral rights, since, as has been seen, the boundaries between North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia had been shifted in 1905 in order to have the Copperbelt fall under the concessions with Lewanika, rather than the more dubious ones which Company agents had had signed with "chiefs" in the North-East. Therefore, Wallace advised, "it is better to encourage this natural diminution of (Lozi) influence (outside the reserved area) than by any drastic action to bring on a serious dispute as to our rights and theirs".[32]

Although Wallace was prepared to use subtle means to abort the renewed Lozi assertions of their rights over their old domains, Administration attitudes towards the new regime, had, by 1918, perceptibly hardened. Lyons' early sympathy for Yeta was quickly waning. The King was too frequently taking a "wrong attitude", Lyons reported, due to "the influence of the educated or semi-educated natives by whom he is surrounded".[33] Yeta's "younger

educated brothers", he later added, had virtually taken over the Kuta from the older indunas; "It is an exception rather than the rule for any of the older Indunas, excepr the Ngambela, to be present now even when matters of great importance are being discussed."[34]

At this point, early in 1919, Ngambela Mokamba died in his twentieth year as the senior commoner in the land. He is remembered by his people as one of their greatest Ngambelas, the one who best fulfilled the Ngambela's proper function of being "between the King and the Nation".[35] One of the earliest Lozi to acquire a western education, Lewanika had chosen him to be his chief minister because of his receptivity to new methods and techniques. Mokamba was the King's major ally against both the conservatives in the Kuta and the white officials, and as the reins of the kingdom were placed increasingly in his hands during Lewanika's final decade, it was he who led most of the futile skirmishes against the Administration. According to both missionary and Lozi sources, the last three years of his life were his most unhappy ones. He was demoralized by the death of Lewanika, and seems to have felt strongly the usurpation of much of his former influence by the brothers of the new King. It is probable too that two decades of fruitless struggle against the Company had diminished his enthusiasm for the renewed counter-offensive.[36]

Yeta moved immediately to appoint a new Ngambela compatible with his policies. Kueleka Tawila was the son of Silumbu, Lewanika's first Ngambela. He had first studied at a local PMS school where he was baptised, then entered Zonnebloem College at the Cape. He returned to the Valley early in the century with Willie Mokalapa and his "Ethiopians", whom he ardently supported. He later married Yeta's oldest sister.[37] In short, he was the quintessential Lozi "new man". He and the King were said to be "of one mind" on most issues, and when Tawila died in January 1920, only nine months after his appointment, Yeta felt the loss severely.[38]

The King's choice as Tawila's successor fits less obviously into the "new Lozi" pattern. Induna Mukulwakashiko, who took office as Ngambela Mataa, was the grandson of the granddaughter of King Mulambwa, and was distantly related to the Mataa who overthrew Lewanika in 1884. His son, Mubukwanu Mataa, was already one of the King's foreign-educated private secretaries, but the only evidence that the new Ngambela had been a "progressive" was that he was one of the few senior indunas to whom Yeta looked for advice after his accession. Nor is this conclusive, since the two men shared a deep hatred for beer-drinking. Indeed, informants suggested this was one of the reasons Yeta selected him. Informants agreed too that his choice was unpopular among many of the indunas,

partly because they favoured other candidates, in part because, as a member of the royal family, he was considered to be constitutionally barred from the Ngambelaship. Yeta replied, however, that the constitutional prohibition was inapplicable since Mataa's connection with the royal family was through his mother's side.[39] Nor did Lyons or the missionaries approve the appointment, the latter because Mataa was not a Christian, the former probably because he was Yeta's choice. With Lyons' encouragement, Adolph Jalla attempted to dissuade the King, but to no avail.[40]

The new Ngambela was quickly given opportunities to demonstrate that he intended to bridge the generation barrier between himself and the new elite, and to cooperate with them fully in their ongoing dispute with the Administration. Despite the disruptions inevitably attendant on the deaths of two chief councillors, Yeta had never ceased pressing his demands. Late in 1919, he announced that he wished to visit England. Lyons strongly opposed such a trip "on account of the unsettled state of his district and the dissatisfied condition of the natives with him".[41] This was the first time Lyons raised these charges, to which he was to return again and again in the succeeding four years.

There were, he claimed, "a number of existing evils" which Yeta must redress before he "earned the right" to an interview with

the King of England. He accused the ruling class of forcibly and illegally collecting tribute from outlying tribes and of compelling men to work for more than the prescribed twelve days of unpaid labour. He believed Yeta was ignoring the advice of his older indunas and, despite repeated warnings, continued to heed the advice of his "semi-educated younger brothers". Finally, the severe penalties and rigorous enforcement of the new adultery and beer laws which the King had laid down soon after his accession had given rise to considerable discontent, "but in the application of both these laws I consider he is in the right and should be upheld".[42]

Lyons' counter-attack against the elite continued. At a meeting in Kalabo in May 1920, he told a group of local people that, by the terms of the Abolition of Slavery Proclamation of 1906, they no longer need assist indunas and headmen to cultivate their lands or build their homes. The ruling class had no right to demand free labour save for community projects such as digging wells, cleaning villages or cattle kraals, and the like.[43] This interpretation of the 1906 Proclamation was correct, and it is undoubtedly true that many indunas were disregarding its provisions. Nevertheless, Lealui strongly protested on two grounds. At a meeting requested by the Lozi, Yeta, Ngambela Mataa and several leading indunas angrily pointed out to Lyons that "it was not good" for the Resident Magistrate to go around the country, without consulting the King

and Kuta, undermining the people's respect for the authority of the ruling class.[44]

Secondly, the Lozi denied that they were ruling harshly and unjustly. To make the position clear, Yeta had his secretaries send to Wallace, the Administrator, a long letter, skilfully and eloquently setting out the Lozi position. Demands by the ruling class that Lozi peasants provide them with free labour involved "the subject of land tenure according to our law". The Lozi had no concept of private property. All land belonged to the King and National Council, but they assigned land to those who asked for it. In return, they had the right to demand unpaid labour from the holders of such land.

Lyons, the letter continued, was interpreting certain of the provisions in the Proclamation in a curious manner. He argued, for example, that a man who was called away from his home to work for an induna must bring his family with him, since the Proclamation forbade "separation". To this, Yeta replied :

> The separation referred to in the Proclamation ... (is) separation by means of exchange, selling, buying and giving out of human beings. If the separation in the Proclamation means (as Lyons contended) when people are called to work and it is a practice of slavery, therefore we are not the only people who are doing it, because we see people called to go and work in Livingstone, Southern Rhodesia and Congo or called as carriers by Officials and others leaving their families; does this also not mean slavery?

If Barotseland was in an unsettled state, this was the responsibility not of the ruling class but of Lyons, "who has been declaring to the people that they can go anywhere they like and do whatever they like because they are free". The position of the King and Kuta, in short, was simple and reasonable :

> As we are the rulers of this country we should have the power and authority to govern our people and to control their rights to land and to control their movements thereon.[45]

This impressive document failed to move the Administration. Coxhead, the Secretary of Native Affairs, informed Yeta that he would not be allowed to visit England because of the discontent in Barotseland which had arisen as a result of the ruling class's excessive demands for unpaid labour, although he acknowledged that he was unable to cite "specific instances" of such demands.[46] Coxhead did realize that Lealui felt considerable mistrust not only for local officials but for the Administration as a whole, but he blamed this on Yeta's "unfortunate" choice of advisers and on the new Ngambela, whom he considered "most unsatifactory". Under their influence, he believed, "Yeta thinks more of money now than anything else ...."[47]

This was considerably less than a half-truth. It was true that the King's demands for an increase in his share of the poll tax had not abated; after all, for the fiscal year 1917-18, taxation

of Africans in North-Western Rhodesia had yielded the Company some £82,000.[48] The King's direct share of this amount continued to be £1300, most of which was distributed among the royal family, indunas and headmen, obviously giving most recipients an insignificant percentage. On the other hand, the King personally received about £1400 from such other sources as the Company's subsidy from the Concession of 1900 and his share of game licences and of ivory collected in the reserved area. Nevertheless, the income of the Lozi ruling class was in no way commensurate with the aspirations of an aristocracy striving to re-assert its primacy, a fact the Administrator tacitly recognized when he noted that the King was "being pressed by his headmen and particularly by his relations to pay them more".[49]

Moreover, these aspirations encompassed more than merely financial demands. Their fulfilment involved greater Lozi control over their own land, Imperial status, and the repudiation of the Company's right to hand over the administration of Northern Rhodesia either to a "Responsible Government" of local Europeans, or to a government formed by the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias, or to a government formed by the union of the two Rhodesias with South Africa - all alternatives then being discussed by the tiny European community in Northern Rhodesia.[50] It was in this sense that the Lozi ruling class, though concerned solely with its own

interests and privileges, inadvertently and unconsciously came to share the interests of all Africans in the territory.

This role became clear in Cape Town in March 1921, when Yeta personally handed to Prince Arthur of Connaught, the new High Commissioner, a petition which Ranger has described as "the only coherent African view presented to the debate on the governmental future of Northern Rhodesia".[51] It contained five major points. The first request was for "the direct rule of the Imperial Government as a protected native state" not merely over the reserved area but over the entire territory earlier known as "Barotseland-North-Western Rhodesia". The second was a demand that all concessions granted to and "agreements" concluded with the Company should be cancelled. Lewanika had received the Company only in its administrative capacity, and "it is surprising today to hear that some of the revenues which the Company derives from the country are not used for administrative purposes". Since the Company was in fact a commercial concern, and since it sold land, new agreements should be concluded giving the Barotse Native Government a share in all the profits it made in North-Western Rhodesia.

The third and fourth points called for the extension of the Barotse Reserve to include two further areas: the Caprivi Strip, and "the land from the headwaters of the Dongwe River down to the

place where the Anglo-Portuguese boundary cuts the Zambesi River". These areas had been expropriated from the Lozi without even consulting, let alone asking for the consent of, the King and Kuta. Indeed, despite staunch Lozi loyalty to Britain during the war, their only reward had been the handing of the Caprivi Strip not back to Barotseland but over to South Africa as part of the South-West Africa mandate. Moreover, the validity of the land concessions of the 1900's was itself questioned. The petition carefully demonstrated that the extension of the reserve west of the Zambesi, granted in the concession of 1909, had been made an explicit condition by Chamberlain of his confirmation of the concession of 1900, and hence could hardly be used as a bargaining counter for obtaining fresh rights in 1909.

Finally, the petition argued that the original financial arrangement had been that the King was to receive ten per cent of the hut tax collected, but the Company had "cleverly planned" that he receive only a fraction of that percentage. Since, in those days, the ruling class had adequate financial resources, they had accepted this unjust settlement. But now, with the cost of living greatly increased, the cattle trade largely ended by the epidemic, free labour almost abolished, and so many of the younger men leaving the country to seek work, "it is very difficult to keep the

same standards of Chieftainship as before". The Company had, furthermore, reneged on its commitment to endow and maintain schools, improve transport facilities, and the like.

> In the case of schools, although the Company retains ninety per cent of the money collected from the natives, it does not waste or spend anything for the education and civilization of the natives, but it has taken the money which was promised to be their (the King's and indunas') salary.

The petition asked therefore that the full ten per cent of the tax be paid to the King, and that "the Company should help by providing money for the maintenance of the school which has been established by our money".[52]

Although in its strictures against the Company, its demand for Company funds for schools, and its plea for direct imperial rule, this petition may have obliquely reflected the interests and opinions of all educated Africans in Northern Rhodesia, its basic purpose is accurately described by Gann :

> Constitutional change was to be a means of re-asserting the chiefly powers of old, relieving the economic position of the Barotse ruling group and enabling them to exact great financial benefits from mining and land settlement.[53]

This fortuitous coincidence between the interests of the Lozi ruling elite and other African elitists in the territory emerged once again when, on his return from Cape Town, Yeta met the new Administrator, F. D. Chaplin. As his father had done before him,

Yeta raised (inter alia) the question of race relations in Barotseland. The King complained that all Europeans in the Valley, including mere traders, forced "every native to take off his hat and sit down and clap". He agreed that Lewanika and Selborne had ruled in 1907 that all whites must be shown respect, but could not accept that his people must take off their hats in the presence of traders. Chaplin was unsympathetic, and after a brief discussion of the question, concluded: "The Government cannot interfere in this matter. All Europeans must be treated with respect .... This matter is settled." [54]

Chaplin was highly displeased by the entire interview. He reported that the King's attitude

> did not indicate any great willingness on his part to cooperate with the Administration, and it seems likely that he has been advised to refuse such cooperation in the hope of thereby obtaining a further addition to his salary. [55]

The reference to Yeta's advisers was not merely to his brothers; it included as well a white South African lawyer with whom the Lozi had been in contact and who had not been permitted to accompany them to their meeting with the High Commissioner in Cape Town. [56]

Not even professional legal advice, however, could overcome the determination of the Company, supported by the British

government, to block Lozi aspirations. In July 1921, the High Commissioner sent the King an official reply to the petition of March. The Lozi share of the tax could not be increased. The concessions with the Company could not be cancelled. The reserved area could not be extended. As for the transference from Company to Imperial overrule, the government "has taken note of your wishes ... and your request will be borne in mind".[57]

This major challenge by the united Lozi ruling class, led by its educated new members, to oust the Company's administration and restore its former glories, thus proved an abject failure. Perhaps it was for this reason that they now turned their attention to George Lyons, the local embodiment of all the humiliations and infringements of traditional prerogatives which Company rule had meant. Lyons had not ceased his accusations that the King and his indunas were illegally extracting tribute and excessive free labour from their subjects. In December 1921, Yeta openly challenged Lyons on the issue. The King called a large general meeting at the capital, attended by Lyons, Adolph Jalla, and invited the large crowd publicly to voice their complaints.[58] Lyons admitted that the only complaints made were against the harsh enforcement of the law prohibiting beer-drinking - a law he supported. But this, he explained. was thanks to his own

unceasing efforts in the past to have remedied "the real cause of the recent discontent" - enforced tribute and labour.

Lyons was far from satisfied, however, that the Lozi rulers had genuinely changed their evil ways. As evidence of this, he adduced the recent appointment of Yeta's son, Daniel Akafuna, to the Kuta. Akafuna was, from Lyons' point of view, the worst possible kind of African: educated in South Africa, involved there with black politicians, finally expelled from school for "open rebellion". His influence on his father could be expected to be as "turbulent", his advice as "pernicious", as Yeta's other young advisers.[59]

Goode, the Acting Administrator, accepted Lyons' assessment of Akafuna, but saw in the latter's appointment an opportunity to threaten the King if he continued to prove uncooperative. Goode instructed Lyons to inform Yeta that Akafuna's appointment must be cancelled. Should he refuse, Goode stated,

> I think it will be necessary to take serious notice of this incident. It seems to me that it might give the opportunity of telling Yeta that if he chooses his advisers in this way he cannot expect the Government to treat the Council with much consideration, and that his own position will suffer.[60]

Yeta was not intimidated. Daniel Akafuna was not dismissed from his seat on the Kuta. Moreover, the King returned to the

attack which the High Commissioner's reply to the Lozi petition was intended to have blunted. In letters to the High Commissioner and to Winston Churchill, the Colonial Secretary, the King noted that the Company's claims to land and mineral rights in Northern Rhodesia were being referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for judgment. Since those claims were largely based on the concessions granted by Lewanika, the Lozi considered that their side of the case should also be heard by the Privy Council, and this, Yeta pointed out, could be done

> better by nobody else than the Barotse themselves, that is, by a few representatives of the Barotse National Council .... The land question vitally affects the very life of the native people of this country.[61]

When, by July 1923, these letters remained unanswered, Yeta announced to the High Commissioner that he had decided to write direct to the Privy Council, setting out "our points on which we do not accept the claims of the Company to land and mineral rights in North-Western Rhodesia".[62] In a long and well-documented letter, all the arguments of the preceding seven years were recapitulated. Above all, it stressed that the Company's rights to land and minerals were inextricably tied to its administrative obligations; once it surrendered the latter, it

automatically lost the former. Any commercial rights granted to the Company after it ceased to administer Northern Rhodesia should be subject to conditions to be laid down in a new agreement.[63]

This letter received a reply. The Colonial Office informed Yeta that the government and the Company had settled their differences without recourse to the Privy Council. The Crown was to take over the administration of Northern Rhodesia in 1924. This meant that though the Lozi had always been under His Majesty's protection, "from the 1st of April (1924) onwards they will stand in an even closer and more direct relationship with the Crown". The Lewanika concessions, however, would not be cancelled, and the Company would continue to possess its mineral rights.[64]

This final point effectively undermined whatever satisfaction the rest of the letter might have provided the Lozi ruling class.[65] Perhaps to signal the dissatisfaction, it was at this point that its leaders decided they were no longer prepared to tolerate George Lyons as Resident Magistrate of Barotseland. In December 1923, the King wrote Goode, the Acting Administrator, requesting Lyons' transfer. The latter's false allegations of the harshness of the Lozi rulers, the letter asserted, had served to

> create in the minds of the natives a spirit of discontent and mistrust towards the Barotse

> Government .... Instead of being a friend and adviser he has set himself as an opponent to the interests of the natives and has become like an obstacle between the (Barotse) Government and the Barotse people.[66]

Lyons was outraged by this unique challenge to the authority of the Administration and by the slurs upon himself. He had finally realized that Lozi hostility to the Company was not being manipulated by "an outside adviser" - the European lawyer in South Africa. The King, he acknowledged, had "probably asked for and received advice (from this lawyer) as to the form of argument he might use in support of his contentions" against the Company. But this man did not dictate Lozi policies, and neither Lyons himself nor any of the missionaries was any longer consulted on Lozi problems. Yeta, he recognized, relied mainly on his young advisers,[67] and he saw in the demand for his transfer an opportunity to retaliate against them.

Lyons now re-affirmed all the accusations he had made in the past against the ruling class, taking "the strongest exception to the insolent tone of Yeta's letter ... which I know to have been composed and written by his younger brothers ...." He recommended that the King's secretaries should immediately be replaced by others "who should be taught once and for all that they must be more careful of what they write to the Administration

officials".[68] Goode believed such a punishment to be excessively harsh, and suggested that if Yeta refused to apologize to Lyons, the Administration's subsidy should be withheld.[69] The High Commissioner, in turn, refused to sanction the threat of withdrawing the subsidy, but agreed that the King must retract his letter and apologize to Lyons. If the Kuta had any complaints, they would be heard so long as they were "courteously and considerately expressed".[70]

Acting upon the High Commissioner's suggestion, Lyons met with Yeta, Ngambela Mataa and about thirty indunas, with Adolph Jalla acting as interpreter at Lyons' request. The latter demanded that the King withdraw his letter, but Yeta refused to do so until he was informed what parts of it were considered "impolite" and "disrespectful". Lyons would discuss nothing, however, until the King apologized, and the interview thus ended.[71] Lyons attributed the impasse to the "young educated boys" who had attended the meeting and who "seemed to sway the Paramount Chief, the Ngambela, and the older indunas".[72] Lyons then asked Adolph Jalla to intercede, but he too found the Lozi intransigent.[73]

For, as Yeta informed the Acting Administrator, he could not agree to withdraw his letter until he was shown where it had been discourteous, which Lyons refused to do. The King insisted that he had not intended to be impolite, unless "disobedience and disloyalty" simply meant a refusal to accept the High Commissioner's "advice", or that the Lozi rulers, despite their putative special status, had no right to request the transfer from their country of an undesirable official.[74] In fact, of course, this was precisely the Administration's position, and it was only the sudden death of George Lyons a short time later which prevented a possibly irreparable rupture between the Lozi and the Administration.[75] The accusations against Yeta's regime were not revived by Lyons' successors, R. H. Palmer and P. E. Hall - persuasive evidence that his personal antipathy towards the King's advisers had led him to exaggerate his case - and no other senior official was ever asked by the ruling class to be withdrawn from Barotseland.

On 1 April 1924, direct Crown rule came to Northern Rhodesia. This was the moment for which Lewanika had vainly awaited ever since 1886, and which, after the Company officials began dismantling the old Lozi empire, the entire ruling class agreed was absolutely crucial. Although successive High Commissioners had consistently supported the Company against the Lozi rulers, even the new elite

shared the belief that imperial overrule was the only possible means to the desired end: under a benevolent and economically disinterested government, the former rights and privileges of the ruling class would be restored. If their reactionary goals could not be achieved under His Majesty's paternal government, their entire strategy would have been proved a failure.

Probably, however, they were not overly optimistic that their demands would be acceded to by the new colonial administration. After all, except for a new Governor, Herbert Stanley, most of the Company's local officials were kept on under the new regime. Moreover, although he was naturally pleased at the transfer of Barotseland from the responsibility of the Company to that of the Crown, the King had already expressed "very much regret" that the Company was to maintain its mineral rights intact.

> Since His Majesty's Government declines to the cancellation of the old Concessions and the making of a new Treaty (Yeta had told the High Commissioner in 1923), the Barotse people feel that the proposed change of Government can only be considered to be theoretical and not practical, because the main objections of the Barotse people were against the terms of the Concessions with the British South Africa Company and its Administration generally. If no effectual change is made, then the protection craved for by the Barotse people has not been attained.[76]

Nevertheless, of all the peoples of Northern Rhodesia, the Lozi alone were explicitly mentioned in the new constitution of Northern Rhodesia, in clauses re-affirming the integrity of the reserved area and guaranteeing the authority of the Lozi king "in tribal matters".[77] The Lozi ruling class, then, had little alternative but to put to the test this new regime for which it had struggled for so long.

In August 1924, Yeta, Ngambela Mataa, and a large number of indunas, at their own request, were granted their first interview with Governor Stanley. They presented him with an eleven-point petition and a long, six-page document "Explanations to Petition".[78] Insofar as it included a demand for Lewanika's original programme to modernize Barotseland, it coincided with articulate African opinion in Northern Rhodesia. Yet it basically, and naturally, reflected above all the desire of the Lozi ruling class for the recovery of its former authority.

Thus the petition called for the Government to "establish educational and industrial schools, and also to introduce means for the facility of transport and communications and to improve their (the Lozis') agricultural, pastoral and trade resources", none of which had been carried out under Company rule; as Hall has said, when Company rule ended in 1924, in Barotseland "it left as its

monument one of the most neglected territories in Africa".[79] This had resulted in the migration from the country of many young men, and the King therefore requested more jobs at better pay for his people.

The petition further asked that the area formerly known as "North-Western Rhodesia" be recognized as being under the authority of the Lozi king, and demanded that the Caprivi Strip be restored to Barotseland. All laws affecting the Lozi should first be submitted to the Kuta for "discussion and agreement", while Lozi should be substituted for junior white officials for such administrative purposes as collecting the "Native Tax". The Company subsidy to the King of £850, which was to continue, should be increased "considering the vast amount of Territory" its mineral rights covered. Moreover, since the Lozi considered that the land outside the reserved area in North-Western Rhodesia remained the property of the King, they now requested that "we should receive a share from the proceeds of the sales and leases of land" in that area. In short, the ruling class was demanding their right to rule the kind of modern nation which Lewanika had always envisioned.

Governor Stanley did not reflect the mentality of Company officials. On the contrary, he was in the vanguard of those English colonial officers who were beginning to adopt the policy of "indirect

rule". For a variety of reasons, it was now considered that the proper method by which to govern their colonies was by upholding the status of traditional tribal rulers.[80] To be sure, as Stanley immediately made clear, this meant no increase in real power, for he rejected all the demands contained in the Lozi petition, though he did so with more patience and sympathy than the Lozi had become accustomed to from Company representatives. What he offered as compensation for a restoration of actual authority was an increase in the revenues of the ruling class to allow its members at least the material appurtenances commensurate with their theoretical status.

Stanley offered the King £1000 to surrender his right to a share of the money received from hunting licences and from ivory in North-Western Rhodesia outside the reserved area. He then suggested that in order to preclude further disputes over the question of exploiting free labour, the King and Kuta abandon even the limited rights to such labour which had been granted in the Proclamation of 1906 abolishing "slavery". In return for so doing, Stanley offered the King personally an annual reimbursement of £500, while the Kuta would receive £2000.

Yeta and his advisers accepted this arrangement with alacrity.[81] They were quick to grasp that the British administration

had no more intention than had the Company of granting them the restoration of authority for which they had yearned. Failing this, they were prepared to accept Stanley's compromise; affluence would have to compensate for real power. Gradually but perceptibly over the next several years, incessant demands for more money for the ruling class came to replace those for modernizing Barotseland and reviving the authority of its elite therein. In this way, the period during which the interests of the Lozi ruling class happened to coincide with those of the detribalized elite elsewhere north of the Zambesi came to an end. As the latter increasingly pressed to acquire new privileges and greater opportunities within the national administration, the essential parochialism, or tribalism, of the Lozi elite manifested itself in virtual isolationism from the mainstream of African affairs in the remainder of the territory.

The proclamation formally abolishing all unpaid labour in Barotseland was issued by the King on 1 April 1925.[82] Five days later, Yeta and Ngambela Mataa met with Hall, the new Resident Magistrate, to discuss the allocation of the £2500 the ruling class was to receive in lieu of unpaid labour. Yeta's share was £500; the sixty-odd people whom he considered leading members of the royal family were to divide another £520; the remainder was to be

divided among the members of the seven Lozi district Kutas, save for £200 which was to be reserved for "Public Works". Thus, although the King's financial position was satisfactory, few other members of the ruling class could have considered these subsidies as reasonable compensation for the wealthy empire they were reconciling themselves never to rule. It was, then, on behalf of both the traditional and new elites that Yeta and the Ngambela now "denounced the inadequacy" of their compensation grant "to enable those who formerly enjoyed labour rights to live in their accustomed way .... The Ngambela again emphasized the state of poverty into which many of the ruling class must fall under the new conditions ...."[83]

Six months later, the Ngambela complained to Hall that the canal at Lealui

> is growing foul through not being cleaned, and sickness may result from drinking its water. How is it to be cleaned?
>
> Resident Magistrate: The Paramount Chief set aside a large amount (£200) out of the £2500 compensation for Public Works. That should be drawn on for the purpose.
>
> Ngambela Mataa : That has mostly been spent a) in paying indunas to announce the new law as to unpaid labour in April; b) on paying paddlers (to take) the Paramount Chief and party to Kamanjowa (to meet the Prince of Wales).

In fact, some ten pounds only remained from the "Public Works Reserve".[84]

In 1927, the King proposed that he and the Kuta should receive a royalty on all timber from Barotseland which was used in building extensions to the Barotse National School in Mongu. His argument was as follows : the Lozis' ten per cent share of the poll tax, save for £1300 which went directly to the King, went into the Barotse Trust Fund to be used for works beneficial to all Lozi. Yet the tax collected was about £100,000, the Lozi share was therefore £10,000, but the Fund continued to show a large surplus of revenue. This, the King maintained, was because the Fund, under an all-white management, provided only an inadequate sum of £3500 annually for the BNS, and financed no other development projects in the country. "We do not see", the Ngambela told Hall,

> How the Fund is helping us at all. Even the school-boys get no clothes and insufficient food. No roads, no Nalikwanda (the royal barge), no Paramount Chief's house, no Khotla (court) houses - what is being done for us with all the money? The Government is doing nothing for us.

Yeta summarized the attitude of the ruling class: if the Administration intended to do nothing for the masses of the country, let it at least properly compensate the elite for the powers and privileges it had lost.

> Before the Government came (he stated), we the Paramount Chief and Khotla had a very happy life. Then we lost our tribute, but still we lived well on our cattle and on our unpaid labour. We had

> great hopes that under the Imperial Government we should recover the rights we had lost, but instead we lost even our twelve days labour. Altogether we have suffered on all sides. It may be seen how natural it is for us to wish to make some profit from the BN School. We wish the school well, but we need the money very much .... Government should consider our lack of money and the cost of living. We wish to be loyal and we think the Government should help us.[85]

Indeed, it began to seem that the more money the ruling class was able to get, the more it demanded. According to Hall, the Resident Magistrate, it was the members of the new elite, and above all Yeta's private secretary, Mubukwanu Mataa, son of the Ngambela, who were most insatiable in their demands for ever-greater governmental subsidies "to augment their own personal luxury and dignity".[86] This assessment was reasonable, given their thwarted aspirations, but there is no reason to believe the entire ruling class did not share their sentiments.

This position had become evident in 1926 when C. G. James, representing Minerals Separation Limited, a mining company, arrived in Lealui. James sought Yeta's agreement to work two mines near the Kabompo River. For this right, he offered to pay the King a fixed sum of £350 annually for five years, plus a royalty on any minerals found; if the mines proved as successful as some of those on the Copperbelt, James told Yeta, it would mean nearly

£20,000 a year in royalties.[87] The Governor's final authorization to this agreement was necessary. Stanley was prepared to leave to Yeta the £350 as well as the first £1000 which he might receive in royalties, but decided that half of any royalties over £1000 be divided between the King and the Barotse Trust Fund.[88]

Although, according to James' estimate, the Governor's proposal would still leave some £10,000 annually in Yeta's hand, the latter was not satisfied. He talked about "the difficulties and hardships under which we now live" which forced him to request more money, and argued that if a proportion of the royalties went into the Trust Fund, it should be used for such works as maintaining the King's palace, the court house at Lealui and the royal barge.[89] Stanley believed the Fund should be "devoted to the benefit of the chief's people", not to the benefit of the ruling class,[90] but thanks to the persuasive powers of R. H. Palmer, the Acting Resident Magistrate who was sympathetic to what Yeta considered his economic plight,[91] the Governor acceded to the King's proposal. Stanley would not, however, agree to a further suggestion by Yeta that sixty per cent of the excess over £1000 be given to the Lozi rulers and forty per cent to the Trust Fund.[92]

The rejection of this final minor proposal left the King dissatisfied. His revenues, he reiterated, remained inadequate properly "to maintain the authority of our Khotlas".[93] In a farewell letter in June 1927 to Stanley, who was being transferred to Ceylon, Yeta expressed his regret that the Governor was departing before the question of sufficient funds for the Barotse Government had been settled. His presentation shrewdly exploited the growing bias among colonial officers towards indirect rule and the preservation of tradition al societies.

> We have a form of government according to our native customs (Yeta wrote), and this form of government the British Government allows us to continue .... But even if the (British) Government may not wish this power to die out, it will eventually die out if it has no sufficient funds. There is a pressing necessity to fund the Barotse Council ... (which) has no funds to depend upon in the carrying out of its duties as a governing body.[94]

Stanley was able to promise no more than to ask his successor, Sir James Maxwell, to consider certain salary increases to some of the lowest paid indunas and headmen.[95] The Lozi rulers thereupon decided on a new initiative. As Lewanika had gone to England many years earlier to present his grievances to the King of England, so now, in 1928, it was decided that Yeta should follow this precedent of seeking redress from the man whom

the Lozi still believed was the ultimate source of authority in the empire. Daniel Akafuna, Yeta's son, was despatched to South Africa to encourage Lozi expatriates there - with whom the ruling class had maintained contact[96] - to form an organization to collect funds for the proposed trip to England.

A letter written by the secretary in Kimberley, a bank messenger, of the duly created "King Lewanika's Memorial Fund", to a policeman who was among the leaders of the Lozi community in Bulawayo, indicates the ambivalent position of the new Lozi elite in terms of the mainstream of African aspirations in south-central Africa. In common with most Africans, it revealed a profound distrust of Europeans: "whitemen will never do any good for the sake of black men, but ... they would rather like to see him always down". On the other hand, while African associations in South Africa, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia outside of Barotseland adopted names stressing their nationality or race, the Lozi organization was named after a tribal king. Indeed, the secretary's letter explained that the new "fund" was named after "King Lewanika" since one of its objectives was to have the title of "king" restored to Yeta. Its second objective was to raise money for Yeta's trip to England, since its supporters were certain that the white government of Northern Rhodesia would refuse to sponsor it.

The letter concluded with a stirring appeal to Lozi nationalism: "Keep the love of our Mother Country at the depth of your respective hearts, that we should all with one consent and unity of mind endeavour to develop or elevate the Country into a high grade."[97]

In the event, nothing further was heard from the "King Lewanika Memorial Fund", and Yeta, not prepared to spend his own money - although it was undoubtedly adequate - did not go to England. Instead, another of the familiar petitions of protest was sent to Maxwell, the new Governor, but no satisfactory response was received.[98] Lozi resentment was reflected in a song popular at the time of Maxwell's meeting with Yeta in 1928 :

> The Governor, Governor, Governor,
> What type of a European
> Is this Governor
> Who has the royal drums
> Beaten for him, the Governor.[99]

The Resident Magistrate reported that relations between himself and the Lozi rulers during 1928 were at a lower ebb than at any time since the death of George Lyons. He claimed that Mubukwanu Mataa, son of the Ngambela, had become not only Yeta's private secretary but his main personal adviser, and that under his influence, "the Native Government again and again refused to accept the advice or cautions" of the Resident Magistrate. This situation, he said,

improved only - and abruptly - in December 1928 when Ngambela Mataa and two of his sons, including Mubukwanu Mataa, were arrested and charged with the ritual murder of a woman and her daughter.[100]

A judge sent by the Government to try the case found the evidence against the three men to be circumstantial, and all were acquitted.[101] Nevertheless, Yeta dismissed both the Ngambela and his own private secretary, the Ngambela's son, from their posts.[102] His motives for so doing are not clear. Possibly, it was simply because many people in Barotseland believed them guilty.[103] It is also possible, however, that the Ngambela and his sons were the victims of a plot to force them out of office, thus exposing for the first time in a decade internal conflicts within the ruling class which its united front against the government had kept latent. The Resident Magistrate and one of my informants believed that the Ngambela had made himself unpopular, but they could not specify why.[104] Mubukwanu Mataa, the present Induna Imandi, told me that it was true that his father was hated by a number of indunas, and it was they who organized this plot against him. His enemies were "ambitious and money-loving men", who felt they were getting an inadequate share of the compensation money for surrendering their right to free labour, money which was disbursed

by the Ngambela.[105] Although he can hardly be considered an unbiased source, Mr. Mataa's analysis is not implausible. It was true that the subsidies of the King and his immediate entourage were infinitely greater than those of the large majority of the ruling class, and the latter may have considered that the King and Ngambela were not doing their utmost to acquire a fair share for them.

Whatever the truth of the matter - and it is likely that it shall never be known - the dismissals of Ngambela Mataa and his son mark a transitional stage between two eras of Lozi history. During the first half of his reign, Yeta, guided by the new elite and supported by the traditionalist indunas, had first attempted to repudiate Company rule in the belief that, under the direct protection of the Crown, their former powers and authority would be restored. When the Crown finally succeeded the Company in 1924, the Lozi ruling class quickly realized that its aspirations would not be fulfilled, and decided instead that it would have to be satisfied with material manifestations of its status. It therefore produced incessant demands for funds adequate to build the kind of palaces, homes, court houses and barges which would properly demonstrate that its members were at least superior to their subjects. Conspicuous consumption would have to compensate for the absence of real power.

Yet by the end of the 1920's, even these demands were lessening. From reactionaries, anxious to reconstruct the old order, they turned into conservatives, satisfied to accept the status quo which they had achieved. Those progressive interests which the Lozi ruling class had happened briefly to represent were now represented by a handful of young men on the Copperbelt and along the line of rail. In Barotseland itself, the elite shut itself off completely from the currents of African politics in the rest of Northern Rhodesia, concerned primarily with local politics and high living in the midst of the "living museum"[106] which their country had palpably become.

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4. Messrs. N. Zaza and Muhali Mutemwa.

5. Mr. Zaza.

6. All the informants named above made this point.

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9. Lyons to Secretary, Livingstone, 6 March 1919, NAZ KDE 2/21/3.

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17. Induna Imandi, former Ngambela Wina, and Mr. Simalumba.

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21. For the Ndebele, see T. Ranger, "Traditional Authorities and the Rise of Modern Politics in Southern Rhodesia", in Stokes and Brown, op.cit., ch.7. For the South African parallel, see M. Benson, Struggle for a Birthright, ch. 1-3.

22. For Nyasaland, see J. Van Velsen, "Some Early Pressure Groups in Malawi", in Stokes and Brown, op.cit., ch.16. For eastern Northern Rhodesia, see Hall, Zambia, p.113, and Robert Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa, the Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964 (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), p.124-7.

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72. Lyons to Goode, 24 Feb 1924, ibid.

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86. Hall to SNA, 19 Dec 1927, ibid; same to same, 13 Dec 1928, NAZ KDE 2/16/5.

87. James to Yeta, 19 June 1926, NAZ KDE 2/15/1.

88. Stanley to Yeta, 21 Oct 1926, ibid.

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92. SNA to Palmer, 7 Jan 1927, ibid.

93. Yeta to Acting Governor, 26 Jan 1927, ibid.

94. Yeta to Stanley, 29 June 1927, NAZ ZA 1/9/47/32.

95. Stanley to Yeta, 24 July 1927, ibid.

96. Neither written nor oral sources provided data to illuminate the nature of these contacts.

97. As in the case of Peregrino in 1906, my own notes on this "Fund" have been mislaid. Again I am indebted to Professor Ranger for my source material, the information on the "Fund" being from his unpublished essay "Tribalism and Nationalism", op. cit. I do not agree with his interpretation, however, that Yeta's proposed trip to England was a modern means of applying political pressure; after all, Lewanika had set the precedent a quarter of a century earlier.

98. Petition of Paramount Chief and Council to Sir James Maxwell, 12 April 1928, NAZ B 1/3/688.

99. Cited in M. M. Sakubita, Za Luna Li Lu Siile (Our Vanishing Past), trans. by D. Nyambe (London, 1958), p.36.

100. Resident Magistrate to SNA, 13 Dec 1928, NAZ KDE 2/16/5.

101. Rex vs. the Ngambela and others, 1928-29, ibid.

102. Ngambela Mataa to Sylvester, Justice of the Peace, 3 Sept 1929, NAZ KDE 2/14/2.

103. According to Sakubita, public opinion believed them guilty, op. cit., p. 34. Mr. Berger of the PMS told me that Jalla agreed, but Berger himself is "absolutely convinced" they were innocent. Of my Lozi informants, Mr. N. Zaza thinks they were guilty but Messrs. Wina and Mupatu disagree.

104. Mr. Mupatu, and Resident Magistrate to SNA, 10 Jan 1929, NAZ KDE 2/16/5.

105. Mr. Mataa retired to his village after his dismissal as Yeta's secretary, where he remained until Ngambela Wina asked him to become an induna in 1941. He claims to know the men who framed him and his father, some of whom he says are still alive, but refused to give me their names.

106. A phrase commonly employed by white officials in Barotseland.

Chapter 6

THE LIVING MUSEUM

The Lozi ruling class had realized by the middle 1920's that the Crown administration had no intention of restoring to it the authority which the Company had usurped. It therefore reconciled itself to the fact that its status could be enhanced only by conspicuous consumption, but the government soon enough made it clear that unlimited demands for increased revenues would only be counter-productive: the government might become so impatient that it would withdraw even those grants to which it had previously agreed. Yeta and his Ngambela at least recognized the precariousness of the Lozi position, and as the relations between Lealui and its white overrulers became less acrimonious, internal conflicts within the ruling class began to emerge once again. At the same time, the government became increasingly concerned both about the backward nature of Barotseland and about its imprecise authority over the Lozi. Although it did nothing to alleviate the first problem, it took steps further to consolidate its control over the Lozi rulers.

According to a sympathetic mission source, Yeta's age and the battles of the first dozen years of his reign, had begun to

take their toll by the late 1920's. The King's earlier aggressiveness perceptibly began to decline; weary with failure, he became indecisive and diffident, revealing, it is said, a submissiveness unbecoming to a ruler.[1] This attitude of docility seems to have been shared by his new Ngambela, Mbangweta Munalula, who was, as his King had become, a pacific man, more interested in accommodating the government than in resisting it. About fifty years old, Munalula was the son of the Muleta, or chief councillor, of the Libonda Kuta in Kalabo District. Educated at a local PMS school to the point where he could "read and write and understand a little English", he succeeded his father in 1913 as Muleta to the Mokwae of Libonda in 1913, a post he retained until Yeta selected him as Ngambela in August 1929.[2] Unlike that of his predecessor, Munalula's appointment was apparen tly welcomed by the government, the missionaries, the "new men" and the traditional indunas alike.[3] It is possible, then, that his choice reflected the tacit decision already reached by the ruling class that, in its own interests, a prudent man was the best one to be its representative to the Crown government.

It is true that, in 1930, Yeta presented Gilbert Rennie, the new Provincial Commissioner (as the Resident Magistrate was now styled), with a petition raising most of the issues which had been in

dispute since the beginning of his reign,[4] but Rennie refused to take it too seriously. He pointed out that Yeta's son and new private secretary, Edward Kalue, had just returned from a visit to Bulawayo where he might have met one of the European lawyers with whom the Lozi remained in contact; on his return, he had pressured Yeta into signing the new petition. Rennie understood that, since Yeta's authority would never be as great as his father's once was, he would have a "permanent grievance". He realized also, however, that Yeta would be "scared out of his wits if he were told that, because of all his grumblings, His Majesty decided to withdraw all officials from Barotseland and leave him to work out his own salvation".[5] Rennie accordingly informed the King that, if he re-opened the old questions, the Lozi ruling class might find that its powers and revenues would actually be reduced.[6]

At the same time, the new "West Coast" governor, James Maxwell, who in 1929 introduced indirect rule to all of Northern Rhodesia outside Barotse Province, indicated that he was prepared to treat the Lozi rulers with solicitude and generosity - within the limits of discretion. This nice combination of threat and special attention worked perfectly: together, Yeta and his new Ngambela, with at least the partial consent of the rest of the National Council, resolved that their prime function henceforth was to preserve the

status quo, to maintain the special position of Barotseland within Northern Rhodesia and of the Lozi ruling class within Barotseland.[7]

Fissures within the ruling class, however, now began to appear. Partly this was because a united front against the Administration was no longer necessary. But to a considerable extent, it was also because Munalula was a weaker Ngambela than his predecessor. Above all, Mataa had thwarted the strong ambitions of the Moyoo, Yeta's senior wife. A clever and politically-minded woman of considerable strength of will, she was determined to gain positions of influence for the members of her own family. Ngambela Mataa, however, had insisted that Yeta abide by Lewanika's earlier arrangement with the Kuta: the indunas had accepted Yeta as King in return for the automatic succession of their sons to their own titles. With the appointment of Munalula, however, the Moyoo began to wield great influence over her husband, who is said to have loved her and showed her great consideration. Functioning behind the scenes as a kind of eminence grise, she persuaded Yeta to renege on his father's quid pro quo. The Moyoo's children, as well as less immediate kin, received promotions, while the villages of her family were provided with such amenities as dispensaries.[8]

This recrudescence of royal nepotism inevitably engendered the strong resentment of many Kuta members. Munalula earned the contempt of many indunas for his acquiescence in this family compact, while Yeta was considered guilty of a serious breach of promise.[9] The resulting tension bore fruit, as shall be seen, before many years had passed.

As far as one can tell, the new educated elite of the post-war years joined their elders in recognizing the futility of further extravagant demands upon the government, and they too turned their attention inward, concerning themselves largely with the consolidation of their own positions. Indeed, if any Lozi could still be said to represent wider African, as opposed to merely Lozi, interests, it was those with white-collar jobs outside the reserved area. Lozi and Nyasas, who had also, for historical reasons, gained early access to European education, had virtual monopoly of jobs as messengers, clerks, typists and interpreters in government and commercial service in Lusaka and Livingstone. Similarly, on the Copperbelt, though they constituted only a tiny minority of the African population,[10] the Lozi, with the Nyasas, formed an "obvious elite". With the best paid and most prestigious jobs on the mines, the Lozi were in the vanguard of "progressive" elitist

African movements, helping to inspire and giving leadership in the nationally-oriented Native Welfare Associations of the 1930's.[11] Although Yeta succeeded to a certain extent in maintaining the loyalty of these men,[12] it was the Lozi urban elite which was in the forefront of the struggle against the conservative ruling class in Barotseland during the nationalist era of the 1950's and 1960's.

At the same time that increasing number of Africans, among them many Lozi, were discovering at first hand about the white man's world, the new colonial orthodoxy, as has already been seen, was the discovery that traditional African societies ought to be preserved.[13] With this revelation, however, came another and more disquieting one: Barotseland, like the High Commission Territories which the Lozi rulers had tried so hard to emulate, had little worth preserving, at least as an economic unit. Beneath the impressive facade of a state in alliance with the British Crown lay the stark reality of a totally undeveloped, almost poverty-stricken labour reserve. There existed few employment opportunities either for the wholly untutored or for the small minority who were fortunate enough to get some schooling. Although the government's per capita expenditure on education was until 1939 lower in Barotse Province than in any other area of Northern Rhodesia,[14] still some 4000 young Lozi were in mission schools

and the Barotse National School by the late 1920's[15] more than enough to create a severe employment crisis.

Under Company rule, Barotseland's primary function was to provide cheap labour for the white economy of southern Africa, and, to the great chagrin of the Lozi, this status continued under Crown government. The latter had not the slightest intention of investing the kind of capital in Barotseland necessary to create the infrastructure of a viable economy. In 1927, Hall, the Resident Magistrate adopted a scheme to investigate the economic resources of Barotseland. He wrote to all his officials in the Province, as well as to missionaries and the chiefs of the several Kutas, requesting information on crop experimentation, forest preservation, cattle breeding, and any other suggestions deemed useful, and asking that "Natives should be associated with this enquiry".[16]

As an essay in mass participation and self-help, the exercise was an unmitigated failure.

> I regret (Hall reported) that it has been found difficult to obtain any native cooperation in the enquiry; no replies have been received from the native authorities to whom copies were sent. Other natives I am told are unwilling to speak without the authority from Lealui .... I am told that generally the natives regard the enquiry with suspicion.[17]

The reasons why Lozi cooperation was not forthcoming are not hard to find. The comment of one government official was undoubtedly accurate: "One cannot fail to be struck," he stated, "by the apparent total lack of interest of the Lealui khotla in the affairs of the country as a whole except in so far as they manifestly and immediately affect their own pockets and prestige".[18] Yet the problem was more complex than the simple callousness of the ruling class. The premise of white officials was that future economic development should be financed from the Barotse Trust Fund. This the King and Kuta rejected on two grounds: first, control of the Fund continued to lie in white hands; secondly, they considered that the proper function of the Fund was the enhancement of the physical dignity of the state, a lofty euphemism for their own material betterment. Development projects, as Yeta had constantly reiterated in his successive petitions, were the legitimate responsibility of the government in accordance with the Concession of 1900.

As for the "other natives" who refused to cooperate, Adolph Jalla provided a number of important insights. He questioned a large number of Lozi about the problem of improving economic conditions in the country, but received few replies. The "elderly men" in particular refused all assistance because they distrusted

white intentions. When Jalla explained that the purpose of the enquiry was to benefit themselves, every old man he spoke to, without exception, pointed to the destruction of Lozi cattle when the Administration attempted to contain the pleuro-pneumonia epidemic during the First War, and consequently, "They don't believe in the good intentions expressed in this scheme".

The attitude of "the younger people" was, according to Jalla, more ambiguous. They were not irrevocably hostile to the government, but were, rather, disappointed by its failure to act.

> They say (Jalla reported): Since the Crown Government has succeeded the Chartered Company, we have seen no improvement worth mentioning. We hear no one speak of a railway to Barotseland or of cheaper transport. We have seen no work undertaken for the benefit of the country, or to help the people to earn money without going far away from their homes. What is our good trying to improve or increase the produce of our gardens? ... Transport is so expensive that it does not pay to send anything to Livingstone for sale. Why should the Government not help to transport our produce to Livingstone? ...[19]

The local government officials generally agreed that transport was the critical underlying problem; as one of them expressed it, "Experimenting with crops should remain in abeyance until transport facilities exist."[20] But the government would not undertake such a costly project, and by 1930 the Provincial Commission was forced to report that, "Apart from the fish industry, which gives employment

to a fair number of natives in their own districts, there is at present no native industry of much economic importance in the Province". Even the cattle industry remained stagnant, not having yet recovered from the pleuro-pneumonia epidemic or the outbreak of lung sickness which followed it.[21]

As a result, the overwhelming proportion of Lozi males were forced to leave home in search of paid employment, whether as unskilled miners or farm workers or as white-collar workers. After all, among those who were unable to migrate, only about one in ten was considered to be "gainfully employed" in 1929.[22] When they could, therefore, they left. In the Nalolo district in 1927, it was reported that about half the able-bodied men were working at various distant labour centres, while most of the other half were resting before leaving again.[23] During the previous year, with the sanction of the government, the Southern Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau had recruited 5200 labourers from Barotseland to join the 8700 Lozi already working south of the Zambesi. On top of this were countless numbers of men who had gone south independent of recruiting agents.[24] The boom on the Copperbelt, from 1925 to 1930, merely added a new attractive destination to unskilled migrants, although it opened an important new source of employment to Lozi qualified to be clerks, interpreters and the like; it did not,

however, replace southern Africa as the major destination of all Lozi migrants.[25] By the end of the decade, Lozi communities existed in Kimberley and Johannesburg, Salisbury, Bulawayo and and Wankie, Livingstone, Broken Hill, the Copperbelt and lesser Northern Rhodesian towns outside Barotse Province.[26]

Those Lozi who migrated south of the Zambesi tended to be unskilled labourers, those along the line of rail in Northern Rhodesia educated white-collar workers. Holland, the Principal of the Barotse National School, was concerned that there would soon be more educated Lozi than jobs for them to fill, even outside Barotseland. In such circumstances, he argued,

> education can only minister to unrest and a sense of grievance. Education must make for independence of thought and (in this case) impart a facility to analyse the irksomeness of his lot as the educated native begins to reason things out.[27]

In fact, the Principal was foreseeing a real problem many years before it actually existed. For the moment, migration to the line of rail and the needs of both the white and black governments in Barotseland siphoned off enough of the educated young men - the natural leaders of the dispossessed masses - to preclude the growth of a large class of the discontented.

Indeed, not even the severity of the depression threw up a serious group of rebels to challenge the established ruling classes. Yet its impact was brutal, on a scale comparable to that of western

Canada at the same time, where economic collapse coincided with unprecedented natural disasters to shake the whole fibre of society. Between 1930 and about 1936-7, paid employment either in Barotseland or abroad became increasingly scarce - the recruiting agencies shut their doors in 1932 - while floods, drought and locusts destroyed four successive crops and pleuro-pneumonia, anthrax, and foot-and-mouth disease terminated the remnants of the cattle trade and the small export trade in skins. Famine, unemployment, and imprisonment or compulsory menial labour for non-payment of the poll tax characterized the life of the average inhabitant of Barotseland during most of the decade.[28]

Nor did the central government take substantial remedial steps to ameliorate the hardship. In this pre-Keynesian world, of course, public relief projects were unknown. More importantly, not until 1935 was the tax reduced from an impossible annual sum of 12s 6d to the difficult one of 7s 6d, and neither before nor after the reduction did district officers show any unusual leniency in punishing "tax-evaders" in view of the economic calamity.[29]

Only the elite was spared severe hardship during these years. The amount of money in circulation in Barotseland, one official reported, was "on the whole confined to the ruling classes whose incomes are derived from Government subsidies, and (who) have

the sale of milk and other produce to Europeans, and are consequently not seriously affected by the financial stringency."[30] This privileged position they flaunted blatantly, determined to demonstrate under whatever conditions a style appropriate to their status. In 1935, with the wage level for the few Lozi fortunate enough to find work down to three to five shillings a month, the Barotse Government, in a dazzling display of conspicuous consumption, spent £1300 on "the maintenance of Lealui", and then showed "a naive delight" in divulging the details to the Provincial Commissioner.

> To the casual reader (Lane-Poole observed), the expenditures may seem extravagant, even prodigal, but due regard has been paid to the assurance repeatedly given that nothing shall be done to reduce the style and standard of living to which the Paramount Chief has been accustomed. Items such as "ten fishes a day throughout the year at a penny a piece" read like an excerpt from a manorial account book in the Middle Ages, while the entry "Two costumes a year for each of 100 maidens working in the Chief's house" reflects an almost oriental glamour upon Yeta's domestic household.[31]

The evidence suggests that the Lozi masses during these years turned in their frustration and impotence to the kind of messianic religious movements which sprang up elsewhere in Central Africa.[32] In 1931, the Watchtower movement was introduced by a Lozi, Mulemwa, who had returned from Livingstone where he had been

converted.[33] Promising easier salvation than did the PMS, Mulemwa's following grew with remarkable speed, perhaps a reflection of the despair which the depression had wrought. Within a year, a majority of adherents of the PMS had joined Watchtower, much as they had flocked to the "Ethiopians" three decades earlier.[34] Since its preachers began by teaching obedience to constituted authority, neither the colonial nor the Lozi government was prepared to attack the sect, though district officers kept its meeting under close surveillance by African policemen.[35] When, however, Mulemwa and his sectaries decided they could no longer give the royal salute to the King and his family, his non-Lozi preachers who had accompanied him from Livingstone were deported from the Province, while he and his Lozi preachers were given strict warning to restrict themselves to their proper spiritual concerns. Although it continued to increase its followers throughout Barotseland, Watchtower never achieved influence of any kind in Lozi politics.[36]

Insignificant as it was, the Watchtower movement was the only institutional manifestation of mass Lozi discontent with their lot during the decade of the depression. Still, the extreme economic dislocation gave birth in at least some minds to the first tentative stirrings of doubt, a vague and rarely articulated

suspicion that the status quo reflected less than the best of all possible worlds. Partly this was a result of the flagrant extravagance of their rulers. The depression served to bring into focus the disparity in standard of living which had been a result of the introduction of a money economy. From the beginning, money had tended to alter the relationship between ruler and subject. Except for schools and a few hospitals and dispensaries, taxes were paid in return for administration and "order" - both services difficult to appreciate. Moreover, the leading members at least of the ruling class were receiving far more in personal subsidies than they had in the pre-European system, while less of their wealth was used for the benefit of their subjects. Instead of the crops grown on an aristocrat's land being used to support his dependants, they were now sold on the market where they received priority. "In the old non-profit economy," according to Gluckman, "control of the means of production gave a man followers who lived on the products they obtained; in the modern economy, this control, when added to the possession of large emoluments, makes these big Lozi into capitalistic employers, while the commoners work for them,, as for Whites." Writing in 1940, Gluckman predicted "a growing cleavage between rulers and subjects", which he believed had already just begun to emerge.[37]

Contemporary evidence of this cleavage is not substantial. A letter written to a missionary from a "native school teacher" reflects the ambivalent attitude of many Lozi to the existing situation.

> The country is changing very much (he wrote), there are troubles everywhere. The money difficulty is very great in the country. The white men are ceasing to employ a great many people ....
>
> A year or two ago everything was in good order throughout the world; how has it happened that suddenly everything is upset ... ? I can understand the ignorant people in this country saying that there is something that white people do not like to say now, but which will come to light sooner or later. They talk like this because it is not easy for them to understand, nor is it for myself.[38]

Nevertheless, whatever the doubts of the mass of Lozi, and whatever the more acute suspicions of a small number of them, in the end they resigned themselves to their unhappy fate. The lack of overt protest was repeatedly remarked upon during these years by district officers - and not without some surprise and relief. "The year 1933," the DC, Lealui, wrote, "will provide the chronicle of people passive in mood ...."[39] Nor was this in fact surprising. After all, mass uprisings have not resulted from every depression in history; Canadians and Englishmen both elected relatively conservative governments during this decade. Thwarted aspirations, not a fatalistic resignation to one's lot,

breed revolutions,[40] and the majority of Lozi did not yet expect much from life. In any event, officials of both the Barotse Government and the colonial administration, in cooperation with European teachers and missionaries, made a determined and successful effort to show, first, that the depression was world-wide, and secondly, that "acts of God" such as drought and locusts were exacerbating the economic problem; obviously, therefore, no responsibility could be placed on any authorities in Barotseland. "So," as an informant put it, "people just quietly suffered."[41]

This passivity confirmed the general satisfaction of the administration with the Barotse Native Government. Most officials on the whole shared Lealui's own belief in the superiority of the Lozi as against most other Northern Rhodesian Africans, Yeta, the Ngambela and many senior indunas succeeding in impressing government officials with their dignity and polished manners, their cooperativeness, and their "soundness".[42]

Yet the government's attitude was marked at the same time by negative feelings. "The Native Government showed very little drive", Logan, the Chief Secretary, pointed out, "and the country as a whole is much more backward than any other areas (of Northern Rhodesia)". Moreover, "The District Officer was in an uncertain position, having no power to interfere with Native Courts,

and little opportunity of initiative".[43] It was this latter problem - the lingering imprecision in the respective spheres of jurisdiction of the white and black governments - which most disturbed white officials. Uncertain whether the new system of Native Authorities which had been imposed upon the other tribes of Northern Rhodesia in 1929 might conflict with the Lozis' special status, Barotseland alone was excluded from the relevant legislation.[44] The administration had now decided, however, that Barotseland must be brought under the new system, and the subsequent negotiations pointed up once again the ultimately dependent status of its rulers: unlike other tribal chiefs, Yeta would be consulted about and, hopefully, consent to the proposed innovations; yet if he rejected them, they would still be implemented.

The government wished to "refine" the "rights and powers" of the ruling class by formally extending its own control over the BNG, especially in regard to its courts and its financial expenditures.[45] Obviously the Lozi rulers were highly reluctant to surrender the independence of their courts or the supplemental incomes which they derived from court fines.[46] For this reason, the negotiations begun in 1930 by government officials to introduce Native Authorities into Barotseland were not concluded until 1935. Yeta's growing financial difficulties finally forced him

to concede. It seems that by 1934, through inept handling of his funds combined with his personal extravagance, the King had accrued debts of some £2500. The government offered to lend him the money to pay his debts on the condition that he agree not only to the formation of a Native Treasury to regularize the handling of finances, but also to Native Courts. At the same time, the government agreed to pay the £1000 which the ongoing law case against the Company had cost the Lozi.[47]

Yeta accepted the quid pro quo, but only in the face of strong opposition from most of his indunas.[48] The new ordinances of 1935 formalized and regularized the legal status of the BNG, which now became the senior Native Authority for Barotse Province. They did not, however, qualitatively alter the power relations between the Lozi elite and their white overlords. Indeed, the administration's authority to interfere in the governing of the Province now became more precise, and the real effect of the Native Authority ordinances was therefore further to reduce the sovereignty of the King and Kuta. This fact was made abundantly clear by the efforts of the Governor and Chief Secretary to re-assure the "unofficial" white members of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council that the ordinances did not in fact increase Lozi rights. Hubert Young, the Governor, summed up the new position.

The ordinances, he explained,

> gives the Governor power, in the first place, to direct that an order shall be issued which he thinks the native authority ought to issue but has not issued; and, in the second place, it gives the Governor power to revoke an order by the native authority .... This has never been expressly provided for before .... The only qualification that is put in is to say that he (the Governor) must have the ordinary manners to consult the Paramount Chief before he does so.[49]

Moreover, the King now had to seek government approval for the appointment and dismissal of indunas, and, as Charles Dundas, the Chief Secretary, emphasized, Yeta's own successor would be chosen with the "guidance and direction" of the Governor.[50]

By the ordinances, the King and the Lealui Kuta became the Supreme Native Authority for the province, while each of the district Kutas was recognized as a Subordinate Authority. The Authorities acted in two capacities. They could issue orders or rules for the administration and governance of their areas,[51] the orders of Subordinate Authorities being subject to approval by Lealui, those of the Supreme Authority to approval by the government. The Authorities were also the courts of first instance and appeal. The Native Courts Ordinance regulated the spheres of jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Courts on the one hand, and, on the other, of three levels of Native Courts. The King's Kuta at Lealui was designated a Superior Court; the eight Kutas under chiefs of the

royal family became First Class Courts, while the many small Kutas of silalo (divisional) indunas were recognized as Second Class Courts. The extent of the jurisdiction of the two latter levels of courts was proportionately lower than that of the Lealui Kuta.

Appeals lay from the Second to the First Class Courts, and thence to the Superior Court in Lealui. Appeals lay from the latter to the Provincial Commissioner in criminal cases, the High Court in civil cases. But a District Commissioner still retained wide powers of review in criminal cases :

> He may suspend, reduce, annul or otherwise modify any sentence of a Native Court .... Criminal cases tried by Native Courts are periodically reviewed by District Officers so that any abuses of power or improper sentences can be corrected and injustices prevented.[52]

The DC's showed little reluctance to exploit these prerogatives. Moreover, for all the new formalization, the nature of the cases heard by the Native Courts hardly changed from the days of Coryndon's "agreements" with Lewanika. In Mongu-Lealui District in 1946, for example, ninety per cent of all civil cases heard concerned matrimonial disputes, while criminal cases were of the most minor and petty kind.[53]

A similar illusion of power without its substance was built into the new Native Treasury. Into it were funnelled, for the first

time, the combined revenues of the King and the Barotse Trust Fund, and from it would come all expenditures. But all expenditures were ultimately controlled by the white administration. The Native Treasury, as the Chief Secretary explained to the Legislative Council, "will submit its estimates for the year to the Governor, who will approve or not as he thinks fit".[54] Moreover, all Treasury cheques, signed in the first instance by the King and Ngambela, were to be counter-signed by the Provincial Commissioner.[55]

There need be no doubt that many indunas deeply resented the privileges which they lost through the Native Courts and Native Treasury Ordinances.[56] They lost their traditional right to a direct share of the fines they themselves imposed, receiving instead a salary fixed by the senior Native Authority, the Lealui Kuta. Indunas of the First and Second Class Courts especially suffered a serious decline in income, and none of them was anxious to turn over to the Native Treasury fines collected. The indunas of the Libonda Kuta indeed refused to do so until officials threatened them with prosecution if they failed to meet this obligation.[57]

As the aggreieved indunas understood, their sorry plight was the direct responsibility of the King, his senior indunas, and members of the royal family. For it was in this area that the senior

members of the ruling class had a certain real power. One of the chief privileges which the Lozi still retained was the right to accumulate a relatively large amount of wealth, and one of the major privileges of the inner elite of the ruling class was the right to distribute this wealth to lesser indunas and headmen largely as they saw fit.

Compared with any other tribe in Northern Rhodesia, the Lozi rulers were enormously wealthy. In 1938, the Barotse National Treasury collected £13,446, more than ten times the revenue of the next richest Treasuries, those of the Bemba and the Plateau Tonga.[58] It received £6000 as its thirty per cent share of the tax collected in Barotse Province; £850 from the Company in respect of the Concession of 1900; £1500 from the Zambesi Saw Mills Company for its timber concessions on each side of the Machili River; £2500 in commutation of the abolition of unpaid labour in 1924; £850 in commutation of the King's share of the revenue from game licences and ivory tusks outside the Province, as well as rents on plots of land, fines and fees of Native Courts, and arms and ammunition licences.

For the same year, the King and the Lealui Kuta, with the approval of the Provincial Commissioner, estimated expenditure of £15,200. Of this total, about £2300 went to the Barotse National

School and £2800 to the missions as educational and medical grants. The remaining £8666 went towards the salaries and expenses of the ruling class. Yeta's own salary was £1500, while "for the maintenance of his residence at Lealui in the style to which he had always been accustomed," he received an additional £1224. The Mokwae of Nalolo received £290, the Ngambela £160. Payments to other indunas and members of the royal family ranged from ten shillings to £40, but no less significant was the geographical distribution of these salaries. Indunas and royals living in Lealui received £1800, while only £2000 went to all the other eight Kutas and £1629 to the more than sixty-five silalo indunas' courts scattered throughout the province. Many minor indunas emerged earning less in their official capacities than many migrant labourers. Thus a very large part of the province's monetary wealth was centralized in the capital, monopolized by the inner elite of the ruling class, the other districts contributing substantially more to the central Treasury than was spent in them.[59]

In general, it was the deliberate policy of the Northern Rhodesian Government to support this particular structure of Lozi society. At the same time, as has been seen, there was an ambivalence in the official position: most administration officers wished to preserve the system largely on the basis of the status quo,

yet arguing for a modification of some of its more flagrant excesses. This attitude was clearly reflected by the members of the Pim-Milligan Commission after their brief visit to Barotseland in 1937. Their general impression was that, notwithstanding the relative wealth of the Barotse Government, the province itself was in "a condition of stagnation". Ignoring the failure of the colonial government to invest in Barotseland, they attributed this condition, first, to the number of headmen and indunas who were receiving salaries without doing a job of work, and secondly to the very high expenses of the royal household and the Lealui Kuta.

Here the ambivalence - so important in bolstering the conservatism of the Lozi rulers - appears. "No one who has been to Lealui", the Commissioners argued, "would wish to see this fine example of native civilization come to an end .... The Paramount Chief is bound to keep up his state at Lealui in the customary manner .... At the same time, the multiplicity of office-holders ... is part of the Barotse system of Government based on custom." How was the administration's determination to preserve intact the so-called traditional Lozi system to be reconciled with its wish to modernize the province? Alterations in the system, the Commissioners recommended,

> can only be achieved by a slow and careful process within the framework of the Barotse system. Expenses can gradually be cut down as existing officials die and by the combination of indunas' courts ....
>
> At the same time, there is no doubt that Barotseland does stand in need of financial assistance from outside. There is much educational as well as health and veterinary work to be done and no resources at present in Barotseland to pay for it .... It is not possible to acquiesce in the continuance of the present stagnation. Efforts should be made and money provided by the Government to deal with the more urgent requirements of the province.[60]

The wheel, then, had come full circle. Lewanika's enthusiasm for the modernization and development of his country had been thwarted by the Company's determination to impose its control at the minimum cost. By the late 1930's, the British government's new concern for the material welfare and economic development of its colonial subjects collided with the Lozi rulers' sole interest in asserting their "special status" by conspicuous consumption, since it was evident they would not be allowed to do so in terms of real political power.

Nevertheless, government officials convinced themselves that Yeta and the Ngambela at least - if not many other indunas - appreciated the need for reforming the Barotse Government and for improving the economic lot of the masses.[61] Their conversion may well have been genuine; in any event, adequate incentives were offered to tempt both men to acquiesce in most government suggestions.

Ngambela Munalula continued to be a favourite of all white officials, one of whom described him as impressing others "by his intelligence, breadth of view, and candour".[62] In 1935, he had been "singled out for honours exceptional for an African of this territory" by being awarded, first, the King's Silver Jubilee Medal, and then the King's Medal in Silver for Native Chiefs.[63] We may fairly assume that these honours served the equivalent function of the government's offer to loan Yeta the money to pay off his debts: they helped reconcile the two men to the implementation of the Native Authority Ordinances despite considerable opposition to them.

Moreover, once the ordinances were implemented, permission was granted by the government for Yeta and the Ngambela to visit England to attend the coronation of George VI, towards the cost of which the government contributed £300.[64] Again, it seems reasonable to assume that the trip was to fulfil two very pragmatic functions: it would be in the nature of a reward for accepting the Native Authorities and an inducement for carrying out the necessary administrative reforms once they returned.

The trip probably further exacerbated the hostility of the many indunas who had - unlike the King himself - been adversely affected by the new ordinances. But for Yeta it was the fulfilment of a dream he had cherished since his father's journey in 1902.

He had, as we have seen, been refused permission to travel to England shortly after his accession, but had never thereafter, as a missionary put it, ceased "wearing down the Mongu Magistrate with continued requests on the subject ...."[65] Now, for reasons already suggested, the old man was formally invited to the Coronation as a "Distinguished Visitor".

In May 1938, Yeta, accompanied by the Ngambela, his official secretary Godwin Mbikusita, and an interpreter, reached England. Their schedule included, besides the Coronation itself, a private audience with the new King, a special service at the French Church in London, and, at the end, three days in Paris visiting the headquarters of the PMS.[66] But unlike his father, Yeta did not have a political meeting with the Colonial Secretary.

The trip seems to have been considered a great success on almost all sides - the King and Ngambela, the administration, the PMS, and the mass of Lozi who perhaps felt that the honour bestowed upon their ruler reflected upon the entire nation. The general satisfaction, however, was not quite universal and, as the PMS journal put it, was "somewhat dampened" by the knowledge that a "cabal" had apparently tried to overthrow Yeta in his absence.[67] Considerable mystery and internal contradictions characterize the abortive coup, though it certainly exposed the deep internal conflicts

which had long riven the Lozi ruling class.

Yeta had earnedhimself a certain number of enemies simply by winning the Kingship in 1916 from his brother Imwiko, whom he then appointed to be chief of Sesheke. His opponents had later increased when the Moyoo, his senior wife, began to exert considerable influence over him after the dismissal of Ngambela Mataa.[68] A new faction opposed to Yeta was created in 1935 when he deposed the new Mulena Mokwae of Nalolo. The old Mokwae, Lewanika's sister Matauka, had designated her daughter Atangumbuyu as her successor. The indunas at Lealui and Nalolo resented this usurpation of the traditional right of the King and National Council to select the Princess Chief. Moreover, Atangumbuyu's father was a commoner. The Nalolo Kuta appealed to Yeta, who was pleased to intervene in order to appoint his own daughter to the position. With the consent of the Provincial Commissioner, Yeta deposed his half-sister and made his daughter, Mareta Mulima, the new Mokwae. In so doing, however, he earned the bitter enmity of members of Atangumbuyu's family.[69]

The new Ngambela, Munalula, seems to have alienated a large number of indunas by his suspiciously close relations with the Boma, and by his acceptance of the Native Authority ordinances. Just prior to Yeta's departure for England, Gordon Read, the Provincial Commissioner, received an anonymous letter demanding

that the Ngambela not accompany the King on his voyage. Munalula was accused of being "unloved" by the people because he always acceded too readily to the wishes of the white government. As J. P. Burger of the PMS commented, this was a serious charge since "Our Lozi like to show ... that they will not be ruled by a handful of whites".[70] Nevertheless, Munalula, as has been seen, went to London.

The chief actor in the drama almost certainly was Edward Kalue Yeta, the King's second son. Educated in South Africa, Kalue became his father's private secretary during Lealui's struggle with George Lyons. Many white officials then believed him largely responsible for Yeta's "extremism", and were eager to have him dismissed from his post. He was later blamed for the King's many debts, and under renewed Government pressure, Yeta finally replaced him with Godwin Mbikusita.[71] In 1937, Kalue was apparently bitterly resentful that Mbikusita, and not he, was chosen to accompany Yeta to England.[72] Moreover, it seems there was a rivalry between Kaluwe and his father involving a young woman named Mutende Konoso.[73] Presumably, Kaluwe now wished to exploit the widespread discontent among many of the minor indunas resulting from the Native Authority ordinances to have himself appointed King.

During the King's absence in England, Gordon Read, the Provincial Commissioner, received two anonymous letters, the one demanding the deposition of Yeta and the accession of Imwiko, the other calling for the dismissal of the Ngambela. Yeta was accused of being implicated in the murder or disappearance of seven people.[74] Whoever wrote the letters at least showed an awareness that only the white government could now depose a king of Barotseland. From Lealui, Kaluwe wrote his father in London, claiming the letters had been written by a group including Mbikusita, Chief Liatitima of Lukulu, Yeta's half-brother Mboo Lewanika, and Induna Nambayo of Lealui,[75] though Yeta later told Mr. Berger of the PMS that Kaluwe was among those charging him with murdering seven people.[76]

A prima facie case could have been made by the King against some of the accused. Induna Nambayo was related to the deposed Mokwae Atangumbuyu, and was said to be seeking revenge on her behalf. It later emerged that two other relatives of Atangumbuyu were involved in the plot, but both of them had died natural - if fortuitous - deaths during Yeta's absence.[77]

Mbikusita's grievances against Yeta was even more obvious: Yeta refused to recognize his claim to be a son of Lewanika. Few Lozi today accept him as such, and he did not begin using the surname Lewanika until 1948. In 1961 Mbikusita claimed that Imwiko officially

recognized him as his half-brother.[78] If this were true, it seems to offer ex post facto vindication of those who accused him of plotting Yeta's overthrow. Moreover, Mbikusita had already demonstrated his driving ambition, unusual only in that it encompassed both Barotseland and urban Northern Rhodesia. Already, too, he had revealed himself capable of taking positions which others did not always find easy to reconcile; among Lozi today he is widely known as "the chameleon", but it is difficult to say when this epithet was first attached to him. In 1933, Mbikusita was among the more conservative delegates at the founding of the "United African Welfare Association of Northern Rhodesia", where he informed his colleagues that Europeans were their masters and that it was "foolish to desire oneself to be in the same category with a white man".[79] Nevertheless, with one foot dipped cautiously in elitist African politics on a national level, and the other planted firmly in Lealui with his appointment as the King's secretary, it was possible to believe Mbikusita capable of colluding with Kalue to become the latter's Ngambela if their plot succeeded.[80]

It was only five months after the case was opened that a final judgement was delivered. This was partly, apparently, because Yeta did not wish to acknowledge his son's guilt,[81] partly because

the Provincial Commissioner was initially not satisfied with the Kuta's original decision that Mbikusita, Mboo, Nambayo and Liatitima were the guilty parties,[82] and in part because the Boma is said not to have taken the case seriously enough.[83] In the end, however, according to J. P. Burger of the PMS, "certain documents", unfortunately never specified, were discovered proving Kaluwe to have been the instigator of the plot. The Governor, who had to hand down the final judgement, accepted the Kuta's decision that Kalue be banished from Barotse Province. Presumably the documents also implicated the other accused, with the exception of Chief Liatitima, for the Governor upheld the Kuta's sentence against them. Mbikusita was not again to hold a post in the Barotse Government,[84] while Nambayo was dismissed from his indunaship and he and Mboo Lewanika were banished to their respective villages. Only the sentence against Liatitima was modified. He alone of the four accused (not including Kaluwe) had appealed to the Kuta against its original judgment against him, but to no avail.[85] The Governor, however, revoked the Kuta's order deporting Liatitima, though he confirmed the sentence that he lose his chieftainship of the Lukulu Kuta and his salaries as chief and as member of the royal family.[86]

The unhappy affair, though finally concluded, left a bitter aftermath. Relations were strained between the King and the Boma,

whose officials - in striking contrast to their colleagues of an earlier generation - refused, for unknown reasons, to take the incident seriously. "One would only like to see the Government more sympathetic to Yeta" commented J. P. Burger. "They do nothing to help him. In Mongu at least, they confine themselves to laughing at his difficulties." Moreover, the old man was grievously hurt that his son had attempted to usurp his position; he "said sadly that Kaluwe had fought more against him, his father, than against the Ngambela whom he openly detested."[87] According to another missionary, Etienne Berger, the episode increased the diffidence and submissiveness which had characterized Yeta during the previous several years. During the long months of waiting for the Governor's decision, he frequently approached Berger, humbly asking, "What shall I do, what shall I do? Should I resign?"[88]

So far as is known, no policy differences divided the alleged plotters from their putative victims. Kaluwe may have exploited the resentment against the apparent subservience of Yeta and the Ngambela to the government, but there is no evidence that anyone at any time demanded firmer resistance to the administration. Indeed, the early letters asked that the Provincial Commissioner should use his powers to depose the King, Liatitima had appealed to the former against the decision of the Kuta,[89] and Mbikusita was

hardly the man to lead an anti-white crusade. Nor is there evidence to suggest that Kalue and his "cabal" were less conservative and more socially-conscious than the King and Ngambela. The entire incident, in fact, may be viewed as a case study vindicating the widespread Actonian cynicism among Lozi of the corrupting nature of power.[90]

For it is arguable that it was a measure of Yeta's greatness as King that he survived in power for over two decades before open opposition to his rule manifested itself. This was, to be sure, a measure as well of the security of his position under the protection of a white government. But it also suggests a real shrewdness in balancing the forces within the ruling class, in - if not satisfying - at least not wholly alienating either the old conservatives or the ambitious educated elite. He had persuaded them of the prudence of accepting a status for their country which, if hardly like the old days, was at least demonstrably better than that of most other tribes in Northern Rhodesia. By the late 1930's, however, the concensus seemed to be shattering. New interests and old resentments were leading to renewed doubts about the wisdom of Yeta's policy of prudence.

The troubles in Balovale District served once again to underline the hollowness of the sovereignty of the Lozi ruling class.

The District had been divided at the Zambesi River by the Concession of 1909. The western portion was attached to the reserved area. The eastern section was not; the Lozi could not control prospecting in it, but the Lealui Kuta's jurisdiction extended ot it. In 1932, to replace the system of having representative indunas in Balovale, Lealui decided to establish a Barotse Appeal Court at Nawinda in Balovale District, with Yeta's son, Daniel Akafuna, as its head; there is little doubt that the move was a means of tightening Lozi jurisdiction in the area.[91] Unfortunately for the latter, however, their own pretensions conflicted with the growing patriotic sensibilities of both the Lunda and Luvale peoples in the District, and by 1936, members of both tribes had repudiated the new Kuta.[92] The Acting Governor, Dundas, attempted to enforce a compromise between the two opposing sides, but both remained intransigent. The government, apparently believing that aphysical conflict between the two groups was not impossible,[93] therefore announced in September 1938 that it was appointing a commission to investigate the entire question.[94]

This was a severe blow to the Lozi. Here was their ally, the British government, considering whether to excise from the Lozi two of their alleged vassal tribes over whom British control had originally been asserted by virtue of the Company's concessions

with Lewanika. Whether this humiliation was sufficient to rupture the institutionalized relations between the Barotse Government and the Crown government remained to be seen. Gluckman, who had worked in Zululand before beginning his research in Barotseland, considered that "the absence of conflict in White-Lozi relations was remarkable".[95]

Moreover, the options to Crown government were distinctly unattractive. Like all other Northern Rhodesian Africans, the Lozi informed the Royal Commission of 1938-39 in unequivocal terms of their antipathy towards Southern Rhodesia's "native policy" and their consequent opposition to any proposal of amalgamating the two Rhodesias. The Lozi case to the Commission was put by a series of individuals who reflected an accurate cross-section of the Province's political and social elite, including Yeta himself, a Kuta judge, a teacher, a chauffeur and a policeman. The overwhelming conservatism of these elitists was striking. They all stressed the impotence of chiefs south of the Zambesi, and all expressed their hopes that Barotseland would continue in its special status within Northern Rhodesia under the direct protection of the Crown.[96] The Commission showed considerable sympathy for the Lozi position. Its report recalled and re-affirmed the Crown's treaty obligations to the King, and recommended that "due regard" should be had for his

privileged position should amalgamation be agreed to.[97]

But though there were thus grounds for ruling class complacency, there were yet already perceptible by 1939 signs of serious potential conflict. Labour migration, for example, temporarily slowed down by the depression, had revived to an unhealthy extent. By 1938, the proportion of adult males normally absent from their homes ranged from fifty to seventy per cent. Notwithstanding these figures, the Northern Rhodesian Government authorized the Witwatersrand Native Labour Recruiting Association (WNLA) to recruit Lozi workers for the mines of the Rand.[98] It was not long before many young men returned from the tough mining compounds of Johannesburg flaunting their contempt for traditional white and black authority alike.

At the same time, class cleavages were perceivable within the Province. Although not yet dangerous, Gluckman noted tensions between, on the one hand, the unprivileged - the peasants, the powerless yet increasing group of skilled men, clerks, and artisans, and the poor minor councillors - and, on the other, a rich insensitive and autocratic inner group of the ruling elite. Moreover, the impotent petty bourgeois began questioning the hitherto accepted economic social and economic superiority of local whites.[99]

Finally, a clash between the Barotse Government and the Northern Rhodesian Government was growing less unlikely. It was not merely that the Crown was considering excising Balovale District from Barotseland. For the Bledisloe Commissioners, like those of the Pim-Milligan Commission, while generally sympathetic to the maintenance of the political status quo in the Province, had been shocked by its economic backwardness. "We could not fail to note," they reported, "that in many respects, notably in the provision for medical services and education, the Barotse Province falls short even of the comparatively low standard obtained in other parts of Northern Rhodesia."[100] They therefore recommended that the colonial government, while respecting the terms of the Concession of 1900, "actively pursue" an agreement with Yeta to modify some of its provisions "so as to permit of more effective administration and development in the interests of the Barotse people".[101]

Before any such approach could be made, however, World War II broke out, and the war effort took priority over reforms in Barotseland. Moreover, early in 1939, Yeta was struck down with paralysis which deprived him of his speech.[102] His imminent death was generally expected, and in the interim period an ad hoc body was set up to replace him. It consisted of Ngambela Munalula; the Natamoyo, Yeta's younger brother Lubinda; Induna Solami, president

of the Mongu-Lealui District Kuta, and the Mokwae of Nalolo.[103] Imwambo, Yeta's Moyoo or senior wife, whose influence over her husband had increased steadily over the decade, tried to insinuate herself into this group, but this move was fiercely resisted by Gordon Read, the Provincial Commissioner; Read and the Moyoo apparently hated each other. According to Mr. Berger of the PMS, Read was a tough officer who saw in this new arrangement an opportunity to extend the influence of the Boma.[104] He worked hand in glove with the Ngambela who, he acknowledged, remained during this period in "constant touch" with him,[105] and according to Mr. Berger, the Barotse Government was at this time more in the hands of the Boma than at any other period since the commencement of Company rule.[106]

Like Charles II, however, Yeta was "an unconscionable time dying". By the end of 1939, he had recovered sufficiently to make known his views by signs as well as through barely decipherable writing with his left hand.[107] This unexpected development provided Read with a further opening: he had Munalula officially appointed as Acting Paramount Chief.[108] Although Lubinda and Solami were to remain senior advisers, Munalula's dual functions as Ngambela and Acting Paramount and his close relationship with the Provincial Commissioner consolidated to an even greater extent the machinery of local government in their hands.[109]

Unfortunately for Gordon Read, Munalula died in January 1941. He was eulogized widely throughout the European community,[110] but the Kuta seems to have felt the loss less deeply, many indunas perhaps recalling his earlier "betrayals" of their interests to the government. This fact was reflected in Gordon Read's speech at the accession of his successor, when he "spoke warmly" of Munalula's virtues, "merits not always recognized by the Malozi".[111]

From the names selected by the Kuta, the mute King indicated his preference for Kalonga Wina.[112] Wina had been born in 1878, the son of a Lealui induna. He spent five years at the PMS school in Kazangula, where he became a Christian. In 1903, he joined the Kuta in Sesheke as its clerk and as interpreter to Yeta. Two years later he married one of Lewanika's daughters and was promoted to a higher rank in the Sesheke Kuta. He remained with Yeta until Lewanika's death, travelling with the Prince once to Cape Town and once to Basutoland. Wina remained at Sesheke after Imwiko became chief of the district until he was called to succeed his father as Induna Wina Lioma at the Lealui Kuta. In 1936, Wina was chosen to be Daniel Akafuna's chief councillor at the new Balovale Kuta, a position he held until the British government ordered the disbanding of the Kuta in 1941. Married into the royal family, a close personal friend of Yeta, generally considered to be a clever and natural leader,

it was his involvement in the Balovale crisis which finally made him the obvious choice for the job. He was seen as a man who, unlike Munalula, would not be servile to the Boma, who would "be able to restore the glory that Lewanika once gave Barotseland."[113]

Gordon Read predictably resented Wina's appointment.[114] Through Induna Solami, Yeta signified his wish that Wina also succeed Munalula as Acting Paramount,[115] a wish the Provincial Commissioner grudgingly approved.[116] Wina had no intention of respecting Gordon Read's suggestion that, like Munalula, he disdain the cooperation of the Moyoo. Though he maintained several senior indunas as his official advisers,[117] he in fact formed a kind of diumvirate with Yeta's wife and successfully contrived to keep the King's own intervention in affairs of state to a minimum.[118]

Nevertheless, Wina shrewdly minimized his unpalatability to the Boma, first, by passively accepting the Crown's decision to excise the Balovale District from Barotseland,[119] and secondly, and most importantly, by cooperating in the only sphere that really mattered to the administration in these years, the war effort. What was expected from the Lozi was political stability and a certain assistance in facilitating the war effort through enlistment for service, providing farm labour, producing rubber and selling cattle. Led by Wina and members of the royal family, the Lozi fulfilled

these expectations to the satisfaction of the territorial government.[120] If the choice was between Britain and its foes, Barotseland's stand was unequivocal.[121]

Yet there were distinct gradations in the enthusiasm shown for the British side. The most active loyalists were from the ruling elite. The mass of Lozi probably had only a dim grasp of a war being waged many thousands of miles away.[122] But among three other sections of the Lozi community, the war was giving rise, in common with most other African peoples, to a new self-consciousness, with results not yet easy to foresee.

The new spirit was articulated most clearly by the Lozi lower-middle class, the small minority of educated men who were materially privileged because of their white-collar jobs yet politically dispossessed. Because many members of the Lozi ruling class, unlike their counterparts in the rest of Northern Rhodesia, were educated and literate, the Kutas were to a considerable extent able to cope with their tasks and meet the demands of white officials without the assistance of educated clerks. Although there were exceptions to the rule, the Barotse Government remained largely in the hands of the traditional aristocracy.[123]

Unlike the educated elite of the 1920's, the majority of this second group of "new men" were not the sons of royals and indunas.

Unlike the former as well, the new group was concerned with the wider questions of race and nationality as opposed to narrower issues concerning Barotseland alone. In their isolation, the handful of educated Africans working in Mongu had already banded together in 1939 to form the Mongu-Lealui African Welfare Association, modelled on the many similar associations which proliferated throughout Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland during the decade. Not only Lozi but any African working in the District - and there were a number of Nyasa clerks at the Boma[124] - was eligible for membership in the Association, which had as its "Aims and Objects:"

(a) To promote cooperation and brotherly feeling between Africans in Northern Rhodesia;

(b) To encourage the spread of civilization by education, industrial and agricultural development;

(c) To protect and further African interests generally

The moderate nature of the proposed Association is reflected in two of its standing rules: copies of the minutes of its annual meeting were to be forwarded to the DC, Mongu, while no literature imported from outside Northern Rhodesia would be circulated among members without the prior consent of the Secretary for Native Affairs.[125]

Their constitution prepared, representatives of "the educated African community in Mongu" requested the government's

permission formally to establish their Association, giving an undertaking "not to interfere in the affairs of the Administration or the Native Authority".[126] Gordon Read, the Provincial Commissioner, refused to sanction its formation, however, on the grounds that it would "fulfil no useful purpose".[127] But in 1943, the rigid and inflexible Read having left the Province, permission was granted for the Association to begin functioning.[128]

The aspirations of its members were clearly reflected in one of its first meetings, held, significantly, in the office of the DC, Mongu. Consistent with its isolationist policy, the Barotse Government had refused to set up in Barotseland one of the Provincial Councils which the central government was instituting in the other provinces for the purpose (inter alia) of nominating African representatives to the Legislative Council. The Association's members strongly urged the formation of such a council in Barotseland for, they explained,

> The masses of the educated class in this province is not playing its part within the scope of African advancement. We quite realize the powerful authority of the Barotse Native Government, but this Association feels it most essential that free people with sound education in this Province should also be encouraged to hobnob with their fellow africans (sic) in other provinces in the enhancement of the african (sic) interests.[129]

There is no evidence that the Lozi rulers heeded the suggestions of the Association, but neither is there doubt that the

latter's members spoke for many of the Province's emerging middle class. A schoolteacher in rural Senanga, for example,, recalls that he and a small number of his friends heard about and were highly influenced by such wartime phenomena as the Atlantic Charter, the Four Freedoms, and the struggle to liberate small nations.[130]

Missionaries too discovered during these years for the first time the depth of Lozi mistrust and even hatred for Europeans. Mlle. Marie Borle, teaching teen-age girls, remembers her pupils pointing out that whites claimed to be bringing peace and civilization to Africa, yet were at that moment destroying each other and much of the world as well. Were the whites, they asked, then to destroy the black people as well? When a Lozi soldier appeared, claiming that he had been killing Europeans, the girls were openly "ecstatic". It was, Mlle. Borle noted, wholly remarkable that Lozi girls had the audacity to express such sentiments in front of a white teacher.[131]

Returning soldiers, then, were a second element in the growth of African self-confidence, in Barotseland as in the rest of the continent. During the war, as the mission journal put it, they had received "an education of a different kind ! and their eyes have been opened to many things hitherto unknown to them".[132] "They have seen new ways of life and have acquired new ideas, and with

them, new desires ...."[133]

Returning labourers were similarly affected. For the first time since Lozi labour migration had commenced on a serious scale, migrants were returning home flaunting their contempt for authority by refusing to demonstrate their respect for and servility to local Europeans. Until the war, any Lozi passing a white invariably moved off the path, doffed his hat, bowed and clapped, shouting Mulena ("lord").[134] Not even the sanctioning of this practice by the Kuta as well as the government could, however, any longer force returned labourers, above all the thousands who had during the war returned from the mines of the Rand,[135] to continue to degrade themselves in this manner. Many government officials considered these men were "hooligans ... filled with ideas of their own importance".[136] This short-sighted and superior attitude was shared by the Lozi rulers, whose response to it was simply to increase the number of indunas' visits to schools, reminding the pupils that continued respect for whites must be shown since the Lozi were universally known for their good manners which were a sign of being civilized.[137]

In any event, such problems seemed peripheral to the central political issue of the time. In a word, Yeta had neither recovered nor died; he remained paralyzed and speechless. From Wina's accession

to early 1945, it was he, as Acting Paramount Chief, who held ultimate responsibility in Lealui. In theory, all decisions came from him after consultation with the King; in fact, during these years, it was the Moyoo who interpreted, and insisted that she alone was capable of interpreting her husband's wishes as signalled by his hand motions. According to both Boma and PMS sources, the Moyoo had acquired "an absolutely decisive influence over affairs of state which has led to suspicion and resentment alike in the Kuta and outside it."[138]

It appears that great pressure was placed upon Wina to end his unpopular alliance with the Moyoo. For early in 1945, he, the Natamoyo (Lubinda Lewanika) and Induna Solami requested that Watmore, the Provincial Commissioner, appoint a "Regency Council", consisting of the three men themselves, to "carry responsibility of the Paramount Chief in affairs of state". The Moyoo, they assured Watmore, "no longer had any say in affairs of state and had been told not to interfere".[139] When Watmore retired shortly thereafter, however, no action on the problem had been taken.

On the 2nd of May, at their own request,[140] Wina and several senior indunas met with Glennie, the Acting Provincial Commissioner, to discuss the matter. Glennie informed the delegation that if a Regency Council were to be formed, the King must resign.

Assuming the status quo to be no longer acceptable, he offered them one of three alternatives: a new King, a Regency Council, or an Acting Paramount chosen from the royal family.[141] Moreover, he insisted that "this important decision must be ratified by (the) will of (the) Nation as expressed in full Kuta".[142] As a result, the chiefs and indunas of all the Kutas in the Province were summoned to the winter capital at Limulunga.

Inevitably, an intense competition ensued among the various members of the royal family to determine which of them would be named Acting Paramount, or Regent. According to J. P. Burger, however

> the Council of Chiefs could not agree on any of them, objecting particularly that the regent would consider himself the natural successor of Yeta and would refuse to abandon his position when the latter dies. You can imagine the intrigues at the Court, animosities and jealousies ....[143]

In fact, this stalemate satisfied most of the interested parties. For it was to the obvious advantage of Wina, Solami and the Natamoyo if no acting chief could be agreed upon, and if they could form a "regency council". Similarly, the various royals finally realized that if they could forestall the appointment of a regent, they could press their own claims after Yeta's death. The temporary compromise agreed upon was that all the leading members of the ruling class would share power until the King died.

For on the 18th of May, the Mulena Mokwae and Yeta's brothers reported to Glennie that, at a special meeting, it had been agreed "not to part with" Yeta, but that "the Ngambela-in-Council should act as a Mouthpiece providing a link between the Paramount Chief, the Central Government, and the Barotse Nation". The "Ngambela-in-Council" in effect meant Wina and the senior indunas of the Lealui Kuta. The "Barotse Nation", it was explicitly clarified, meant those members of the royal family who were the chiefs of the remaining Kutas, who were to be consulted "in all important questions of state". There would be "no consultation whatsoever with the Moyoo nor any influence from her".[144] In short, the old inner elite of the ruling class, those who had over the previous two decades been the greatest beneficiaries of the status quo, were determined to regain the ascendancy they had temporarily lost during the de facto reign of Wina and the Moyoo.

Although the evidence here is lacking, it is possible that this move provoked a highly antagonistic reaction among the minor members of the National Council. For early in June, Sikota Akafuna, the husband of Yeta's daughter, the Mokwae of Nalolo, asked Glennie to see Yeta to "obtain his reactions to a suggestion that he should retire". Clearly no Lozi was prepared to undertake this distasteful task. Several days later, Daniel Seguin, the PMS missionary at the

capital, who had remained, as Glennie understood, "in the closest touch" with Lozi affairs, called on the Provincial Commissioner and "frankly stated that the articulate and responsible elements of the Barotse people were thoroughly dissatisfied with the present state of affairs, that Barotseland was retrogressing, and that a crisis might occur if Government did not intervene". These representations from Akafuna and Seguin convinced Glennie that not only must Yeta resign, but that he must do so without delay in order to undermine "the self-seekers" who surrounded him and "in whose interest it was that he continues in his position until his death".[145]

Glennie's decision ended the vacillation. Yeta sadly resigned himself to abdicating, indicating his wish that his half-brother Imwiko succeed him.[146] Imwambo, the Moyoo, informed Seguin that her husband hoped Imwiko would appoint their son Lubosi as his own successor, but Imwiko refused to give any undertaking in this regard.[147] At this stage, Glennie for the first time informed the central government of Yeta's "desire to abdicate",[148] while he had Seguin prepare English and Silozi versions of a "Declaration of Abdication" and a "Proclamation of Abdication to the Nation". These documents were then approved by the full National Council, after which they were presented to the King, signed by him with the greatest sorrow,[149]

and appeared in a special edition of a bilingual government-issued newspaper.[150] Thus it was that the sick old monarch was reluctantly forced into retirement by the ambitious politicians of his nation using the mistrusted but powerful white Provincial Commissioner who in turn used as his intermediary the politically impotent but trusted white missionary.

Perhaps the King received a certain consolation from the many expressions of tribute which he received from those senior government officials whom he had always respected: the Secretary of State, the Governor, the Secretary for Native Affairs[151]. Nor can it be doubted that the sorrow of his people was genuine and widespread. They respected him as their King, but they also loved him as a man.[152] Perhaps indeed he abdicated just in time. The end of the war was a watershed in all the colonies in Africa; a new era of social and political consciousness was dawning. Yeta, child of an earlier generation, was hardly the man to lead his people happily into it. Essentially his mentality was closer to his father's and to that of the missionaries and even colonial officers whom he had known and with whom he had worked. For all his struggles against European rule during the first half of his reign, he had continued to respect white men as such, to think in terms of "natives" and the Empire. He had become, in short, an anachronism. Social

reform and political equality - the keynotes of the post-war colonial world - were beyond his comprehension. The question remained, however, whether his successor could make the transition more smoothly.

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81. Burger to Director, 21 Dec 1937 and 31 Jan 1938, PMSS.

82. Same to same, 3 Nov 1937 and 24 Nov 1937, ibid.

83. Same to same, 17 March 1938.

84. Mr. Simalumba, with whom Mbikusita lived for some time after his banishment, is convinced of his innocence, but Mr. Berger told me he was "certainly" guilty.

85. Chief Liatitima, who later became a strong supporter of UNIP.

86. Burger to Director, 17 March 1938, PMSS.

87. Ibid.

88. Mr. Berger.

89. Chief Liatitima.

90. Virtually all my informants explained that men in power were always threatened by others jealous of that power. Gluckman records the same sentiments in almost all his works on the Lozi.

91. Balovale Commission Report, 1939, p.107 and Mr. Wina, who was appointed chief councillor to Akafuna at Nawinda.

92. Report, pp.129-33.

93. Ibid., pp.179 and 185.

94. Report of the Commission Appointed to Examine and Report Upon the Whole Question of the Past and Present Relations of the Paramount Chief of the Barotse Nation and the Chiefs Resident in the Balovale District both East and West of the Zambesi River, with Special Reference to the Ownership of Land and the Methods by which the Tribes Have Been Governed and to Make Recommendations for the Future, Sir Philip J. MacDonnell, Commissioner (Lusaka, 1939). This report remained "strictly confidential", and the Lozi did not learn until 1941 that Balovale District was to be excised from Barotse Province. I hope to deal with the subject in greater detail elsewhere.

95. Gluckman, Economy, 1941, p.119.

96. Report of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Royal Commission (Bledisloe Commission), Cmd. 5949, 1939, pp.168-9, 175-6, 218, 235-6.

97. Ibid., pp.235-6.

98. Ibid., pp.184-7; Philpott, "Mongu-Mulobezi Labour Route", op. cit., pp.50-4; Gluckman, "Barotseland : Where Western Civilization Has Brought Poverty", Libertas, July, 1945 (typescript copy at RLI).

99. Gluckman, Economy, pp.120-1.

100. Bledisloe Commission Report, p.235.

101. Ibid., p.167.

102. News from B. and B., No. 7, March 1940, p.4.

103. Messrs. Mupatu and Simalumba.

104. Mr. Berger.

105. Gordon Read, "Mbangweta Munalula", op. cit.

106. Mr. Berger.

107. News from B. and B., No. 7, March 1940, p.4.

108. Messrs. Wina (who succeeded Munalula) and Simalumba.

109. Read, op. cit., and Mr. Berger.

110. Read, op.cit; News from B. and B., No. 9, March 1942; Gluckman to Gordon Read, 27 Jan 1941, in Ngambela Munalula Dossier, Barotse Province Files, Mongu Boma (hereafter Boma Files).

111. C. G. Stevens (DC, Mongu), "Installation of the Ngambela of Barotseland : A Picturesque Ceremony at Lealui", March 1941, Boma Files.

112. According to Wina himself.

113. Messrs. Zaza, Simalumba and Berger. The quotation is Mr. Berger's.

114. Read to Yeta, 15 April 1941, Wina Dossier, Boma Files.

115. Solami to Read, 16 April 1941, ibid.

116. Read to Yeta, 19 April 1941, ibid.

117. Mr. Wina.

118. Mr. Berger.

119. See Northern Rhodesia Government Gazette, Vol. XXXI, No. 38, 9 July 1941, General Notice No. 398.

120. A. F. B. Glennie, "Report on Barotse Province", Colonial Annual Reports, 1946, copy in Boma Files.

121. Messrs. M. Mataa (Induna Imandi), Wina, Simalumba and Mupatu.

122. Glennie, "Report", 1946, op. cit.

123. Gluckman, Seven Tribes, pp.57-8.

124. Ibid.

125. Mongu-Lealui African Welfare Association Draft Rules, Boma Files, Provincial Administration, 1939-53.

126. DC, Mongu, to Acting Provincial Commissioner, 5 July 1939, ibid.

127. Read to DC, Mongu, 19 Sept 1939, ibid.

128. DC, Mongu to PC, 23 Dec 1943.

129. Minutes of a Committee Meeting of the Association, 21 Dec 1944, ibid.

130. Mr. Simalumba.

131. Mlle. Borle.

132. News from B. and B., No. 14, May 1947, p.3.

133. Ibid., No. 13, March 1946, p.2.

134. Messrs. Simalumba and Berger and Mlle. Borle.

135. Northern Rhodesian Labour Department, Annual Reports, 1941-46.

136. See, for e.g., Philpott, "Mulobezi-Mongu Labour Route", op. cit., p.53.

137. Mr. Berger witnessed such occasions in his schools.

138. Glennie to Chief Secretary, 20 June 1945, Boma Files, Retirement of Paramount Chief Yeta Dossier; also Mr. Berger.

139. Glennie to Chief Secretary, 20 June 1945, ibid.

140. Wina to Glennie, 1 May 1945, ibid.

141. Minutes of Meeting netween Glennie and Wina et al, 2 May 1945, ibid.

142. Note of Meeting between Glennie and Imwiko et al, 8 May 1945, ibid.

143. Burger to Director, 18 July 1945, PMSS.

144. Mulena Mokwae et al to Glennie, 18 May 1945, Boma Files, op. cit.

145. Glennie to Chief Secretary, 20 June 1945, ibid.

146. Seguin to Glennie, 19 June 1945, ibid.

147. Same to same, 20 June 1945, ibid.

148. Glennie to Chief Secretary, 20 June 1945.

149. Seguin to Glennie, 21 June 1945, ibid.

150. "Proclamation of Abdication of Paramount Chief Yeta III of Barotseland" and "Declaration of Abdication ....", 23 June 1945, ibid; see also Mutende, July 1945.

151. Secretary of State to Yeta, undated, Boma Files, op. cit; Governor's Message to Yeta, undated, ibid; Mutende, July 1945.

152. Mr. Berger.

Chapter 7

THE CONSOLIDATION OF TRIBALISM

With the National Council still assembled in Limalunga, Glennie, the Acting Provincial Commissioner, called for the rapid selection of Yeta's successor. The operation wasto be no more than the confirmation of Imwiko,[1] who in fact was appointed with little apparent opposition.[2] Imwiko Lewanika was then sixty years old. He was the son who Lewanika had sent to school in England early in the century, where he completed Standard VII. As we have seen, he was in 1916 the choice of certain indunas to succeed his father, one of the reasons perhaps that Yeta appointed him to be chief of Sesheke, where he remained until 1945. There he is said to have developed an impressive reputation for his cordial relations not only with his indunas, but with the educated men and common people as well. If opposition to his becoming King was minimal, however, probably part at least of the reason was the expectation that, given his age, his reign would be relatively brief.[3]

Whatever Imwiko's aspirations as King may have been, the framework within which he was to operate during his reign was

firmly imposed upon him by the central government. This was made unmistakeably clear in the speech given by Glennie, now the Provincial Commissioner, to the National Council on the day of Imwiko's installation ceremony. Plans mooted prior to the outbreak of the war, and postponed both because of it and Yeta's illness, were now to be implemented. Above all, the Barotse Government was to be reformed so that all its members "will have a definite job of valuable work to do", and a programme of economic development, financed by the British Government's "big gift of money to the Empire", was to be commenced.[4]

In retrospect, it is clear that the new administrative reforms proved too little too late, and were largely irrelevant in terms of the real political demands of the post-war era, while the development scheme created expectations which it never had the resources - financial or human - to fulfil. Glennie, however, forced the Kuta to accept changes in both areas, thus incurring widespread hostility towards himself and to the new King.[5] Although he began his term believing that the Lozi, unlike other tribes in the colony, "must be convinced" before reforms were imposed upon them,[6] he soon decided that changes must be wrought "in the face of a jealous conservative opposition which seeks to cling to every crag and cranny of advantage and to yield no iota of privilege without a

struggle."[7]

Perhaps because their own interests were not directly affected, perhaps because they understood that opposition was futile, Imwiko and his main advisers - Ngambela Wina, Amukena Lewanika (Lubinda having been appointed chief of Sesheke), and indunas Solami, Suu and Ngangwana - agreed to Glennie's proposed reforms, though with little enthusiasm.[8] But among many of the ruling class, the reaction was predictably hostile. For the reforms of the BNG involved the abolition of a large number of indunaships.[9] This not only meant that many indunas lost their titles, their salaries, privileges, and access to the centres of power. For the titles abolished belonged largely to the anachronistic makolo - the non-territorial political sectors - and if their holders had no obvious practical function in the BNG, nevertheless their titles were "rooted in Lozi traditions" and at "the centre of some episode in (early) Lozi history".[10] In a real sense, then, the reforms were seen as an attack on the institution of the Kingship itself, the centre of the unity of the peoples of the nation.[11]

Nor was the Kuta pleased by Glennie's insistence that representatives of two outside groups be appointed to the National Council: those of the younger educated men not belonging to the

ruling class, and those of the many small, non-Lozi tribes in the Province.[12] It was true that the government sanctioned the deposition of Mwene Mutondo, chief of the Nkoya people, who had demanded that Mankoya District should be allowed to secede from Barotseland as Balovale had done.[13] Yet not even this re-affirmation of Lozi sovereignty could reconcile most indunas to the ongoing reforms.

In 1947, the central government, through Glennie, "pushed upon" Imwiko the revival of the Katengo council.[14] The Katengo, "the council of the many", had been abandoned at some indeterminable stage in the late 19th century,[15] but officials had come to regard it as Barotseland's germinal House of Commons which they wanted to reconstruct for the purpose of "parliamentary reform".[16] The resurrected Katengo was to be an advisory council which would forward recommendations to the National Council. Its members were to come from five electoral wards corresponding with the Province's five districts. Initially the members were nominated by the local Native Authority in consultation with the DC and with the approval of the Provincial Commissioner, but one of the five from each district was to retire annually and be replaced by a member elected by universal adult male suffrage.

The new council, duly implemented, was a failure from the first. Most indunas resented its very existence, their hostility increasing as the promised elections resulted in a number of ambitious teachers and clerks joining the Katengo.[17] The Kuta largely ignored the Katengo's recommendations,[18] while the Provincial Commissioner forbade it to discuss important political matters or express anti-white sentiments.[19] In short, the government's administrative and political reforms left the politically dispossessed white-collar group wholly unsatisfied, heightened the conflict between the latter and the ruling elite, and increased the resentment of both groups against the white administration.

In its attempts to raise the level of Lozi technology and the living standards of the mass of the population, it was only barely more successful. The economic position of the Province was no less depressed after the war than before it. Peasant farmers were producing barely enough crops for their own subsistence. Employment opportunities for both the skilled and unskilled remained minimal. The extent of labour migration was such that many villages were left literally with only women, children and old men.[20] "There is no remedy to this evil", Glennie acknowledged, "except an extensive programme of economic and social development which

will provide within the Province higher wages, better conditions, and a wider variety of occupations."[21]

To that end, in 1947, using Colonial development and Welfare Funds, the central government decided to establish a Development Centre in Barotseland south of Sefula at Namashukende. For the first time since their arrival, the white overlords were seriously prepared to spend some money developing the country in the manner which Lewanika had long wanted. As Lewanika and Mokamba would have done, Imwiko and Wina accepted the development scheme; like them too, they met strong resistance from many indunas for collaborating with the white man.[22] Fox-Pitt, the Acting PC, informed the King that the Government needed to lease a large tract of land at Namashukende. Imwiko and the Ngambela gave their consent, but the Kutas of Lealui and Nalolo both believed the scheme was merely "another white man's trick" to "steal Lozi land" and distribute it to white settlers.[23] Moreover, it is possible that many indunas saw in the scheme yet another attempt of one of their kings to ally himself with the European government against the interests of the traditional ruling class. It was this long-standing and deep-rooted fear of many lesser indunas that they would be "sold out" either by the white government, or by the inner elite of their own government, or by the two elites in cooperation,

which led the Kuta to refuse to lease the required land. Imwiko and Wina therefore signed the formal document on their own initiative.[24]

This transaction accurately reflected the impotence of the Kutas when the King and Boma combined against them. As a result of this apparent collusion between the King and Glennie, deep rifts were appearing at the capital between the Kuta and Imwiko, two informants estimating that "at least three-quarters of his indunas were hostile to the Litunga".[25] When, therefore, Imwiko took ill and suddenly died in June 1948, an atmosphere already existed in which rumours of foul play found ready acceptance.

Probably the true story will never be known. Informants' opinions were very largely determined by their opinions of Imwiko's successor, Mwanawina. According to one of them, the King believed Mwanawina was plotting against him a few days before his death.[26] It is clear that Imwiko was in good health until the day of his illness, 19 June 1948.[27] At supper that evening, he was served with a fish, and his wife later told Etienne Berger, the missionary at Limalunga, that he vomited while eating the fish which he did not finish. Around midnight, the King collapsed. His wife summoned Ngambela Wina who, after much consultation with other chiefs and senior indunas, asked Berger to drive the King to the

Mongu hospital in a PMS vehicle.[28] Imwiko died two days later, without regaining consciousness, and the official medical report stated that he had died of a stroke.[29]

Many - probably a large majority - of Lozi were not then, nor are they now, satisfied by this verdict. They continue to believe that Imwiko's cook or waiter was given poison which he put into the fish.[30] Most of my informants believed that Mwanawina himself had provided the poison, the simple motive being his desire to succeed. On the other hand, rumours soon began circulating that Ngambela Wina was responsible.[31] It is true that Imwiko had told Fox-Pitt, the Acting PC, that he contemplated replacing Wina as Ngambela, although he had apparently dropped the plan just prior to his death.[32] Wina himself naturally denies that he was implicated; indeed, he accepts that the King died of natural causes.[33] Moreover, according to one of Mwanawina's current opponents, the latter had personally instigated the rumours implicating the Ngambela in order to divert suspicion from himself and simultaneously to discredit Wina in order more easily to dismiss him,[34] which he in fact soon did.

Imwiko's death created a serious power vacuum in the Barotse Government. That events in Africa were picking up increased momentum was reflected not only in places like the Gold Coast,

but in Northern Rhodesia itself, where the first African National Congress was formed in the year Imwiko died.[35] To the Northern Rhodesian Government, therefore, his loss was a serious blow. Its Director of Information described him as "gentle, dignified African ruler of a type that is in danger of disappearing in the colonies today",[36] which meant that he embodied traditional values while agreeing to the strictly limited reforms which the Government asked of him.

This interpretation is not incompatible with that of many of my informants, most of whom, admittedly, became opponents of his successor. They describe him as a modernizer, a progressive, perhaps even a democrat who, had he lived, would probably have come to terms with African nationalism, thus precluding the bitter clash between the latter and the Lozi ruling class in the 1960's.[37]

It is probably true that Imwiko was built more in his father's "progressive" mould than Mwanawina proved to be. Nevertheless, his supporters' case seems rather overstated. The initiative for all the reforms, after all, had come from Glennie, and Imwiko's acquiescence in them seems to have been motivated more by a realistic assessment of his actual power position than by any great personal commitment to democratic change. In short, he accepted the dictates of those who wielded the real power, which the Boma

did in Barotseland virtually until the first African government was formed in Lusaka in 1962, and would therefore have remained hostile to the nationalists, as the Boma did, until that moment. On the other hand, it is indeed arguable that he would at that point- either from conviction or "flexibility" - have made peace with the new black administration, as his successor entirely refused to do, and would thus have minimized the friction for which Mwanawina's intransigence was responsible.

Mwanawina's accession, however, was by no means automatic. Fox-Pitt, the Acting PC, considered him unfit for the task, believing him to be not only obstinate and inflexible but unintelligent as well. In order to try to gauge Lozi opinion, Fox-Pitt approached Berger of the PMS with the suggestion that the Mokwae of Nalolo, Yeta's daughter, be appointed to the kingship. Berger informed him that the nation would under no circumstances accept a female ruler.[38] Fox-Pitt reluctantly gave up this scheme, but remained unreconciled to Mwanawina. Unlike Glennie, Fox-Pitt was a liberal democrat - he later joined the African National Congress - and selected as his second preference Masheki Akashambatwa, son of Akashambatwa Lewanika, whom he considered to be less conservative than Mwanawina.[39] As the election conclusively proved,

however, Fox-Pitt's opinions were wholly irrelevant. Mwanawina received 76 votes, Masheki only four.[40] The ruling class had made its own preference unequivocally clear.

Mwanawina was Lewanika's fourth son, born around 1888. He received his early education at PMS schools in Barotseland before his father sent him in 1908 to Lovedale College in South Africa for five years. He returned to become secretary and interpreter to Lewanika, soon gaining a reputation as a loyal supporter of the Empire; as we have seen, he was the only one of the King's son to volunteer in 1916 to lead Lozi porters across Northern Rhodesia to the East African frontier. He remained one of Yeta's senior advisers until 1937, when he was appointed to be the first chief of the newly-created Mankoya Kuta, where he successfully resisted Nkoya demands for greater freedom from Lozi overrule. Again during World War II he won the gratitude of the government by encouraging rubber production and collecting cash contributions in his District for the war effort. In 1946, these services were formally recognized by the award of the King's Silver Medal for Chiefs.[41]

It was precisely because he had shown himself to be a firm Lozi patriot, as in the Mankoya controversy, and yet was warmly regarded by the British government, that the vast majority of the

ruling class chose Mwanawina. For they now expected him to appeal to the metropolitan government against the importunities and demands of local officials to continue the reforms initiated under Imwiko. "It is said," noted J. P. Burger, "that despite his gentleness, he knows what he wants ...."[42]

What he wanted was to make substantial changes both in policies and in personnel. He began with the latter, setting in motion the machinery to enable him to dismiss Wina as Ngambela and Francis Suu as Administrative Secretary of the Native Authority. Mwanawina and Wina had first clashed when the latter had supported Mwene Mutondo of the Nkoya in his dispute with the former.[43] Moreover, the King was convinced that Wina and Suu had voted for Masheki against himself.[44] Finally, he was anxious, as we shall see, to appoint as Ngambela his son-in-law, Akabeswa Imasiku.

It was easy enough, in the charged atmosphere of the time, for Mwanawina to show less self-interested reasons for dismissing the two men. Wina was said to have exploited Yeta's illness to increase his own powers, and was denounced for not following him into retirement. He was charged both with poisoning Imwiko and for failing to take proper care of him as he lay dying, as well as with accepting the white man's claim that Imwiko had died of a

stroke.[45] He was condemned for accepting Glennie's reforms of the Barotse Government, since these were considered to be attacks on the "house of kingship" itself.[46] Wina and Suu were similarly accused of trying to undermine the prerogatives of the National Council in their own interests by seeking the Boma's support for the election of Masheki Akashambatwa.[47]

Mwanawina spent a month coordinating and consolidating the opposition to the Ngambela,[48] then informed Glennie that,

> As a result of numerous complaints made by a multitude of many people of this country against the conduct and administration of the Ngambela Wina as Prime Minister and Suu as a secretary, their services as such persons had been embarrassed ....
>
> Also ... the Barotse National Council ... agree with the people in having no confidence in ... the two men, that they should no longer continue in service of Barotse Native Government.[49]

Having achieved his first objective, Mwanawina now attempted to appoint as Ngambela Akabeswa Imasiku, his son-in-law and chief councillor at the Mankoya Kuta. Glennie, however, favoured Muheli Walubita, and "advised" Mwanawina that if he chose Imasiku over "the older and mor experienced Walubita, strong public opposition would be aroused, and he would be accused of favouritism".[50]

Walubita was Glennie's kind of African. Born in 1897 to the Liashimba (chief councillor) of the Sesheke Kuta, he had attended PMS schools in both Barotseland and Basutoland. He had succeeded his father as Liashimba, but when Imwiko became King, he appointed Walubita to be Induna Kalonga at the Lealui Kuta. Like Mwanawina, he really belonged to an earlier era. One of his happiest memories is of his meeting with the Governor, Sir Hubert Young, in the 1930's. He considers that among his proudest achievements as Ngambela were the trip to the Coronation in 1953 and the receipt of the King's Medal for African Chiefs.[51] He thus seemed to be a man to whom the Paramount Chief could reconcile himself. Instead of a showdown with Glennie, therefore, he and the Kuta accepted Walubita's appointment as Ngambela.[52]

This problem concluded, J. P. Burger wrote hopefully, "the long period of instability" was over.[53] Such optimism, however, was highly misplaced. In general, as we can now see, Barotseland could not achieve genuine stability until its several factions came to terms with the post-war world, a process which proved arduous indeed. Moreover, in the years following Mwanawina's accession, the currents disrupting Lozi life were many and complex. As Glennie recognized, the extraordinary events of 1948 had stimulated political consciousness to an extent "hitherto unknown

outside an exclusive circle".[54] Factions within the royal family challenged the King; the educated elite challenged the ruling class; the latter challenged the Boma; and all Lozi challenged the central government on the question of amalgamating the two Rhodesias. Since most of these conflicts occurred simultaneously, the Lozi participants often found themselves united and divided at one and the same time, all factions, for example, coming together against amalgamation, then splitting off again on more parochial political issues.

The question of amalgamating Northern and Southern Rhodesia produced most cohesion among Lozi of all classes and factions. In 1938, the Bledisloe Commission had discovered in no uncertain terms the unanimity of Lozi hostility to any connection with a Southern Rhodesia dominated by white settlers.[55] That attitude had now not only hardened, but had been channelled into a demand for a positive alternative: if amalgamation took place, the Lozi would demand to secede from Northern Rhodesia and be made a full protectorate along the lines of the High Commission Territories south of the Limpopo.

It is not wholly clear where this demand originated. Certainly one of its strongest proponents was Frank Worthington, one of Coryndon's original officials who, after his retirement,

underwent a striking volte face to become an enthusiastic advocate of maintaining the traditional Barotse Government intact.[56] Returning to Lealui in 1947,[57] he coached Imwiko on the historical arguments to be invoked to justify a Lozi demand, in the event of amalgamation, "for a (Government) Proclamation to be issued placing your country on the same footing as Bechuanaland ..."[58]

As the demands for amalgamation by white unofficial members of the Legislative Council increased after the war, so did Lozi opposition to the proposal intensify. In June 1948, the National Council met in Limulunga for the specific purpose, as Ngambela Wina told the assembly, of submitting their views on "one important matter", the demand for a Barotseland Protectorate. One after another, chiefs and indunas rose to warn against the consequences of amalgamation and to demand a genuinely self-governing protectorate "such as Lewanika always wanted".[59]

Moreover, presumably to prove to the government that however much they might disagree on other matters, all Lozi supported Lealui on this issue, the National Council asked for the views of the Mongu African Welfare Association. This was a safe enough move, for the Association had already voiced its total opposition to amalgamation.[60] Predictably, therefore,

at its next meeting, its members denounced the evils of white rule in Southern Rhodesia, vowed to resist the imposition of amalgamation at all costs, and demanded full protectorate status for Barotseland.[61]

The accession of Mwanawina in no way altered Lozi opinion on the subject. The new King quickly made it clear that being loyal to the Crown and Empire was a very different matter indeed from accepting the whims of the white community in Northern Rhodesia. As a result, Gilbert Rennie, the Governor, flew to Lealui to reassure the King and Kuta that no change in the territorial constitution would be made "without prior consultation and agreement with the Paramount Chief and his Council".[62]

Rennie's visit was followed in 1949 by that of Arthur Creech-Jones, Labour's Secretary of State for the Colonies, who repeated the Governor's assurances.[63] But Creech-Jones went further. After his visit, he apparently wrote Mwanawina a long, confidential letter, stating how impressed he had been with the Lozi system of government, assuring him he had no wish to dismantle or undermine it, guaranteeing to the Paramount Chief and Kut a all their rights should amalgamation be decided upon, and actually promising them the right of veto on all legislation affecting Barotseland.[64]

It was presumably in the light of these firm re-assurances that the demands of the Lozi rulers were modified. Rather than a separate protectorate, detached from Northern Rhodesia, they now began talking in terms of being recognized as the "Barotseland Protectorate" within the protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, with all their rights under the various agreements of the past re-affirmed in writing by the British Government.[65]

This may be seen as a shrewd tactical move by the Lozi ruling class. For what it meant was that it was prepared to compromise on its most extreme demand, secession, in return for a restoration of its lost glories of the past. Within months of his accession, Mwanawina caused to be drawn up a petition setting out all the grievances of which his father and Yeta has so frequently complained, save only that it excluded their "progressive" demands for modernizing and developing the country. The petition was concerned solely with the restoration of the powers and privileges of the ruling elite.

Although emphasizing that the Paramount Chief and his people "remained unswervingly loyal, as always, to the Crown", the petition declared that many rights of the King and Kuta had been forcibly wrested from them. Why should the jurisdiction of the Kutas be limited to minor offences instead of to "all cases

between natives"? Why need the Governor approve all appointments to and dismissals from the several Native Authorities? Why should expenditures of the Native Treasury be subject to "the directions and approval" of the Governor? Finally, the petition drew attention to the profound dissatisfaction of the Lozi that, under the supposed protection of the Crown, their country had shrunk to a mere rump, with losses on their western frontier in 1905, of the Caprivi Strip in 1909, and of Balovale in 1941.[66]

Although initially the government promised no more than to consider the points raised in the petition, still it meant that Lealui would receive considerable attention from their white overlords. In 1951, Mwanawina, Ngambela Walubita and two senior indunas were invited to Lusaka where they discussed the petition with Governor Rennie, while later in the year, Labour's new Colonial Secretary, James Griffith, visited Lealui. Griffiths' main purpose was to discuss the Federation question, but the Lozi rulers cleverly indicated that they could not give this issue their full attention until questions of their status and rights had been definitively settled.[67]

Mwanawina's initiative in re-opening the grievances of an earlier generation succeeding in uniting the Lozi ruling class

against the white government. Unlike Lewanika at several stages in his reign, Yeta during the 1930's, and Imwiko in his short time, Mwanawina seemed to be fighting for the rights of the entire ruling class, rather than for those of its inner elite at the expense of its less influential members. Nevertheless, once the common enemy, the white government, was no longer the paramount problem, the community divided into a number of mutually hostile factions. Above all, two groups were dissatisfied with their status within Barotseland: the members of the Mongu Welfare Association, and various members of the royal family who were vying for the succession.

The election of Mwanawina had unfortunate implications for two groups within the royal family. In the first place, being the third successive son of Lewanika to become king, princes by other lines had effectively begun to lose the chance of gaining the throne.[68] Secondly, the hopes of the children of Yeta and Imwiko, once so high, were frustrated by their uncle's accession, since his own sons were receiving the positions and favours they once foresaw for themselves. This frustration was equally felt by the many children of Lewanika's many other sons. Yet among neither group was all hope abandoned, since the succession could theoretically revert to any of them upon the death of

Mwanawina, who was after all over sixty years old. In consequence, intriguing and scheming became the order of the day, a number of indunas attached to the various princes apparently playing a leading role.[69]

This is the general explanation of the serious internecine political conflict which convulsed Lealui during most of 1949 and 1950. It is, however, difficult to suggest exactly which factions or individuals were involved. The major incidents were three cases of arson during 1949 directed against the property of Ngambela Walubita and one of Mwanawina's daughters. With the full cooperation of the Boma, the Barotse Government imposed a curfew on Lealui and the Paramount dismissed several indunas. However, Glennie reported, "no sooner has one purge been accomplished than signs of disaffection appear in a different quarter". He agreed that those responsible were "cliques of indunas and others connected with the ruling families", adding obscurely that "Such forces are altogether reactionary and have, in effect, adopted a 'back to Lewanika' slogan ...."[70]

I know of no other evidence which alludes to, let alone clarifies, this matter.[71] One may perhaps speculate that as part of their strategy to win support for their claims to the throne, certain princes, assisted by a number of indunas, adopted the

classical political ploy of accusing their enemies of being inadequately patriotic. Conceivably, their pressure may have pushed Mwanawina into demanding more forcefully the restoration of the traditional rights and powers of the ruling class, in competition with the "cliques" mentioned by Glennie.

By 1950, however, with only one case of suspected arson in Lealui, large purges of indunas ceased. Nevertheless, the Paramount Chief and his coterie remained extremely insecure, and general unrest continued to characterize the atmosphere at the capital.[72]

A more organized opposition to the Barotse Native Government, though of a distinctly muted kind, came from the self-styled "African intelligentsia" of the Mongu African Welfare Association. Its hundred-odd members were English speaking clerks in the Boma, white stores, recruiting agencies, and even the BNG, school teachers and medical orderlies, as well as a number of prince consorts who worked for their livelihood. Many had been to schools in Basutoland and South Africa, others had worked on the line of rail, and some had been as far afield during the war as Uganda. The large majority of them were Lozi, but an important minority had migrated from Nyasaland.[73] Indeed, the Association was marked by internal rivalries

between these Nyasa and the Lozi,[74] not surprising in view of the fact that it had been transformed from the moderate proto-nationalist elitist organization which it had been in the early 1940's[75] into a conservative and tribalist pressure group.

It was predictable that the Association and the ruling class would stand together against amalgamation and white settlers from Southern Rhodesia. But that the aspirations of Association members - at least its Lozi members - were almost wholly tribally - rather than nationally-oriented, was indicated by the resentment it shared with the ruling class of the diminution of Lozi sovereignty under white "protection". The Association fully supported Mwanawina's petition calling for the restoration of former Lozi prerogatives; above all, it demanded the return of all territory formerly belonging to "the vast empire of the Barotse Nation", and the restoration of the proper title of "King" rather than "Paramount Chief" to Mwanawina.[76]

In fact, the only real criticism by the Association of the BNG was that it ignored the members of the Association. Most of the latter shared the conviction that their higher education gave them the same natural right - indeed the duty - to be involved in the decision-making process as tradition gave to chiefs and indunas. Their basic complaint, as the Association's Lozi president, Daniel

Mukoboto, a Boma clerk, put it, was that "the young educated Malozi were neglected by the Barotse Native Authority in not obtaining their views on matters affecting the Barotse Nationas a whole".[77]

The sole raison d'etre of the Association, then, had become to promote the immediate and specific class interests of its members within Barotseland. Its basic assumptions were almost entirely identical with those of the ruling elite; it wanted little more than to share its power. This explains the Association's support for Mwanawina's petition. It was, in consequence, a relatively easy faction to undermine. In the next few years, in what appears to have been a deliberate policy decision, Mwanawina began inviting senior members of the Association to fill clerical posts in the BNG,[78] and it is striking how many members of the Welfare Association in the 1940's were employees of the BNG by the 1950's.[79]

Like the Boma, however, Lealui could obviously absorb only a limited number of the alienated "intelligentsia". A large number of the latter continued, therefore, to leave Barotseland in search of better employment or higher education in the urban areas along the line of rail. Indeed, through most of the 1950's, Lozi remained the largest single tribal group at Munali in Lusaka,[80] the most important secondary school in Northern Rhodesia and, like

Achimota College in the Gold Coast and Fort Hare in South Africa, a breeding ground for future African political leaders.

Among those educated young men who were not absorbed into the ruling class and who chose not to migrate, alienation and resentment increased. One District Officer told a touring official in 1953 that many people, white and black alike, doubted whether any development was possible in the province, "without changing fundamentally the Barotse Native Government. You would be surprised if you knew what a great undercurrent of discontent with the BNG there is among the so-called intelligentsia".[81] Indeed, the hostility of the latter was exacerbated by the fact that their erstwhile colleagues who had been taken into the BNG had, as they saw it, betrayed the cause. As a Lozi clerk told the same official,

> The whole of Mwanawina's court they are backward fools. A few of them used to be okay, but then they had their mouths closed with big jobs and now they are just like the uneducated ones .... They do not advance progressive young men, only men who are related to the royal family ....
>
> Many, very many (are dissatisfied). But they are afraid to speak.[82]

Indeed, aside from absorbing a number of outspoken clerks, Mwanawina seemed determined to antagonize all but a tiny minority of his subjects. By 1951, he seems to have succeeded in purging

the Kuta of those elements remaining loyal to other branches of the royal family, and in their place installed his own close relatives. Always nepotistic and highly centralized, the BNG became even more so under his rule. All important decision-making, and even many minor ones, became the sole preserve of Mwanawina and his principal advisers.[83]

The new Katengo Council, the great symbol of the government's determination moderately to democratize the BNG, was almost completely ignored by the ruling elite.[84] Nor did the latter cooperate with the white officials in charge of the Namashukende Development Scheme.[85] The general consequences of these authoritarian and obstructionist practices was to leave the Province, both politically and economically, a backwater.

On the whole, the ruling elite was quite satisfied with this condition. It is true that the Kuta rebelled once against the wishes of Mwanawina, preventing him from appointing as his private secretary Godwin Mbikusita, who had the previous year, 1951, been voted out as president of the African National Congress because he supported Federation and was allegedly a government informer.[86] These were not, however, the Kuta's grounds for opposing him. According to J. P. Burger, the indunas were concerned, rather, that "as soon as he is there (at the capital), the intrigues begin, and

the Capital has enough of these anyways".[87]

But on questions of policy, the Kuta, carefully reorganized by Mwanawina personally, shared his desire to isolate Barotseland as much as possible from the main currents of Northern Rhodesian life. Thus, for example, Mwanawina's appointees to the African Representative Council, an advisory body which had been created by the central government in 1946,[88] were given explicit instructions that their role was to be a purely passive one. "This policy", as Glennie understood, "is not designed to integrate Barotse interests too closely with those of the country as a whole .... The Barotse leaders evidently wish to drive a lonely furrow as possible".[89]

Indeed, it can hardly be doubted that Mwanawina, like Yeta in the 1930's, wished nothing more than that the ruling class should live in splendid isolation. The difference was that Mwanawina's splendour was on a vastly greater scale than that of his half-brother. Thanks to fees paid by the Zambesi Sawmills Company for working the teak forests in Sesheke District and by WNLA for its labour recruits to the Rand mines, the Barotse Native Treasury showed a balance at the end of 1951 of £102,000, most of which went to pay salaries and for the proper upkeep of Lealui.[90]

Glennie and the central government were highly dismayed by the callous conservatism of Mwanawina and his court. In contrast

to Imwiko's reign, however, they were no longer prepared to impose their reforming schemes upon a reluctant tribal elite. Because they decided they needed its support in other more critical areas, government officials were forced to tolerate a great deal from the Barotse Government to which they were opposed. Above all, they considered it important, in terms both of wider public opinion and of influencing other chiefs in the territory, to win Mwanawina's approval for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Secondly, they wanted him to help keep Lozi on the Copperbelt out of the considerable agitation then being conducted against Federation. In neither area did he fail them.

In 1952, when the African National Congress and the African Mineworkers' Union were threatening various forms of "mass protest" to prevent the implementation of Federation,[91] Mwanawina, in the words of a white official, "used his influence for peace and good order to good effect by warning his subjects on the line of rail not to be misled into taking part in the disturbances which agitators might organize ...."[92] Although his intervention further exacerbated tensions on the Copperbelt between the mass of Bemba miners and the minority of elitists Lozi clerks,[93] Mwanawina's gesture paid him considerable dividends. Your "wisdom", the new Colonial Secretary, Henry Hopkinson told him, "when there was much

stupid talk of political strikes and disturbances and when you told your peoples to have nothing to do with such foolishness, has not passed unnoticed".[94]

Now, partly as a reward for his "wisdom" in this matter, and partly as an inducement to have him approve of Federation, the Government began to move closer towards meeting some of Mwanawina's demands. Governor Rennie came to Lealui to announce that the jurisdiction of the courts of the Paramount and the Mokwae of Nalolo would be extended and that he was "considering" granting to the Paramount the sole right to appoint and dismiss indunas.[95] Shortly thereafter, the Colonial Secretary, Harry Hopkinson, also flew to Lealui where he assured a full meeting of the National Council that Barotseland's "special position" would in no way be altered under Federation, nor would the Lozi be in any jeopardy of losing their land. Hopkinson went further by agreeing to the recent proposal that the Lozi's protected status be formalized by its becoming, instead of "Barotse Province", the "Barotseland Protectorate, and the Provincial Commissioner becoming the "Resident Commissioner".[96]

Mwanawina could hardly have demanded greater safeguards than these. Yet so great was Lozi hostility to white rule that, after Hopkinson's speech, Ngambela Walubita felt it necessary to

repeat that Federation was "entirely opposed by all (Lozi) people ... not wanting to associate with S (outhern) R (hodesia)". Another induna reported to Hopkinson that he had recently collected the views of Lozi from Livingstone to the Copperbelt and found that "Ill-treatment of Africans in SR made Barotses on Railway Line and here be against Federation". Mwanawina himself revealed that he remained unconvinced that the laws of the settler-dominated Federal Parliament would not prevail over those of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council.[97] As late as February 1963, in two meetings with Glennie, the Provincial Commissioner, Mwanawina and the Kuta continued to express their fears of beoming part of a Federation controlled by white settlers in Southern Rhodesia.[98]

In April 1953, Governor Rennie again flew to Limulunga. He addressed a public meeting of about 500 people, of whom precisely eight raised their voices in favour of Federation.[99] He then conferred privately at length with Mwanawina and his senior advisers. Rennie used, Ngambela Walubita later stated, "words to cheat us".[100] He emphasized repeatedly the argument that since the Queen approved the Federation, opposition to it was tantamount to being disloyal to the Queen. Mwanawina later said he was unable to resist this argument.[101]

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Paramount Chief and Kuta issued a statement declaring that if Federation was decided upon, they would raise no objections provided that

(1) Rights under the Lewanika Concessions are preserved by an appropriate provision in the Federal Constitution, and

(2) That that part of Northern Rhodesia known as Barotseland be styled or declared by Order in Council as the Barotseland Protectorate.[102]

In fact, the Governor had already acknowledged that these demands would be met.[103] At about the same time, Glennie announced that the government would no longer have the right to approve the appointments of indunas to and their dismissals from the BNG.[104]

While officers of the central government promptly spread the news of Mwanawina's decision in order to "give a lead to other more hesitant tribes", and other Lozi denounced the decision as reactionary and arbitrary,[105] the Paramount Chief himself, accompanied by Ngambela Walubita, flew off to London to attend the coronation of Elizabeth II and to receive a Coronation Medal.[106]

The trip to London was presumably in the nature of a reward for Mwanawina's decision. Whether, in the event he had refused to accept Federation, Governor Rennie was prepared to deport him to London as, in not wholly unsimilar circumstances, Sir Andrew Cohen deported the Kabaka of Buganda, is not known. By refusing

to accept, inter alia, any prospective Federation of the East African territories, by resisting Sir Andrew on the grounds that he was protecting African interests against European intruders, the Kabaka suffered deposition and deportation. He thus greatly increased his public popularity, and, as a direct consequence, his authority in the late 1950's and early 1960's was greatly increased, a factor significantly affecting the position of Buganda in pre-independent Uganda and, briefly, independent Uganda.[107]

Because Mwanawina's decision seemed to be against the interests of his people, he effectively isolated not merely his "Protectorate" from the rest of Northern Rhodesia but himself from all his subjects save the tiny minority of the ruling class. During the nationalist struggle of the 1960's, he was shown to be highly unpopular among the great majority of his people, thus making it virtually impossible for the British government to uphold his interests against the African nationalists. The responsibility for this rested solely with him and his advisers. For he too remained suspicious of the intentions of the white leaders of the new Federation, suspicions which were increased by the speeches of Godfrey Huggins and Roy Welensky demanding full independent status.[108] Yet at no time was he prepared, either in 1953 or later, to attempt to reach any accommodation with the forces opposing Federation. This was

a strategical error of the greatest consequence. For even though he had not shown the courage of the Kabaka in 1953, he might still have salvaged something of his personal popularity. Had he made concessions to his moderate internal opponents during the 1950's, they may not have aligned themselves with the nationalists. Had he later agreed to cooperate with the latter, he might have won for himself a position comparable to that temporarily achieved by the Kabaka in independent Uganda. But his unyielding intransigence assured the ultimate destruction of the remaining rump of a formerly powerful empire.

These shattering events were put in motion moderately enough after Federation had begun. In Barotseland, the "main agitator", as a white official described him,[109] was Newo Zaza, who had spent several years on the Copperbelt where he completed a South African correspondence course to Form 3. In 1954 he was elected to the Katengo Council, which he effectively exploited to voice his criticisms of the BNG.[110] In the same year, his brother Clement returned from Bechuanaland, where he had achieved considerable distinction as a supervisor of schools.[111] Together they won over several other educated Lozi in the district, and, apparently eschewing the local Welfare Association, began a systematic attack on the BNG.[112]

At about the same time, a small group of Lozi on the line of rail had banded together as the "Barotse National Association". The organization seems to have been initiated by the ubiquitous Godwin Mbikusita, then president of the Mines Salaried Staff Association, a company-approved organization which siphoned off elitist white-collar Africans from the African Mineworkers Union.[113] Mbikusita's motive in creating the BNA, given his close relationship with Mwanawina, was presumably to prove that urban Lozi supported the BNG. The fact that he soon dropped out of the BNA appears to have been the result of its take-over by a faction hostile to the Paramount Chief. Under Sekeli Konoso, a Lusaka businessman, the BNA began a "truculent and abusive" campaign against the BNG.[114]

Although there was apparently no initial collusion between the Zazas' small group in Barotseland and the BNA, their virtually identical criticisms of the Lozi ruling class inevitably brought them together. Their essential aim was to reform, rather than re-structure, the existing administrative and political apparatus. They considered the BNG a family compact. A large percentage of indunas were, since the purges of 1949 and 1950, relatives of the Paramount Chief. The opinions of unrelated indunas went unheeded. The Katengo Council was contemptuously ignored. The welfare of the inner ruling elite alone was their sole concern. A large part of

the best agricultural land in the flood-plain was kept in their own hands. Public money from the Native Treasury was being squandered for private uses, such as the redecoration of the palaces of the chiefs. The masses received few benefits from the BNG. The most capable people, if they were of humble origin, were excluded from the inner circle of power. In short, the Barotse Government, according to its enemies, was callous, corrupt and it excluded them.[115]

The Zaza brothers' programme called upon Mwanawina to abdicate and demanded a new constitution and the election of a new Paramount who would be obliged to abide by it. Their proposed constitution, hardly a radical manifesto, did not call for democratic government. Elected Katengo members were to share decision-making with traditional indunas, and the new Paramount as a constitutional monarch, would be bound by their decisions.[116]

However conservative these reforms - which essentially demanded an alliance between the educated and the traditional elites - they inevitably infuriated the Lozi rulers. Mwanawina is said to have threatened to dismiss Newo Zaza from the Katengo and to banish his whole village from Barotseland,[117] but public opinion apparently deterred him from such drastic retaliation.[118] The two brothers forged ahead with their campaign. They solicited, with apparent success, pledges of support from most of the Mongu

"intelligentsia". They also approached Glennie, the Resident Commissioner, realizing his powers to enforce reforms was far greater than their own. Glennie, it is said, expressed sympathy with their arguments, but counselled patience since, he pointed out, the old man was not expected to live much longer. He would not be pushed too far, however. When the Zazas persisted in demanding from him immediate action, Glennie firmly warned them that their activities could be interpreted as a conspiracy against the Paramount Chief, for which serious punishment could be meted out.[119]

The criticisms of the Zazas and Konoso of the BNG were shared by the senior commoner in it, Ngambela Walubita. Although hardly less conservative than Mwanawina, the Ngambela strongly opposed the latter's transformation of the Kuta into a family compact, but with no success. Walubita's sense of frustration was aggravated, moreover, by the Paramount's increasingly overt determination to have him replaced by his own son-in-law, Akabeswa Imasiku, and early in 1956, Walubita succumbed and announced his resignation on the pretext of ill-health and growing deafness.[120]

Walubita's intended successor was sixty years old, and had been educated in Southern Rhodesia and in PMS schools in Barotseland to Form I. In the early 1920's, Imasiku married the daughter of

Lewanika's daughter Muyabango. Shortly thereafter he became a convert of the Seventh Day Adventists, for whom he taught and preached until 1945, when his wife's brother, Mwanawina, summoned him to become his chief councillor at the Mankoya Kuta. When Mwanawina became Paramount, he appointed Imasiku to be Induna Kalonga at Lealui, and later nominated him as one of the Lozi members on the African Representative Council.[121]

Clearly the Paramount was satisfied that Imasiku was his man, for he had unsuccessfully sought his appointment as Ngambela in 1948, as we have seen, after Wina's dismissal. Yet he was very nearly thwarted again. "There is no doubt," wrote Coisson of the PMS, "that there is among the people a strong feeling against Kalonga", and his confirmation by the National Council proved "more difficult than one foresaw".[122] Presumably the rebels were those indunas who felt isolated from the inner elite of the ruling group, and nominated Muleta, chief councillor of the Libonda Kuta, and Godwin Mbikusita, who had recently returned from a course on Moral Re-Armament in Switzerland.[123] On the advice of the Boma, a secret ballot was conducted not only among the members of the National Council, but among Lozi on the line of rail. The ballots of both groups were then counted by Mwanawina and the Natamoyo, his brother, who announced a large majority for Imasiku, with

Mbikusita second and Muleta last.[124]

This method of selection made the Paramount patently susceptible to accusations of fraud, and the then Treasurer of the BNG told me that in fact Imasiku was not chosen correctly and that he was not "the people's choice".[125] Certainly Sekeli Konoso of the Barotse National Association was infuriated by Imasiku's appointment. He wrote to Mwanawina, demanding that the Paramount resign,[126] and to the Zaza brothers informing them that he intended personally to come to Lealui to protest.[127]

Thus forewarned, the Zazas began mobilizing their supporters. It was a fascinating group. Walubita had resigned in opposition to the Paramount Chief. The latter is said to have refused to appoint Newo Zaza as Education Induna.[128] Yuyi Mupatu, then Induna Imandi, was aggrieved because the Kuta would not permit him to open a private school for underprivileged boys.[129] Francis Suu had been dismissed in 1948 as administrative secretary to the BNG by Mwanawina, who still refused to grant him a pension.[130] J. K. Kapota had resigned as Induna Luyanga because of "poor treatment" by Mwanawina.[131] Muimui Anakandi had harboured a grievance against the royal family since his dismissal as Induna Nambayo for his alleged complicity in the plot against Yeta in 1937.[132] The leaders, in short, had obvious personal interests in supporting

Konoso, however much they also may have agreed with his policies.

Konoso arrived in Barotseland early in 1956, but after being refused permission to address the Kuta, returned to Lusaka where he continued a sustained attack against the BNG.[133] In October, Mwanawina, with the approval of the Resident Commissioner, decided to charge Konoso for distributing pamphlets in Barotseland defaming and insulting the Paramount Chief.[134] In January 1957, Konoso appeared before the Lealui Kuta acoompanied by some thousands of his supporters.[135] While the large crowd loudly demanded the dismissal of Ngambela Imasiku, the Kuta sentenced Konoso to three years in solitary confinement, a sentence later reduced by the Federal High Court to six months' imprisonment with hard labour.[136] Following this drastic sentence, Konoso's supporters demonstrated in protest at the Mongu Boma, as a result of which about ten of them - including the Zaza brothers, Yuyi Mupatu, and Francis Suu - were convicted in the Mongu Magistrate's Court for disorderly conduct and received light fines.[137]

The immediate result of this debacle was a decision by the central government to appoint a commission to consider reforms in the BNG. Such a commission, it was hoped, might mollify Konoso's supporters while prodding Mwanawina to make certain concessions to his opponents. The government, Glyn Jones, the

new Resident Commissioner promised, would give the BNG "every help to suppress subversive activities while at the same time encouraging it to give due attention to moderately stated criticism."[138]

The government, however, had no intention of imposing reforms on Mwanawina against his will. He was too invaluable an ally against African nationalism to alienate gratuitously. His special status was clearly reflected in the composition of the commission which was to investigate his administration. All of its members, including its head, Colin Rawlins, who had been a district officer in Barotseland for many years, could be relied upon to be largely - if not entirely - sympathetic to the status quo. Predictably, it included no representative of Konoso and his "subversive" supporters. Such an appointment. J. P. Burger had commented, "would be desirable, but I doubt if the Kuta would consent, at least without very strong Government pressure".[139] One can, therefore, understand the reaction to the announcement of the commission members by a number of Lozi, as reported by Burger: "This is a family council, composed of the relatives or friends of the king, and will lead to nothing."[140]

This forecast proved precisely accurate. After interviewing 405 witnesses and reading 38 written submissions, the commissioners concluded that

> The present framework of the Barotse Native Government, being suitable for the conditions existing in Barotseland at present and being adaptable to changing conditions in the future, should remain the basis on which any future developments are built.[141]

Most seriously, the Report refused to accept the recommendation of "many witnesses" that "some if not all members of the Barotse Native Government (be) elected to their posts by the general public." This proposal was considered not "practical": "the time and money necessary in organizing and supervising elections in a large, thinly-populated and only semi-literate country would be out of all proportion to the results achieved."[142] The only recommendation of any substance in the entire Report was one clearly designed to assuage those Lozi who felt that the BNG must be more representative of mass opinion: five members of the Katengo Council "should become full members of the National Council in meetings of that Council dealing with motions from the Katengo Council".[143] The Kuta accepted the recommendation, as well, nor surprisingly, as the general conclusion of the Report that "the pattern of the Barotse Native Government should remain unchanged".[144]

Glyn Jones, the Resident Commissioner, reacted to the Report with the same complacency as did the Kuta, although pointing out what the Report had signally failed to stress, that many witnesses expressed great dissatisfaction at Mwanawina's policy of appointing

to the BNG men who were "elderly, reactionary and incapable of appreciating" the need for changes. "The younger educated Malozi," he acknowledged, "were not being encouraged to assume posts of responsibility because the existing councils showed resistance to the transfusion of new blood into themselves."[145]

The Rawlins Commission satisfied none of Mwanawina's critics. A long, lugubrious letter written in March, 1958 by J. P. Burger, one of the more politically-aware of the PMS missionaries, provides a shrewd and accurate assessment of the prevailing political climate, and is therefore worth citing at some length.

> It has been calm here for several months (Burger wrote). Since the (Konoso) troubles in January 1957, a European detective has been placed in Mongu, with African assistants, to follow the developments in the situation .... He is watching the upper schools, and the teachers, for propaganda they could pass to their students ....
>
> The Government is behind Mwanawina. He himself has learned nothing, it seems ... (and is) badly seconded by his Ngambela ....
>
> Faithful to Government policy ... it (the Rawlins Commission Report) makes the most superficial recommendations in order not to weaken the authority of the Paramount Chief. Whereas ... the idea of the reign of one person has become contemptible .... They (his opponents) complain that the Paramount Chief pays no attention to their (Katengo councillors') reports and that he takes no account of the opinion of his people.

> Moreover, groups of Lozi from Bulawayo to the Copperbelt want to have their voice heard, but this has so far been refused. They now threaten not to pay their levies (to the BNG) if their right to be heard is not recognized.
>
> Everywhere, in Barotseland as on the line of rail, the word democracy is solemnly being pronounced. One can only applaud.
>
> But Mwanawina is insensible to the signs of the times. Recently, when he arrived at Limulunga (the winter capital), we were struck to see that he received virtually no royal salute. When we asked our people (i.e. Lozi Christians) about it, they said "This is good, this is progress !"[146]

Lozi informants confirmed this analysis.[147] If Mwanawina was respected in his capacity as King, he was unloved as a man. This distinction between the man and his office was apparent in the demands of Konoso and the Zaza brothers, who were in a real sense defending the integrity of the Kingship against an unjust King. Mwanawina could hardly have been unaware of his unpopularity. Nor could he have failed to realize that the failure of Barotseland materially to benefit from Federation vindicated the suspicions of those who had always opposed it. A new hospital in Mongu was not considered adequate compensation for closer association with and potential control by white settlers in Southern Rhodesia.[148] Yet Mwanawina continued to remain indifferent to the widespread current of antagonism against him, refusing even to accept the advice of the PMS that he establish some kind of information or propaganda

department through which he could try to explain his position to his subjects both at home and abroad.[149]

He could, for example, have informed them that he shared their suspicions of the intentions of the Federal Government and Welensky's continuing demands for dominion status. When Douglas Hall, Northern Rhodesia's Secretary for Native Affairs, visited Barotseland late in 1957, the Ngambela informed him that "the Paramount Chief and people" wanted no part of a fully self-governing Federation, but wished rather to continue in their "Protectorate" status "under the direct protection of the Queen".[150] Again the following year, the National Council expressed its concern that the new proposals for the Northern Rhodesian constitution would grant excessive powers to the territory's Europeans, thereby endangering special position of the Lozi ruling class.[151]

By this stage, however, the Federal Government perceived that in Mwanawina it had a devoted ally and apparently firm bulwark against the forces of African nationalism. For in May 1958, Welensky paid a formal visit to Mongu where he guaranteed the Paramount Chief and Kuta against any interference in Barotseland's affairs by his government.[152] Many Lozi resented any dealings with Welensky,[153] but Mwanawina's disdain for their opinions was

presumably grounded on his faith in government support for his position. Nor, so long as white power was predominant in Northern Rhodesia, was such faith misplaced. One white liberal described Barotseland as "probably the most backward part of Central Africa, or the most unspoilt, depending on your point of view".[154]

The point of view of most white officials was obvious enough. " ... The Lozi system of government above all other seems to have exerted a political fascination and persuasion of its own over administrators who come into contact with it," observed Raymond Apthorpe, an anthropologist.[155] Gervase Clay, the new Resident Commissioner, commented in 1958 that "Few would disagree with the findings of the Rawlins Committee that 'The present Barotse Native Government constitution is basically sound and adaptable to changing conditions in Barotseland'."[156] M. C. Billing of the Lusaka Secretariat, who observed with maudlin sentimentality that "the whole set up of life in the Barotse plain ... is something which has a flavour of its own", also acknowledged, on a more pragmatic level, that "There is no doubt at all that the chiefs are ... a stabilizing influence when many responsible Africans are not a little bewildered by the ebb and flow of political propaganda".[157]

Because the government felt that Mwanawina's good will was necessary to retain his "stabilizing influence", it was not

prepared to impose measures upon him against his will, a form of solicitude it showed to no other chiefs in Northern Rhodesia. His special status - and the means by which the central government tried to win his consent to important moves - was demonstrated once again in connection with the territorial elections of 1959. The extremely complicated new constitution for Northern Rhodesia was an unsuccessful compromise between the irreconcilable demands of the Europeans and the African nationalists. A minority of the electoral constituencies were specially reserved for Africans, suffrage being severely restricted to a small number of Africans.[158]

The Barotseland Protectorate was one of the Special (African) Constituencies. Mwanawina and his advisers were, however, far from certain that they wished to take advantage of it. As they had informed Welensky in 1958, because they refused to take any steps which might reduce their own powers, "It is not our custom to get mixed up in other parliaments. Our custom is to deal with all matters through the Paramount Chief and the Kuta."[159] Despite Welensky's assurances, by the end of the year, with the elections only three months away, Mwanawina remained determined not to allow his subjects to participate in it.[160]

At the beginning of 1959, the Queen's New Year's Honour List included the name of the Paramount Chief, who now became

Sir Mwanawina Lewanika III, KBE - the first and last African in Central Africa to be so honoured.[161] Rather than crude bribery, J. P. Burger interpreted the award as an implicit assurance to Mwanawina from the British Government that the election of a Lozi member to the Legislative Council would not be a step towards infringing his special position.[162] This point could not have been lost on Mwanawina. Presumably too he was made aware that, since all his indunas and recognized headmen were eligible to vote, he had effective control of the seat. Moreover, he discovered an impressively "modern" yet loyal candidate in the person of Kwalombota Mulonda, a graduate in education from Makerere in Uganda, now a teacher at the Barotse Secondary School who had earlier acted briefly as Administrative Secretary to the BNG.[163] For all these reasons, Mwanawinaagreed that Barotseland would participate in the elections, and in March 1959, Mulonda duly "romped home", receiving 382 of the 571 votes cast for the three candidates in the constituency.[164]

Mwanawina appeared then to be at the peak of his career. Indeed, he enjoyed more prestige and privileges than any King of Barotseland had done since Coryndon's arrival in 1897. His conservative and isolationist policies made him indisputably the most important chief in Central Africa. Honoured by the Queen,

respected and flattered by government officials, wooed by the Prime Minister of the Federation personally, his position seemed as impregnable as that of the Federation itself. Only the large majority of his subjects and the African nationalists were against him and the Federation, and the winds of change were blowing, as he, his court, and his white supporters very soon discovered to their dismay, in their direction.

REFERENCES

Chapter 7

1. Glennie to Chief Secretary, 25 June 1945, Boma Files, Retirement of Yeta Dossier.

2. Mr. Wina.

3. Mr. M. Kawana, a senior induna of the Sesheke Kuta under Imwiko; Mr. G. M. Mukande, formerly Central Treasurer of the BNG, appointed by Imiwiko; Mr. Simalumba.

4. Copy of Glennie's speech, undated, Boma Files, op. cit.

5. Glennie remained PC of Barotseland for eleven years. Mr. Mukande described him as "tough and humourless". He epitomized the white officials' ambivalent attitude towards Barotseland, on the one hand cherishing its isolation and conservatism, on the other considering the BNG too inefficient. See His "The Barotse System of Government", Journal of African Administration, Vol. IV, No. 1, Jan 1952, pp. 9-13, and "The Administrative Officer Today : Barotseland", Corona, Vol. 2, No. 3, March 1959, pp. 86-88.

6. Glennie, "Report on Barotse Province", in Colonial Annual Reports, 1946,copy in Boma Files.

7. Glennie, "Barotse System of Government", op. cit., p. 9.

8. Messrs. Mukande and Kapota. The latter was a Boma clerk until Imwiko appointed him Induna Luyanga at Lealui in 1947.

9. Glennie, "Report", 1946, op. cit.

10. Gluckman, Administrative Organization of the Barotse Native Authorities with a Plan for Reforming Them, (RLI Communication No. 1, Livingstone, 1943), p.8. Gluckman wrote this essay hoping to persuade the government to impose its reforms with some thought to historical continuity as well as efficiency, arguing, for example, that instead of eliminating titles, the duties of their holders should be re-organized. Few of his proposals were adopted.

11. Gluckman, Seven Tribes, p.61.

12. Glennie, "Report", 1946, op.cit; Glennie, "Reports on Barotse Province", NRNAAR, 1947, p.72, and 1948, p.68; Acting PC to Welfare Association, 10 July 1948, Boma Files, Provincial Administration, 1939-53.

13. G. Clay, History of the Mankoya District, RLI Communication No. 4 (Lusaka 1945); Glennie, "Report", NRNAAR, 1948, p.68, and Mr. Njekwa, who was personal secretary to Mwanawina Lewanika, who had been appointed chief of Mankoya District in 1937..

14. Harry Franklin, Unholy Wedlock : The Failure of the Central African Federation (London, 1963), p.221.

15. See Chapter 1.

16. Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, p.382.

17. R. S. Burles, "The Katengo Council Elections", Journal of African Administration, Vol. 4, No. 1, Jan 1952, p.15; Glennie, "Report", NRNAAR, 1948, p.69.

18. Messrs. Mukande and Berger.

19. Franklin, op.cit., p.221, and Mr. Mupatu, who was one of the appointees to the new council.

20. This situation still obtained when I was in Barotseland in 1965.

21. Glennie's Report, 1946, op.cit.

22. Glennie, "A Note on the Barotse Province and Some Current Questions", 25 Aug 1952, marked "Confidential" Boma Files.

23. Messrs. Wina, Mupatu, Mukande, Simalumba and Berger all agreed on this point.

24. Fox-Pitt, "Barotse Province", NRNAAR, 1947, p.75.

25. Messrs. Arthur and Newo Zaza.

26. Mr. Kapota, who in 1951 was either dismissed or resigned from his position as Induna Luyanga after an argument with Mwanawina.

27. Burger to Director, 21 June 1948, PMSS. Burger had seen the King the day before.

28. Mr. Berger.

29. Glennie, "Report", NRNAAR, 1948, p.70.

30. Messrs. Njekwa, Kapota, Mupatu, Mukande, Arthur and Newo Zaza.

31. Burger to Director, 27 July 1948, PMSS.

32. Acting PC Murray to SNA, 26 Oct 1948, Boma Files, Wina Dossier.

33. Mr. Wina.

34. Mr. Kapota.

35. Hall, Zambia, pp.124-6; Rotberg, Rise of Nationalism, p.212.

36. Cited in News from B. and B., March 1949, p.3.

37. Messrs. Mupatu, Mukande, Kapota and Arthur and Newo Zaza.

38. Mr. Berger.

39. Burger to Director, 27 July 1948, PMSS.

40. Same to same, 29 Aug 1948, ibid.

41. "Biographical Note on Paramount Chief Mwanawina III" in Notes on the Barotseland Protectorate and Its Districts (anonymous, 3 July 1956), Boma Files.

42. Burger to Director, 28 Sept 1948, PMSS.

43. Messrs. Wina and Walubita. The latter succeeded Wina as Ngambela.

44. Burger to Director, 27 July 1948, PMSS, and Messrs. Mupatu, Makonde, Kapota and Berger. The latter was told this by Mwanawina himself.

45. Burger to Director, 29 Aug 1948 and 11 Oct 1948, PMSS.

46. Gluckman, Seven Tribes, p.39.

47. Statement by Induna Katema, 23 Sept 1948, Boma Files, Daniel Mukoboto Dossier.

48. See Boma Files, Mukoboto Dossier and Ngambela Wina Dossier; Glennie, Report, NRNAAR, 1948, p.70. Mr. Mupatu, then a relatively senior induna of the Lealui Kuta, told me there can be little doubt that Mwanawina was responsible for the concerted campaign against Wina and Suu.

49. Mwanawina to Glennie, 12 Oct 1948, Boma Files, Ngambela Imasiku Dossier.

50. Glennie to SNA, 29 Nov 1948, Boma Files, Wina Dossier.

51. Mr. Walubita.

52. Mwanawina to Glennie, 27 Nov 1948, and Glennie to Mwanawina, 27 Nov 1948, Boma Files, Wina Dossier.

53. Burger to Director 26 Dec 1948, PMSS.

54. Glennie, "Report", NRNAAR, 1948, p.71.

55. See Chapter 6.

56. See Stokes, "Barotseland", op. cit., p.301.

57. Fox-Pitt, "Report", NRNAAR, 1947, p.71.

58. Worthington to Imwiko, 27 Sept 1947, NAZ KDE 2/43/1.

59. Minutes of the National Council Meeting, 4 and 5 June 1948, Boma Files, Barotse Native Authorities Conference.

60. Minutes of Association Meeting, 3 June 1948, Boma Files, Welfare Association Dossier.

61. Minutes of Meeting, 9 Sept 1948, ibid.

62. Glennie, "Report", NRNAAR, 1948, pp.70-1.

63. Ibid. for 1949, p.82.

64. According to Mr. Berger of the PMS, to whom Mwanawina showed the letter.

65. Glennie, "Report", NRNAAR, 1949, p.82; Glyn Jones (Acting PC), "Report", ibid., 1950, p.91.

66. Cited in "A Note on the Barotse Province and Some Current Questions", 25 Aug 1952, (probably by Glennie), Boma Files.

67. Ibid., and Glennie, "Report", NRNAAR, 1951, p.80.

68. Gluckman, Seven Tribes, p.41.

69. These perceptive insights are suggested in Glyn Jones (Acting PC), "Report", NRNAAR, 1950, p.92.

70. Glennie, "Report", ibid., 1949, p.82.

71. There are no references to it in either the Boma or PMSS files, nor were any Lozi informants forthcoming on the subject.

72. Jones, "Report", 1950, NRNAAR, p.91.

73. Data from Mr. Daniel Soko, himself a Nyasa, once a prominent member of the Association who now runs a small shop in Mongu, and Mr. Arthur Zaza.

74. Gluckman, Seven Tribes, p.57.

75. See Chapter 6.

76. Association's Memorandum of Rights and Privileges of Barotseland Not Respected by N. Rhodesian Government, 9 Sept 1948, Boma Files, Welfare Association Dossier.

77. Minutes of Association Meetings of 3 June 1948 and 9 Sept 1948, ibid. The Boma Files contain no documents relating to the Association after 1948. Mr. Soko told me that it continued its activities into the early 1950's, but was unable to recall the issues with which it was concerned.

78. Glennie, "Report", NRNAAR, 1952, p.86.

79. This is confirmed by Messrs. Soko and A. Wina. Daniel Mukoboto, for e.g., became Mwanawina's private secretary in the late 1950's, until he was murdered in mysterious circumstances in 1961.

80. Glennie, "Report", NRNAAR, 1955, p.92.

81. Peter Fraenkel, Wayaleshi (London, 1959), p.108.

82. Ibid., pp.102-4.

83. Glennie, "Report", NRNAAR, 1951, p.80. Also Mr. Newo Zaza, see below.

84. Ibid., p.81, and "Note on Barotse Province ....", 25 Aug 1952, op.cit.

85. "Note on Barotse Province", op.cit; Jones, "Report", NRNAAR, 1950, p.91; Glennie, "Report", ibid., 1951, p.93.

86. Rotberg, op.cit., p.234; Hall, op.cit., p.152.

87. Burger to Director, 21 Sept 1952, PMSS.

88. Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, p.385.

89. Glennie, "Report", NRNAAR, 1949, p.85; also Mr. Mataa (Induna Imandi), who was one of the appointees to the ARC.

90. Glennie, "Barotse System of Government", op.cit., p.13; "Note on Barotse Province", op.cit.

91. Rotberg, op.cit., p.238.

92. Anonymous biographical note on Mwanawina in Northern Rhodesian Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1959, p.193.

93. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community, pp.133-4, 144, 236.

94. Hopkinson's Speech, 5 Aug 1952, reported in N.R. Information Department Press Communique No. 626.

95. Glennie, "Report", NRNAAR, 1952, p.86.

96. Hopkinson's speech, op.cit.

97. Record of Meeting between Secretary of State and Chief and Council, 2 Aug 1952, Boma Files, Proposals for Closer Association between Central African Territories Dossier.

98. Meetings between Glennie and Chief and Council, 7 Feb and 14 Feb 1953, ibid.

99. Burger to Director, 29 April 1953, PMSS.

100. Mr. Walubita.

101. The interpretation given by Mwanawina to Harry Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.220, is identical almost to the word with that given me by Mr. Walubita.

102. Cited in Glennie to all Barotse Province DC's, 20 April 1953, Boma Files, Closer Association Dossier.

103. Copy of Rennie's address to the Legislative Council, 16 April 1953, in Ibid.

104. Glennie, "Report", NRNAAR, 1953, p.96.

105. Ibid., pp.93-4.

106. Ibid., p.93, and News from B. and B., 1953, pp.10-11.

107. Low and Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule, App. I, and A. I. Richards, "Epilogue", in L. A. Fallers, The King's Men (London, 1964), pp.359-64.

108. Rotberg, Rise of Nationalism, p.254.

109. Confidential, unsigned, undated memorandum, probably by Glennie, in Boma Files.

110. Mr. N. Zaza.

111. Mr. C. Zaza.

112. Mr. N. Zaza.

113. Rotberg, op. cit., pp.279-80; Hall, op. cit., p.177.

114. Confidential memorandum, op. cit.

115. Messrs. N. and C. Zaza, Mupatu, Simalumba and Mukande. The writer of the confidential memorandum, op. cit., concurred. The "key positions" in the BNG, he wrote, "are filled by the powerful landowners. Thus you have a baronage poised between the Chief and the Lozi polloi who do not matter a damn. All very medieval .... The BNG is reasonably benevolent provided the requirements of the royal family and the interests of the cabal which forms the cabinet are first met."

116. Mr. C. Zaza.

117. Mr. N. Zaza.

118. M. Mainga, "The Origin of the Lozi", in Stokes and Brown, Zambesian Past, p.241, fn. 3.

119. Messrs. Newo and Clement Zaza independently gave identical testimonies on the matter.

120. Messrs. Walubita, Kapota, Arthur and Newo Zaza; Mukande.

121. Written biography of Akabeswa Imasiku, given me by his son Lifunana Imasiku.

122. Coisson to Director, 3 May 1956, PMSS.

123. Hall, op. cit., p.152.

124. Mr. Lifunana Imasiku, son of Ngambela Imasiku, and assistant personal secretary to Mwanawina, 1951-61, personal secretary 1961-66.

125. Mr. Mukande.

126. Coisson to Director, 5 Sept 1956, PMSS. Mwanawina showed the letter to Coisson.

127. Mr. C. Zaza.

128. Mr. L. Imasiku.

129. Mr. Mupatu. Permission was later granted.

130. Wina and Suu to Glennie, 12 July 1953, Boma Files, Wina Dossier.

131. Mr. Kapota.

132. See Chapter 6.

133. J. F. Hayley, "Report on Barotseland Protectorate", NRNAAR, 1956, p.80. Glennie retired in October 1956 after eleven years in Barotseland.

134. Mwanawina to RC, 26 Oct 1956, Boma Files, Correspondence between RC and Paramount Chief.

135. Glyn Jones, RC, "Report", NRNAAR, 1957, p.88.

136. Burger to Director, 6 May 1957, PMSS.

137. Messrs. Mupatu and C. Zaza, who were fined £5 and £9 respectively, and Jones, "Report", op.cit., p.88.

138. Jones, "Report", op.cit., p.88.

139. Burger to Director, 6 May 1957, PMSS.

140. Same to same, 12 June 1957, ibid.

141. Report of the Committee to inquire into the Constitution of the Barotse Native Government together with the comments thereon of the National Council (Lusaka, 1958), p.3.

142. Ibid., p.2.

143. Ibid., p.5.

144. Ibid., p.15.

145. Jones, "Report", op.cit., p.88.

146. Burger to Director, 31 March 1958, PMSS.

147. Messrs. Mukande, Mupatu and Simalumba.

148. Messrs. Walubita, Mukande, A. and C. Zaza, Mupatu and Simalumba.

149. Messrs. Berger and Graebert.

150. Northern News, 18 Nov 1957.

151. G. Clay, RC, "Report", NRNAAR, 1958, p.80.

152. Northern News, 20 May 1958.

153. Mr. L. Imasiku.

154. Peter Fraenkel, Wayaleshi, p.92.

155. "Introduction" to Apthorpe (ed.), From Tribal Rule to Modern Government (Lusaka, 1959), p.vi.

156. Clay, "Report", NRNAAR, 1958, pp.79-80.

157. Billing, "Government Policy in the Utilization of Indigenous Political Systems", in Apthorpe, op.cit., pp.1-3, 11.

158. Hall, op.cit., pp.167-8; Rotberg, op.cit., pp.290, 294, 297, 300.

159. Northern News, 20 May 1958.

160. Burger to Director, 4 Jan 1959, PMSS.

161. Hall, op.cit., p.238.

162. Burger to Director, 4 Jan 1959, PMSS.

163. Clay, Annual Report, 1962,copy in Boma Files.

164. Editorial note by Apthorpe in his From Tribal Rule to Modern Government, pp.67-8. The other two candidates stood as independents, apparently receiving the support of those white-collar Lozi who were eligible to vote but who numbered fewer than indunas and headmen.

Chapter 8

TRIBALISM VERSUS NATIONALISM

The positions of both the Lozi ruling class and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland seemed invulnerable in 1959. In fact, the imminent destruction of both was signalled - for those who cared to see - the previous year when Dr. K. H. Banda returned to Nyasaland and a militant group of Northern Rhodesia's African nationalists broke away from Harry Nkumbula's African National Congress. The Northern Rhodesian militants formed the Zambian African National Congress (ZANC), which in October 1959 became the United National Independence Party (UNIP).

In February and March 1959, the Northern Rhodesian Government banned ZANC.[1] Although few people were aware of it at the time, this fact proved to be of substantially greater significance to Barotseland than the election at the same time of Mwanawina's candidate, Kwalombota Mulonda, to the Legislative Council. For several non-Lozi ZANC leaders were restricted to Barotseland: Simon Kapepwe, Justin Chimba, and Nephas Tembo to Mongu District, Reuben Kamanga to Sesheke.[2] The rustication of these men has been described as a "cardinal mistake" on the part of the government,[3] reflecting the self-deceptive conviction

of white officials that rural Africans would not be susceptible to the nationalists' message, and that the Lozi would not succumb to the lure of "alien" Africans.

It is true that after Konoso's conviction early in 1957, organized opposition to the Barotse Native Government had dissolved. Yet its conservative critics remained dissatisfied, though leaderless,[4] and an underground group of ZANC supporters already existed by 1959.[5] Although the former faction was concerned primarily with Barotseland politics as opposed to national politics, as Lealui and the Federal Government became increasingly identified in the public mind, it found itself moving inexorably towards the tiny minority which supported the larger nationalist movement. The consolidation and expansion of the two groups was a direct result of the politicizing efforts of the ZANC restrictees during 1959. Through unceasing propaganda, they created an ever-widening network of contacts with the result that, by the end of their period of restriction, they could count upon the dedicated support of most of the African middle class - teachers, clerks, storekeepers - in Mongu, Senanga and Sesheke.[6]

Moreover, the rusticated nationalists won considerable public gratitude for their involvement in the case of the mysterious murder of Akashambatwa Imwiko, son of the late King Imwiko. Many UNIP

supporters and personal opponents of Mwanawina maintained at the time, and continue to believe, that the Paramount was responsible for Akashambatwa's murder. Probably the truth of the matter can never conclusively be proved. But the important political fact is that many Lozi were convinced of Mwanawina's responsibility, believed that Boma officials were bribed to cooperate with him in order to conceal his complicity, and saw that it was UNIP leaders who kept the affair in the headlines, forcing the government at least to pretend to be carrying out a thorough investigation.[7]

Apparently it was because of pressure from Kapepwe and Justin Chimba that Gervase Clay, the Resident Commissioner, began his inquiry.[8] The police detained for questioning Lifunana Imasiku, son of the Ngambela and assistant private secretary to Mwanawina, and Induna Amba, the Paramount's senior steward.[9] When they were released, two UNIP officials, Frank Chitambala and Nalumino Mundia, a Lozi, began a protest fast in Lusaka.[10] Later, Muheli Walubita, the former Ngambela, publicly supported the case against the Paramount, thus tacitly identifying himself with Lozi UNIP, a group heotherwise would have disdained as being too extreme.[11] Chief Liatitima, a Lozi royal who was already working with UNIP, openly accused Lifunana Imasiku of having murdered Akashambatwa at Mwanawina's behest. Imasiku

thereupon successfully sued Liatitima for defamation of character,[12] and the sordid affair was finally closed with the murder unsolved.

Its consequences, however, were long felt. For it was among the major early causes of political polarization in Barotseland. Many Lozi believed in Mwanawina's guilt, and to them the case appeared to be sufficient vindication of the UNIP charge of deliberate collusion between the Boma and the BNG to perpetuate injustice and the rule of the traditional clique in Lealui. Moreover, UNIP's involvement in the case made it seem the sole viable organization within which conservative and radical Lozi alike could unite, for very different reasons, against the ruling elite and its Boma protectors.

On the other hand, UNIP's role assured for it the undying hostility of the large part of the Lozi ruling class. This was not wholly inevitable. Aside from the Paramount and the Ngambela, most of the Lozi elite were treated as racially inferior by many district officials, and consequently shared with UNIP and its supporters a bitter resentment of their treatment.[13] As Chief Liatitima said, "All our traditions were spoiled by the whites since we were forced to give them the same forms of respect we should give only to Chiefs".[14] Since at the time the possibility of a nationalist victory in Northern Rhodesia seemed infinitely

remote, the ruling class had either to gamble and support UNIP, or take their stand against what some of its members called black "extremists",[15] which meant remaining on the top rung of the Barotseland hierarchy though at the lowest level of the white hierarchy. Like a majority of their counterparts in Africa when faced with the same choice, the traditional Lozi rulers opted for the latter alternative. As Lewanika had long before appealed to the British Crown against Lobengula's Ndebele, so now did his son continue to repose his security with Her Majesty's Government against Kenneth Kaunda's "alien" nationalists.

In practice, this meant that no political parties were allowed to operate in Barotseland, and UNIP was refused permission by the BNG to hold meetings in the "Protectorate".[16] Apparently with government encouragement,[17] indunas were sent through the countryside to vilify UNIP, break up its meetings, and arrest its partisans who were then fined by the local Kutas.[18]

Mwanawina was not yet prepared, however, to join with Welensky against the nationalists. In March 1960, the National Council submitted to the visiting members of the Monckton Commission a memorandum restating its demand that, in the event the Federation received dominion status, "Barotseland should remain separate as a full Protectorate under the Protection of Her Majesty's

Government ...."[19] The Commission's Report re-affirmed once again Barotseland's "special position",[20] but Lealui was no longer so easily reassured. Apparently at the urging of Godwin Mbikusita, who had become a member of the Federal Assembly in 1959, representing Welensky's United Federal Party (UFP)[21] Mwanawina again renewed his demands for secession.

In August 1960, the full National Council assembled and decided to put to Iain MacLeod, the new Colonial Secretary, the request that Barotseland be allowed to secede from Northern Rhodesia and the Federation and be proclaimed a protectorate directly under the British Government on the lines of the High Commission Territories.[22] When news of this decision leaked out, it resulted in a tremendous uproar among all African nationalists in the territory, including those in Barotseland,[23] who agreed with the interpretation of the Northern News, a newspaper which supported Welensky, that the decision revealed the Lozi rulers to be as hostile to black nationalism as to white domination.[24]

Ngambela Imasiku hotly denied that secession was a reaction to the fear of a nationalist victory. Such a contingency was, he asserted, quite irrelevant, since "We do not consider ourselves a part of Northern Rhodesia or as a protectorate within a protectorate. We are a different country and a different people. We have our own

government."[25] As a statement of fact, this declaration was entirely accurate. So far as Lealui was concerned, the attachment of Barotseland to Northern Rhodesia was fortuitous, an administrative convenience initiated originally by the Company when North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia were amalgamated and continued by the successor colonial government. Barotseland had existed as an independent national entity long before the creation of Northern Rhodesia, and was legally and historically entitled to maintain or to dissolve the attachment as its rulers wished.

In terms of political reality, however, historical rights were beside the point. Even the Northern News, hostile but reconciled to black rule in the future, recognized this truth. It cogently pointed out the fundamental weakness of the Lozi position : their demand for independence, it foresaw,

> if there is the expected nationalist majority in the Northern Rhodesian legislature ... could develop into a full scale secession conflict on the lines of Buganda or Katanga. Poor, primitive and isolated, the "protectorate within a protectorate" scarcely occupies the same key position as these two secessionist provinces do in Uganda and the Congo.[26]

Indeed, Barotseland's position was far more like that of the High Commission Territories which its rulers wished to emulate,[27] and even that of the South African "Bantustans": " ... backwaters, rural slums ... under-developed ...."[28]

Moreover, as the Northern News acknowledged, Barotseland represented "a remnant of old-style tribal rule which offends modern pan-African thinking".[29] In particular, Lealui's stand was intolerable to those UNIP leaders who were Lozi, not least, perhaps, because a number of them were Lozi aristocrats who - like so many of Konoso's supporters some years earlier - happened to have personal grievances against Mwanawina. Arthur and Sikota Wina were the sons of the Ngambela whom the Paramount had dismissed. Chief Liatitima had been deposed as chief of Lukulu for his alleged complicity in the plot against Yeta in 1937, and Mwanawina refused to re-instate him. Princess Nakatindi was the daughter of Yeta and his Moyoo, and was apparently disappointed when Mwanawina appointed his own daughter as Mokwae of Nalolo. Their determination to resist Lealui's demand for secession was thus compounded of elements of nationalist principle, personal antipathies, and the aristocrat's belief in his natural right to rule.

Moreover, most Lozi on the line of rail appeared to be antagonistic to the BNG. Although Sikeli Konoso himself had by now allied himself with Lealui,[30] the Barotse National Society in Lusaka strongly opposed secession. At a meeting of the Society in November 1960, Harry Franklin and Kwalombota Mulonda, members of the Legislative Council both of whose constituencies

incorporated Barotseland, supported Mwanawina's constitutional right to secede. Their statements were met with loud derision, Franklin being denounced as "a paid agent of the imperialists" and Mulonda as a "Tshombe". Both men walked out of the meeting, after which those present announced the immediate formation of the Barotse Anti-Secession Movement.[31] BASMO was little more than a specifically Lozi front organization for UNIP,[32] and its leaders warned the government that, if Barotseland were allowed to secede, the "chaos and discord" which would result would be "much worse" than that which the secession of Katanga had produced in the Congo.[33]

Gervase Clay, the Resident Commissioner, acknowledged that in Barotseland itself, "a minority of the educated Africans have been attracted by the shouts of the nationalists", though he believed that "the vast majority of the inhabitants of the Protectorate" supported the BNG.[34] Mwanawina sent Ngambela Imasiku and K. Mulonda, the Lozi Legco member, to preach throughout Barotseland the need for secession, as a result of which, Clay's successor, Heath, claimed, the Paramount was "able to speak authoritatively for the majority of his subjects residing in the Protectorate".[35] Presumably Mwanawina felt he could now say,

with Chief Kaizer Matanzima of the Transkei, "the chiefs are the people".[36] The African Mail, however, reported that several of Mulonda's meetings were successfully boycotted, while at others his audience walked out as he began to speak.[37]

With such backing, the Paramount Chief and Ngambela flew to London for special talks with MacLeod. The Colonial Secretary informed them that secession would not serve the best interests of Barotseland. As it had shown by its support of the Luvale and Lunda two decades earlier, the British government was not prepared to face the risk of violence in order to preserve Barotseland's status. It was, however, ready to re-confirm its previous commitments. MacLeod informed Mwanawina that he had proposed that "the special rights and benefits of the Barotse people (be) enshrined and protected" in Orders in Council in order to "make it clear beyond doubt" that the Northern Rhodesian Legislature could not, "without the consent of the Paramount Chief and Council, pass laws ... interfering with the rights and safeguards accorded to the Barotse". Moreover, it was announced that the Lozi Paramount would henceforth be styled the Litunga - "earth", owner of the land - of the Barotseland Protectorate.[38] A half century earlier, the Company had withdrawn Lewanika's right to be called "King" in order to reduce him to the same status as that of the other chiefs

of Northern Rhodesia; now, in order to elevate his successor above his peers, the Company's successors were distinguishing him with the supreme title of the Lozi themselves.

MacLeod's compromise satisfied no one. The Litunga still demanded secession, while UNIP saw the new concessions as part of an imperialist plot to divide and rule.[39] The Boma continued to stand solidly behind Mwanawina since, as Heath, the RC, believed, the majority of Lozi remained "loyal to the traditional regime".[40] In the meanwhile, the Litunga contrived to provoke UNIP on every possible occasion. The party remained illegal in Barotseland, its local supporters being able to maintain only clandestine links with their leaders in Lusaka. BASMO organizers from Lusaka were immediately deported.[41] Nalumino Mundia, a senior UNIP official and a Lozi, was imprisoned in Mongu for a month for defying a deportation order.[42] When Mwanawina played host in September 1961 to Lord Dalhousie, Governor-General of the Federation, BASMO claimed that "this shows clearly that you (the Litunga) have accepted Federation.[43] Finally, Godwin Mbikusita's influence with the Litunga seemed to be increasing, for he acted as the spokesman for the BNG on several occasions during the year.[44] Already anathema to all nationalists as a UFP member of the Federal Parliament, Mbikusita's interventions on behalf of

Mwanawina served further to intensify UNIP's determination to smash Barotseland's ancien regime.

In November 1961, the party decided to send Mundia and two Lozi royals, Liatitima and Ngombala Lubita, back to Barotseland. In Mongu, Mundia was served with a deportation order, but refused to obey it. He did accept the consequent summons to appear before the Kuta, arriving in Lealui with a large group of vociferous supporters. Alarmed by the hostile crowd, Ngambela Imasiku telephoned Mongu to demand that the police come and arrest Mundia.[45] A white inspector duly arrived with a small contingent of police and, at the Kuta's behest, ordered Mundia to withdraw and the crowd to disperse. A riot ensued - the first in Barotseland under white rule - ending only after the police used tear gas against the crowd.

The Mongu Magistrate sentenced Mundia to one year's imprisonment, but he appealed successfully. The Kuta summarily sentenced Liatitima to three months' imprisonment, but his appeal was also successful, the judge finding that in fact "There does not appear to have been a trial at all".[46] Others were less fortunate. The Kuta sentenced a large number of people to three months' imprisonment while the Mongu Magistrate jailed eleven men for eighteen months on charges of rioting.[47]

The riots, the trials, and the apparent alliance between the Kuta and the Boma aroused great interest in Barotseland generally and spurred the local UNIP supporters to begin a serious, if illegal, campaign of organizing and propaganda. Under Hastings Noyoo, Kawana Mulemwa and Felix Musale, an underground Barotse Division of UNIP had already been formed. The three men now decided to flaunt the ban on political parties by formally establishing a provincial branch of UNIP and began organizing for the Northern Rhodesian elections due to be held in 1962.[48] In his report for 1961, Heath, the Resident Commissioner, commented that the Litunga and his Council had become the targets of "a mounting volume of largely ill-informed comment from within and without the Protectorate."[49]

The more hostile UNIP's attitude towards the Litunga became, the more valuable an asset did he appear to Roy Welensky. Early in 1962, Mwanawina's personal secretary, Lifunana Imasiku, who was also the son of the Ngambela, claims to have met Welensky in Salisbury. The Prime Minister suggested to him a plan for a new Federation incorporating Southern Rhodesia, the Copperbelt, Katanga and Barotseland. Welensky offered to arrange a personal meeting if necessary between the Litunga and Tshombe, but Mwanawina rejected the scheme, fearing it would alienate his white friends in Lusaka and London.[50] Welesnky was undeterred, however,

and in February 1962 put roughly the same proposition to Duncan Sandys, the Colonial Secretary : he would agree to the secession of Nyasaland and North-Eastern Rhodesia in return for a new Federation, in which Southern Rhodesia would provide the talent, the Copperbelt the wealth, and Barotseland the labour as well as a cooperative African ruler.[51]

As Harry Franklin later wrote, the entire scheme was "so manifestly absurd in the context of African politics that none of us in the Northern Rhodesian Government took it seriously ...."[52] Duncan Sandys, however, apparently saw some merit in the idea of a new Federation with Barotseland as its Bantustan. Accompanied by Godwin Mbikusita, he flew to Barotseland and after conferring with the Litunga, left with a signed document formally requesting Barotseland's secession from Northern Rhodesia "while remaining within the Federation".[53]

To UNIP, these negotiations were merely a transparent manoeuvre to "play off" the Lozi rulers against the nationalists.[54] Sikota Wina, UNIP's publicity chief, declared that "If Mwanawina breaks away he will be doing so illegally and we will be justified in overthrowing him."[55] Sandys, however, soon reneged on the alleged agreement, and announced that it "would not be in the interests of the Barotse people

to pursue the question of separation at this stage".[56] Nevertheless, even after Sandys' repudiation of the scheme, secession, within or without a Federation, remained Lealui's demand, as Godwin Mbikusita busily intrigued behind the scenes encouraging the Litunga not to capitulate.[57]

Immediately thereafter, in his capacity as one of Welensky's two African parliamentary secretaries, Mbikusita accompanied his Prime Minister to London for talks with R. A. Butler. They were informed that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would be allowed to secede from the Federation, but Barotseland would not be permitted to secede from Northern Rhodesia. Mbikusita legitimately pointed out to Butler that this meant the British government was breaking its treaties with Lewanika, while Welensky, a recent convert to the African cause, added that "the Barotse have been sold down the river".[58]

Thus, for the first time since Lewanika had looked to the "Great Queen" for protection, the Lozi ruling class was faced with no alternative but to rely for support on local white settlers against both the British government and threatening alien Africans. The Litunga publicly announced that "If extremists (UNIP) come to power in Northern Rhodesia, we will not be interested in associating with the Government".[59]

In April 1962, with Mbikusita back in Barotseland, Mwanawina summoned the National Council for a meeting from which emanated a new tactic: although secession was still the final goal, the Lozi rulers nevertheless agreed to accept the new constitution for Northern Rhodesia and allow political parties to organize for the territorial elections in 1962.[60] The last decision unquestionably reflected the assessment shared by the ruling class, the Boma, and most white opinion in Northern Rhodesia that, in the words of the Northern News, though "a class of collar-and-tie African civil servant or clerk might want more say in the Barotse Government, neither UNIP nor Congress have (sic) any appreciable following in Barotseland".[61]

Given this premise, the Boma had put strong pressure on the BNG to recognize UNIP,[62] while the united Lozi ruling class concluded that if in the forthcoming elections, candidates supporting its position defeated the nationalists, Britain would be forced to concede to the demand for secession. The initiative for creating a traditionalist political party to this end came not, as has sometimes been thought, from Welensky and Mbikusita,[63] but from the National Council itself. Its meeting had reaffirmed the policy of secession on the grounds that UNIP threatened to destroy the Kingship, depose the indunas,

and integrate Barotseland into Zambia. To meet this threat, it had been decided to found "a Party pledged to free Barotseland from UNIP rule and make it not a part of Northern Rhodesia".[64] Only the intervention of the Resident Commissioner prevented an official declaration of Kuta support for the Sicaba (National) Party.[65] Mwanawina and his indunas remained officially neutral, though they were in fact relying on the party to demonstrate to Britain mass support for secession.[66] The Paramount did not, for example, prevent the party painting elephants on its Land Rovers, although the elephant symbol was traditionally reserved for the King alone.[67]

The Land Rovers - three of them - plus £200 in cash, were given to the Sicaba Party by "friends" of Godwin Mbikusita who had "pledged themselves to secede Barotseland from Northern Rhodesia".[68] It was palpably obvious to all who Mbikusita's "friends" were;[69] the appearance in Barotseland during the last month of the campaign of Mr. George Addicott, a public relations man from Salisbury, to work for the Sicaba Party, merely confirmed what was already known.[70] Nevertheless, Lealui pretended that it was not being supported by Wellensky's United Federal Party, the Sicaba supporters clearly preferring to await the results of the election before repudiating the campaign assistance.[71]

The Sicaba Party entered the election without the active support of Ngambela Imasiku, one of its most ardent supporters. Imasiku had long been the chief target of UNIP's attack on the ruling class, since it was considered impolitic to attack the Litunga directly, and was unpopular outside Lealui.[72] When, therefore, Chief Liatitima appeared in Lealui in July 1962 demanding the Ngambela's dismissal, Mwanawina refused to back Imasiku, presumably considering him a liability in the election, and the Ngambela resigned.[73]

It is not likely, however, that his absence affected the elections. The ruling class, in its complacency, launched no real campaign for its two candidates, Francis Suu, the seventy year old former Administrative Secretary of the BNG who had recently been reinstated in the Litunga's good graces,[74] and Griffiths Mukande, the much younger and energetic Senior Treasurer of the BNG.[75] Nor did the informal alliance between the Sicaba Party and the UFP candidate in the "National" constituency of Zambesi, Maurice Rabb, have the desired result. In the rest of Northern Rhodesia, the UFP backed the ANC in the hope of forestalling a UNIP victory; in Barotseland, the UFP shared the common illusion that the Sicaba Party had the better chance of defeating the UNIP candidates.[76] As the Northern News said, it was "probable that the lower roll

Barotseland voter will make it his business to find out how his Paramount Chief would like him to vote - and do so."[77]

Significantly, UNIP itself shared the view that Barotseland - which the Northern News described as "the tribal museum-piece of Africa"[78] - was one of its weakest areas. In consequence, its propagandists, both Lozi and non-Lozi, and including Kenneth Kaunda himself, took great care to reassure the old ruling class that a UNIP government would interfere neither with the Litunga's personal position nor with the Barotseland's "protectorate" status.[79]

This was a shrewd tactic, for it revealed UNIP's awareness that it had two very different sources of support within Barotseland: the dispossessed white-collar group and the traditionalist opponents of the Litunga. Its campaign to woo both elements was virtually flawless. Its candidates were Arthur Wina, Mubiana Nalilungwe, and Dr. Masekwa Nalumango. All were university graduates, Wina was the son of the Ngambela dismissed by Mwanawina in 1948, and Nalumango was the son of an induna. Their appeal thus lay not only to the aspiring middle classes; they offered at the same time - in themselves and explicitly, as was seen above - a traditional form of leadership to Lozi voters who respected the Kingship but resented the presentincumbent.

Moreover, building on its formerly illegal branches in the Protectorate, UNIP Lozi leaders from Lusaka, created an efficient

election organization[80] through which they proclaimed its "double-edged" struggle against both white domination and "crumbling, anachronistic feudalism".[81] The status of the Litunga and the Protectorate would remain unaltered, but Barotseland, to its own great economic advantage, would remain within Zambia. UNIP's development plans promised more schools and agricultural development centres, more and better roads, and - very rashly - a railway from Mongu to Lusaka.[82] In short, it was the essential modernizing programme which Lewanika had devised many decades earlier. Once again, through UNIP, the dynamic and educated elements of the Lozi aristocracy were offering to lead the nation out of its backwardness and isolation, with the qualification, as Ranger has pointed out, that "the failure of the Lozi establishment to modernize and develop the country on its own meant a realization that the desired progress could only be achieved within the wider Northern Rhodesian frame-work."[83]

The franchise was still qualified. It effectively included African civil servants and teachers on the one hand, indunas and headmen on the other. While UNIP ensured that a majority of the white collar elite registered, the number of the latter group who put their names on the voters' roll fell far below the government's expectations. Not surprisingly, therefore, Arthur Wina overwhelmed

Francis Suu by 1057 votes to 65, while Nalilungwe received 688 to 69 for his ANC opponent and 42 for Mukande of the Sicaba Party.[84]

This was a stunning defeat for Mwanawina and the ruling class, and resulted in a serious breach within the traditionalist camp. Three of Sicaba's leading members, including Suu, publicly announced their resignations from the party. Already during the campaign, they acknowledged, they had discovered that

> Some of the big people and masses of the people (had) joined UNIP one by one. Eventually we found that wherever we went in Barotseland, people had become all UNIP members. Even in the Chiefs' villages, there were none on the side of freeing Barotseland from Northern Rhodesia.

Moreover, they pointed out, they had helped create the party to free Barotseland from the control not only of UNIP but of the Federal Government. Yet they had discovered during the campaign that "some of us were trying to make our party a part of the Federal Party. It was not until the last moment when we realized this, for Mr. Rabb of the Federal Party came and said all the material we used belonged to the Federal Party." Consequently, they had decided "in sorrow to dissolve the Sicaba Party".[85]

Some of its members, however, refused to be dissolved.[86] The party executive was re-organized, and Ngombala Lubita, a son of one of Lewanika's daughters, became its president. Lubita had

been an active UNIP supporter until December 1962, when Munakayamba Sipalo, a leading Lozi UNIP official, was attacked with a petrol bomb. Virtually all Lozi in UNIP agreed that the Bemba members of the party were responsible for the incident. While the majority of Lozi in UNIP decided that they would not let themselves be pushed out of the party, and thereby allow the Bemba to dominate it,[87] Lubita and a number of others resigned in protest. He returned to Barotseland to become the president of, as he claimed, a wholly unaligned Sicaba Party opposing the incorporation of Barotseland into Zambia.[88]

The Litunga continued to give unofficial support to the party and official endorsement of its secessionist policy.[89] Nor did he cease his provocation of UNIP in his choice of advisers. In December 1962, Silumelume Siyubo was appointed Acting Ngambela to replace Imasiku.[90] Siyubo had been a teacher at the PMS primary school in Sefula when Mwanawina selected him in 1956 to replace Imasiku as Induna Kalonga. Although there was a widespread feeling outside the capital that many more qualified men were available for the post, the Litunga trusted him as a fervent oppon ent of UNIP and one whom he could presumably easily manipulate.[91]

At the same time, the new UNIP-ANC coalition government

of Northern Rhodesia was determined that reforms of the BNG must be initiated. The Litunga was informed that the Katengo Council must be a wholly elected body, and that if he did not make the necessary arrangements, the government would organize the election without Lealui's participation.[92] Although there was great opposition in the Kuta,[93] the BNG finally announced the dissolution of the existing Katengo and an election by universal suffrage to replace it to be held on 17 April 1963.[94]

After the BNG postponed the election date four times in the following four months,[95] no one doubted that the Litunga was manoeuvring to avoid, if possible, an election the outcome of which he no longer faced with equanimity. Indeed, UNIP's victories in 1962 had made secession seem more vital than ever, and Mwanawina succeeded in receiving another invitation from R. A. Butler for a further round of talks in London.[96] To UNIP's chagrin, Mwanawina flew to London accompanied not only by Siyubo, now confirmed as Ngambela, but by Mbikusita and L. K. Wilson, a Salisbury lawyer whom Mbikusita had hired to prepare the Lozi case for secession.[97]

Not even Wilson's legal expertise, however, could sway the British Government. As the Northern News understood, after the election results in Barotseland in 1962, "Britain can only conclude that the Litunga's monarchy is an anachronism and that, like others

in Africa, it must eventually yield ...." If this meant reneging on earlier agreements with Lewanika, political realities allowed no other solution.[98] Butler told the Litunga that Britain could not afford to finance Barotseland if it were divorced from Northern Rhodesia,[99] and the meeting therefore seemed to be a victory for UNIP.

There was, however, as yet little reason to believe that Mwanawina would abjectly capitulate. To UNIP, it was ominous that the Litunga and his party had returned home not via Lusaka but through Salisbury, where they found a Rhodesian Air Force plane, presumably provided by Welensky, waiting to fly them direct to Mongu. UNIP spokesmen believed that Welensky and Mbikusita were still encouraging the Litunga to press for secession and to boycott the planned talks between the Lozi rulers and the Northern Rhodesian Government.[100]

These negotiations were to follow the Katengo elections, which had finally been set for 15 August 1963. Since universal suffrage now obtained, the election would establish whether the Litunga could legitimately claim to represent his subjects in a democratic sense. "The real issue", as the Northern News said, "is the constitutional future of Barotseland."[101] Yet the Lozi ruling class hardly bothered to run an election campaign. After an abortive alliance with ANC,

Prince Ngombala Lubita had dissolved the Sicaba Party,[102] but the ruling class made no effort to establish a substitute for it. The Kuta merely approved nominees for eighteen of the twenty-five Katengo seats, thus giving UNIP eight seats at the outset by default.[103]

UNIP's campaign, in stark contrast, was once again highly organized at every level. Kaunda and other cabinet ministers addressed public meetings, while virtually every voter in every village was personally canvassed.[104] Political interest had grown remarkably in a few short years. The UNIP candidates stressed that secession would create great economic hardship; a vote for UNIP was a vote for remaining part of a free, prosperous Zambia; a nice balance of pragmatism and orthodox nationalist principle. Moreover, UNIP leaders warned that if Barotseland seceded, it might be taken over and enslaved by the whites of South Africa and Portugal with whom, they claimed, the Litunga was in close contact.[105] "While the hierarchy talks about friendship and possible federation with the white-dominated regimes in Southern Rhodesia, Angola and even South Africa," Arthur Wina wrote, "the people talk only of war on them".[106]

The people spoke through their votes. UNIP's victory was beyond its own most optimistic predictions. It won every one of the eighteen contested seats, gaining 84 per cent of the 25,000 votes

cast.[107] Not even the Boma doubted that the results were a profound blow to the secessionists.[108] Arthur Wina declared that "If ever there was a danger of a Tshombe emerging on the Northern Rhodesian political scene, (the) elections have nipped his growth in the bud". The Lozi people, Wina concluded, had "shown clearly ... their desire to have things that everybody else (in Zambia) has", including "freedom from feudalistic or colonial rule (and) the chance of bettering their living conditions". To this end, he called for radical reforms of the BNG and immediate discussions of "the future of the treaties between Lewanika and the British Crown ... (in) an independent and free Zambia".[109]

The Litunga clearly feared these new developments. His own people having deserted him, he again turned to Europeans in his struggle against African nationalism. He began a correspondence with Patrick Wall and Roland Bell, Conservative Members of Parliament, and S. B. Cook, a Conservative lawyer in London, all known supporters of Tshombe, asking them to put pressure on their government to allow Barotseland to secede.[110] At the same time, through Mbikusita, L. K. Wilson, the Salisbury lawyer, was invited to delve in the Lealui archives for evidence to support the ruling class's demands.[111]

As a result of his research, Wilson produced three documents.

The first was a detailed record of the guarantees of Barotseland's status as set down in the several concessions signed by Lewanika, and thereafter repeatedly reaffirmed by successive Governors and Secretaries of State and enshrined in the Con stitutions of 1924, 1953 and 1961.[112] The second document presented the Lozi case for a protectorate along the lines of the High Commission Territories, based on Barotseland's legal rights, its existence as a nation prior to the creation of Northern Rhodesia, the failure of the colonial government to develop Barotseland, the alleged meaninglessness of UNIP's electoral victories, the unsuitability of western democracy for African conditions, and the ostensible material advantages of becoming an independent protectorate.[113] Finally, Wilson produced a detailed written constitution for the new "Protectorate of Barotseland".[114]

Wilson's activities were conducted without undue publicity, not only not to provoke UNIP, but also because, after the Katengo elections, a number of the old guard had resigned themselves to the inevitability of their fate, some of them actually giving up their indunaships.[115] Indeed, Mwanawina himself apparently wished to find a <u>modus vivendi</u> with UNIP by this stage, but was deterred by the intransigence of an influential minority of extremists who still believed secession was possible; the extremists are said

to have included Mbikusita, Ngambela Siyubo, the Natamoyo (Mwanawina's half-brother), and indunas Inangwana, Luyanga, Imandi and Nalabutu. In public, however, they agreed that the best tactic was to concede that secession would not be granted and called instead for a kind of semi-independent status for Barotseland which would continue to share "common services" with Zambia.[116]

It was about the time that this compromise solution was suggested that rumours were circulating in Lusaka that Mwanawina might be appointed the first Governor-General of Zambia, in order to facilitate the integration of Barotseland into Zambia "by showing respect for the Paramount Chief's prestige".[117] Certainly Mwanawina's enemies claim that had Imwiko lived to make peace with UNIP, the Litunga might have fulfilled a function in Zambia similar to that of the Kabaka in independent Uganda.[118] In fact, there was probably no chance for such a solution for the Bemba members of UNIP would have bitterly resisted naming a Lozi to such a position, and Mwanawina personally was by this stage persona non grata to the entire party.

Against the Litunga were pitted the apparently united UNIP nationalists of Barotseland and the central government. The twenty-five new Katengo councillors, under Hastings Noyoo of Senanga, following the policy laid down in Lusaka, were opposing secession,

demanding that the Litunga become a figurehead, and calling for the dismissal of the Ngambela, partly in order to replace him with an elected man, but also because he symbolized the traditionalists' opposition to UNIP.[119]

Before action could be taken against Siyubo, however, a Lozi delegation had to meet representatives of the government to discuss the future of Barotseland. After an acrimonious dispute in which Noyoo led the elected Katengo councillors out of their first session of the National Council,[120] the Council agreed that five of the thirteen Lozi delegates to the Livingstone talks would be elected members, the other eight being what the latter called "traditionalist stooges".[121]

The UNIP government representatives at the talks, Arthur Wina and Simon Kapepwe, were anxious that a quick agreement be reached, since they believed Britain would not allow the elections preceding full independence without Barotseland's consent.[122] They naturally looked to the UNIP Katengo councillors to cooperate with them to this end, but discovered, for the first time, that Barotseland UNIP was comprised of men who intended to be both Lozi patriots - tribalists - and nationalists. The traditionalist indunas argued, predictably, that if they were to remain part of Zambia at all, it must be on the condition of virtually complete

local autonomy. Kapepwe and Wina were more chagrined to find that Hasting Noyoo's group differed only in degree, not in kind. The elected councillors wanted to be "part and parcel of Zambia", but with Barotseland's special status remaining intact and indeed being enshrined in the Zambian constitution.

This totally unexpected development forced Wina and Kapepwe to make important concessions to the Lozi in order to preclude complete failure and the possible postponement of the national elections as a result. It was agreed that Barotseland would remain part of the wider territory and participate in the 1964 elections, but the "final" discussion of Barotseland's relationship with independent Zambia was postponed to a later date.[123]

Returning to Barotseland, the elected councillors now determined to carry through the deposition of the Ngambela, perhaps in an attempt to demonstrate their solidarity with the national party. A series of furious debates in the National Council between the UNIP councillors and its traditionalist members was followed by a near-violent demonstration in Lealui against Siyubo,[124] and on the 18th of October he announced his resignation. The elected councillors, considering themselves the direct representatives of the Lozi people, demanded that their leader, Hastings Noyoo, become Ngambela, but the traditionalists, speaking for the Litunga,

refused to consider such an appointment. The two factions eventually agreed to compromise by selecting Muleta, the chief judge of the Libonda Kuta, as acting Ngambela, since he had an impressive reputation as a judge and had remained politically neutral to that point.[125] Muleta however soon discarded the guise of judicial impartiality and privately agreed that secession remained the only genuine hope of saving Barotseland from the nationalists.[126]

Nevertheless, the tactic in public remained one of apparent willingness to compromise. The Litunga accepted the Lusaka directive that a Working Party be established, consisting of representatives of both factions in the National Council, to make recommendations for the radical reform of the BNG. In fact, the two groups reached "a remarkable degree of agreement on most of the proposals for reform", including the separation of judiciary, legislature and executive and the gradual transformation of the Litunga into a constitutional monarch. On the critical point of the future composition of the National Council, however, their interests widely diverged, the elected councillors demanding a majority for themselves, the traditionalists calling for parity of representation between the two factions. With no obvious means to reconcile these conflicting views on the spot, both groups agreed in

January 1964 to submit the issue to Lusaka for arbitration.[127]

This was the second occasion since the Livingstone talks that Lealui appeared to be demonstrating its reasonableness. For in December it had presented a memorandum setting out its ideas for the future relationship of Barotseland and Zambia for consideration by the Lusaka government. The memorandum, a revised version of L. K. Wilson's draft, expressed the wish of the Lozi rulers to "achieve the closest possible integration with Northern Rhodesia which will permit the individuality and traditional institutions of Barotseland to remain". This objective could be assured only if Barotseland's special status were written into the new constitution. The memoramdum then proceeded to elaborate on the precise responsibilities and prerogatives which would remain in the hands of the National Council, concluding finally with the request that the Northern Rhodesian Government formally accept "responsibility for the financial support and economic development of Barotseland".[128] Here was the weakest point in Lealui's case for secession and UNIP's strongest bargaining counter, for the central government was then contributing some £250,000 annually to the Barotse Government.[129]

Clearly if Barotseland must be associated with Zambia - and Lealui was not yet persuaded that it must - the acceptance by UNIP

of these proposals would have gone far to assuage the sensibilities of the ruling class. Apparently the Litunga and his advisers did believe that a UNIP government would accede to their demands, and it was for this reason that they did not participate in the national elections of January 1964.[130] Of UNIP's ten candidates in Barotseland - who included such sons and daughters of the traditional ruling class as Arthur Wina, Dr. K. Konoso and Princess Nakatindi - all but three won by acclamation, the others scoring resounding victories.[131]

Presumably fearing that these results would stiffen UNIP's resistance to his demands, the Litunga's thoughts returned again to total secession. As we have seen, UNIP leaders had accused Lealui of seeking the help of South Africa and Portugal against the nationalists. In January 1964, Prince Ngombala Lubita - former member successively of ANC, BASIMO, UNIP, the Sicaba Party and again ANC - undertook a journey apparently to determine if assistance from these sources would be forthcoming.[132] Lubita claims the initiative for the trip came from the Litunga, but the latter's private secretary claims that Lubita was the instigator.[133] In any event, it is clear that Mwanawina arranged that WNLA, the local labour recruiting agency for the Rand mines, should provide the Prince with a free air journey to Johannesburg. WNLA was at

that time recruiting some five to six thousand men annually from Barotseland for South Africa, who received there about five pounds per month.[134] Lubita carried with him a letter from the Litunga to Gemmill, WNLA's General-Manager in South Africa, asking that WNLA's attestation fee to the BNG be raised from 11s 6d to 24s per head, an increase of about £5000 a year, and concluding that "it is my wish and mypeople's wish that we continue with our friendship as it was before".[135]

Lubita claims to have met Gemmill in Johannesburg. WNLA must already have been concerned that a UNIP government would repudiate its contract to recruit cheap labour in Barotseland,[136] and Lubita underlined for Gemmill the threat implied in Mwanawina's letter. As a result, WNLA agreed to raise its attestation fee as the letter requested.[137]

Lubita also claims that the Litunga wished him to visit sympathetic government officials in South Africa, Rhodesia, Portugal and France to seek financial and military aid for the Lozi ruling class. He indeed insists that from South Africa he was flown in a private plane to Paris and "other places", but refused to divulge further details; no other source either confirmed or denied this story. But the Litunga's private secretary, Mr. Imasiku, corroborates Lubita's claim that, through WNLA, the latter met on his return

journey in March 1964 with a representative of the Verwoerd government in Katima Molilo, in the Caprivi Strip on the border of Barotseland, for the purpose of obtaining South African military and financial assistance for Barotseland. Here Lubita ended his story, but Mr. Imasiku went on to say that the South African representative agreed to station troops in Katima Molilo, preparatory to a military invasion of Barotseland for the purpose of "freeing" it from Zambia. Mr. Imasiku in fact claims that a South African Police Depot was established at Katima Molilo immediately thereafter, but the Litunga in the end refused to endorse this bizarre scheme, for making Barotseland into a Bantustan of South Africa, while Lubita decided to return once again to the UNIP fold.[138]

We may surely assume, given Lubita's obvious lack of discretion, that he reported his adventures to the UNIP leaders, who, after the January elections, had taken sole possession of the Northern Rhodesian Government. It was perhaps at this stage that UNIP irrevocably determined to destroy the Barotse Native Government, though for tactical reasons it was prepared to promise the Lozi rulers certain privileges which it did not intend to fulfil after the formal attainment of independence in October 1964.[139]

Partly because he had adopted a similar tactic, and partly because he had come to realize that the elected Katengo councillors were less dangerous than he had originally feared, the Litunga agreed to implement certain reforms in the BNG which Lusaka had decided upon after assessing the dispute between the traditionalists and the elected councillors of the Working Party. Hastings Noyoo was elected deputy Ngambela, while the twelve appointed departmental indunas were replaced by five elected councillors each in charge of a department - finance, education, social services, natural resources, and transport and communications. These five men in effect formed the Cabinet, and with the Litunga and Acting Ngambela Muleta constituted the formal ruling body in local government.[140]

In a titular sense, therefore, UNIP had thus won effective control of the Barotse Government. When, however, the Barotseland delegation appeared in Lusaka for a further round of talks with the UNIP government, it became clear once again that the elected councillors were tribalists as well as nationalists. The delegation, led by the Litunga, included three elected and three traditional councillors, and the central government's representatives were obviously shocked to discover that they presented a united front.

The elected councillors refused to follow the party line, insisting as forcibly as the traditionalists that Barotseland would join Zambia only if its special status were recognized. In the end, it was the central government which was forced largely to capitulate. The Memorandum presented at the end of 1963[141] was essentially agreed to, and Kaunda and the Litunga issued a joint communique declaring that "Northern Rhodesia and Barotseland will go forward to independence as one country".[142]

It was not to be so easy, however. The Litunga had insisted that the agreement formally be incorporated into the Zambian constitution, but here UNIP drew the line. No other tribe in the territory had received so much special attention in the nationalists' advance towards full independence, and to single out the Lozi in the constitution was a flaunting of UNIP's "One Zambia, One Nation" motto to an extent the party - and particularly its Bemba members - was not prepared to accept. As a compromise, the Litunga and Kaunda agreed upon a formal treaty to be signed by the British, Barotse and Northern Rhodesian Governments.[143]

UNIP seemed willing, then, to conciliate the traditionalists, but it was not prepared to tolerate the breach of party discipline by the three elected councillars at the Lusaka talks. Hastings Noyoo and his two colleagues were consequently suspended from

the party for six months,[144] a punishment which offered the Litunga an obvious opportunity to consolidate the two factions in the National Council against the central government. Instead, he did precisely the opposite. Five days after the suspensions were announced, Mwanawina presented his slate of the twenty councillors which Lusaka had decided he could appoint to the 45-member National Council. Each of his nominees was a known political opponent of UNIP; eight had unsuccessfully stood against UNIP candidates in the Katengo elections of 1963, and at the top of the list stood UNIP's major bete noir, Godwin Mbikusita.[145]

Two of the elected councillors who had remained loyal to the national party, Saxon Liselo and Likolonga Masosa,[146] grasped this chance to re-unite the UNIP councillors. On the 4th of May, the National Council convened, and the elected members combined to demand that seventeen of the Litunga's twenty nominees, including Mbikusita, be replaced.[147] On the 5th of May, the Litunga received an invitation from Duncan Sandys, who had replaced Butler as Minister responsible for Central Africa, to send a delegation to London, where Sandys and Kaunda were already conferring.[148] All the National Council members wished to accept this invitation, but they were unable to agree on the composition of the Lozi delegation. The elected councillors unitedly demanded

that the delegation consist entirely of their representatives, a demand the appointed members naturally rejected. By the 7th of May, the Council was completely deadlocked,[149] and the Litunga announced that for internal reasons, it was impossible for him at this stage to go to London at all.[150]

This decision provoked the sending of two urgent telegrams to the Litunga, one from Roland Bell, MP, and S. B. Cook, who had been appointed as his advisers by the Conservative government, the other from the Under-Secretary of State in the Commonwealth Relations Office. Both messages strongly urged the Litunga to get his delegation to London immediately, lest at the conclusion of the independence conference with Sandys, Kaunda would demand to settle the position of Barotseland with or without the participation of Lozi representatives.[151]

On the following day, the 12th of May, the National Council reconvened. Given the urgency of the situation, the meeting finally agreed to a three-man delegation consisting of the Litunga, Acting Ngambela Muleta, and Deputy Ngambela Noyoo; John Wilson, the Boma officer who had been seconded to the BNG as Administrative Secretary the previous November, would accompany the delegation. The two factions also agreed that the delegation would press for an agreement along the lines reached at the Lusaka talks, and that

such an agreement must be written into the new Zambian constitution.[152]

On the 15th of May, the Litunga and his party flew to London where they met with Sandys and Kaunda. They found that the latter was prepared to accept the Lusaka agreement, but would on no condition agree that it be entrenched in the constitution. On the advice of Roland Bell, the Conservative MP, the Lozi representatives agreed to a separate treaty. Sandys, Kaunda and Bell all explained that Britain was prepared to sign such an agreement not as a participant but only as a witness. It was clear at the time, however, and became increasingly evident in the following months, that the Lozi failed to grasp the crucial distinction. For this reason, though they were disappointed that the agreement would not be incorporated into the constitution, they considered that they had won a substantial victory.[153]

On the 18th of May, Kaunda and the Litunga signed "The Barotseland Agreement, 1964", Duncan Sandys adding his signature "signifying the approval of Her Majesty's Government". Its purpose was to establish Barotseland's position within Zambia in place of the earlier agreement between Britain and Barotseland which would be terminated when Northern Rhodesia became fully independent in October. To this end, Barotseland was to become

an integral part of Zambia with its traditional rights preserved, and the Litunga was to retain powers over local government matters greater than those granted to any other chief in Zambia.[154] The reason Kaunda was prepared to grant such privileges to the Lozi, and why he insisted on a separate treaty rather than a clause in the constitution, is quite clear. As Mr. Clement Zaza, UNIP's Political Assistant in Barotseland, openly acknowledged a year later,

> The Barotseland London Agreement was agreed upon merely as a passport to enable Zambia (to) integrate Barotseland and proceed to Independence as one country. After all, the Zambia Government has no moral obligation whatsoever to respect or honour the said Agreement.[155]

The three Northern Rhodesian groups involved in the London agreement, then, shared contradictory hopes as to its future implications. To the UNIP government, it was a simple expedient which it could, if necessary, repudiate in imposing its authority over Barotseland. To the Litunga, it was the means to preserve the traditional prerogatives of the Lozi ruling class. To the elected councillors, it was a further step towards usurping the positions and privileges of the traditional rulers. There was never any doubt that, in the end, Zambia was going to rule Barotseland. UNIP was initially prepared to allow this process to transpire

gradually and gently, but the intransigence and uncooperative attitude of both factions of the National Council assured that it came swiftly, brutally, and definitively.[156]

After the signing of the Barotseland Agreement, the central government decided to give the BNG the opportunity to implement the reforms emanating from the Working Party's report earlier in the year. Aside from the appointments of five elected councillors as departmental heads, and of Noyoo as Deputy Ngambela, no reforms had been carried out. Above all, the judiciary, executive and legislature were still not separated; indunas remained judges, legislators and civil servants.

The National Council, however, was far too involved in internecine warfare to concern itself with reforms. The elected councillors were primarily determined upon removing Mbikusita and several of his supporters from the Council,[157] but the Litunga refused and the antagonism between the two factions intensified. In August, Nalumino Mundia, the Minister of Local Government and a Lozi, came to Lealui and informed the National Council that local government reforms must commence immediately.[158] For the first time, the councillors - elected and appointed alike - understood that their positions were in real jeopardy, and from this point, rather than merely procrastinate, they became positively,

intrasigently, obstructive.

Nevertheless, the split within the National Council continued. Concerted pressure on the Litunga by the new Resident Minister,[159] Jose Monga of Southern Province, and by the elected councillors finally resulted in the dismissal in October of Mbikusita and two of his supporters from the Council. At the same time, however, the rupture between the elected councillors and the central government deepened, for Lusaka appointed as Political Assistant to the Resident Minister, Clement Zaza, instead of one of their own number.[160]

Barotseland celebrated Independence Day, 24 October 1964, along with the rest of Zambia. Six days later, Sikota Wina, another Lozi who had replaced Mundia as Minister of Local Government, announced that the National Council would elect a permanent Ngambela at the end of November.[161] Only two candidates stood, both of them elected councillors, and on 30 November Hastings Noyoo was easily elected to the Ngambelaship. The Litunga, however, was not reconciled to an elected Ngambela, and refused to instal Noyoo. Sikoto Wina flew to Lealui to demand that Noyoo be installed by the 19th of December or the government would itself announce that it recognized him as Ngambela. Wina made it clear to the Litunga that "this was not just a matter of

appointing the Ngambela. It is a test case, a matter of principle of the supremacy of the Central Government over local authorities ...."[162]

Noyoo was finally installed as Ngambela on the 19th of December, thus averting an immediate confrontation between Lealui and Lusaka, but perhaps giving the latter the false impression that its will would henceforth prevail. When, a short time later, the government announced that a Provincial Development Commission would be set up to coordinate development projects in Barotseland, all but five loyal UNIP members of the National Council united to protest against the decision as an infringement of the rights of the BNG under the Barotseland Agreement. It was this decision by the Council which caused Lusaka finally to lose patience with the Lozi councillors, while it made the two factions within the Council realize that their common interests outweighed their disagreements. In January 1965, with only a handful of UNIP loyalists dissenting, the Council announced that the time was not propitious for reforming the Barotse Government; indeed, the Council declared, its real objective was to make Barotseland a "sister state" of Zambia, part of a loose federation in which the Zambian government was to pay the bills for but have no control over the Lozi.[163]

Lusaka refused to take this challenge seriously, however, and went ahead with some of the reforms which it had been openly

discussing for the past months. In February 1965, the judges (indunas) of the several Kutas were informed that as of 1 July they would fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, and in March, the government announced that capital development projects would henceforth be carried out not through the Kutas but through the Bomas. When the chief officer of the Senanga District Local Authority was instructed to move his organization from the Nalolo Kuta to the Senanga Boma, the Mokwae of Nalolo demanded an urgent meeting of the National Council. On the 28th of May, with only a handful of dissenters, the Council resolved never to move the Local Authorities from their existing sites to the Bomas nor to hand over jurisdiction of Lozi judges to the Ministry of Justice. It decided to present a memorandum to the central government rejecting all further reforms and accusing it of breaking the 1964 Agreement.

UNIP could hardly tolerate such provocation much longer. Already the councillors total absorption in political machinations had resulted in the failure of virtually all of Lusaka's development plans. In December 1964, funds had been allocated for water schemes, access roads to courts, artesian wells and agricultural drainage canals; by the middle of 1965, the Lozi authorities had not begun a single one of these projects.[164] In May, the government

announced that a total of £1,500,000 was to be spent in Barotseland under its Transitional Development Plan,[165] and there was a real fear that the implementation of the various projects would be forestalled by the Council.

At the Council meeting on the 28th of May, it had been decided to refuse all further cooperation with Lusaka - Francis Suu declared that the Lozi would "resist to the death" any encroachment on their rights - and the Ngambela was given authority to seek widespread publicity for the grievances of the newly united elites in Lealui. In June, Zambian newspapers were rife with sensational stories of the rift between Barotseland and the UNIP government. A number of senior ministers, led by Arthur Wina, flew to Mongu, where Wina informed the Ngambela that the National Council must either cooperate or go to jail. Noyoo agreed,[166] and Wina publicly announced that the National Council had made a full apology for "misinterpreting the Government's policy".[167]

A fortnight later, the Ngambela openly repudiated the apology.[168] This was Lusaka's breaking point. As a direct consequence of Noyoo's statement, the government decided to introduce its Local Government Bill, abolishing the National Council and replacing it by five district councils, initially appointed by the Minister of Local

Government, later to be elected.[169] "Just Another Chief Now", headlined the newspapers,[170] and though the Litunga was promised that he would remain "the final authority in Barotseland in all matters concerning the allocation of land",[171] this assessment was accurate.

The Litunga lost the right to appoint councillors and judges (now separate functions), his control of the Barotse Treasury, and his right to reject legislation of which he disapproved. The central government paid the salaries of the royal family and the Litunga's household staff, and the President's office itself was the source of his own annual income of £10,000.[172] In short, Mwanawina's power basis was cut from under him, he was totally dependent on the men he was trying to resist, and these facts he understood completely.[173]

The reaction in Lealui was predictably furious. Chiefs and indunas gathered in the capital to discuss ways of resisting the new measures. They considered starting a new party to promote their interests,[174] and, still failing to grasp either constitutional or political realities, wrote letters to friends in London demanding the intervention of the British government.[175] Godwin Mbikusita, then working in Southern Rhodesia, was asked to return to lead the opposition;[176] he did not do so, and if he had, the Resident Minister

was prepared to deport him from Barotseland. Although some councillors understood that they were provoking potentially dire consequences for themselves, a vocal minority, led by the Natamoyo and Induna Luyanga, were attempting to persuade the Litunga that all was not lost.[177] Luyanga openly told me that the Lozi had many white friends in London, Washington, Katanga and Johannesburg to whom they could still appeal, and if Barotseland was to be destroyed, their friends would help them destroy Zambia in the process. Luyanga and the Natamoyo were indeed trying to convince the Litunga to write the necessary letters of appeal to these "friends".[178]

In fact, it was far too late. The government was quite prepared, had the need arisen, simply to arrest and imprison all the dissidents. In October 1965, President Kaunda signed the order bringing into force the Local Government Bill, and on the 1st of November, Sikota Wina published the statutory instruments abolishing the National Council, setting up the five District Councils and announcing the names of their nominated members.[179] Shortly before, Parliament had approved the Chiefs Act, effectively giving the President unilateral authority to recognize or withdraw recognition from any chief in Zambia; the Litunga of Barotseland

was explicitly mentioned as falling under the provisions of this Act,[180] and there was no reason to doubt, first, that it would be applied if Lealui continued as a centre of opposition to Lusaka, and secondly, that Mwanawina's successor would in effect be chosen by the central government.

Given the realities of African nationalism, it was inevitable that the work of the British South Africa Company was completed by a black government. The destruction of the old kingdom of Barotseland was now total; it became merely one among seven provinces of independent Zambia. In retrospect, one can see that this was the logically necessary result of the initiative taken by Lewanika eight decades earlier. Had his vision of creating a modern state along western lines been fulfilled, the outcome might have been somewhat altered. But because the Company had decimated his empire, and because it was the policy of neither the Company nor the British government to develop modern nations in black Africa, Barotseland had long before been transformed into a backward, isolated and essentially insignificant labour reserve, comprising only one-sixth of the land mass and containing less than one-tenth of the population of Zambia.[181]

Yet it is unlikely that in the event anything could have reversed its fate. Not even larger and economically more viable kingdoms

like those of the Ganda and the Ashanti could escape the inexorable fate implicit in the nationalist creed. Pride, independence of spirit, attitudes of superiority, even fighting skill - all are inadequate in the face of the power available to a modern government. "One Zambia, One Nation" was irreconcilable with the continued existence of a privileged tribal elite, and the failure of that elite to attempt to accommodate itself to the new order - as Lewanika had recognized that it was necessary to do when faced with white power - assured that its destruction came sooner rather than later. But it had to come, and Lewanika's son, whatever tactics he had adopted, could have prevented it no more than his more adaptable father was able to deter the British South Africa Company. In the end, the successors of Khama became the rulers of independent Botswana at the expense of their country remaining a client state of and a labour reservoir for South Africa. Lewanika's successors lost their power in independent Zambia, but his hopes for modernizing his country are now likely to be fulfilled, to the benefit of the mass of the Lozi people if not to its traditional elite.

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Chapter 8

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2. G. Clay, Annual Report on the Barotseland Protectorate, 1959, copy in Boma Files.

3. Harry Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.220.

4. Mr. C. Zaza.

5. Messrs. Mbanga Mutemwa and Hastings Noyoo, who became Ngambela in 1964 representing UNIP.

6. Messrs. C. Zaza, M. Mutemwa, Noyoo and Simalumba.

7. Prince Ngombala Lubita, Messrs. N. and A. Zaza, Kapota, Mupatu and Lifunana Imasiku.

8. Mr. C. Zaza.

9. Mr. L. Imasiku.

10. Northern News, 19 Jan 1960 and 20 Jan 1960.

11. Ibid., 23 May 1960, and Mr. Imasiku.

12. Mr. Imasiku; Clay, Report, 1960; African Mail, 21 March 1961.

13. Mr. M. Kawana, formerly a senior induna, Sesheke Kuta; L. A. Ambanwa, Chief Judge, Sesheke Kuta; M. Timwendela, induna, Sesheke Kuta; Y. Mupatu, formerly induna, Lealui Kuta.

14. Chief Liatitima.

15. For e.g., Mwendaweli Lewanika, Chief of Mankoya District, in Monckton Commission Report, App. VIII, Evidence Vol. 2, p.246.

16. Under Order No. 8, Public Meetings, in BNG Orders and Rules, English version (Lusaka, 1957), p.11.

17. According to Franklin, op.cit., 220.

18. Induna Kawana at Sesheke told me Chief Lubinda selected him "to go out to the people of his district and talk against UNIP".

19. Monckton Commission Report, op.cit., pp.207-8.

20. Report of the Advisory Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Cmd. 1148 (London, 1960).

21. Hall, op.cit., p.240.

22. Clay, Report, 1960.

23. African Mail, 22 Nov 1960.

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26. Ibid., 6 Dec 1960. Pratt had made the same distinction between Buganda and Barotseland earlier; see Low and Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule, pp.299-300.

27. Jack Halpern, South Africa's Hostages : Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (London, 1965), Parts 3 and 4.

28. Govan Mbeki, South Africa : The Peasants' Revolt (London, 1964), p.16.

29. Northern News, 6 Dec 1960.

30. Ibid., 22 Jan 1959, and Memorandum by Konoso in Monckton Commission Report, p. 70.

31. African Mail, 22 Nov 1960.

32. Prince Ngombala Lubita, one of its officials.

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33. African Mail, 27 Dec 1960.

34. Clay, Report, 1960.

35. Heath, Report, 1961.

36. Cited in Mbeki, op. cit., p. 60.

37. African Mail, 7 March 1961.

38. Ibid., 18 July 1961; Northern News, 22 April 1961; Heath, Report, 1961.

39. Northern News, 5 April 1961 and 14 April 1961.

40. Heath, Report, 1961.

41. African Mail, 13 June 1961.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 12 Sept 1961.

44. Northern News, 16 May 1961; African Mail, 25 July 1961.

45. Mr. L. Imasiku.

46. Copy of the judgment, signed " W. E. Windham, Judge, 15 Dec 1961, In the High Court of Northern Rhodesia at Lusaka", shown to me by Chief Liatitima.

47. African Mail, 16 Jan 1962; Chief Liatitima, Prince Lubita and Mr. L. Imasiku.

48. Mr. H. Noyoo.

49. Heath, Report, 1951.

50. Mr. L. Imasiku.

51. Sir Roy Welensky, Welensky's Four Thousand Days (London, 1964), pp.318, 322-3.

52. Franklin, Unholy Wedlock, p.219.

53. Ibid., pp.216-22; African Mail, 20 Feb 1962; Northern News, 26 Feb 1962.

54. Central African Mail (formerly African Mail), 6 March 1962.

55. Ibid., 27 Feb 1962.

56. Ibid., 6 Mar 1962.

57. Ibid., 27 Mar 1962.

58. Welensky, op. cit., pp.360-1.

59. Northern News, 23 April 1962.

60. Ibid., 12 May 1962.

61. Ibid., 3 May 1962.

62. Informant "X", a senior European official at the Mongu Boma, who asked that he not be identified.

63. See, for e.g., Hall, opcit., p.219, and D. C. Mulford, The Northern Rhodesian Elections, 1962 (Nairobi, 1964), p.143.

64. Copy of letter from F. L. Suu, Y. Mupatu, and L. Mufungulwa to the Litunga, 27 Nov 1962, in possession of Mr. Mupatu. The three men were among the founders of the new party.

65. Informant X.

66. Mr. L. Imasiku, the Paramount's private secretary.

67. Central African Mail, 25 Sept 1962, and Chief Liatitima.

68. Suu et al to Litunga, 27 Nov 1962, op. cit.

69. Messrs. L. Imasiku and Mupatu, and Central African Mail, 23 Oct 1962.

70. Central African Mail, 23 Oct 1962.

71. Mr. Imasiku.

72. Messrs. Mupatu and Simalumba.

73. Central African Mail, 24 July 1962, and Mr. L. Imasiku.

74. Mr. Simalumba. Suu's role reflects on the highly conservative nature of much of Mwanawina's opposition in the 1950's.

75. Mulford, op. cit., p.143.

76. Central African Mail, 23 Oct 1962; Northern News, 18 Oct 1962.

77. Northern News, 4 Sept 1962.

78. Ibid.

79. Central African Mail, 17 July 1962 and 24 July 1962.

80. Mulford, op. cit., p.90; Mr. H. Noyoo.

81. Central African Mail, 30 Oct 1962. Many people of both races frequently described the Lozi system as a "feudal" one. For the differences between European feudalism and the Lozi system see Gluckman, Politics, Law and Ritual, p.40.

82. Northern News, 8 May 1962; Mulford, op. cit., pp.143-4.

83. T. Ranger, "Tribalism and Nationalism : The Case of Barotseland" (unpublished typescript), p.12 .

84. Mulford, op. cit., pp.143-4.

85. Suu et al to Litunga and the chiefs of all the District Kutas, 27 Nov 1962, op. cit.

86. Northern News, 13 Dec 1962.

87. Mr. C. Zaza.

88. Prince Lubita.

89. Central African Mail, 24 Dec 1962.

90. Ibid.

91. Messrs. Imasiku, Mupatu, Simalumba and Chief Liatitima.

92. Mr. Imasiku and Central African Mail, 29 Jan 1963.

93. Rawlins (Acting RC), Report, 1963.

94. Northern News, 20 Feb 1963.

95. Ibid., 16 May 1963, 1 June 1963, 11 July 1963, 2 Aug 1963.

96. Ibid., 11 July 1963.

97. Central African Mail, 13 July 1963 and Mr. H. Noyoo.

98. Northern News, 2 Aug 1967.

99. Sir Mwanawina.

100a. Central African Mail, 3 Aug 1963.

101. Northern News, 15 Aug 1962.

102. Prince Lubita; Central African Mail, 23 March 1963; Northern News, 1 Aug 1963.

103. Middleton (RC) to Ministry of Native Affairs, 11 July 1963, Boma Files, Resident Commissioners' Letters; Northern News, 20 Aug and 22 Aug 1963.

104. Mr. Mbanga Mutemwa and Chief Liatitima. The latter stood as a UNIP candidate in Sesheke District and the former was one of his campaign organizers.

105. Mr. (later Ngambela) H. Noyoo, who told me that certain indunas had revealed these facts to him. See also below.

106. Central African Mail, 24 Aug 1963.

107. Northern News, 22 Aug 1963.

108. Rawlins (RC), Report, 1963. In the same year, in an election in the Transkei, "the voters routed the pro-government candidates and proved conclusively that the people of the Transkei ... are overwhelmingly opposed to apartheid and ... separate territorial development". Mbeki, op.cit., p.21.

109. Central African Mail, 24 Aug 1963.

110. Informant X.

111. Mr. L. Imasiku, the Litunga's private secretary. Wilson stayed with Mr. Graebert of the Lealui PMS.

112. "Historical Record of Assurances Given of Barotseland's Rights", undated, privately held.

113. "The Lozi Case for a Protectorate", 1963, privately held.

114. "Barotseland Constitution", 1963, privately held.

115. Rawlins, Report, 1963.

116. Informant X.

117. Central African Mail, 31 Aug 1963.

118. Messrs. Kapota and Mukande.

119. Northern News, 20 Aug 1963 and 31 Aug 1963; Central African Mail, 17 Aug 1963.

120. Northern News, 5 Sept 1963.

121. Ibid., and Mr. H. Noyoo.

122. Central African Mail, 31 Aug 1963.

123. Northern News, 13 Sept 1963; Rawlins, Report, 1963; Mr. H. Noyoo.

124. Rawlins, Report, 1963. As a result of the incipient riots, Mr. John Wilson was appointed by the Boma as Administrative Secretary to the BNG. He lived in the capital for almost a year, both to deter violence and to keep a close scrutiny on events.

125. Messrs. H. Noyoo and X.

126. Informant X.

127. Rawlins, Report, 1963.

128. Memorandum by the Barotse Government in Preparation for Negotiations with the Northern Rhodesian Government Regarding its Future Status (undated), Boma Files, Negotiations with Central Government Dossier.

129. Northern News, 11 June 1965.

130. Informant X.

131. Central African Mail, 24 Jan 1964. Arthur Wina defeated his opponents, for e.g., 14,676 to 515.

132. Lubita himself cannot be considered a reliable source, but the fact of his journey is confirmed by Mr. L. Imasiku, personal secretary to the Litunga, and informant X of the Mongu Boma.

133. Mr. Lifunana Imasiku.

134. Northern Rhodesian Labour Department, Annual Report, 1960, and Mr. Richard Bailey, WNLA Representative, Barotseland, 1950-65.

135. Lubita showed me a copy of this letter, undated, bearing the Litunga's official seal.

136. Which it in fact did in 1967.

137. Mr. Bailey of WNLA in Mongu denies this, but Lubita's claim is confirmed by Mr. L. Imasiku and Griffiths Mukande, Treasurer of the BNG until 1963.

138. The interviews with Messrs. Imasiku and Lubita were of course conducted separately.

139. Mr. Clement Zaza, who later became UNIP Political Assistant for Barotseland.

140. Mr. H. Noyoo and Northern News, 25 March 1964.

141. See fn. 128.

142. Northern News, 20 April 1964.

143. L. K. Wilson to Litunga, 20 April 1964, Boma Files, Negotiations with Central Government Dossier; Kaunda to Litunga, 20 April 1964, ibid.

144. Central African Mail, 24 April 1964.

145. Informant X and Chief Liatitima.

146. Later Political Assistant in Northern Province and Political Organizer in Barotseland, respectively.

147. Informant X.

148. Central African Mail, 8 May 1964.

149. Informant X.

150. Northern News, 11 May 1964.

151. Bell and Hudson to Litunga, 11 May 1964, Boma Files, op. cit.; Acting RC Rawlins to Litunga, 11 May 1964, ibid.

152. Minutes of an Extraordinary Meeting of the National Council, 12 May 1964, ibid.

153. Mr. H. Noyoo and informant X.

154. The Barotseland Agreement 1964, Cmd. 2366, 19 May 1964 (London, 1964).

155. Cited in Ngambela Noyoo to President Kaunda, 23 June 1965, Boma Files, op. cit. Mr. Zaza made the same comment to me.

156. I am indebted for much of the following data to Mr. John Stewart, Senior Provincial Local Government Officer from Oct 1964 to Dec 1965. He was the representative in Barotseland of the Ministry of Local Government, under the aegis of which most of the reforms were carried out.

157. Central African Mail, 29 May 1964.

158. Speech by Mundia to National Council, 6 Aug 1964, Boma Files, op. cit.

159. Resident Ministers replaced Provincial Commissioners, or, in Barotseland's special case, the Resident Commissioner.

160. Mr. Stewart.

161. Northern News, 30 Oct 1964.

162. Ibid., 21 Dec 1964.

163. Mr. Stewart.

164. Ibid.

165. Central African Mail, 14 May 1965.

166. Mr. Stewart.

167. Northern News, 10 June 1965.

168. Ibid., 29 June 1965.

169. Mr. Stewart.

170. Zambian Mail (formerly Central African Mail), 3 Sept 1965.

171. John Stewart to the Litunga, 24 Sept 1965, privately held.

172. Times of Zambia (formerly Northern News), 22 Sept 1965.

173. Ngambela Noyoo to John Stewart, 20 Sept 1965, privately held.

174. Prince Ngombala Lubita.

175. Mr. L. Imasiku; also Minutes of a meeting between Mr. John Stewart and 55 Chiefs and Indunas at Lealui, 27 Aug 1965, taken by myself.

176. Mr. Imasiku.

177. Ibid.

178. Ibid.

179. Times of Zambia, 30 Oct 1965.

180. Government of Zambia, Act No. 67 of 1965, 4 Oct 1965.

181. As Cranford Pratt observed in 1958, Barotseland "has none of the influence or power vis-a-vis the Central Government which Buganda enjoys because of her dominant position economically, politically, and culturally within Uganda". Low and Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule, p.299.


22°
24°
14°
16°
BALOVALE
KALABO
MONGU
LEALUI
MANKOYA
SENANGA
SESHEKE
Balovale
Kalabo
Mongu
Nalolo
Senanga
Mankoya
Sesheke
Kasangula
Machili Forest Area
DONGWE R.
SABOMPOL R.
LUANGINGA R.
ZAMBEZI R.
LUI R.
KWANDO R.
MASHI R.
MACHILI R.
LEGEND
INTERNATIONAL
BAROTSELAND
DISTRICT BOUNDARIES
1900 RESERVE
AREAS OF 1900 RESERVE OUTSIDE PROVINCE
1909 EXTENSION OF RESERVE
NON RESERVE AREA WITHIN PROVINCE
BALOVALE EXCISION 1941
BAROTSELAND
SCALE
0 20 40 60 80 100

BAROTSELAND

(after Balovale excision - 1941)

SCALE

0 20 40 60 80 100

LEGEND

FLOOD PLAIN

RAILWAYS

PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY

22° 24° 26° 28°

14° 16° 18°

LUNDA

LUBALE

KAONDE

LAMBA

MBUNDA

NKOYA

NYENGO

LOZI

KWANGWA

MASHASHA

MONGU

MBUNDA

TOTELA

ILA

MASHI

TOKA

TONGA

SUBIYA

ANGOLA

CAPRIVI STRIP

S.W. AFRICA

BOTSWANA

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

Balovale

Kasempa

Lukulu

Mankoya

Lalafuta R.

Lungwebungu R.

Kabompo R.

Dongwe R.

Luanginga R.

Libonda

Kalabo

Limulunga

Lealui

Sefula

Nalolo

Namushakende

Senanga

Lui R.

Lumbe R.

Kwando or Mashi R.

Zambezi R.

Sioma

Mulobezi

Machili R.

Shesheke

Katima Molilo

Kasangula

Livingstone

Victoria Falls

Wankie

Pandamatenka

Linyanti

Chobe R.

Nkana

Ndola

Luanshya

Kapiri Mposhi

Broken Hill

KAFUE RIVER

Lusaka

Namwala

Kafue

Chirundu

Choma

ZAMBEZI RIVER

ZAMBIA



SOURCES

A. A NOTE ON SOURCES

This thesis has been based on both oral and written sources, though the balance between the two has been uneven. Not sufficient time was spent collecting oral evidence. This was not wholly foreseeable, for the general inadequacy of Lozi testimonies became evident only towards the end of my field work. As a result, the period up to about the middle 1930's is based largely on written sources, supplemented by oral testimonies; for the final three decades, the reverse is on the whole true.

These generalizations must be qualified. For the latter period, for example, critical data was obtained from newspapers, the annual reports of the Provincial/Resident Commissioner, the PMS archives in Sefula, and the Boma Files in Mongu. In fact, these written sources more substantially complemented oral data for the final thirty years than Lozi testimonies supplemented the written records for the earlier period. Indeed, it is probably true that, with one exception, Lozi informants did not quantitatively add to the information which was extracted from the written sources.

Significantly, the exception was an eyewitness to the events of 1884-5 and 1888 in Sesheke, Mr. L. B. Kalimukwa, younger brother of Sitwala Mulanziani, who supported Mataa against Lewanika

during the rebellion of 1884-5. Similarly, the reason why Lozi informants proved so much more valuable for the later period was because most of them were eyewitnesses of and often participants in, the events they discussed. To be sure, the accounts of participants are bound to be highly biassed, and must be scrutinized very rigorously. Nevertheless, there can be no question that, among the Lozi at least, the testimonies of eyewitnesses proved infinitely more fruitful than what Vansina defines as "oral tradition" proper - hearsay accounts of the past.[1]

The Lozi, perhaps because they consider themselves a superior people, are very conscious of their history. A Lozi house servant working for a white trader or official in Mongu knows the names of his past kings and their ngambelas in a way that, for example, a relatively educated middle class Canadian would not recall the names of Canada's prime ministers or the kings of England. Yet their knowledge is tightly circumscribed. Even amateur historians such as Messrs. Simalumba, Mupatu and Newo Zaza were unable (or unwilling) to shed light on a number of important questions. Neither they nor any other Lozi informant had ever heard of Silva Porto, and had minimal knowledge of the Helmore-Price expedition of 1860, Livingstone, Serpa Pinto, and Westbeech. More importantly, their knowledge of the internal

politics of the court was superficial. They were usually unable to explain the conflicting interests of various factions, and indeed, aside from those situations in which there was an open dispute within the National Council - such as during the negotiations for the Lochner Concession in 1890 - tended to speak of the ruling class as a monolithic entity.

There seem to be several explanations for this superficial level of knowledge. Partly it may be a result of the highly centralized nature of the Lozi state, wherein oral tradition is passed down through the members of the ruling class, and in consequence is the story of whose who have been victorious; this of course is hardly a unique phenomena, much of the history of Europe having been produced in the same way. Secondly, oral tradition recalls largely that which remains important to the present generation. Virtually any Lozi can testify to the autochthonous nature of the Lozi kingdom, an interpretation which legitimizes the right of the present ruling family to hold office. For, although it is impossible to quantify, I believe that the large majority of Lozi in Barotseland are proud of their kingship and their heritage. Moreover, Coillard is remembered rather than Westbeech, in part of course because he lived for fifteen years longer and actually taught the fathers of several of my informants,

but also because the PMS continues as an important institution in the lives of many Lozi. George Middleton, who failed, is barely recalled. For the same reason, informants recalled the Lochner Concession but had only the dimmest recollection of the Ware Concession of 1889. Again, to most Lozi, after 1890 the important political events were not the internecine conflicts within the ruling class, but the united front of all Lozi against the onslaught of the Company's administrators.

In the same way, Lozi institutions which have disappeared are no longer remembered. Gluckman places great emphasis on the important role of the makolo - the non-territorial political sectors - in pre-20th century Lozi history. He indeed claims that Lewanika's attempt to re-institute the makolo between 1878 and 1884 was one of the key reasons for his overthrow.[2] I have accepted this argument, even though no Lozi informant volunteered information about the makolo, and few of them could describe it when asked directly. Even in 1941, Gluckman observed that "Older people recognize their attachment to their hereditary sector head ... but some young men do not know to which sector they belong".[3] Today, not even the old men know their sector, and I believe the reason is simple: though the makolo system had not functioned since the 19th century,

a number of indunas still bore the titles of makolo heads in 1941. Six years later, as part of the government's enforced programme of reforms of the Barotse Government, these titles were abolished since their bearers had no obvious function in the BNG. Two decades later, the entire concept of the sector system was forgotten by Lozi informants. In 1965, the traditional National Council was abolished by the UNIP government; it is not at all inconceivable that students who in the future try to record Lozi traditions - Lozi students not excluded - will find that their informants will know as little about the Council as mine did about the makolo.

Finally, oral tradition has been greatly influence - and it is perhaps not too much to say corrupted - by Adolph Jalla of the PMS's History of the Barotse Nation, first published in 1909. A history of the Lozi nation from its presumed genesis, it may not unfairly be considered the official history of the ruling class and the PMS. His informants were Lewanika, Ngambela Mokamba and the senior indunas of the Lealui Kuta, and Jalla acknowledged that "The history was read to the Kuta before it was published. It is wholly approved by the Kuta."[4] As Charles White, a serious student of Zambian ethnohistory, has recently written,

> Lozi traditions as recorded by Jalla are in general a disappointing source of ethnohistorical data. They provide no corroboration for cross-references from other traditions, and in fact are in contradiction to them; they contain an unusual amount of miraculous fairy tales in comparison with analogous traditions .... One may suspect that these traditions involve an unusual degree of manipulation of history for reasons of dynastic prestige, since so little real history is provided in them ....[5]

In short, Jalla "proved" that Lewanika was the direct descendant of the first Lozi king who was the son of god.

At the same time, the History is tendentious as regards the PMS as well as the royal family. Referring to the strife and instability following Lewanika's return to the throne in 1885, Jalla comments :

> It really seemed as if the nation wished to commit suicide. But no. The Lord of pity intended to save it by bringing to it the Gospel of peace and love. In March 1886, the King of Kings sent his servant François Coillard to Barotseland, and through him the country began to be saved.[6]

The damage Jalla has done to attempts accurately to reconstruct Lozi history through oral tradition is incalculable. His book has been read by every literate Lozi in the past half-century. On numerous occasions I found informants using phrases taken directly from Jalla. The members of the Sesheke Kuta frequently referred to their copy in Silozi during my interview with them. One could not always be sure whether this dependence on Jalla was not merely a device to keep anything but the authorized version from the interviewer. At

times, I sensed that this was the reason, but on several occasions I was convinced that the informant had little else to relate. Most Lozi are pleased that Jalla seems to confirm that their royal family is directly descended from the son of God. But even the most sophisticated of them accept that murder and bloodshed was commonplace after the 1885 counter-rebellion, information which Jalla received not from the royal family but from the semi-hysterical reports of his colleague, Coillard.

To be sure, Coillard's voluminous outpourings can not be overlooked by the historian. From 1884 to 1890 his journals and letters stored in Paris provide the only regular source of written observations about Barotseland. Since they had never previously been used, one expected them to be the key evidence for the period. Unfortunately for the historian, however, they epitomize what Gray has called the "uncomprehending comments of European observers" of African life during the last half of the 19th century.[7] Nor do his unpublished journals and diaries go far to adding to the information which was provided in On the Threshold of Central Africa. It is of great interest that in 1878, when he was still a supplicant hoping for permission to establish a mission in Barotseland, Coillard's comments on Lozi life and society were on the whole favourable. This, I believe, is because he wanted to be able to prove to his friends in

Europe, upon whom he had to rely for financial backing, that Barotseland was a fruitful area for mission work. Immediately upon his return in 1884, however, having found his initial finances and in Europe/believing he was now welcome in the country, his point of view dramatically shifted. "I have studied heathenism at close quarters in Basutoland as among the Zulu and other tribes," he wrote "But here it surpasses all conception .... (Here one finds) all that is hideous and odious in paganism ...."[8]

This was before the rebellion, before the bloodshed and murder. The explanation for this volte face lies, I believe, with Coillard rather than with the changed circumstances in Barotseland. For now that his mission had been established, he had to demonstrate to his sponsors in Europe the vital necessity for continuing his crusade to end what he considered the "savagery" and immorality of the Lozi.

Sharing, to begin with, the prejudices of most Europeans in Africa during this period, needing to prove his indispensability in bringing "civilization" to the heathens, Coillard's perspective of Lozi life and politics was hardly judicious and impartial. Nor did the circumstances of the Lozi political scene create a climate in which he felt sufficiently comfortable to begin providing a less distorted view of the situation. Coillard's time in the Barotse Valley may roughly be divided into two : 1885 to 1893-4, when he feared

that the mission would be ejected from the country; and 1894 to his death in 1904, after Lewanika determined that the mission was to remain. During the first period, Coillard could see nothing but the machinations of what he unrevealingly called "the pagan conservative party", led by induna Nalabutu, whose motives and interests he never understood beyond the fact that the "party" was hostile to the mission and to British protection upon which the PMS had begun to rely for its safety. At the same time, he consistently referred to Lewanika contemptuously as a "weather-cock", believing him weak and labile, wholly refusing to see that the King was caught in an impossible position between the factions in the Kuta. During the latter period, Coillard and the King developed a warm personal relationship. Lewanika, however, refused to the end to convert to Christianity, and Coillard's disappointment was so profound that once again he allowed his personal prejudices to colour his observations. So bitter was he, in fact, that he opposed Lewanika's trip to England in 1902,[9] almost certainly for vindictive reasons. From first to last, therefore, his role, as Gann has said, was that of "the self-confessed 'Micah' and moral critic of the Barotse and their ways".[10]

The obvious question follows, can any of Coillard's data be relied upon? The answer seems to be that it may be used with the utmost caution in two ways: first, by checking it against Lozi

traditions and other contemporary written sources; and secondly, by attempting to place his comments in their proper perspective. For example, we may take it that the "pagan conservative party" was that faction in the Kuta which feared that Lewanika would oollude with his white protectors to limit the powers of his traditional advisers, and that the mission was considered as the first step in this process. Similarly, we can see that Lewanika's erratic attitude towards the mission was a product of his insecurity, caught between those indunas who opposed British protection and his belief that he needed Coillard to establish and maintain communication with the British government.

Nevertheless, the problems remain difficult. Westbeech and Coillard, for example, both claimed to be playing a key role in Sesheke at the end of 1885, yet neither of them ever refers to the presence of the other. Frank Lochner's interpretations of Lozi political problems obviously came direct from Coillard. Middleton was wholly hostile to the Company. And oral tradition is unable to illuminate most of the problems of interpretation which follow.

Nor were Coillard's missionary colleagues more forthcoming. Their letters from Barotseland, held in the mission's Paris headquarters, were clearly intended for publication in the several PMS Journals. Their contents, in consequence, were intended not so

much to edify their readers as to sustain their enthusiasm for contributing funds. They largely eschewed matters political, concentrating instead on the health and welfare of the missionaries and their families, financial problems of the mission, the latest baptism, or any recrudescence - real or imagined - of "primitive heathenism" which might be the latest gossip on the mission stations. Since there were entire years when the Paris archives' files turned up not a single piece of new or relevant information, their circumscription by a fifty-year rule can hardly be considered critical.

Like those of the mission, the records of the government self-evidently reflect the interests of their writers. Since Barotseland-North-Western Rhodesia loomed relatively large in the eyes of Rhodes and the Company from about 1889 to about 1905, there is a large quantity of official records for this period, which are important in establishing the relationship between the King and his white overlords even if they provide few insights into local politics in Barotseland. By 1905, however, with Company authority effectively established, interest in the Lozi as such abruptly declined. "The days of great events at the Zambesi are probably past," a missionary understood. "We have come to 'the day of the small things'".[11] As Lewanika and the Lozi lost their earlier role as

"the centre on which the successful development of the north depended ... Barotseland was bound to sink more and more into the political and economic background".[12] The consequence of the consolidation of white rule for the historian of Barotseland as of many other African peoples[13] was simply the dwindling number of political reports produced by government and Company officials; even a perfunctory glance at the indices of the African (South) volumes of the Colonial Office verifies how few are the rewards to be gleaned from such sources.

Similarly, reports from district officers tended to concentrate on local administrative problems such as taxation, new buildings for the Boma, and the like, to the exclusion of ongoing political issues. A number of crises - or, often, rumours of crises - at the capital produced further material, such as the alleged attempts to overthrow Lewanika in 1905 and 1911, and Yeta's prolonged dispute with George Lyons from 1919 to 1924. But such incidents were very much the exception, and in any event created the impression that the history of Barotseland consisted of a more or less regular series of crises and conflicts.

I have deliberately emphasised the inadequacies of both the oral and written sources for the period until about World War II. It does not follow that no reconstruction of Lozi history before 1939

is possible; it does follow that much of that reconstruction must be tentative, and that many questions must needs remain unanswered. Nevertheless, for all their inadequacies, the quantity of material from which to work is relatively large, however dubious its quality. All of it had to be analyzed with rigorous care, cross-checking wherever possible the evidence of the various sources.

For the final quarter-century with which this thesis deals, the evidence is considerably more valuable, for three reasons. As has already been said, the testimonies of observers for participants in Lozi politics since, say, the attempted coup against Yeta in 1937, were detailed and indispensable, at times indeed even indiscreet. Secondly, I was allowed access to the files in the Mongu Boma which had not yet been deposited in the National Archives in Lusaka. These contained a number of dossiers throwing great light on Yeta's forced abdication, the machinations involved in the dismissal of Ngambela Wina, the activities of the Mongu African Welfare Association, and the attempts by the Lozi ruling class to resist integration with Zambia.

Thirdly, I was able to see copies of reports which had been sent from Barotseland to Paris by the missionaries from about 1935 to 1959. These reflect the critical role played by simple chance in the historian's task. Many of the PMS missionaries were politically

indifferent. The writerof these reports, however, J. P. Burger, was highly politically oriented, and always kept au courant with affairs in the capital through his unique role as a friend of the Boma, the ruling class, and the black intelligentsia. This role is clear in his letters, and was confirmed to me by his colleague, Etienne Berger. Burger, for example, provided information about the attempt to overthrow Yeta in 1937 which I found nowhere else; his data, combined with the testimonies of a number of alleged participants, made possible a coherent reconstruction of the event.

Similarly, he exposed the collusion between Lealui and the Boma in the appointment of the Rawlins Commission of 1957, the purpose of which was to vindicate the status quo. It is instructive to compare his comments with Lozi opinion of the Commission, since we can now see that its failure to lead to substantial reforms in the Native Government helped force conservative opponents of Mwanawina into the hands of UNIP. Yet the very existence of the Commission is barely recalled by most Lozi, for reasons already suggested: it resulted in no positive action, so there is little to remember about it any longer.

There is a second inadequacy in the testimonies of eyewitnesses and participants. They too lacked a proper perspective, and were unable to see the larger themes and currents emerging from particular

incidents or ongoing events. Thus I found among my Lozi informants little grasp of the impact on African self-consciousness of the Second World War or of the migrants who were returning home from their awakening experiences on the Witwatersrand mines. Here it was European informants - missionaries - who were able to point out this impact since they were able to stand back from events and perceive them from a more detached position.

Finally, no historian can begin to understand Barotseland's past without a thorough grounding in the many works of Gluckman published as a result of his field work in the 1940's. Gluckman's greatest failing - from the point of view of the historian - is that he himself has never written a general history of Barotseland, though his works are replete with allusions to historical incidents. It is difficult to know what kind of history Gluckman would produce, for his informants were of two kinds : first, members of the ruling class, and secondly, other Lozi whom he apparently paid for his information. Gluckman freely acknowledges in conversation what he rarely states in his books: that he was treated by the Lozi as a mulena - "lord" - and that one of his chief assistants was Mwendaweli Lewanika, half-brother of the present Litunga, who is now chief of the Mankoya Kuta and, as I saw during my time in Lealui, one of the fiercest traditionalists in the ruling class. Moreover,

as he also knows, Gluckman was given the sobriquet Makapweka by the Lozi, meaning "the one who gives", and many of my informants confirmed the implications of this name. Mr. Philip Silverman, an American scholar studying local government in Barotseland has recently corroborated the same fact: most Lozi today consider that Gluckman received much information of dubious reliability by Lozi who were simply interested in getting his money.

Nor does Gluckman usually bother to mention in his books that the largest proportion of his field work was done in unique circumstances, that is, when Yeta was paralyzed and the Ngambela was acting as Paramount Chief. His reconstruction of the Lozi political structure was consequently largely derived from hearsay accounts rather than from what he himself witnessed. Finally, Gluckman's greatest virtue as a social anthropologist originally was that he did not construct an ideal model; he placed the structure of Lozi society in its historical context, and used different tenses to suggest the contemporary applicability of his analysis. Gluckman has not, however, maintained this practice, and in his recent works on Barotseland writes largely in the present tense about phenomena which no longer have the significance which they did a quarter of a century ago. His later publications, therefore, must be read with extreme caution, since they tend to obfuscate rather than to illuminate

the existing situation.

Nevertheless, one would very much have liked to have had Gluckman as an informant for the decade of the 1940's. He was in close touch with the Boma and with the ruling class, and must possess considerable knowledge of the period. Precisely how much he knows, however, can not be deduced from his writings. For example, he writes: " ... British insistence on reforming their (Lozi) administration in the interests of efficiency and economy has appeared to the people as an attack on the 'house of kingship' itself. The councillors who gave way to this attack have been discharged by the whole nation, after the death of the Paramount Chief who agreed to the reforms."[14] The reference of course is to the dismissal of Ngambela Wina and Francis Suu by Mwanawina when he acceded in 1948. The point is that the interpretation is that of the ruling clique, and, as we have argued in chapter seven, Mwanawina's reasons for dismissing the two men were in fact personal rather than constitutional. Whether Gluckman offers this interpretation because he believed the rationalizations of his ruling class informants, or because he was using a specific historical incident to illustrate an analytical generalization, is not known; perhaps one day he will produce the work which will give us the answer.

Again, one must reiterate that this brief analysis of some of the sources I have used has deliberately been destructive, but one must repudiate the impression that, though all my sources were to some extent corrupted - being inaccurate, biassed, misleading or ignorant - no valid reconstruction of Lozi history is possible. All sources, after all, are biassed, written as much as oral, those dealing with England as well as those concerning Zambia. We have tried to suggest in this chapter the peculiar nature of the biasses of the sources available for writing the history of a part of Africa. It is also clear that the next necessary step for a more intensive study of Barotseland's history must be a more concerted effort to collect oral tradition than I was able to do, and as Oliver has said, "it is obvious that this is something which will be done mainly, and done best, by Africans themselves".[15] Above all, the priority seems to me to be a Namier-like study of the members of the ruling class during Lewanika's long reign. I believe a sustained effort by a Lozi student could result in the accumulation of sufficient data from oral tradition to reveal the composition of the different factions within the ruling class, and to suggest the interests and connections of these men which account for the stand they took on the controversial issues of the time: whether or not to accept the PMS and British protection, and how best to resist

C

Company encroachments on Lozi sovereignty.

In the meanwhile, a pattern emerges from the general question of how written European and oral Lozi sources have complemented each other in the writing of this thesis. For the cumulative effect of Lozi testimonies was to evoke a qualitatively different interpretation of the main themes and problems in the modern history of Barotseland from that suggested by the written sources.

From the latter, one conjures up an image of a chaotic, savage society, which is saved from itself by Christianity, the Company and the Queen; it then exists contentedly for more than half a century in its isolation as a "living museum", until peace and harmony are disrupted in the 1960's by "outside agitators".

The Lozi picture is substantially different. A wise king, perceiving the significance of the Scramble, takes the initiative in requesting British protection. He is deceived into "selling" his country instead to a commercial company, which deprives him of most of his customary powers and his country of its empire. When Britain finally assumes direct overrule, the new King requests the restoration of the powers stolen from his father, but in vain. Here Lozi interpretations diverge. Opponents of UNIP see the refusal to allow Barotseland to secede from Zambia as the final

betrayal by Britain of its treaties with Lewanika. Nationalist supporters see the Paramount Chief as a reactionary, refusing to allow the Lozi to take their proper places as leaders of a developing, progressive Zambia.

It is only through a careful balancing of these conflicting claims that anything like a reasonably accurate reconstruction of Lozi history is possible.

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3. Gluckman, Economy of the Central Barotse Plain, p.98.

4. Jalla, History of the Barotse Nation, introduction.

5. White, "The Ethnohistory of the Upper Zambesi", African Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1962, p.12.

6. Jalla, op.cit., p.52.

7. Richard Gray, "East Africa Without the Whites", review article in Race, Oct 1964, Vol. VI, No. 2, p.162.

8. Coillard, Journal, 4 Sept 1884, and Threshold, p.150.

9. Coillard, Journal, 30 Jan 1901.

10. Gann, History of Northern Rhodesia, p.30.

11. News from Barotsiland, No. 34, May 1908, p.1.

12. Bradley, "Statesmen : Coryndon and Lewanika", African Observer, Vol. 5, No. 5, Sept 1936, pp.53-4.

13. Barnes, for e.g., met precisely the same difficulty in attempting to reconstruct the modern history of the Fort Jameson Ngoni; see Barnes, Politics in a Changing Society, p.116.

14. Gluckman, Seven Tribes, p.39.

15. R. Oliver, "After the Oxford History", SOAS Seminar Paper, 27 Oct 1965, p.7.

B. ORAL SOURCES

(i) Lozi informants (data to November 1965)

L. A. AMBANWA

Born 1896 at Lealui. Attended Lealui PMS school under Adolph Jalla. Father, Akatama, was induna at Lealui. Mother, member of royal family, sister of late chief Lubinda, son of King Lewanika.

Became silalo induna 1934-36 then transferred as induna to Mwandi Kuta, Sesheke District. 1964 became Chief Judge, Mwandi Kuta.

MUIMUI ANAKANDI

Born 1901 in Lealui. Father was induna Namamba in Lealui from 1875 until his death in 1931. Educated Sefula PMS School for five years. 1925 became Head Teacher at Loatile (Lealui) PMS school. 1929 appointed induna Nambayo at Lealui. Lost title after alleged implication in plot against Yeta in 1937. Returned to his village. 1963 appointed by Mwanawina as one of the nominated members of the Barotse National Council.

MUBUKWANU MATAA IMANDI

Born 1905 in Lealui. Father, the grandson of Mulambwa's granddaughter, was induna in Lealui and Ngambela Mataa, 1921-9.

Lewanika sent him to PMS Schools in Basutoland for four years and then to Zonnebloem College, Cape Town where he reached the equivalent of GCE.

Returned 1917 as interpreter and secretary to Yeta and the National Council until 1929 when both he and his father were dismissed after being acquitted of a murder charge and they returned to their village.

1941, Imandi recalled to Lealui by Ngambela Wina to rejoin the Kuta. Appointed Labour induna for Barotseland, 1943.

1945 Imwiko appointed Imandi to be one of the Lozi members of the African Representative Council and promoted to Induna Inyamawina.

1948, made Education Induna for Barotseland and remained with the African Representative Council until 1950. Later promoted to Induna Imandi.

Resumed his Education post in 1957 until April 1965 when Departmental Indunas were abolished. Several times in 1963 and 1964 represented Lozi ruling class in negotiations with UNIP government.

LIFUNANA AKABESWA IMASIKU

Born 1921 in Nalolo, son of Akabeswa Imasiku, a Seventh Day Adventist School Teacher who married Iliayamupu, daughter of Muyabango, daughter of Lewanika. His father became Ngambela to Mwanawina, 1956-1962.

Lifunana Imasiku sent to SDA schools in Northern Rhodesia to Standard VI, then the SDA Training College in Bulawayo to Form II and stayed there for a further two years training teachers.
1942, returned as Head Teacher to SDA School at Luimba Hill.
1945-48, employed by Northern Rhodesian Government.
1951, The Paramount Chief requested that he be transferred to the Barotse Government as assistant private secretary to Mwanawina. After Daniel Mukoboto's mysterious death in 1961, Imasiku succeeded as Mwanawina's private secretary.

INAMBAO INDOPU

Born about 1895 in Senanga, related to the royal family. Maternal grandfather was the brother of Lewanika's mother. Father was a Nalolo induna.

Sent to Senanga PMS School until 1914. Became a house servant in Salisbury 1915-17. Returned to Senanga and worked as furniture maker. 1928 built a store for a European and started wood carving. The King appointed him to an indunaship and made him official royal carver.

LISULU BATUKE KALIMUKWA

Born during Sipopa's reign about 100 years ago. Son of Kalimukwa Mulanziani, senior representative induna at Sesheke who was succeeded by his eldest son, Sitwala Mulanziani. 1885 Lewanika returned from Mashi and Lisulu escaped with his brother Sitwala to Matokaland in the Southern Province. 1888 they returned seeking revenge but were driven back. Sitwala killed by the Ndebele and Lisulu was taken as slave by them. Escaped during the Ndebele uprising against British South Africa Company, 1896, and returned to Barotseland in company with Coryndon's band in 1897. Lewanika forgave him and he was allowed to retire to village Siwela near Sefula and has since been supported by relatives.

J. K. KAPOTA

Born 1902 in Mabumbu near Mongu, son of village headman and silalo induna. Sent to Mabumbu PMS School, 1913-1918, to standard III. Then spent four years at Sefula Teacher Training School to Form I. Taught at Luwamba Mission for one year and then joined the BSA Police in Southern Rhodesia for two years. Then worked as a store assistant in South West Africa for eighteen months. Returned home in 1927 and taught for a year at Mabumbu School. Joined the government service as Boma clerk and court interpreter. 1947 appointed by Imwiko as induna Luyanga in Lealui, but after differences with Mwanawina, he resigned or was dismissed in 1951. Again became Boma clerk in Mongu where he is still employed.

MUTAMBEKWA KAWANA

Born c. 1888 in the Sesheke district. Father sent by Sipopa to be representative induna at Sesheke soon after the Kololo were overthrown in 1864.

Sent to PMS School to standard II, then worked on the railways in Bulawayo for five years. Returned to Barotseland, then 1916 went to Livingstone for seven years until his father died and he returned to Sesheke and made an induna. Later promoted to one of the senior titles in the Kuta. He retired in 1965. A relatively early supporter of UNIP.

DANIEL KASINA KENDALA

Born 1921 in Yuba village near Limulunga. PMS Schools to standard III. 1942, Jeanes School, Mazabuka to standard IV. Joined Rhodesia Railways, Bulawayo as porter, then assistant conductor. 1953, promoted to assistant train inspector. Father died 1954 and he returned to Barotseland to succeed as Mwene (Chief) Kendala - one of the two chiefs of the Mbunda living in Barotseland. Has since then been President of several minor Kutas, and also sits on the National Council in his capacity as Mbunda Chief. Considered a chief of the Lozi royal family.

KAFUNDUKA MUBUKWANU LIATITIMA

Born 1902 in Lealui. A direct descendant of King Mulambwa. Silumelume, who was King after Mulambwa, was his great-grandfather. His father was chief councillor of Lukulu Kuta.

Educated to standard IV at PMS School Mabumbu. 1922 joined his father at Lukulu and in 1925 succeeded him as chief of Lukulu. Allegedly implicated in plot in 1937 against King Yeta and deprived of his chieftainship. Became farmer until 1944. Then dealt in various trading ventures until 1950, when he opened a store in Sesheke, which he left in 1960 to become an organizer for UNIP. Returned 1962 to Barotseland to campaign for Nalilungwe and Wina. Successfully stood for Sesheke in 1963 in the National Council (Katengo) election. Later appointed to Zambian House of Chiefs. Widely known as "the uncle of UNIP".

MOBITAMWINDE LIBATI

Born 1906 in Mongu. Father a member of Lealui Kuta until he died in 1939. Mother a commoner. Educated at Sefula PMS School to standard VI. Then worked in Livingstone until 1938. He succeeded his father and became District Education Induna, Mwandi (Sesheke) Kuta. Remained Education officer until 1965 when the new government system abolished his post. Now village headman, Sesheke District.

NGOMBALA LUBITA

Born 1929 at Lealui. His mother was Lewanika's daughter. Educated in Northern Rhodesia and South Africa to Form VI. Now claims to be doing correspondence course with Oxford for B.Sc. (Economics).

1950 became Sales Manager in a store in Bechuanaland. Arrested for gold smuggling and held for nine months. Returned to Northern Rhodesia and became clerk for the Municipal Council of Luanshya. Arrested 1959 as member of UNIP; freed, but lost his job. Became leading member of the Barotse Anti-Secession Movement, a UNIP organization . 1962, Munakayumba Sipalo burnt by a petrol bomb. Lubita believed UNIP Bemba supporters responsible and quit UNIP to join the Sicaba Party, later becoming President. Sicaba became affiliated with ANC but the party was soon disbanded. Apparently undertook secret mission for Paramount Chief, early 1964, but then returned to UNIP.

MWANA MALI

Born 1910 in Mwandi. Father, Mwanga, village headman. Mother a Subiya. Educated to standard II PMS School Mwandi. 1942 became silalo induna - had been supervisor for Zambesi Sawmills Company in Livingstone since 1937.

1949 appointed induna of Mwandi (Sesheke) Kuta.

GRIFFITHS MUSIALIKE MUKANDE

Born 1912 at Namaenya, near Sefula. Father an evangelist, converted by Coillard. Mother a relative of an induna.

Educated at Sefula PMS and Bulawayo to 1934. Worked as accounts clerk, then became District Treasurer to Imwiko until latter became Paramount Chief, and he was promoted to Central Treasurer for the Barotse Government until 1963. Sent to Oxford University for six months course on Local Government. Joined Sicaba Party 1962 and stood unsuccessfully as one of its candidates in the 1962 national election. Quit 1963 when he learnt it was financed by Welensky's United Federal Party. Now has a store in Lifelo village, Mongu district.

YUYI WAMUNYIMA MUPATU

Born 1898. Father was head bodyguard to Lewanika. After attending Sefula PMS school, Lewanika sent him to Lovedale College in South Africa, together with two of the king's own sons, until 1914. Returned to Barotseland as store assistant. 1915, taught at Barotse National School until 1926 when a new headmaster, Holland, lowered the syllabus. Mupatu objected and lost his job. Sent to another school near Livingstone. Returned to Barotseland in 1929 and was the first Lozi to own a trading store. 1934, the store was burntdown and he lost all his savings.

1936, Cottrell, the new principal, invited him to return to BNS but first sent him to be trained as a teacher-supervisor at Jeanes School, Mazabuka. 1943 became trader again and also opened a school in Limulunga for underprivileged young men, "Makapekwa School" - "the rejected". 1949, Mwanawina appointed him Administrative Secretary to the BNG and induna responsible for education. He remained there until 1956 - but saw more and more of the suffering of boys thrown out of school and asks to reopen his school. Permission is denied him by the Kuta and he returned to trading. Joined opposition to Mwanawina for a short time in mid-fifties, but kept applying for his school until 1963 when he was finally allowed to re-open it.

Original member of the Sicaba Party but quit when he found it was financed by the United Federal Party. Claims to know much of oral tradition because of the Lozi custom that young boys must listen to the stories of the old men around the fires at night. Has himself written three short booklets on aspects of Lozi history.

MBANGA MUTEMWA

Born 1929 in Lealui. His father, a senior induna titled Kalonga, was a Subiya and his mother a Lozi-Toka. Educated at PMS schools to standard VI, then Lovedale College, South Africa for eighteen months. 1950, returned to Northern Rhodesia as Post Office clerk until 1965. Then became Regional Produce Buyer in Mongu for the Barotse Province Agricultural Rural Marketing Board.

Joined Zambian African National Congress 1958; has remained active member of UNIP, helping in 1963 to organize the Barotseland Provincial Election. Also very interested in Lozi history and has completed an unpublished work, The Ngambelas of Barotseland.

MUHALI MUTEMA

Born 1922 in Nalolo. Mother's father was a cousin to Lewanika and member of the household of Mokwae of Nalolo and fought in the 1884-5 rebellion.

Educated PMS school to standard VI and Teachers Training School at Sefula. Became primary school teacher in 1943 and has taught all over Barotseland. Came to Mwandi Primary School, Sesheke District, in 1960. Learned most of his history from his mother's father.

PARAMOUNT CHIEF MWANAWINA III

Fourth son of Lewanika. Born at Lealui. Early education at PMS schools. 1908 sent to Lovedale College, South Africa. Completed education 1913. Returned as secretary and interpreter to his father. Worked in close cooperation with the government for the war effort during the two world wars. His services were recognized by the award in 1946, of the King's Silver Medal for chiefs and the coronation medal in 1953. A senior advisor of his brother Yeta until 1939. Then appointed Chief of Mankoya Kuta until 1948. Succeeded Imwiko as Paramount Chief, 1948 until present. His policies assured the destruction of the traditional Lozi ruling class once UNIP became the government.

MOOKA NAWA

Born 1897, Senanga district. Father, Nawa, son of Chief Mosokatani of Choma district. Mother was daughter of Ngambela Silumba, Lewanika's Ngambela (1878-84).

Attended PMS schools until 1911 and became a messenger. 1937, clerk at Ngoma Kuta. 1942, steward of Chief Imwiko at Mwandi. 1947, appointed agriculture induna at Mwandi Kuta, Sesheke District, remained induna at Mwandi until the present.

ILUKUI NJEKWA

Born 1923 at Mongu. His father's grandfather was Njekwa, King Sipopa's Ngambela; his grandfather was induna in charge of a silalo and his father was chosen by Ngambela Mokamba to go to Barotse National School where he learned to become a clerk and worked for Europeans in Bomas across Barotseland; but he died young and never attained indunaship.

Educated Mabumbu and Lukona PMS schools to standard VI. After school in 1942 he worked for Mwanawina as his treasury clerk and private secretary in Mankoya Kuta to 1945. Joined central government as health clerk in Mongu 1952-56. Then worked in Bechuanaland as interpreter and clerk of the court. Eye trouble caused him to lose his job and he worked at various trades until employed as bookkeeper for a retail store in Mongu, April 1965.

HASTINGS NDANGWA NOYOO

Born 1928 in Sikandi village, Mongu district. Father, an evangelist and teacher for the PMS and very distantly related to the first Ngambela Imbula. His mother also a commoner although some of her ancestors were Ngambelas.

Educated at PMS Schools to standard VI. 1948, joined Lusaka Medical School for four years. Medical certificate held back for six months because of his opposition to Federation. Later became a medical assistant for the Ministry of Health in Mongu, which was taken over in 1956 by the Federal Government. Noyoo, already a strong ANC supporter, resigned in protest and returned to open a shop in Barotseland. Active in underground UNIP circles until 1963. Elected as UNIP member to the Barotse National Council. Appointed assistant Ngambela March 1964 and Ngambela, December 1964. Temporarily suspended from UNIP for refusing to follow party line, mid-1964.

SAMUEL SHAPA

Born 1926 at Kalabo. Ancestors were indunas but parents were "ordinary Lozi".

Educated at Seventh Day Adventist College, Rhodesia and became a convert.

Returned to Liumba Hill SDA Mission School as an evangelist and school supervisor. Ordained as pastor 1950. Field pastor in Mongu 1952-59. Transferred to Sitoti Mission and School, near Senanga as acting director, manager of schools and pastor.

NDAMBO SIMALUMBA

Born 1913 at Nalolo. Father a steward of Mokwae Matauka of Nalolo during Lewanika's reign and grandfather an induna. Educated Sefula and Lukona PMS schools to standard VI, then Normal School, Sefula for three years.

Started teaching 1935 and is now Headmaster since 1960 at Itufa PMS school. He is also an evangelist and runs both the school and the services on the station. An early supporter of UNIP. Profoundly interested in Lozi history, which he learnt from his father and grandfather and other people he has talked to. Considering writing a book on Lozi history.

P. SOKA

Born 1916 in Mwandi. Father a Subiya, had an apparently important ruling position.

Attended Mwandi PMS school to Sub B. Worked at Zambesi Sawmills Company 1934-49.

Says he was appointed silalo induna 1945 although worked in Livingstone and Bulawayo until 1953. Appointed induna of Mwandi Kuta 1964.

M. TIMWENDILA

Born 1909 in Mongu. Father, Lubinda, son of Lewanika, who was Lealui Natamoyo from 1934-1945, and then Chief of Sesheke, 1946-1966. Mother's father village headman. Educated Barotse National School to standard IV. 1934 became inventory clerk, Zambesi Sawmills Company. 1939, Nkana Mines as telephone operator. 1944, store clerk. When his father became Chief of Sesheke he was appointed induna of Mwandi Kuta.

MUHELI WALUBITA

Born 1897 at Kazangula. Father Liashimba (Chief Councillor) to Imwiko at Sesheke. 1904, started school at Sesheke PMS then to Basutoland until 1916. Returned to Barotseland as clerk at Mwandi Kuta and private secretary to the Chief of Sesheke until 1935.

1936 helped set up Naliele as Kuta for Mankoya District. 1938 father died and he was appointed by the Paramount Chief to be Liashimba at Sesheke. 1945 went with Imwiko to Lealui and was appointed induna Kalonga - educational induna for Barotseland. 1947, induna for agricultural development. 1948 appointed Ngambela. 1956 resigned as Ngambela because of differences with Mwanawina.

SHEMAKONO KALONGA WINA

Born 1878, son of a Lealui induna. 1893 PMS school, Kazangula for five years. Then taken by Yeta as his kitchen boy. Returned PMS Schools until 1902. Returned to Sesheke to work in Yeta's household, marrying one of Lewanika's daughters in 1905. After Yeta became King in 1916, he remained at Sesheke with Imwiko, having been appointed an induna. His father died in 1922 and Wina returned to Lealui to succeed him as Induna Wina Lioma. 1936 Daniel Akafuna took him to Balovale to be his Chief Councillor. Appointed in 1941 as Ngambela and acting Paramount Chief. Remained Ngambela under Imwiko, but dismissed by Mwanawina in 1948. Retired to village Namitomi, Mongu-Lealui District. Father of Arthur and Sikota Wina, members of the Zambian cabinet.

ARTHUR MUBUKWANU ZAZA

Born 1919 in Mule village, near Sefula. His mother was a Matoka and his father a bodyguard to Lewanika who selected him to attend Coillard's first school at Sefula. Father among a small group which converted early and he became a PMS evangelist, preacher and teacher until his death in 1924.

Arthur Zaza also went to Sefula PMS School from 1930-1935 to standard III, then Lukona for upper primary education to standard VI. 1940-42 to Munali Secondary School (now called Hodgson Technical School) to Form II which was the highest education available in Northern Rhodesia at that time. Became recruiting agent (1942-3) for WNLA in Kalabo until offered a job by the Information Department in Lusaka as a broadcaster in the vernacular, and edited the Silozi part of Mutende, a fortnightly journal. 1949 he was transferred to Provincial Administration, Barotseland as head clerk at Namushakende Development Centre. 1956-60 accounts clerk in Mankoya for the Boma. 1961-62 head clerk for the Boma at Sesheke. 1962-64 chief clerk for the Boma at Senanga. September, 1964, sent to Staff Training College, Lusaka to study finance and joined the Ministry of Local Government and Housing in May, 1965. Now District Local Government Officer in Samfya district.

MUYUNDA CLEMENT ZAZA

Born 1901 at Sefula. Brother of Arthur Zaza (see above). Sent to Sefula PMS school to standard III, then did four years as a trainee teacher. Became school teacher at Sefula until 1926. Went to Belgian Congo for short while and returned on foot. Joined Senanga PMS School as area supervisor for four schools. Became Head teacher in Sefula Girls' Primary School, then Lukona School. Returned to Sefula Normal School as assistant teacher until 1936. After wage dispute with PMS officials, went to Bechuanaland and became supervisor of eighteen schools. 1954, returned to Barotseland and became a cabinet maker and one of the leaders of the opposition to Mwanawina, 1953-59. Called upon to be Boarding Master at Munali Secondary School in Lusaka from 1960 until February 1965 when President Kaunda appointed him Political Assistant to the Resident Minister of Barotse Province.

NEWO ZAZA

Born 1910 in Mule village, Sefula. Brother of Arthur and Clement Zaza (see above). Educated to standard VI at Sefula PMS School. Then became a laboratory technician on the Copper Belt and later taught practical pathology in Lusaka, which he learnt from a local doctor. Did a South African correspondence course to Form III. 1945 returned to Mule and tried several trades and then was elected to the reformed Katengo Council, 1954-7. He was threatened with dismissal by the Litunga for being a leader of the anti-Mwanawina group. He was also a member of the District Education authority and Chairman of the School Council in Sefula.

A well known local historian. Has interviewed many old Lozi and has read C. Mackintosh, Coillard of the Zambesi.

(ii) Non-Lozi Informants (data to the end of 1965)

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BERGER, Etienne	Paris Missionary Society: 1934-1949 1961-1965
BORLE, Marie	Paris Missionary Society 1931-1965
GRAEBERT, Maurice	Paris Missionary Society 1948-1965
MLENGA, Kelvin	Editor, Central African Mail (Lusaka) 1964-6
PITTET, D.	Paris Missionary Society 1948-65
SOKO, Daniel	A Nyasa - Arrived Barotseland c. 1939. Runs shop in Mongu. Active member of the Mongu African Welfare Association 1943-51
STEWART, John A. B.	Senior Provincial Local Government Officer, October 1964 to December 1965
"X"	A senior European official at the Mongu Boma, 1962-65, who asked that he not be identified.

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